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ABSTRACT 
Authenticiti, Ambiguity and Freedom: 
Recuperating the Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir for a 
Contemporary Ethics of Ambiguity 
The existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir has been criticised 
for being a "rniserablism"; for throwing us into an absurd universe with no 
meaning; and for giving an account of freedom which concludes that each can do 'as 
one pleases' without regard for others due to an inherent lack of meaning in the 
world. It has been argued that, due to its insistence on an irreducible, 'radical' 
freedom, it is not possible to develop an ethics based on existentialism and, 
therefore, that it is of little use in providing any grounds for an ethics today. 
In this thesis, I argue against such a reading of de Beauvoir' s existentialism, and for 
a recuperation of the existential notion of authenticite for a contemporary ethics. 
In order demonstrate the importance of the concept of authenticite, I make an explicit 
distinction between two conceptions of the 'authentic' self. The more common 
understanding is of the decontextualised, autonomous and disembodied 
individual/subject evident in traditional philosophical accounts of the 'authentic' 
self. The second is what I identify as the authentique self described by de Beauvoir, 
understood as embodied, situated and contextualised - the self as related 
ambiguously to others and the world. A primary aim of this thesis is to demonstrate 
the important interconnections between the concepts of ambiguity and authenticite, 
and to reveal that the more common notion of 'authenticity' is based (often 
implicitly) upon a denial of our ambiguous freedom. 
Taking up the more recent reclamation of the unique philosophical importance of de 
Beauvoir's account of ambiguity and freedom, which has strong affinities with the 
existential phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, I apply de Beauvoir's 
account of authenticite, based on ambiguous freedom, to the examination of limits 
within feminist theory and within the debate over Aboriginal identity in the 
Tasmanian context. I argue that both of these debates have been limited by their 
understandings of 'authenticity' and that both would find within de Beauvoir's 
philosophy of ambiguous freedom a way to move beyond, or at least question, this 
understanding. 
I conclude that, by taking seriously the account of ambiguous freedom described 
throughout de Beauvoir's texts, we are provided with an ethics that allows for 
openness and joy in our relations with others and which offers a powerful 
descriptive and explanatory account of some complex contemporary social and 
political situations. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
The bibliography at the end of this thesis gives full details of the works cited below. 
Primary texts by Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre 
are referenced in-text using the following abbreviations, with full bibliographic 
details in footnotes. 
BN Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (Sartre) 
EE An Eye for an Eye 
EPW Existentialism and Popular Wisdom 
FC Force of Circumstance 
LM Literature and Metaphysics 
PC Pyrrhus et Cineas 
PL Prime of Life 
pp Phenomenology of Perception (Merleau-Ponty) 
RPP Review of the Phenomenology of Perception 
TEA The Ethics of Ambiguity 
TSS The Second Sex 
WIE What is Existentialism? 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since its conception in the late 1930s the French existentialism associated with Jean-
Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir has been criticised for failing to provide 
contemporary society with an ethics; for focusing too narrowly on the individual 
and on 'radical freedom'; and for 'pulling the rug out' from beneath us without 
providing a means to move forward. 1 Herbert Marcuse, for example, wrote of 
Sartre's existential theory that, in questioning the meaning of existence, it reveals the 
Cogito as the foundation for human existence and that this Cogito is " ... thrown into 
an 'absurd' world in which the brute fact of death and the irretrievable process of 
Time deny all meaning".2 Despite many philosophers being inspired and influenced 
by the various manifestations of existentialism, views like Marcuse' s have endured 
over time with one contemporary philosopher recently arguing that: 
... after breaking the spell of the life-denying doctrines that dominated 
modernity, existentialism could offer post-modern thinking nothing to hold 
on to. For, if we rigorously deny that there is no human nature at all, then 
all the possible grounds for processes of enlightenment in law, politics and 
ethics are fatally undermined. Once this Humpty Dumpty has been toppled, 
1 Critiques of the (particularly Sartrean) existential view of freedom abound. See, for 
example, Adorono, Theodore, Negative Dialectics, (trans E.B. Ashton), Continuum: New 
York, 1992; Marcuse, Herbert, "Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre's L'Etre et le 
Neant" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 8, No. 3. March, 1948, pp. 309-336; 
Grossmann, Reinhold, Phenomenology and Existentialism, Routledge: London, 1984; Follesdal, 
Dagfinn, "Sartre on Freedom," in The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, Arthur Schlipp (ed), 
LaSalle: Open Court, 1981, pp. 392-407; Campbell, Gerald T., "Sartre's Absolute Freedom," 
Laval Theologique Philosophique, February 1977, pp 61-91; Kruks, Sonia, "Simone de Beauvoir: 
Teaching Sartre about Freedom", in Simons, Margaret, (ed) Feminist Interpretations of Simone 
de Beauvoir, The Pennsylvania University Press: Pennsylvania, 1995. 
2 Marcuse, Herbert, "Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre's L'Etre et le Neant" in 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 8, No. 3. March, 1948, p 309. 
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not even the entire population of sovereign individuals, exercising their free 
wills, could put him together again.3 
In this thesis, however, I argue against this interpretation and show that Simone de 
Beauvoir's particular development of existential philosophy is able to overcome the 
criticism that it has nothing to offer in the contemporary socio-political setting. 
This thesis will demonstrate that de Beauvoir's existential philosophy of ambiguity 
provides a foundation for a contemporary ethics in the following ways. It is a 
philosophy to be 'lived' rather than an abstract theory or system; it emphasises the 
importance of the self-other relation to being and our responsibility to others; it 
acknowledges our embodiment and our facticity, as well as our capacity for 
transcendence; it promises (or at least offers) us joy in our relations with others; and, 
finally, it insists upon continued effort and engagement with the world. As will 
become clear, the influence of Hegel's so called 'master-slave dialectic' is also 
evident in de Beauvoir' s analysis of the self-other relation, although her 
appropriation and re-configuration of this dialectic has been largely ignored in 
translations of her work, as Toril Mai and Nancy Bauer both argue.4 
I argue that de Beauvoir's work, which takes up and re-thinks the importance of the 
self-other relation to ethics, is able to address what I will identify as a problematic 
understanding of the "authentic" in social and political philosophy (and the socio-
political realm more generally). Moreover, I argue that her focus on ambiguity 
allows for (though does not necessitate) joy in our relations with others and our 
appreciation of the world. A key point will be the reclamation and reconnection of 
the themes of ambiguity and authenticite in de Beauvoir' s existentialism; themes 
which were traditionally overlooked by aligning her more with (a particular reading 
3 Levin, David Michael, 'Existentialism at the end of Modernity: Questioning the I's Eyes', 
Philosophy Today: Spring 1990; 34, l, p91. 
4 See Toril Moi, 'While we wait: The English Translation of The Second Sex', Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society, Summer 2002, Vol 27, no. 4. and Bauer, Nancy, Simone de 
Beauvoir, Philosophy and Feminism, Columbia University Press: New York, 2001. This aspect of 
de Beauvoir's work will be discussed further throughout this thesis. 
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of) Sartre than with other existentialist-phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl.5 If we draw out the concepts of 
ambiguity and freedom in her work and focus on the importance of others to 
understanding subjectivity (or intersubjectivity) for ethics, we can derive an ethics 
of authenticite that offers much to contemporary debates. In this thesis I take up the 
more recent focus on the importance of ambiguity to de Beauvoir' s ethics and argue 
that we must also acknowledge the implications of what de Beauvoir understands 
by this term when it comes to thinking about how one can act with authenticite.6 
As we shall see, the concept of authenticity as it is usually understood, both 
philosophically and socially, differs significantly from the particularly existential 
account of authenticite I wish to examine here. Moreover, this latter account in fact 
has something to offer as a corrective to the more problematic understanding. The 
problematic understanding of authenticity - which posits a 'self' that negates or fails 
to recognise the importance of the other - is a recurring theme in this thesis and I 
return to it in later chapters to illustrate how it impacts upon everyday, lived 
situations: situations which are influenced (though often implicitly) by 
philosophical understandings of the relation between 'self' and 'other'. 
5 It is important to note here that I am arguing against an interpretation of de Beauvoir as 
being aligned with a particular reading of Sartre. It is not my aim in this thesis to argue in 
depth either for or against this reading of Sartre, although I acknowledge that many theorists 
argue for a recuperation of his work. De Beauvoir herself believed that many critical 
interpretations of Sartre were mistaken (including Merleau-Ponty's) and much of her work 
aims at further applying or explaining the existentialism she saw him to be propounding. A 
future work may involve recuperating Sartre through de Beauvoir, however, that will not be 
the intention of this thesis. 
6 More recent interpretations have been concerned with analysing the importance of 
ambiguity to de Beauvoir's work. For example the work of Gail Weiss, 'Ambiguity', in 
Merleau-Ponty, Key Concepts, Rosalyn Diprose and Jack Reynolds (eds), Acuman Publishing: 
Chesam, 2008; Monika Langer, 'Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty on Ambiguity' in The 
Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, Claudia Card (ed}, Cambridge University Press, 
2003 and Debra Bergoffen, 'Between the Ethical and Politcal: The Difference of Ambiguity' in 
The Existential Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir, O'Brien and Embree (eds), Kluwer Academic 
Publishers: Netherlands, 2001 explicitly examine the implications of de Beauvoir's concept of 
ambiguity to her ethics. This focus on the significance of ambiguity is, however, a more 
recent one and its connection with the concept of authenticite for ethics has not been a focus 
of either traditional or more recent examination. 
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AUTHENTICITE, AMBIGUITY AND FREEDOM 
Crucial to de Beauvoir' s account of authenticite is the relationship between the 
concepts of ambiguity and freedom, a relationship which is examined throughout 
this thesis. We will see that authenticite, on de Beauvoir's account, is not based on 
individualism or a denial of the importance of the other (which is a major criticism 
of Sartre's philosophy) but, when read correctly, in fact depends upon recognition of 
our intersubjectivity and, with this, our connection to others. Rather than the more 
common understanding of the 'authentic' as that which is 'genuine', 'true' or 'real', I 
examine the way in which de Beauvoir links ambiguity to authenticite, so that 
authenticite is seen as a willing assumption or an affirmation of our ambiguous nature 
and the tension that this implies. It is important to note here that this affirmation 
goes beyond a reflective intellectual activity and involves engaging with freedom in 
the world. 
To briefly summarise a point that will be further examined throughout this thesis, in 
de Beauvoir's work the concept of 'ambiguity' is used to describe the ontological 
nature of human existence, which is characterised by an irreducible tension and 
irrevocable connection between our ontological freedom (our transcendence) and 
our 'embeddedness' in the world (our facticite). What this means is that, whilst 
being ultimately 'free' from any fixed or inherent 'nature' that might exhaustively 
define us, we are at the same time situated and embodied beings whose materiality is 
significant to (and affected by) our experience of the world (our history, social 
location, age, sex, class etc) and the others with whom we share this world. 
Encapsulated in the term 'ambiguity' is our existence as both 'self and 'other', 
'subject' and object', a life that is dying from the moment of conception, and de 
Beauvoir attempts to describe the constant play and tension between what are 
usually seen as mutually exclusive facets of our being. This aspect of her work has 
led to what is often seen as a contradiction in her account of freedom and existence.7 
7 As will be discussed in detail throughout this thesis, a number of de Beauvoir scholars have 
made a point of the 'notorious contradictions' in her work. For example see: Arp, Kristana, 
The Bonds of Freedom: Simone de Beauvoir's Existential Ethics, Open Court: Chicago, 2001; 
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This is because she argues that we are always ontologically free (we have no 
essential essence that determines us) but at the same time we are always situated -
always historically, physically, temporally and psychologically located in the world 
with others, which impacts upon our practical freedom and our capacity to act. De 
Beauvoir does not want us to try to 'overcome' this tension, however, but to accept it 
in order to live authentically. 
We have seen that this recourse to the serious is a lie; it entails the sacrifice of 
man to the Thing, of freedom to the Cause. In order for the return to the 
positive to be genuine it must involve negativity, it must not conceal the 
antinomies between means and end, present and future; they must be lived 
in permanent tension; one must retreat from neither the outrage of violence 
nor deny it, or, which amounts to the same thing, assume it lightly (TEA, 
p 133.) 
De Beauvoir argues that what she terms the "existential conversion" is closer to the 
phenomenological reduction than the Hegelian synthesis, so that the tension 
between self and other, wanting to be and lacking being, are taken up (assumed) 
rather than overcome. She writes of this ambiguity and tension: 
Now, we have seen that the original scheme of man is ambiguous: he wants 
to be and to the extent that he coincides with this wish, he fails. All the plans 
in which this will-to-be is actualised are condemned; and the ends 
circumscribed by these plans remain mirages. Human transcendence is 
vainly engulfed in those miscarried attempts. But man also wills himself to 
be a disclosure of being, and if he coincides with this wish, he wins ... but the 
disclosure implies a perpetual tension to keep being at a certain distance, to 
Deutscher, Penelope, 'The Notorious Contradictions of Simone de Beauvoir' in Yielding 
Gender: Feminism, deconstruction and the history of philosophy, London: Routledge, 1997; 
Gatens, Moira, (particularly in) Feminism and Philosophy. Perspectives on Equality and 
Difference, Polity Press: Cambridge, 1991; Kruks, Sonia, Situation and Human Existence: 
Freedom, Subjectivity and Sociehj, Unwin Hyman: London, 1990 and Moi, Toril, 'While we 
wait: The English Translation of The Second Sex', Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and 
Society, Summer 2002, Vol 27, no. 4. 
x 
tear oneself from the world, and to assert oneself as a freedom (TEA, pp 23-
24). 
In contrast to those who see this aspect of existentialism to be demonstrative of a 
'miserablism' or a negativity, we will see that this perpetual tension and disclosure 
is a key point in her account of positive self-other relations. Moreover, rather than 
viewing this account of freedom and ambiguity as contradictory (in terms of trying 
to bring together terms which are mutually exclusive), there is a requirement for 
recognition and a willing acceptance of the fundamental ambiguity described by de 
Beauvoir for ethics. We must recognise and assume (take-up) the tension between 
the ambiguous aspects of our lives, which means accepting a connection between 
terms that can neither be reconciled nor synthesised, once and for all. 
As becomes apparent with a closer reading of de Beauvoir' s work, the limits and 
opportunities of situation are crucial to existential freedom and, therefore, a 'radical 
freedom' or "an entire population of sovereign individuals" (described above by 
Levin) would be impossible. Ethical action, according to this account, entails 
acceptance of both the boundaries and the potential implied by the complex 
conditions of each life. 'Situation' for de Beauvoir explains the way in which 
subjectivity develops in relation to the world. As Sonia Kruks summarises it, to be 
'in situation' means that human being (existence) involves "a relation of mutual 
permeability between subjectivity and its surrounding world".8 As we shall see, the 
concept of being in-situation enables a conception of existence that overcomes binary 
accounts that assert either autonomous (isolated) subjectivity or Universalist 
accounts that subsume the individual under the rubric of 'mankind'. Whilst 
acknowledging the 'dual' aspect of existence (one is both subject and object, 
immanence and transcendence, self and other), this existential account gives equal 
weight to each and, rather than denying it, attempts to recognise and maintain the 
tension entailed in this ambiguity. We will see, also, that urging for an 'acceptance' 
or 'taking up' of our tension and ambiguity is not about a 'tolerance' or a 'bearing' 
8 Kruks, Sonia, Situation and Human Existence: Freedom, Subjectivity and Society, Unwin 
Hyman: London, 1990, p11. 
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of something that is negative but a positive assumption. De Beauvoir shows us that 
ambiguity and authenticite allow for joy in our engagement with the world and with 
others. The self-other relation, though always in tension, can be one of love and 
respect and, indeed, an authentique relationship requires that we acknowledge the 
tension and play between self and other. 
The first section of this thesis involves repositioning de Beauvoir more closely with 
Merleau-Ponty (and also, to a lesser extent, with Heidegger and Husser!) than Sartre 
in order to explicate the concepts just described. This requires examining the 
philosophical and socio-political concepts of authenticity/authenticite and ambiguity, 
as well as providing a fuller account of ambiguity and human freedom as 
understood by de Beauvoir. This analysis also involves examining other important 
influences on de Beauvoir, and particularly her rendering of the master-slave 
dialectic. 9. 
As de Beauvoir argues, philosophy is not (or should not be) an abstract theory but is 
a part of life, "every living step is a philosophical choice" for her and another aim of 
this thesis is to demonstrate how 'real life' situations can be engaged with using de 
Beauvoir's arguments for ambiguity. Using the concepts of authenticite, ambiguity, 
and freedom examined in the first part of this thesis the second part then provides 
an analysis of a number of contemporary socio-political situations in order to 
demonstrate the importance of recognising and taking up freedom in everyday 
circumstances. These examples highlight the potential for an ethics based on 
ambiguity and authenticite today. The concepts of authenticite, freedom and 
ambiguity play an important role in each of the situations examined, and we will 
see that a misconceived understanding of these terms is evident in contemporary 
debate over identity politics and ethics. As a suggestion for overcoming this 
misconception, I argue that an appropriate understanding of what is 'authentique' 
requires a positive, active, acceptance of ambiguity and freedom, rather than the 
9 My interpretation of de Beauvoir's account of the self-other relation is based to a large 
extent on Nancy Bauer's recent examination. See, Bauer, Nancy, 'The Truth of Self-Certainty: 
A Rendering of Hegel' s Master-Slave Dialectic' in Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy and 
Feminism, Columbia University Press: New York, 2001. 
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denial of the importance of these terms that characterises much contemporary 
debate. 
In summary, chapter four argues that feminist theory and praxis (like philosophy 
more generally) has not made adequate use of the concept of ambiguity (as 
expressed in de Beauvoir' s work) and has, therefore, missed an ally in its aims to 
better understand the relationships between women and men. Taking up some of 
the key aspects in contemporary 'third wave' approaches to questions of sexual 
difference that strive to understand identity, I argue that those feminisms that have 
(implicitly) denied freedom and situation by advocating either essential difference or 
essential equality between men and women have each grasped a partial truth. 
However, in excluding their 'opposite', they do not give enough attention to 
ambiguity and, thus, cannot be genuinely ethical (authentique) in de Beauvoir's 
terms. Such feminisms are inauthentic as they either reify sexual difference, as if it 
were inherent, or deny the obvious differences that characterise humans in the 
world and presume a 'blank state'. That is, both ignore the ambiguity of our 
situation, which positions us as both immanence and transcendence, and always in 
relation. I assert that, in order to have relevance today and to have significance for 
men and women, feminism would do well to embrace ambiguity and the freedom 
entailed by this concept. As a number of contemporary scholars argue, feminist 
philosophy should now go beyond a focus on 'woman' and 'women's' issues in 
order to be of relevance to broader social and political issues, including intimate 
relationships between subjects. I argue that ambiguity provides a means to do this, 
without denying the importance of feminism's history and its successes.10 
10 It is important to note that this thesis does not purport to give a full analysis of the many 
and varied aspects of the history of feminism and its current manifestations. Feminism has 
made significant contributions to various areas of theory and practice, including post-
colonial theory, examinations of globalisation, environmental philosophy, philosophy of 
health care and education to name but a few. A further research project may be to examine 
in more detail how these various applications of feminist thought make use of, or might be 
enhanced by, the concepts of ambiguity and authenticite. It is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to do so however, and I focus on those aspects of socio-political feminism that deal more 
explicitly with the self-other relation, identity, and relationships between the sexes. 
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Another 'real world' example that demonstrates the applicability of an ethics of 
ambiguity is the current debate over what is seen as the authenticity (or the 
opposing inauthenticity) of Aboriginal identity within the Australian context. Like 
feminisms that argue for equality or difference, these debates are also limited by a 
failure to fully recognise and embrace ambiguity. This failure has the potential to 
limit political action to essentialist discourse that is hindered by the dichotomous 
thinking characteristic of colonialism (particularly the distinction between colonised 
and coloniser in constructions of identity). Chapter five argues that, by reclaiming 
ambiguity, and with this the concept of authenticite as described by de Beauvoir, 
debates over identity can be opened up and the concept of authenticite can provide 
for the experience of those whose identities are torn or 'ambiguous'. Ultimately, I 
wish to explore an account with which one can maintain a sense of belonging to a 
particular group by acknowledging the importance of particular differences and 
ways of being but also acknowledge the way in which this group identity has come 
to be in situation. We shall see that, by recognising and affirming one's ambiguity, 
one can thus be authentique and avoid the tyranny of essentialism. 
In contrast to those who see existentialism as a 'miserablism' that leaves us in a state 
of despair by removing all meaning and value from the world, this thesis concludes 
with the argument that an attitude of wonder and generosity is evident within de 
Beauvoir's work and that such an attitude can be cultivated in order to allow for 
celebration of ambiguity and to allow for a positive existential ethics. The final 
chapter examines how a 'taking up' of freedom and ambiguity, with an emphasis on 
generosity and a sense of wonder, provides a foundation for authentique political 
and ethical relations. As de Beauvoir writes, "most [people] spend their life crushed 
by the weight of cliches that smother them. [Whereas] if they resolved to acquire a 
clear awareness of their situation in the world, then only would they find 
themselves in harmony with themselves and reality" (EPW, p215). 
As will become clear, a focus on wonder and generosity does not deny that conflict 
and violence are possible, and a crucial point of this thesis is to demonstrate that we 
cannot 'do away' with or reconcile the tension involved in the ambiguous self-other 
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relation but, rather, that there is always the option to strive for positive relations 
with others by remaining aware of this irrevocable tension. 
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SECTION I: 
RECLAIMING AMBIGUITY AND AUTHENTICITE IN 
SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR'S EXISTENTIALISM 
In spite of so many stubborn lies, at every moment, at every opportunity, the truth 
comes to light, the truth of life and death, of my solitude and my bond with the 
world, of my freedom and my servitude, of the insignificance and the sovereign 
importance of each man and all men ... Since we do not succeed in fleeing it, let us 
try to look the truth in the face. Let us try to assume our fundamental ambiguity. It 
is in the knowledge of the genuine conditions of our life that we must draw our 
strength to live and our reason for acting. 
(TEA, p9) 
CHAPTER ONE: 
OVERCOMING INDIVIDUALISM - REUNITING AMBIGUITY AND 
AUTHENTICITE 
But I, detached from them and everything, what am I myself? 
(Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Reveries of the Solitary Walker, pl) 
... I am, I exist, here and now, I am myself. 
(Beauvoir, POL, pp 272-73) 
I am all that I see, I am an intersubjective field, not despite my body and historical 
situation, but, on the contrary, by being this body and this situation, and through 
them, all the rest. 
(Merleau-Ponty, PP) 
There exists no privileged spot in the world about which he can safely say 'this is 
me' ... He is himself only through relationships with something other than himself. 
(Beauvoir, PC, pp97-98) 
French existentialism has, undeniably, done much to successfully question and 
overturn problematic understandings of human existence evident in modernity: 
problems such as mind/body dualisms, belief in absolute truth and value, 
universalism and essentialisms. However, it has been argued that, in doing this, it 
has failed to provide us with a means to move forward or with a foundation upon 
which to base an ethics that is of any use today.11 As far as providing instruction on 
how one should act ethically, existentialism has been seen as lacking. For example, 
one contemporary critic has recently argued that, in her attempt to develop an ethics 
of ambiguity that reconceptualises freedom, "[Simone de] Beauvoir does not 
provide any kind of measure for substantively discerning the content of freedom 
and oppression". Moreover, he argues that, " ... she substitutes her abstraction of 
freedom for other ideological abstractions and thereby does not gain much ground 
11 For two recent arguments against the potential for an existential ethics today see 
Braddock, Matthew, 'A Critique of Simone de Beauvoir's Existential Ethics', in Philosophy 
Today; Fall 2007; Vol 51, Issue 3, pp303-311 and Levin, David Michael, 'Existentialism at the 
end of Modernity: Questioning the I's Eyes', in Philosophy Today: Spring 1990; Vol 34, Issue 1. 
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over her opponents".12 This critic concludes that, whilst "philosophers still wrestle 
with the question of whether a strong existentialist ethics is possible" the work of 
Simone de Beauvoir gives him "no reason to answer in the affirmative".13 
Although more recent scholarship has focused on de Beauvoir's contribution to the 
field, French existentialism is often seen to be synonymous with Jean-Paul Sartre's 
Being and Nothingness14, which is viewed by many as the "iconic and defining work 
of the [existentialist] tradition".15 As we will see in the following chapter, de 
Beauvoir has for decades been read as merely "following" Sartre or to be applying 
his philosophy to her own work. This interpretation has been due, largely, to the 
close personal and working relationship they shared and, also, to de Beauvoir's 
often-stated claim that she was not a philosopher and that philosophy was Sartre's 
domain. As we will see, rather than being taken as a reason to deny the validity of 
de Beauvoir's contribution to philosophy, her claims reflect a particular approach to 
philosophical methodology, which are more in keeping with a 'lived' philosophy of 
embodiment than an abstract, universal principle.16 
This thesis focuses on some of the main criticisms levelled at existentialism, 
particularly the existentialism associated with Sartre, which many associate with de 
Beauvoir, and argues that a retrieval of the concept of authenticite - understood as 
inextricably connected to the concept of ambiguity developed in de Beauvoir's work 
12 Braddock, Matthew, 'A Critique of Simone de Beauvoir's Existential Ethics', in Philosophy 
Today; Fall 2007; Vol 51, Issue 3, pp306 and 307. 
13 Ibid, p310. 
14 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Bezng and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, H. Barnes 
(trans). London: Routledge, 1994. First published in French in 1943. 
15 See Jack Reynolds, Understanding Existentialism, Acumen: Chesam, 2006 or David Cooper, 
Existentialism, Basil Blackwell, 1990 for a discussion of the history of the term 'existentialism'. 
As David Cooper notes, the term 'existentialism' was not developed by Sartre and de 
Beauvoir but was applied to them by their colleague Gabriel Marcel, and, according to de 
Beauvoir they took on this label 'for their own purposes' only after an "initial irritation". The 
label 'existentialist' has also been applied in retrospect to Soren Kierkegaard, Karl Jaspers, 
Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and even to Marcel himself. 
16 Nancy Bauer makes this claim in her examination of the relationship between de Beauvoir, 
Sartre and philosophy. Bauer, Nancy, Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy and Feminism, Columbia 
University Press: New York, 2001. 
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- enables many of these criticisms to be addressed. Moreover, an examination of her 
account reveals an existentialism that overcomes Sartre's more individualistic 
account of human being. 
As a means to further understand the importance of the concept of authenticite, this 
chapter examines conceptions of 'self' in philosophy and more broadly in the socio-
political realm. In particular, I make an explicit distinction between two conceptions 
of the 'authentic' self. The first is the more common understanding of the 
decontextualised individual - the autonomous and rational self described (in 
>"" 
different ways) by philosophers such as Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant, Jean- CC 
·.::.t: 
Jacques Rousseau, John Locke and John Stuart Mill (amongst others). In contrast to CC 
ro 
the rational disembodied self that underpins problematic understandings of . ......l 
U) 
authenticity, the authentique self described by de Beauvoir, is a self understood as <( 
i--
embodied, situated and contextualised - the ambiguous self that is related and 
connected to others and the world yet, ultimately 'free'. 
en 
With the aim of reinforcing the distinction between these two understandings, I will CC 
LLJ 
use the English terms 'authentic' and 'authenticity' to designate the (more 
z 
problematic) former understanding and the French terms authenticite and ::::J 
authentique (as used by de Beauvoir) to designate the latter (more positive) 
understanding. 
As we will see authenticite, when reunited with ambiguity (as developed in de 
Beauvoir's work), provides a means of relating ethically to others and overcomes 
the criticisms of radical freedom and individualism that have been levelled at 
Sartre's philosophy and which have been taken to characterise French 
existentialism. The authentique self, under this account, is not a radically free self, but 
a situated self that is, at the same time, free from an inherent 'essence' and also 
interdependent and embodied (ambiguous). 
Authenticite in existential terms involves living in 'good faith' - with recognition of 
the fact that one is fundamentally free from any essence, and acknowledging that the 
same is true for others. To be in good faith, however, one must also recognise the 
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significance of one's situation and comprehend that our material conditions form 
part of who we are. To live in bad faith (inauthentically), therefore, can involve the 
denial of one's freedom and the freedom of others by asserting either that one has an 
essential essence or by denying the existence of any sense of self or meaning at all. 
De Beauvoir's account of the self attempts to surpass this 'either/or' distinction, 
which she argues results from a failure to recognise ambiguity in its proper sense. 
She argues that different doctrines have attempted to overcome or deny the 
connection between facticite and transcendence by either celebrating an 'inner self' 
that is distinct from arbitrary external events, or by giving more weight to the 
external so that humans become objective 'things'. For example, she argues that 
Christianity and Marxism can be seen to take up one aspect of the ambiguous 
human condition and to ignore the other: 
Pascal summarized the ambiguity of the relationship between Universe and 
man in a famous and striking expression when he called man a thinking 
reed. From this definition, Christianity retains essentially the aspect of 
interiority: in the secret of his heart, by the purity of his intentions, and by the 
individual accomplishment of the ethics dictated by his conscience, man will 
attain his salvation in this world. On the contrary, Marxism emphasizes that 
man is a reed, a thing among things, definable by his relationship with the 
objective reality of the world (WIE, p325). 
De Beauvoir' s account of existentialism, on the contrary, wants to overturn this view 
of the oppositional aspects of existence in that it " ... strives to hold both ends of the 
chain at the same time, surpassing the interior-exterior, subjective-objective 
opposition" (Ibid). De Beauvoir's position is not a denial of either interior or exterior, 
but a recognition of the way in which both these aspects are lived 'ambiguously'. 
Regarding the attempts of philosophers to attempt to deny ambiguity by denying 
either the internal or the external worlds, de Beauvoir writes: 
4 
Hegel, with more ingenuity, tried to reject none of the aspects of man's 
condition and to reconcile them all. According to his system, the moment is 
preserved in the development of time; Nature asserts itself in the face of The 
Spirit which denies it while assuming it; the individual is again found in the 
collectivity within which he is lost; and each man's death is fulfilled by being 
cancelled out in the Life of Mankind. Once can thus repose in a marvellous 
optimism where even the bloody wars simply express the fertile restlessness 
of the spirit (TEA, p8). 
However, de Beauvoir expresses disillusion with this system in which the 
individual is lost to the universal and she says that "it was by affirming the 
irreducible character of ambiguity that Kierkegaard opposed himself to Hegel" 
(TEA, p9). 
For Hegel, problematically in de Beauvoir' s opinion, "particularity appears only as a 
moment in the totality in which it must surpass itself" whereas, for existentialism, in 
contrast to this, "impersonal universal man" is "not the source of values" (p 17). On 
her account, existentialism is "opposed to dialectical materialism" and she argues 
that existentialists "think that the meaning of the situation does not impose itself on 
the consciousness of the passive subject, that it surges up only by the disclosure 
which a free subject effects in his project" (TEA, p20). 
The existential account does not attempt to 'surpass' this ambiguity, but 'assumes' it 
because, as we saw above, the task of humanity in attaining truth is to accept 
ambiguity (TEA, p13). In order to be authentique, we must take up and willingly 
assert our ambiguity, and it is this willing assertion that allows for positive, even 
joyful, relations with others. 
AN IMPORTANT MATTER OF TRANSLATION 
It is important to point out that Toril Mai and Margaret Simons have both argued 
that the cuts, omissions and mistranslations in the current English translation of The 
Second Sex lead to an inadequate representation of de Beauvoir's overall argument 
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and to apparent contradictions in her philosophical account. Moi argues that 
problematic translation makes much of The Second Sex appear to be de Beauvoir' s 
personal opinion and that crucial philosophical terms and passages are confused by 
the translator, zoologist H.M. Parshley, particularly those relating to Hegel and to 
specific existential terminology.17 
Moi sees four main points on which Parshley has failed to consider the 
philosophical implications of de Beauvoir's work and terminology. She argues that 
Parshley confuses the term for "existence" with the term for "essence"; he mistakes 
"subjectivity" as meaning "not objective"; he does not identify de Beauvoir's many 
references to Hegel; and he fails to understand de Beauvoir' s use of 'alienation' is a 
philosophical term that comes from Hegel and Lacan.18 
Significantly for this thesis, another mistranslated term is 'authentique', which has 
particular connotations in existential philosophy that are linked to the concept of bad 
faith and to the recognition of one's freedom. A correct understanding of the term 
authentique, as used by de Beauvoir in a particularly existential way, is crucial to her 
philosophical investigation of the situation of women. However, as Moi points out, 
Parshley's mistranslation of the term as 'genuine', 'real' or 'true' is based on 
colloquial understandings and he misses altogether the recognition of responsibility 
that comes with the term for de Beauvoir.19 Although the existential term authentique 
is crucial to de Beauvoir' s analysis of women's situation in The Second Sex, Moi 
argues that "when Parshley freely transforms Beauvoir's authentique into "real", 
"genuine" and "true", he turns her questions about women's freedom into 
17 Moi, Toril, 'While we wait: The English translation of The Second Sex, Signs, Summer,2002; 
Vol.27, no 4, pp 1005-1035. At the time of writing this thesis, Random House (Knopf), the 
publishers holding the rights to The Second Sex have commissioned a new English translation 
of The Second Sex (see Glazer, Sarah,' A Second Sex', Artforum, New York, April/May 2007, 
Vol. 14, Issue 1, pp34-37). As Toril Moi states, "let's hope they do justice to Beauvoir's 
masterpiece", Moi, Tori!, 'It Changed My Life', in The Guardian, United Kingdom, January 
2008. 
18 Ibid, pp 1014-1015. 
19 Ibid, p 1014. 
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moralizing sentimentality".20 In fact, although Parshley acknowledges the 
'influence' of existentialism on de Beauvoir's work, he argues in the translator's 
preface that " ... the serious reader will find... occasionally recurring passages of 
existentialist thought [in The Second Sex] ... " (Parshley, TSS, p8, my emphasis). He 
goes on to argue that these existentialist concepts could be " ... expressed more or 
less adequately in quite other terms" (Ibid). Parshley, it is quite apparent, did not 
take seriously the strong philosophical connection between de Beauvoir's analysis in 
The Second Sex and existential phenomenology, preferring to see her work as a book 
on 'women', not on philosophy. 
The mistranslation of such a significant term is a crucial point because the colloquial 
understanding of 'authentic' is so problematic and so different to the existential 
meaning of the term authentique. The common term is based upon an idea of the 
'given' and demonstrates the tendency to see something as genuine or true only if it 
is 'fixed' (or has an essential nature). The 'authentic' in these terms is diametrically 
opposed to the idea of authenticite, in that it demands clarity and solidity rather than 
recognition and acceptance of ambiguity, which grounds de Beauvoir' s ethics. 
Authenticite is a key component of both Sartre and de Beauvoir' s existential 
philosophy and relates to a subject's understanding of their ontological existence, 
which cannot be reduced to objectivity or to idealism. The tension and play between 
multiple aspects of human being, which is captured in the concept of ambiguity, 
underlies authenticite. 
De Beauvoir is not alone in using the term in this way, and although Parshley does 
not point us to this either, there are strong connections between Martin Heidegger's 
thought and the way in which de Beauvoir develops her account of existentialism.21 
In Being and Time, Heidegger argues that both authenticite (Eigentlichkeit in German) 
and inauthenticity are necessary to existence and that humans continually move 
20 Ibid. 
21 Eva Gothlin examines in more detail the relationship and differences between de 
Beauvoir's and Heidegger's accounts of authenticite in "Reading Simone de Beauvoir with 
Martin Heidegger" in The Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, pp 59-63. 
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between these two basic modes of being.22 For Heidegger, authenticite relates to 
recognition of wholeness "because it assumes, rather than flees from the finitude 
and groundlessness of Dasein's existence".23 Authenticite is distinct from 
inauthenticity in that it is grounded predominantly in 'possibility', whereas 
inauthentic existence is grounded in 'actuality' (such as when the self is constituted 
as an object or mere thing). Authentique existence, on Heidegger' s account, is aware 
of the meaning of existence, whereas inauthentic existence is not.24 That is, the 
authentique subject is able to reflectively 'transcend' their situation in order to 
recognise it as being a lack of Being. The theme of authenticite as it relates to 
understanding of one's ambiguous existence is shared by de Beauvoir and, 
throughout her work, she provides an analysis of the practical implications 'in-the-
world' of the failure to recognise ambiguity and the resultant inauthenticite. 
Crucially then, the common use of the term 'authentic' and de Beauvoir's existential 
use of the term are opposed, and this has implications for understanding her 
analysis of the situation of women in The Second Sex. 
Another important term that comes from Heidegger' s phenomenology, which is 
connected to the concept of ambiguity, but which was mistakenly translated in early 
French texts is Etre la - "being-there" - which comes from Heidegger's Dasein. This 
was translated in early French readings of Being and Time as realite humaine or 
"human reality", "human nature". De Beauvoir and Sartre also take the termfacticite 
from Heidegger's Faktizitiit, which means "self-understanding as inextricably bound 
up with the Being of those entities encountered in the world". 25 
A recurring theme throughout de Beauvoir's work, which is evident early on in 
Pyrrhus et Cineas, is the argument that man cannot renounce the 'exterior' world and 
22 Reynolds, Jack, Understanding Existentialism, Acumen: Chesham, 2006, p37. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
zs Simone de Beauvoir, Pyrrhus et Cineas, in Simone De Beauvoir: Philosophical Writings, 
Simons, Margaret A, with Marybeth Timmerman and Mary Beth Mader (eds) University of 
Illinois Press: Urbana and Chicago, 2004, p146, fn 61. 
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cannot 'give up' on others.26 Here, she refers us to Hegel, whom she says shows us 
that "reality should never be conceived as an interiority hidden in the depths of 
appearance" (PC, p97). She argues that the Epicurean 'ataraxia' and the Stoic 
renouncement of body demand an attempt to remove oneself from the external, to 
go within, but that in doing so they deny any possibility of enjoyment. For, in order 
for us to enjoy, we must be in a situation that also has the potential for painfulness, 
"but in reality, enjoyment is not a given fixed in the narrow envelope of the instant. 
Gide tells us that each pleasure envelopes the entire world; the instant implies 
eternity; God is present in the sensation" (PC, p96). Discussion of the importance of 
being in the world and embodiment is taken up in the following chapter. For now I 
raise it to point to the importance of distinguishing de Beauvoir's authenticite from a 
kind of individualism that insists on separation from the world, others, and our 
materiality for enlightenment or freedom, which is a more common understanding 
of what is meant by authenticity. 
CRITICISMS OF (SARTRE'S) EXISTENTIALISM 
Being in the world with others is a crucial component of de Beauvoir' s account of 
authenticite, and a point at which her work is distinct from the individualism critics 
see in Being and Nothingness. One of the major criticisms made against Sartre has 
been that he focuses too narrowly on the individual, and on consciousness in 
describing existence.27 On this reading, Sartre's account is seen to propose a radical 
individual freedom, which fails to adequately examine and account for the 
sociability of humans. Because of this radical freedom and focus on the individual, 
his account is viewed as being unable to respond to problems that have arisen in 
26 Bergoffen notes that, in her later works, de Beauvoir moves away from the 'inner' and 
'outer' split one can read in Pyrrhus et Cineas and this account of the different aspects of our 
existence become more nuanced. 
27 For discussion of the criticisms of Sartre see Sherman, David, 'Sartre, critical theory and 
the Paradox of Freedom' in Philosophy Today, Celina, Summer 2006, Vol. 50, Issue 2, pp198-
213. 
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contemporary society, problems related to how we must respond to others.28 David 
Levin, for example, argues that: 
Since the philosophical discourse of modernity was ignoring the singularity 
of individual existence [with its insistence on a universal subject and on 
objectivity], existentialism properly assumed a compensatory function in this 
discourse. But its conception of the individual is ... fatally wrong. For the 
way in which it is wrong is such as to make it impossible for existentialism 
to be responsive to some of the most serious questions and problems now 
facing us, in late modernity ... it took us [to the threshold of a post modern 
world] without being in a position to serve as our guide once we crossed the 
threshold.29 
As well as being condemned for a perceived individualism and for proposing an 
account of freedom that negates connections with others, existentialism has also 
been the target of criticism which identifies it with a 'negativity' and a failure to go 
beyond the destruction of value and meaning, thus inviting the prospect of moral 
and epistemological relativism. As de Beauvoir notes in her autobiography, at the 
time she and Sartre were writing, /1 existentialism was being treated as nihilist 
philosophy, wilfully pessimistic, frivolous, licentious, despairing and ignoble ... ".30 
De Beauvoir also notes in Existentialism and Popular Wisdom that existentialism has 
(wrongly) been accused of being a 11miserablism".31 Herbert Marcuse's comments 
provide an example of such criticism. He wrote in 1948 that, within existentialism 
11 
... the subject itself has become absurd and its world void of purpose and hope" 
28 Levin, David Michael, 'Existentialism at the end of Modernity: Questioning the I's Eyes, 
Philosophy Today: Spring 1990; 34, 1; p91. 
29 Ibid, p91. 
30 De Beauvoir, Simone, Force of Circumstance, trans. R. Howard, Andre Deutsch and 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, New York, 1965, p67. 
31 Existentialism and Popular Wisdom, in Simons, Margaret A., with Marybeth Timmerman and 
Mary Beth Mader (eds) Simone De Beauvoir: Philosophical Writings, University of Illinois Press: 
Urbana and Chicago, 2004, p203 (hereafter referenced in parentheses as EPW). 
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and, he argued that, in Sartre's work, " ... Man seeks his freedom and happiness in a 
world where there is no hope, sense, progress or morrow" .32 
Marcuse was by no means alone in holding this view of existentialism, and 
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, writing in 1949, was also critical of what he saw to be 
a negative and morbid philosophy. Lacan argued that: 
Existentialism must be judged by the explanations it gives of the subjective 
impasses that have resulted from it; a freedom that is never more authentic 
than when it is in the walls of a prison; a demand for commitment, 
expressing the impotence of pure consciousness to master any situation; a 
voyeuristic-sadistic idealisation of the sexual relation; a personality that 
realises itself only in suicide; a consciousness of the other that can be 
satisfied only by Hegelian murder.33 
Against such criticisms, de Beauvoir's explicit aim in The Ethics of Ambiguity and 
other works was to describe how existentialism could, in fact, propose an ethics 
which was not purely negative and which celebrated the importance of others to 
existence. At the same time, de Beau voir also sought to demonstrate that we can 
have a positive ethics and relations with others whilst maintaining the tension 
implied in the self-other relation described in the Hegelian dialectic. It can be 
argued that, in attempting to explain how Sartre's philosophy of ambiguity in Being 
and Nothingness provided the basis for an ethics, de Beauvoir develops a more 
nuanced and socially located account of subjectivity and self-other relations. She 
did not, however, explicitly aim to undermine Sartre's work but, rather, was 
expounding what she believed was implicit (and had been misinterpreted by others) 
within his existentialist account. 34 
32 Marcuse, Herbert, 'Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre's L'Etre et le Neant' in 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 8, No. 3. (Mar, 1948), p 309-310. 
33 Lacan, Jacques, Jacques Lacan: Ecrztes, A Selection, trans Allen Sheridan, W.W. Norton and 
Company: New York and London, 1977, p6. 
34 For discussion of de Beauvoir's interpretation of Sartre's work see for example: Sonia 
Kruks, Situation and Human Existence: Freedom, Subjectivity and Society, Unwin Hyman: 
London, 1990; Nancy Bauer, Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy and Feminism, Columbia 
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REUNITING AUTHENTICITE AND AMBIGUITY: BEYOND INDIVIDUAL AND 
RADICAL FREEDOM 
This thesis will demonstrate that, with of her focus on the importance of others and 
the body to existence, de Beauvoir's account of ambiguity and freedom, particularly 
in The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex, is able to overcome the criticism that 
existentialism has little or nothing to offer an ethical theory of relevance to 
contemporary issues. De Beauvoir' s philosophy of ambiguity, and the ethics she 
develops from this, can in fact offer a great deal to contemporary social and ethical 
debates with its insistence on irreducible freedom and, at the same time, 
acknowledgment of the undeniable significance of situation. Most importantly, de 
Beauvoir escapes the negative individualism and "Hegelian mastery" that Lacan 
accuses Sartre of perpetuating while maintaining the ambiguity of the self-
other/subject-object relation. By insisting upon the crucial importance of our 
connection to others she eloquently reveals that we can affirm our existence with 
passion and joy when we recognise our co-existence and our situatedness amongst 
others and in the world: 
Most men spend their life crushed by the weight of cliches that smother 
them. If they resolved to acquire a clear awareness of their situation in the 
world, then only would they find themselves in harmony with themselves 
and reality (EPW, p215). 
Understanding the importance and potential in our relations with others and 
developing an accurate understanding of the existence of the 'self' was an important 
task for de Beauvoir, which is evident in her novels, autobiographies and 
philosophical texts. De Beauvoir argues that (rather than attempting to understand 
or explain our existence through abstract systems or universal truths) by looking to 
one's situation, to one's location in a particular context we can gain insight into 
what it means to be a particular (interconnected) self. She writes of her own 
University Press: New York, 2001 and Margaret Simons, Feminist Interpretations of Simone de 
Beauvoir, The Pennsylvania University Press: Pennsylvania, 1995, amongst other recent 
feminist works. This topic is taken up in further detail in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
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experience in trying to find a methodology and philosophy that reflected her 
experience of the world: 
The flight to the universal was only a passing episode in the personal 
adventure of my life. I went back [from Hegel] to Kierkegaard, which I had 
been reading with passion; the truth that he asserted defied doubt as 
victoriously as the Cartesian evidence. Neither System, nor History could, 
any more than the Malicious Demon, cancel the living certainty of "I am, I 
exist, at this place and this moment, me" (POL, p 537). 
Against the claim of a reductive individualism that denies the centrality of others to 
self-identity, my central argument is that understanding our ambiguity (our 
irreducible ontological freedom and - at the same time - the very real practical 
limitations we encounter and our irreducible inter-subjectivity) is key to developing 
authentique ethical relations with others in the world. In short, we will see that 
without recognising, understanding and taking up our own and other's ambiguity, 
we cannot be authentique. This argument is supported by a re-reading of de 
Beauvoir, for whom authenticite is, ultimately, understood as "disclosing the world 
with and for others".35 In addition, as de Beauvoir concludes in The Ethics of 
Ambiguity, others are crucial to a viable existential ethics. She writes of the 
importance of the other to my understanding of my own freedom: 
... since the individual is defined only by his relationship to the world and to 
other individuals; he exists only by transcending himself, and his freedom 
can only be achieved through the freedom of others. He justifies his 
existence by a movement which, like freedom, springs from his heart but 
which leads outside of him (TEA, p156). 
As de Beauvoir had earlier argued in Pyrrhus et Cineas, the abstract universal 
philosophy of those such as Hegel had not satisfied her because of its failure to 
35 Gothlin, Eva, 'Reading Simone de Beauvoir with Martin Heidegger', in The Cambridge 
Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, Claudia Card (ed), Cambridge University Press, 2003 p62, 
emphasis added. 
13 
account for individual and particular experience. She wrote of this apparent lack of 
care for real, concrete, existences: "if we are floating in the Hegelian ether, neither 
the life nor the death of these particular men seems important to us" (PC, p112). On 
such an account, all are subsumed to the universal and "my own self is abolished ... 
Spread out to infinity, my place in the world is erased just as if I had succeeded in 
containing it in one dimensional point" (PC, plOl). De Beauvoir shows us, through 
her philosophical examination of 'in the world' experiences (such as what it means 
to be a woman in a particular situation), that concrete experiences are important and 
that, rather than attempting to abstract oneself from these in an attempt to gain an 
objective set of moral principles, we should begin our ethical questioning in the 
world. Questions about ethics and about how to engage with others and the world 
must consider both the transcendent and the immanent aspects of our existence. 
After all, both aspects are indivisible from what it means to be human. 
As the following chapter will demonstrate in more detail, there are important 
similarities between de Beauvoir's account of self and other and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty's. In a passage that challenges the 'authentic inner self' critiqued above, 
Merleau-Ponty argues: 
Truth does not 'inhabit' only the 'inner man', or more accurately, there is no 
inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself. 
When I return to myself from an excursion into ·the realm of dogmatic 
common sense or of science, I find, not a source of intrinsic truth, but a subject 
destined to the world (PP, xii emphasis added). 
Merleau-Ponty argued that phenomenology, in 'returning to the things themselves' 
and returning to "a world that precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always 
speaks" (PP, ix-x) overcomes the detachment of the subject from the world and the 
body, a detachment that he argued philosophers such as Kant and Descartes were 
guilty of perpetuating in their rationalist discourse: 
Descartes and particularly Kant detached the subject, or consciousness, by 
showing that I could not possibly apprehend anything as existing unless I 
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first of all experienced myself as existing in the act of apprehending it. They 
presented consciousness, the absolute certainty of my existence for myself, 
as the condition of there being anything at all; and the act of relating as the 
basis of relatedness ... but [in reality] the relations between subject and world 
are not strictly bilateral. .. " (PP, px). 
In Pyrrhus and Cineas, de Beauvoir also examines the importance of others to my 
freedom. There she says: 
However long I look at myself in a mirror and tell myself my own history, I 
never grasp myself as a solid object. I feel within me that void which is 
myself; I feel that I am not. And that is why any cult of the self is truly 
impossible; I cannot destine myself to myself ... Humanity never realizes 
itself. But the other is there, before me, closed upon himself, open onto 
infinity (PC, p116). 
For de Beauvoir, others are crucial to our understanding of self and any philosophy 
or ethics that attempts to deny this, or that is implicitly committed to this denial, is 
flawed. 
AUTHENTICITE AND AMBIGUITY AS KEY (CONNECTED) CONCEPTS 
Demonstrating the connection between authenticite and ambiguity is a primary aim 
of this work. As noted above, an important part of demonstrating this connection 
involves an examination of the significant differences between the concepts of 
'authenticite' (in terms of the explicitly existential term) and the more traditional 
understanding of the term 'authenticity', which is demonstrated in 'everyday' 
encounters. 
The (common) concept of 'authenticity', which posits an 'inner-self' that exists in 
separation from the external world and others, is based upon the misunderstood 
notion of self and freedom that de Beauvoir (with Sartre) terms a "state of 
seriousness". De Beauvoir argues in The Ethics of Ambiguity that a 'spirit of 
seriousness' considers "values as ready-made things" (TEA, p35) and one who 
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displays such a spirit claims that particular ends (which have actually been set up 
my humans) are "absolute" (TEA, p46). In this case, the problem is the idea of being 
true to a 'ready-made' self, a self that is the essence of who one is. 
The attitude of seriousness, in which values and meanings (and ultimately the self) 
are viewed as ready-made and externally given, is the attitude of the majority 
according to de Beauvoir. She argues that it is because we were all once children, 
whose worlds appeared ready-made but who eventually have our freedom revealed 
to us and do not know how to act in the face of it, that many hold such an attitude. 
In order to overcome our uncertainty, and out of nostalgia for our childhood, we 
attempt to rid ourselves of this freedom "by claiming to subordinate it to values 
which would be unconditioned" (TEA, p48). Thus man "makes himself serious", he 
"dissimulates his subjectivity under the shield of rights which emanate from the 
ethical universe recognized by him; he is no longer a man, but a father, a boss, a 
member of the Christian Church or the Communist Party" (TEA, p48). The serious 
man, therefore, "imagines that the accession of these values likewise permanently 
confers value upon himself' (TEA, p46, my emphasis). The authentic self, on this 
understanding, exists inherently, in isolation, the authentic, serious, self "is". 
Although glimpsing freedom, those characterised by a spirit of seriousness see laws 
as eternally given and certain values as immutable, thus denying their freedom. This 
denial is not necessarily a conscious and deliberate denial, but an unconscious 
belief, which underlies our everyday actions. De Beauvoir argues that the political 
fanaticisms that "empty politics of all human content" are based on this view and 
also the ethical systems of many religions, which appeal to an underlying concept of 
'human nature' and God-given virtues (TEA, p46). The serious man, according to de 
Beauvoir, does not question his own existence as being defined by the meaning and 
values that he views to be absolute and, therefore, he asserts himself against others 
whose meanings and values contest his own. 
Perhaps the most sinister characteristic of this type of person is the tendency to 
sacrifice others for the values he unquestioningly accepts and the attitude of 
seriousness is by no means confined to conservative moralists. Both the Left and 
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Right of the political spectrum can be guilty of seriousness in their assertion of the 
essentiality of the values they espouse, " ... the serious man puts nothing into 
question ... army, highway, revolution, productions becom[e] inhuman idols to 
which one will not hesitate to sacrifice man himself" (TEA, p49). A radical ecological 
conservationist can be as guilty of seriousness in claims of the inherent essence of 
'the natural' as the forest worker who sees inherent value in jobs and the economy. 
As de Beauvoir says: 
The serious is not defined by the nature of the ends pursued. A frivolous 
lady of fashion can have this mentality of the serious as well as an engineer. 
There is the serious from the moment that freedom denies itself to the 
advantage of ends which one claims are absolute (TEA, 46). 
The serious man thus denies ambiguity in favour of 'the absolute'. For such a person 
things exist as 'given' in the world and his conception of self and of others is 
stagnant and fixed. As de Beauvoir argues, the serious man posits absolute ends and 
absolute values and, in forgoing liberty, takes the easy option. In so doing, he 
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.. • avoids the strain involved in undertaking an authentic [authentiqueJ existence" 
(TSS, p21). The (problematic) conception of the authentic is opposed to the 
existential concept of authenticite, which actually emphasises recognition of our 
ambiguity and, with this, denies the possibility of an 'essence' that underlies each 
human existence. 
AUTHENTICITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL: CAN HAVING A 'SELF' BE ETHICAL? 
THE PROBLEM OF THE 'AUTHENTIC' INNER SELF (AND INDIVIDUALISM) 
This understanding of self, as it relates to an idea of the 'genuine' or 'real', is 
connected to the modem notion of the individual, which Craig Calhoun equates 
with "the idea that human beings can be understood in themselves as at least 
potentially self-sufficient, self-contained and self-moving".36 
36 Calhoun, Craig, (ed) Social Theory and the Politics of Identity, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994, p 
315. 
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Charles Taylor is one contemporary philosopher who analyses the way in which 
underlying conceptions of self have impacted in the social and political realms. 
Taylor's work demonstrates that, within a contemporary culture of individualism -
which presupposes an 'inner self' - a reductive account of existence works by 
making 'the other' fit within a particular conception. What this means is that we 
attempt to 'solidify' the other in order to secure our idea of who we are. According 
to this form of individualism, the 'authentic' self is the autonomous 'inner' self, the 
self that exists apart from or despite others.37 
As de Beauvoir describes it in Pyrrhus et Cineas, this understanding of self has an 
important ethical dimension which is evident when humans try to escape from the 
burden of responsibility for the world or for others by focusing within: 
Often during hardship man thus denies all his attachments. He does not 
want hardship; he looks for a way to flee from it. He looks within himself; he 
sees an indifferent body, a heart that beats to a steady rhythm. A voice says 
"I exist". The hardship is not there. It is in the deserted house, on this dead 
face, in these streets. If I go within myself, I look at those inert streets with 
astonishment, saying "But what does it matter to me? All is nothing to me" 
(PC, p92). 
By closing off the world, by seeking peace and tranquillity 'within', I attempt to 
evade the anguish of the other's pain, the responsibility for preventing or easing 
their hurt, "If I withdraw into myself, the other is also closed for me" (Ibid.). 
However, de Beauvoir argues that while I may try to remove myself from the world 
and therefore from all concern, that "I am not first a thing but a spontaneity that 
desires, that loves, that wants, that acts" (PC, p93). My embodied ambiguity will not 
allow me to evade the world, no matter how hard I try to ignore it. 
Conceptions of the self as fixed, as separate from others and inherent within an 
individual, are not by any means new. For example, Rene Descartes' disengaged 
37 Taylor, Charles, The Ethics of Authenticity, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, England, 1995. 
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rationality and the 'responsible self', which he described in the 1640s, provides the 
foundation for much of the philosophical thought that followed. In his search for the 
truth about human existence, Descartes (considered by many as the 'father of 
modern philosophy') famously concluded with the theory, "Cogito, ergo, sum", or, "I 
think, therefore, I am".38 This conclusion provided the basis for him to argue in the 
Discourse "I am a being whose whole essence or nature is to think, and whose being 
requires no place and depends on no material thing" .39 The Cartesian consciousness 
is immaterial, defined in separation from the material body which, somehow, 
'intermingles' with it.40 On this account, it is the self within, rather than the 
embodied self, situated in a particular time and place, that is 'authentic'. 
The dominant idea of a source deep within oneself was implicit within modern 
religious and philosophical notions of the self. This 'source' was seen to possess 
inherent knowledge that could be accessed by looking within. St Augustine, for 
example, saw a way to God through 'reflexive awareness of ourselves', arriving at 
what Merleau-Ponty describes as a "constituting power which has always been 
identical with the inner self ... as yet untouched by being and time" (PP, p xi). Later, 
French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau also saw morality as a 'voice of nature 
within' and Reason as a faculty endowed by God to help man control his passions: 
The Most High has designed to do honour to mankind; has endowed man 
with boundless passions, together with a law to guide them, so that man 
may be alike free and self-controlled: though swayed by these passions man 
is endowed with reason by which to control them.41 
38 Descartes, Rene; Laurence J. Lafleur (trans.) Discourse on Method and Meditations, The 
Liberal Arts Press: New York, 1960. 
39 Descartes, Rene, as cited in Antony Flew (ed), A Dictionary of Philosophy, Pan Books: 
London, 1979, p9. 
40 The problems within Descartes' mind/body dualism are discussed in chapters two and 
three of this thesis. 
41 Rousseau, Jean-Jaques, Emile: or on education, (trans) Allan Bloom, Basic Books: New York, 
1979, p323. 
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For these philosophers the passions were seen to muffle or "drown out" the inner 
voice, and our dependence on others was seen to induce such passions.42 At this 
time, the way to have 'authentic' moral contact with the 'self' was by denying 
passion and the imposition of external forces. Self-determination was seen as 
freedom from outside influence and the ability to decide for oneself how, and who, 
one should be. 
This focus on the inner self and radical individualism is, for Taylor, an example of a 
deviant form of authenticity, which he argues continues today. He links this to the 
Kantian notion of freedom as 'autonomy' as well as to the Hegelian and Marxian 
arguments that freedom is self-determination.43 Taylor is critical of the notion that 
each has one's own human way of being, that one can have 'contact' with one's 
inner nature, with one's inner ('genuine' and unadulterated) 'self'. He terms this a 
debased, trivialised, absurd form of a culture of authenticity and the idea of the inner 
'original' self as the background to the problematic modern ideal of authenticity. 
Taylor argues that the 'sentiment of existence' described in Rousseau's Reveries of the 
Solitary Walker44 is indicative of a modern "inwardness that develops into the 
modern ideal of authenticity".45 The sentiment of existence Rousseau describes in 
the Reveries has a source which is "nothing external to us, nothing apart from 
ourselves and our own existence" (Reveries, 89; 1, 1047). This dichotomous 
understanding of 'self' and 'other', which attempts to deny the significance of the 
external world by appealing to an innate self, a self that exists prior to the social. As 
Anthony Appiah argues, this conception of the authentic self assumes that "there is 
a real self buried in there, the self one has to dig out and express", and which he 
42 Taylor, Charles, The Ethics of Authenticity, p 27. 
43 Diana Meyers argues that for the Kantian ethical subject "emotional bonds and social 
conventions imperil objectivity and undermine commitment to duty". See 'Feminist 
Perspectives on the Self', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/stanford/entries/feminism-self/, accessed 28 January 2008. 
44 Rousseau, Jean-Jaques, Reveries of the Solitary Walker, (trans) Peter France, Penguin Books: 
London, 1979 (Hereafter referenced in text as Reveries). 
45 Marks, Jonathon, 'Misreading One's Sources: Charles Taylor's Rousseau' in American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No 1, January 2005, p121. 
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argues is essentialist.46 This theme, of an essential authentic inner self, which exists 
in separation from its situation, will be returned to throughout this thesis, as it is 
symptomatic of an attempt to evade ambiguity. This evasion entails a denial of one 
side of a dichotomy (subject/object, mind/body, inner/outer, self/other) and the 
subsequent reification of the 'opposite' side, often with an over-valuing of one side 
at the expense of the other. 
As a number of feminist philosophers have noted,47 unacknowledged (value-laden) 
dichotomies abound in Rousseau's work and, in The Social Contract, Rousseau 
argues that there are "private persons ... whose life and freedom are naturally 
independent of the public person (SC, 61; 111, 373).48 
We can see, however, that although Rousseau attempts to find his 'authentic self' by 
cutting himself off from society, in doing so, he actually demonstrates that, alone, he 
no longer knows who he is, eventually resulting in him asking the profound 
question, " ... without them, what am I?". We see that, when searching for meaning 
and authenticity within himself, Rousseau finds neither. Ultimately, one must 
return to the world and accept the tension that this implies. One must be prepared 
to experience the world - which entails the potential for both positive and negative 
experiences. It is not by removing oneself from society, from the risks entailed in 
human relationships, that we find authenticite. We find it in our engagement with 
others - in the tension and joy that this relation allows. 
In both the Social Contract and Emile, Rousseau attempts to work through the 
relationship between the natural and the cultural. He argues in the Social Contract 
that, "Out of a stupid and bounded animal [society] made an intelligent being and a 
46 Appiah, Anthony K., 'Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social 
Reproduction', in Multiculturalism, Examining the Politics of Recognition, Amy Gutmann (ed), 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, pp 149-63 (my emphasis). 
47 See for example, Gatens, Moira, 'Rousseau and Wollstonecraft: Nature vs. Reason' in Janna 
L. Thompson (ed.), Women and Philosophy: Australian Journal of Philosophy, supplement to vol. 
64, pp 1-15 and Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason· 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy, 
Routledge: London, 1993. 
48 Rousseau, Jean-Jaques, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, trans, Victor 
Gourvitch, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1997, p373. 
21 
man", and on this account society or culture transforms the 'natural' self into 
'man' .49 Whilst he is attempting to give weight to the importance of the public or 
social world, this argument (for a natural being made human by the social) again 
represents a presupposition about a pre-given nature. Rousseau sees a separation 
between the natural and social worlds, the private and the public realms, where one 
makes a 'transition' from the state of nature to the "civil state". Rousseau fails to see 
the ambiguous connections between these two aspects of human existence and, 
instead, propounds an irreconcilable and absolute distinction between them. 50 
In understanding how it is that one may interact with others it is important to 
acknowledge that whilst our situation and our 'community' are significant to our 
sense of self, that, as de Beauvoir says, "society exists only by means of particular 
individuals" (TEA, p 122). 
As well as being critical of the idea that identities or values are fixed and immutable, 
authenticite is also opposed to a total denial of current meanings and value, where 
each can do as one pleases with complete disregard for others. As Taylor argues, 
modes of contemporary culture "that opt for self-fulfilment without regard to the 
demands of our ties with others or to demands of any kind emanating from 
something more or other than human desires or aspirations are self-defeating ... they 
destroy the conditions for realising authenticity itself".51 
What we see here is recognition of the external, historical, worldly relations that 
inform identity and imply that we are not self-contained entities that can 'choose' 
freely what we are, irrespective of our situation. We are embedded within a socio-
49 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Social Contract, 53; 111, pp 364-65. 
50 In addition, as a number of feminist philosophers have pointed out, Rousseau has a 
problematic tendency to equate the social and public with the masculine and the private 
sphere with the feminine, thus denying the capacity for women to develop as social and 
political beings. For further discussion of this point see, for example Gatens, Moira, 
'Rousseau and Wollstonecraft: Nature vs. Reason' in Janna L. Thompson (ed), Women and 
Philosophy: Australian Journal of Philosophy, supplement to vol. 64, pp 1-15 and Lloyd, 
Genevieve, The Man of Reason. 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy, Routledge: London, 
1993. 
51 Ibid, p 35. 
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historical context, which constitutes our 'horizons of significance' and meaning is 
developed and interpreted through our situation. Crucial to such a conception of 
authenticite, therefore, is the fundamental role of our relationships with others. Of 
this relationship, he writes: 
I can define my identity only against the background of things that matter. 
But to bracket out history, nature, society, the demands of solidarity, 
everything but what I find in myself would be to eliminate all candidates for 
what matters. Only if I exist in a world in which history, or the demands of 
nature, or the needs of my fellow human beings, or the duties of citizenship, 
or the call of God, or something else of this order matters crucially, can I 
define an identity for myself that is not trivial. Authenticity is not the enemy 
of demands that emanate beyond the self; it supposes such demands.52 
For Taylor then, as for de Beauvoir, authenticite presupposes that selves develop in a 
social context and that our identities require others and relationships with history 
and the world. We are formed in dialogue with the world and with others, and this 
includes recognition of the importance of every day life: 
A human being alone is an impossibility, not just de facto, but as it were de 
jure. Outside of the continuing conversation of a community ... human 
agency ... would be not just impossible but inconceivable.53 
In an argument that sounds remarkably like de Beauvoir's claims about the 
importance of others to ethical understandings of action, Taylor has recently written 
that "It matters to each one of us as we act that the others are there as witness of 
what we are doing and thus as co-determiners of the meaning of our action".54 
52 Ibid, pp 40-41. 
53 Taylor, Charles, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2, Cambridge 
University Press, 1985, p8. 
54 Taylor, Charles, 'Cultures of Democracy and Citizen Efficacy' Public Culture 19:1 2007, 
p144. 
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This echoes de Beauvoir's thought in Pyrrhus et Cineas, where she writes: "there 
exists no privileged spot in the world about which he can safely say 'this is me' .. . He 
is himself only through relationships with something other than himself' (PC, p97-98, my 
emphasis). De Beauvoir emphasises the point that we cannot escape the fact that we 
are embedded in the world, we cannot " ... suddenly spring forth into the world in 
pure ipseity (selfness) of [our] being without the world springing forth in front of 
[us]" (PC, p 98, my emphasis). Others, and the world, are crucial to an appropriate 
understanding of authenticite. 
While I have drawn links above with Taylor's concept of authenticite and the 
importance of others to ethics, I do not wish to conflate his and de Beauvoir' s work. 
For example, in a more recent work, 'The Politics of Recognition', Taylor advocates 
for recognition by the State of particular group identities in order to move away 
from Universalist assumptions about equal rights and to maintain the differences 
that define particular groups.55 The issue with such a politics is, as Lyshaug argues, 
that "when a state 'recognizes' and promotes a particular group's identity, it 
invariably enhances the power of that group's leaders to interpret their group's 
culture and to determine which of its aspects will be safeguarded." In doing this, "a 
politics of recognition is bound to undermine the liberty and autonomy of group 
members". 56 
Lyshaug argues that, in allowing groups to institutionalise their identities, "Taylor's 
politics of recognition would entrench, for members of such groups, what Anthony 
Appiah calls a 'script' - a set of 'loose norms or models, which play a role in shaping 
the life plans of those who make these collective identities central to their individual 
identities' .57 
55 Taylor, Charles, 'The Politics of Recognition', in New Contexts of Canadian Criticism, Ajay 
Heble et al (Eds.), Broadview Press: Canada, 1997. 
56 Lyshaug, Brenda, 'Authenticity and the Politics of Identity: A Critique of Charles Taylor's 
Politics of Recognition', in Contemporary Political Theory Avenel: Dec 2004. Vol 3, Iss. 3, 
p309. 
57 Ibid, p 309 
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What is problematic about such an account of recognition, is that it holds within it 
an assumption that there are clear and distinct boundaries of communities that are 
'recognizable'.58 Although one can see why Taylor wants to do this, in order to 
attach political significance to cultural identity rather than accepting the neutralism 
of procedural liberalism, this move does risk a loss of freedom and does not 
adequately account for the ambiguity of identity. Taylor wants to be able to accord 
significance to group politics, to allow for the importance of difference and 
culturally unique practices but needs to be able to do so in a way that does not 
undermine his argument for intersubjectivity and authenticity. Lyshaug argues that 
the problem for Taylor is that his politics of recognition does not honour the 
"distance" between the self and socially recognised identities.59 
Using the power of the state to shore up the boundaries of existing cultural 
communities can undermine the conditions of authentic self-
realization ... [by] rendering key dimensions of personal identity rigid ... in 
part by creating an incentive for political entrepreneurs to reify cultural 
identity. 60 
As is evident above, and as others have noted, Taylor's work also involves a strong 
(although sometimes implicit) theism.61 Conversely, although she was raised a 
Catholic, de Beauvoir lost faith in religion as a young adult and she sees a reliance 
58 Jbid, p310 
59 Ibid, p 318 
60 Ibid, p 311 
6l Taylor's early work involves an implicit theism, which he makes explicit in his later work. 
Taylor received the Marianist Award from the Catholic religious order the Society of Mary 
in 1996 and presented a lecture in 1999 entitled, 'A Catholic Modernity?', which explored the 
nature of his religious faith. During this lecture Taylor stated that he had kept his religious 
views tacit in his earlier work in order to 'persuade honest thinkers of any and all 
metaphysical or theological commitments' to consider his arguments.61 Taylor has since 
published several works which explicitly reveal his theism and he received the Templeton 
Prize "for Progress toward Research or Discoveries about Spiritual Realities" in 2007. See 
Taylor, Charles, A Catholic Modernity? Charles Taylor's Marianist Award Lecture, edited and 
introduction by James L. Heft, Oxford University Press, 1999. For discussion of the theism 
evident in Taylor's work see for example Ian Fraser, "Charles Taylor's Catholicism", 
Contemporary Political Theory, Aug 2005. Vol. 4, Iss. 3; p 231. 
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on God for ethics as another example of the human failure to recognise ambiguity 
and to accept responsibility for one's own actions. She argues that "the authentique 
man will not consent to recognize any foreign absolute" (TEA, p14) and this 
includes God: 
When man projects into an ideal heaven that impossible synthesis of the for-
itself and the in-itself that is called God, it is because he wishes the regard of 
this existing Being to change his existence into being (TEA, p14). 
Although many of the aspects of Taylor's work prove valuable for illustrating the 
importance of the idea of authenticite in the contemporary setting, his later reliance 
upon theism to articulate an ethics and his advocacy for a politics of recognition that 
could easily result in strategic political essentialism, do not have as much to offer as 
de Beauvoir's account of freedom and ambiguity.62 De Beauvoir does not rely upon 
God for an explanation of ontology or ethics and does not posit any "absolute" 
values. As we will see throughout this thesis, this point is important in retaining 
ambiguity and an open future by recognising ultimate freedom, a freedom that is 
problematised if we accept God as creator or determiner of being, value and action. 
It is the thickness of the world, in our embodied state, in our ambiguity that a reason 
to act and to live can found - not in the illusion of Heaven or Nirvana. 
As de Beauvoir notes, however, a common response made to existentialist claims is 
that "if man is free to define for himself the conditions of a life which is valid in his 
own eyes, can he not choose whatever he likes and act however he likes?" (TEA, p15, 
emphasis added). The absence of God in ethics is problematic for those who will 
ask, 'if there is no God, how can there be value or meaning'? Moreover, many will 
argue that without God "everything is_ permitted" (Ibid). 
De Beauvoir notes that the existential claims she and Sartre made were condemned 
by those who argued that, "if the individual were not constrained by the external 
62 A later research project may involve more closely comparing Taylor and de Beauvoir's 
work to argue that her account of ambiguity and freedom can overcome the limits within 
Taylor's work. It would be beyond the scope of this thesis to do so however. 
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world to want this rather than that, there would be nothing to defend him against 
his whims" (TEA, p22). However, in contrast to those who accuse existentialism of 
destroying the possibility of ethics by denying universal virtues and morals, for de 
Beauvoir, it is precisely because of the lack of inherent or fixed meaning and value in 
the world that ethics is even possible. This is because if humans (and human action) 
were determined, or if value was inherent in the world, there would be no need for 
ethics. De Beauvoir contests the claim that if man is "re-established at the heart of 
his destiny" all ethics would be repudiated. An existential account of ethics argues 
that it is through man's 'abandonment on earth' that he becomes responsible for his 
acts. It is up to humankind to determine what is important and what has value, to 
measure our actions and to assume responsibility for what we make of the world. 
As de Beauvoir argues, "The source of all values resides in the freedom of 
[hum]man[ity]" (TEA, p17). She writes, "One does not offer an ethics to a God. It is 
impossible to propose any to man if one defines him as nature, something given" 
(TEA, plO). The need for a principle of ethics is the result (and a demonstration) of 
our fundamental ambiguity - and it is the recognition and 'assumption' (in the sense 
of a taking-up) of this ambiguity that provides the basis for ethical thinking. As de 
Beauvoir says, "the genuine man will not agree to recognize any foreign absolutes" 
(TEA, p14). 
It is crucial to remember when thinking about 'ethics' in this way that de Beauvoir 
was not attempting to prescribe universal 'recipes' for action but, rather, a method 
for questioning before action. This method, rather than being a list of virtues and 
vices, stresses that one must continually remind oneself of the assumptions and 
expectations one brings to situations. This ethical thinking begins with the 
examination and continual questioning of our 'being' in the world and not with 
presuppositions about this being, de Beauvoir writes of this phenomenological 
methodology that: 
... morality resides in the painfulness of an indefinite questioning ... what 
distinguishes the tyrant from the man of good will is that the first rests in the 
certainty of his aims, whereas the second keeps asking himself Am I really 
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working for the liberation of men? ... In setting up its ends, freedom must 
put them in parentheses, confront them at each moment with that absolute 
end which it itself constitutes, and contest, in its own name, the means it 
uses to win itself (TEA, pp 133-134, emphasis added).63 
CONCLUSION 
The de Beauvoirian conception of authenticite can be summarised in the following 
three key points. Firstly, to live authentically one must recognise one's ontological 
freedom and 'assume', 'affirm' (or take up) rather than attempt to flee this freedom. 
Such 'fleeing' most often occurs through denial of freedom and the positing of an 
objective self or absolute value, a self that is a 'thing' (as in the spirit of seriousness). 
The authentique subject, on the other hand, must be prepared to willingly assert the 
fundamental freedom that characterises humanity. Secondly, however, one must 
also (at the same time) recognise one's connections to others and the practical limits 
and potential of one's situation, therefore acknowledging that the self is 
'ambiguous': being at the same time both ontologically free and practically limited. 
The self is neither a radically free and totally autonomous individual devoid of 
connections nor an objective 'thing'.64 Thirdly, through understanding ambiguity, 
the 'authentique' self is aware of the way in which meaning develops in the world. 
The authentique individual does not posit fixed and immutable values but, rather, 
endeavours to question presuppositions and unearth assumptions - to 'step back' 
from the world. The authentique subject looks to each situation in making decisions 
and does not posit a universal morality.65 As de Beauvoir says in The Ethics of 
Ambiguity, "[t]o attain his truth, man must not attempt to dispel the ambiguity of his 
being, but on the contrary, accept the task of realizing it" (TEA, p13). 
63 As we shall see in subsequent chapters this 'trick of tyrants' is evident in a number of 
contemporary political situations. 
64 This point will be further examined in chapter three, with an analysis of the different 
'levels' of freedom in de Beauvoir' s work. 
65 As we will see in the following chapters, existentialism has been criticised for not 
providing a normative ethics and for failing to prescribe how one should act. 
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I have tried to demonstrate above the connections between metaphysical 
conceptions of 'self' and the way in which we relate to others in the world. Those 
accounts that privilege an 'inner self' as being the 'authentic', 'genuine' and 
autonomous are problematic when considered in the light of ambiguity. This 
relation between 'self' and 'other', which is often seen as being opposing or 
mutually exclusive, will be further examined throughout the subsequent chapters. 
The aim here has been to introduce the idea of the connection between the concepts 
of authenticite and ambiguity as a means to begin re-thinking problematic social 
relations based upon the ideal of the authentic self. De Beauvoir tells us, "I exist as 
an authentique subject, in a constantly renewed upspringing that is opposed to the 
fixed reality of things" (EPW, p212). Here, "upspringing", jaillisement, has the 
meaning of "gushing, spouting, spurting" and refers to the temporality of my 
existence and the constant movement that is the world. My self must be constantly 
re-thought and renewed through my relation with others and the world, which is 
disclosed to me through my openness, my being in the world. 
De Beauvoir' s philosophy of ambiguity, when considered in connection with the 
ethical ideal of authenticite, provides a means to begin to rethink the problem of the 
'self-other' relation in such a way as to enable positive relations but without 
denying the potential for conflict, violence and oppression that are so evident within 
society. The search for meaning and the search for a true self have been key tasks of 
philosophy and of religion throughout the ages. However, as Martin Dillon so 
eloquently puts it, both philosophers and followers of religion have found that, in 
this search, "Inner worlds have turned out to be as barren as after worlds [and now] 
it is time to take stock of this world". 66 
66 Dillon, Martin, Merleau-Ponty's Ontology, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 
Second Edition, 1988, p xix. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
INTERPRETATIONS OF SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR -
RE-THINKING THE IMPORTANCE OF AMBIGUITY FOR 
AUTHENTICITE 
Mlle de Beauvoir' s book is, after all, on woman, not on philosophy 
(HM Parshley, Translator's Preface to The Second Sex) 
SITUATING DE BEAUVOIR 
Since its publication in 1949, The Second Sex has received both celebration and 
condemnation for its contribution to the feminist debate. Some interpreters have 
argued that de Beauvoir is an essentialist who grounds 'woman' in her biology, 
which she is seen to denigrate.67 At the same time, others have seen her as a social 
constructivist and the mother of the sex/gender distinction, whose account allows 
(and encourages) woman to move beyond or 'transcend' her biology.68 Many argue 
that, by retaining the existential valorisation of transcendence, she tacitly 
presupposes a 'masculine' ideal as that towards which women should aim and that 
she distances herself from her own situation as a woman through her criticisms of 
child-birth and motherhood. Genevieve Lloyd, for example, writes that: 
.. .in repudiating one kind of exclusion, de Beauvoir's mode of response can 
help reinforce another. For it seems implicitly to accept the downgrading of 
the excluded character traits traditionally associated with femininity, and to 
endorse the assumption that the only human excellences and virtues which 
67 For example see Judith Okely, Simone de Beauvoir: a Re-reading, London: Virago, 1986, pp 
89-99. Moira Gatens, in her earlier work, also accuses de Beauvoir of taking up Sartre's 
account of the female body and its relation to immanence (see 'Feminism, Philosophy and 
Riddles without Answers', 1991, p17). 
68 Celine Leon provides an example of the social constructivist reading, arguing that for de 
Beauvoir "[t]he difference between men and women is purely cultural. Woman's Otherness 
is fabricated, imposed by culture, not biology" (Leon, Celine, in Simons, Margaret A., (ed.) 
Feminist Interpretatzons of Simone de Beauvoir. University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1995 p139). 
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deserve to be taken seriously are those exemplified in the range of activities 
and concerns that have been associated with maleness.69 
Still others have argued that her work is inherently contradictory due to her 
attempts to apply Sartre's existential account to an examination of women, thus 
(albeit 'accidentally') revealing the limitations of the Sartrean account.70 Recently, 
however, de Beauvoir' s work has been the focus of a renewed critical appraisal, 
with particular emphasis on her philosophical importance in the areas of ethical 
relations and ontology. As Sarah Heinfu:naa tells us, "it is only recently that scholars 
have approached Beauvoir's texts without assuming that they are applications of 
Sartre's ontological doctrines"71 and Nancy Holland argues, "it may be time to 
reconsider the plausibility of a feminism that draws on the tradition of Simone de 
Beauvoir and her philosophical allies" .72 
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s especially there has been an explicit focus on the 
philosophical implications of The Second Sex and a number of commentators are re-
examining and re-thinking de Beauvoir' s contribution to feminist philosophy as 
well as to broader social and philosophical questions.73 Her earlier works, 
69 Lloyd, Genevieve, The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy, London: 
Methuen, 1984, p104. Tina Chanter also argues that de Beauvoir is advocating such a 
position and she writes that "Beauvoir's final message is that sexual difference should be 
eradicated and women must become like men" (Chanter, Tina, Ethics of Eros. Irigaray's 
rewriting of the Philosophers, New York: Routledge, 1995, p 76). 
70 Deutscher, Penelope, 'The Notorious Contradictions of Simone de Beauvoir', in Yielding 
Gender: Feminism, Deconstruction and the History of Philosophy, London: Routledge, 1997. 
71 Heinamaa, Sara, introduction to the Review of the Phenomenology of Perception, in Simone De 
Beauvoir: Philosophical Writings, Simons, Margaret A, with Marybeth Timmerman and Mary 
Beth Mader (eds), University of Illinois Press: Urbana and Chicago, 2004. 
72 Holland, Nancy, 'Feminist Politics and The Human Situation: A Re-Reading of Merleau-
Ponty, Philosophy Today; 2000; 49, 5; plOO. 
73 Philosophers such as Sonia Kruks, Situation and Human Existence· Freedom, Subjectivity and 
Society, Unwin Hyman: London, 1990; Eva Lundgren-Gothlin, Sex and Existence· Somine de 
Beauvoir's The Second Sex, Althone Press: London 1996; Toril Moi, Simone de Beauvoir. The 
Making of an Intellectual Woman, Blackwell: Oxford, 1994; Margaret Simons, Feminist 
Interpretations of Simone de Beauvoir, The Pennsylvania University Press: Pennsylvania, 1995 
and Karen Vintges, Philosophy as Passion, The Thinking of Simone de Beauvoir, Indiana 
University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1996 all began re-thinking the 
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particularly The Ethics of Ambiguity, are also again being engaged with, as are her 
novels and political and philosophical essays. For example, Cambridge University 
Press in 2003 published a 'companion to Simone de Beauvoir' as part of their series 
of companions to major philosophers, and a group of de Beauvoir scholars are now 
translating previously untranslated texts to English with the aim of /1 a 
transformation of Beauvoir's place in the canon".74 In an introduction to one of 
these newly translated works, Debra Bergoffen argues that these translations are 
being undertaken at what she terms /1 an auspicious moment in Beauvoir studies": 
... a moment when Beauvoir's refusal to identify herself as a philosopher in 
her own right is itself being refused; a moment when her work is being 
studied for its unique insights and contributions to philosophical and 
feminist thought; a moment when the questions of violence and justice ... are 
pressing political and ethical concern.75 
Significantly then, her work is now being read and examined for its unique 
philosophical implications and not just as the work of 'Sartre's companion' .76 
Edward Fullbrook, for example, argues that although 11Beauvoir the philosopher 
had been erased from existence", that recent translations of her work demonstrate 
her philosophical importance and originality.77 
philosophical importance of de Beauvoir in the early 1990s and since this time others have 
taken up this task, see bibliography for further details. 
74 Simons, Margaret et al (eds), Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophical Writings, University of 
Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 2004. 
75 Bergoffen, Debra, "Introduction to Pyrrhus et Cineas" in Simone de Beauvoir. Philosophical 
Writings, Simons et al (eds) Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004, p80. 
76 The relationship between Sartre and de Beauvoir and between de Beauvoir and other 
philosophers will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
77 Fullbrook, Edward, "Introduction to Two Unpublished Chapters from She Came to Stay", 
in Szmone de Beauvozr: Philosophical Writings, Simons et al (eds) Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2004, p34. 
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So, in contrast to those who have read de Beauvoir's work as an example of the 
'Heloise complex' described by Michelle Le Deouff in Hipparchia's Choice78 (or as an 
attack on women's embodiment and on biological 'facticity' in general) recent 
scholars argue that we can find in her work a critique of traditional philosophy and 
a means to begin re-thinking the many ways in which philosophy has failed to 
address the questions raised by the experience of particular and situated individuals 
in the world.79 Moreover, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, I argue that her 
insistence upon the acknowledgement of our ambiguous situation, and the 
recognition of the particular context of individuals that challenges the adequacy of 
the ideal of a 'universal human norm', is a successful way to negotiate problematic 
assumptions about identity and ethics within contemporary political debates. As 
Linnell Secomb has argued, the contradictory responses to de Beauvoir, which have 
seen her as being interpreted as both a biological determinist and a social 
constructivist, "may become more explicable through a reading of her work that 
utilises and values its ambiguities and complexities".80 
This chapter aims to continue with this 'reclamation' of Simone de Beauvoir, and 
her account of ambiguous embodiment, by arguing that she is neither a cultural 
constructivist nor an essentialist with respect to the body and its relation to identity 
(as various historical interpretations have claimed). I argue against the claim that de 
Beauvoir essentialises and denigrates the (female) body or, conversely, that she 
denies the importance of the body altogether by privileging transcendence. 
Alternatively, with a focus on ambiguity, one can find in her work a recognition of 
the importance of the 'facts' of biology as well as an insistence on an irreducible 
7s Le Deouff describes the Heloise Complex as the situation in which women become 
interested in and admitted into the world of philosophy only through being the admirer and 
proponent of a male's philosophy and are not considered to be philosophers in their own 
right but rather 'followers' of a particular male philosopher. Hipparchia's Choice: An Essay 
Concerning Women, Philosophy, etc. trans. Trista Selous, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, 1991p59-60. 
79 See Nancy Bauer, Simone de Beauvoir- Philosphy and Feminism: Columbia, 2003, Debra 
Bergoffen, The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Gendered Phenomenologies, Erotic Generosities, 
SUNY Press, Albany, New York, 1997 and Sonia Kruks, Situatwn and Human 
Existence:Freedom, Subjectivity and Society, Unwin Hyman: London, 1990. 
so See Linnell Secomb, 'Beauvoir's Minoritarian Philosophy', Hypatia, Volume 14 (4), 1999. 
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freedom from essence. De Beauvoir recognises that bodies are important, that they 
matter and affect our grasp upon the world and our interactions with others yet, at 
the same time, she insists that the ways in which the 'facts' of biology are lived and 
understood are dependent upon the varying social meanings in which they are 
situated. For de Beauvoir, femininity is "neither an essence nor a nature: [but rather] 
it is a situation created by civilizations from certain physiological givens".81 This 
understanding of ambiguity has very real implications for identity politics. 
De Beauvoir' s understanding of the ambiguous body can be seen, for example, in 
her discussion of biology in The Second Sex. There she argues that philosophers and 
scientists have interpreted male and female biology in a particular way in order to 
justify their already existing biases; biases which see woman more closely aligned 
with nature and imprisoned in her sex. De Beauvoir writes, "legislators, priests, 
philosophers, writers and scientists have striven to show that the subordinate 
position of women is willed in heaven and advantageous on earth" (TSS, p22) and 
she argues that this kind of interpretation has arisen because, "[the scientist or 
philosopher] wishes to find in biology a justification for this sentiment" (TSS, p34). 
De Beauvoir claims, against such interpretations, that "[t]o be present in the world 
implies strictly that there exists a body which is at once a material thing in the world 
and a point of view towards this world: but nothing requires that this body have this 
or that particular structure ... " (TSS, p 39, emphasis added). 
De Beauvoir' s account of an ambiguously positioned body has lead to varied 
interpretations of her work and this chapter examines what have become known as 
the 'notorious contradictions' of de Beauvoir, as well as what a closer look at these 
apparent contradictions can reveal. I conclude by arguing that, in reading de 
Beauvoir' s work alongside that of Merleau-Ponty, with an emphaisis on the key 
themes of ambiguity, intersubjectivity and the importance of others, one can 
overcome the criticism of an inherent "Sartreanism" in her work and understand the 
complexity of her arguments about freedom and situation. Importantly, this allows 
us to place an emphasis on joy in being-with-others that is not evident in the 
81 Beauvoir, Simone, de, Laforce de l'age, Gallimard: Paris, 1960. 
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Sartrean account of subjectivity and which is crucial to her account of authenticite. I 
will return to these themes in subsequent chapters to further elaborate the 
irreducible connection between the concepts of freedom, ambiguity and authenticite 
in de Beauvoir's ethics and ontology. 
HISTORICAL LOCATION 
Simone de Beauvoir received her Agregee de Philosophie in 1929 (the youngest person 
to have done so at that time), after attending lectures at the Ecole Normale Superieure, 
where she met and befriended Sartre and Merleau-Ponty as well as Raymond Aron 
and Claude Levi-Strauss (amongst others). Although she did not claim to be a 
philosopher (and much has been written about her statements that Sartre was the 
philosopher and she was the novelist) her many published novels also contain a 
great deal of philosophical thought and questioning.sz De Beauvoir's idea of 
philosophy and its purpose is that it should be able to be 'lived' and not simply an 
abstract system of thought devoid of real meaning for real people. A quote from 
"What is Existentialism?" (an article written by de Beauvoir for French-English 
newspaper France-Amerique in 1947) illustrates well her view on philosophy and the 
way in which it can reach a broader population: 
The fact that non-specialists, regardless of their incompetence, are interested 
in existentialism must have an explanation. Symbolic logic, for example, 
never incited such passionate disputes. The reason, in fact, is that although 
existentialism claims to rest on the most serious theoretical bases, it also 
claims to be a practical and living attitude toward the problems posed by the world 
today. It is a philosophy yet does not want to stay enclosed in books and 
82 For example Margaret Simons argues that de Beauvoir's 1927 diaries reveal "her 
passionate commitment to doing philosophy, [and that] ... her literary methodology for doing 
philosophy acknowledges early philosophical influences and defines major themes of her 
own later philosophy and that of Sartre's Being and Nothingness" (Simons, Margaret, 'An 
appeal to re-open the question of influence', Philosophy Today., 1998. Vol. 42, pp 17-25). 
Kate and Edward Fullbrook also argue that de Beauvoir first developed the ideas later to be 
found in Sartre's Being and Nothingness and that he developed these after reading the second 
draft of de Beauvoir's novel She Came to Stay, (Fullbrook & Fullbrook, Simone de Beauvoir and 
Jean-Paul Sartre: The Remaking of a Twentieth-Century Legend, London: Harvester, 1993.) 
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schools; it intends to revive the great tradition of ancient wisdom that also 
involved difficult physics and logic, yet proposed a concrete attitude to all 
men. That is why it is not expressed solely in theoretical and abstract 
treatises but also strives to reach a larger public through novels and plays 
(WIE, p324, my emphasis). 
De Beauvoir contends that " ... philosophy ... particularly in France, has never 
appeared as a singular discipline but as a global vision of the world and of man that 
must embrace the totality of the human domain" (Ibid). For de Beauvoir, there was 
a difference in the way she and Sartre 'did' philosophy that reflects this focus on the 
lived-world. In her autobiographical work, Prime of Life, she wrote of this difference, 
"if a theory convinced me, it did not remain exterior to me, it changed my relation 
to the world, coloured my experience .... for me philosophy was a living reality" (PL, 
p254, emphasis added). 
Although much of her existential analysis of the human situation occurs more 
implicitly in her novels and plays, de Beauvoir also published a number of explicitly 
philosophical texts throughout her career. Examples of these include Pyrrhus et 
Cineas (1944), Moral Idealism and Political Realism (1945), Existentialism and Popular 
Wisdom (1945), Literature and Metaphysics (1946), The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947) and 
The Second Sex in 1949. Similar themes pervade these texts, most notably her focus 
on freedom, situation, the ambiguous nature of self-other relations and the 
importance of recognising this for ethics. These themes will recur throughout this 
thesis. 
De Beauvoir was also involved in the founding of the journal Les Tempes Modernes, 
which she both edited and contributed to, along with Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Aron 
and others. This political journal provided the opportunity for French intellectuals 
to comment on political situations both in France and in other areas of Europe, 
demonstrating de Beauvoir's interest in the political and social issues of her time.83 
83 For biographical information on de Beauvoir see Deirdre Bair, Simone de Beauvoir: A 
Biography, Vintage: Great Britain, 1991. 
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Again, this is evidence of de Beauvoir's belief that philosophy should not be a 
practice abstracted from the everyday lives of people but is "a living reality". This 
belief is reiterated in "Existentialism and Popular Wisdom", where de Beauvoir 
writes that "every living step is a philosophical choice and the ambition of a 
philosophy worthy of the name is to be a way of life that brings its justification with 
itself" (EPW, p218). 
INFLUENCES ON DE BEAUVOIR 
There is much debate in de Beauvoir scholarship over who the major philosophical 
influences upon her were, and a cursory glance at the 'contents' section of The 
Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir gives an example of these varied 
influences.84 Sartre, Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, Malebranche, 
Wright, Marx and Hegel are all mentioned as influencing her work in some way; 
whether she is seen to be espousing either similar or contrasting arguments. De 
Beauvoir herself makes reference in her work to many of these philosophers, as well 
as to others such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Camus, Descartes, Levinas, Rousseau, 
Aristotle and Plato. As we saw in the previous chapter, a number of scholars have 
also argued that the importance of past philosophers, such as Hegel, to her work 
have been obscured by poor translations. 
Whilst I do draw some explicit parallels between her work and that of Merleau-
Ponty, as well as acknowledging her own continued assertion about the closeness of 
her work to Sartre's, and the influence of Hegel' s master-slave dialectic on her 
understanding of the self-other relation, I argue that de Beauvoir, like every 
philosopher before and after her, is indebted in at least some way to the thought 
that has come before.85 Focusing on one key influence risks losing the complexity of 
84 Margaret Simons argues that, conversely, "Sartre's philosophical debt to de Beauvoir may 
have been ... considerable" (Simons, M., 'An appeal to re-open the question of influence', 
Philosophy Today, Celina: 1998, Vol. 42, pp 17-25). 
85 Bergoffen notes in her introduction to Pyrrhus et Cineas that "Beauvoir herself is a reliable 
guide [to her intellectual situation]. She refers us to Hegel, Heidegger, Nietzsche, 
Kierkegaard and Descartes amongst others, as she situates herself among those influencing 
her thinking" (See introduction to Pyrrhus et Cineas, in Simons, Margaret A., with Marybeth 
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her own particular philosophy. As one de Beauvoir scholar has recently stated, 
"what emerges from the study of Beauvoir' s early influences is how heterogeneous 
her philosophical background was with respect to genre and style".86 
Furthermore, as de Beauvoir herself argues, we are all part of a cultural and 
historical context in which ideas, beliefs, imaginings and assumptions are 
continually being taken up and developed, in denial or in affirmation, and our work 
develops in response to the situation in which we are embedded; 
A philosophical theory, like a physics or mathematical theory, is accessible 
only to the initiated. Indeed, it is indispensable to be familiar with the long 
tradition upon which it rests if one wants to grasp the foundations and the 
originality of the new doctrine (WIE, p324). 
In support of this claim, Martin Dillon argues that "the history of Western 
Philosophy... manifests in retrospect an eidetic necessity in the manner of its 
unfolding ... present thought is conditioned by past thought" and that, therefore, 
"one understands a philosopher's thought better if one interprets it within its 
historical context, specifically within the contexts of its philosophical antecedents".87 
Ultimately, however, this thesis aims to "extricate" de Beauvoir from a particular 
reading of Sartreanism and to align her more closely with Merleau-Ponty, 
particularly in terms of her account of intersubjectivity and the body and the 
purpose of philosophical analysis, for, as Sara Heinamaa argues: 
... if we let go of the assumption that Beauvoir's philosophical position 
adheres to the commitments of her private life, then it becomes possible to 
pose the scholarly questions of interpretation. We can ask if Beauvoir's 
Timmerman and Mary Beth Mader (Eds.), Simone De Beauvoir: Philosophical Writings, 
University of Illinois Press: Urbana and Chicago, 2004, p81). 
86 Altman, Meryl, 'Beauvoir, Hegel, War', in Hypatia, Vol. 22, no. 3, Summer 2007, p 68. 
87 Dillon, Martin, Merleau-Ponty's Ontology, Northwestern University Press: Illinois, 1997 
(Second Edition), p xvii. 
38 
discussion of subjectivity really is similar to that of Sartre or perhaps nearer 
to that of Merleau-Ponty or Heidegger.88 
OVERCOMING SARTREANISM. DE BEAUVOIR AND MERLEAU-PONTY: 
UNINTENTIONAL ALLIES? 
As noted above, in mainstream European philosophy, de Beauvoir' s name is most 
often associated with that of her long time partner Jean-Paul Sartre. There has been 
debate in both mainstream and feminist philosophy as to how important the 
influence of Sartre was on de Beauvoir and, for some time, it was commonly held 
that The Second Sex, was 'simply' an application or extension of Sartre's existentialist 
theory to the situation of women.89 As noted above, however, the reception of de 
Beauvoir' s work has recently changed, and a number of scholars argue that her 
work in fact provides an implicit critique of Sartre's social philosophy, and that we 
can find in it a richer and more complex account of subjectivity that has pertinence 
for political theory today.90 Sonia Kruks, for example, argues that in The Second Sex 
de Beauvoir "begins from within Sartre's framework, but ends by offering us an 
analysis which bursts out of the confines of Sartreanism" .91 Kruks in fact, argues 
that, contrary to de Beauvoir inheriting Sartre's views, "the case can be made that at 
certain points in Sartre's development it is Beauvoir's intellectual history that 
88 Heinamaa, Sara, introduction to Review of the Phenomenology of Perception, in Simone De 
Beauvoir: Philosophical Writings, Simons, Margaret A, with Marybeth Timmerman and Mary 
Beth Mader (eds), University of Illinois Press: Urbana and Chicago, 2004, p 157. 
89 Moira Gatens, in her earlier work, argues that de Beauvoir is limited by Sartre's 
existentialism and the male biases inherent within it. She also argues that de Beauvoir is 
influenced by Sartre's negative view of the female body (Feminism and Philosophy· Perspectives 
on Equality and Difference, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, pp 48, 54, 55, 59). 
H.M. Parshley, in his introduction to the English translation of The Second Sex, wrote of de 
Beauvoir that "her philosophy is focused in the Existentialism of Sartre" (Preface to TSS, p8). 
Margaret Simons argues, conversely, that "Sartre's philosophical debt to de Beauvoir may 
have been ... considerable" (Simons, M., 'An appeal to re-open the question of influence', 
Philosophy Today, Celina: 1998, Vol. 42, pp 17-25). 
90 See Kruks, Sonia, Situation and Human Existence: Freedom, Subjectivity and Society, Unwin 
Hyman: London, 1990 and Nancy Bauer, Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy and Feminism, 
Columbia University Press: New York, 2001 for examples of this argument. 
91 Kruks, Sonia, Situation and Human Existence, p 99. 
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becomes his. This is particularly so with regard to Sartre's struggle ... to develop a 
social philosophy" .92 
Despite the fact that many now argue that it is not the case, de Beauvoir herself 
consistently argued that she was working within a 'Sartrean' account of 
existentialism. She argued that the problems raised against existentialism were due 
to the fact that Sartre's work was misunderstood by many of his critics and that she 
took up many of the themes of his work in order to address this misunderstanding. 
In The Ethics of Ambiguity for example, de Beauvoir makes the overt claim to develop 
an existential ethic, which critics argued was not possible with the existentialism 
Sartre developed in Being and Nothingness. De Beauvoir writes of this criticism: 
[I]t is ... true that in Being and Nothingness Sartre has insisted above all on the 
abortive aspect of the human adventure. It is only in the last pages that he 
opens up the perspective of an ethics. However, if we reflect upon his 
descriptions of existence, we perceive that they are far from condemning 
man without recourse. The failure described in Being and Nothingness is 
definitive, but it is also ambiguous (TEA, p11). 
It should also be noted that, on the other hand, de Beauvoir made few explicit 
claims to support the work of Merleau-Ponty and, in 1955, when he publicly 
criticised Sartre in the Adventures of the Dialectic, de Beauvoir responded in Les temps 
Modernes with an article entitled "Merleau-Ponty and the Pseudo Sartreanism" .93 In 
this article de Beauvoir was critical of Merleau-Ponty for deliberately 
misrepresenting Sartre's work, arguing that he had misinterpreted Sartre on all his 
92 Kruks, Sonia, "Simone de Beauvoir: Teaching Sartre about Freedom", in Simons, Margaret, 
(Ed.) Feminist Interpretations of Simone de Beauvoir, The Pennsylvania University Press: 
Pennsylvania, 1995 
93 Beauvoir, Simone de, "Merleau-Ponty and Pseudo Sartreanism", trans. Veronique Zaytzeff 
with the assistance of Frederick Morrison, International Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 21, 3, 1980 
reprinted in The Debate between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Jon Stewart (Ed.), Northwestern 
University Press: Evanston, 1998, pp 448-491. 
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major themes, and that basically, he "had got it wrong".94 De Beauvoir does admit 
here that Merleau-Ponty could be praised for "creating a philosophy that surpasses 
the difficulties of Sartreanism" (PS, p 489), however, although their friendship had 
preceded de Beauvoir' s relationship with Sartre, their relationship did not have 
anywhere near the closeness or intensity that she shared with Sartre. She wrote in 
her memoirs "I saw quickly that in spite of our affinities there was a good deal of 
distance between Pradelle [Merleau-Ponty] and I. In his purely cerebral inquietude, 
I did not recognise my inner anguishing" (The Prime of Life). 95 
Margaret Whitford supports de Beauvoir's claim that Merleau-Ponty misinterprets 
Sartre and that he overemphasises the differences between himself and Sartre in 
order to develop his argument more emphatically. She asserts that the major 
difference between the two, who were both nevertheless interested in the world and 
how it is experienced by humans, was that "for Sartre man is free" whilst for 
Merleau-Ponty "man is historical"96• De Beauvoir elaborates this distinction in her 
review of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: 
Sartre, in Being and Nothingness, first emphasizes the opposition of the "for-
itself" and the "in-itself" and the nihilating power of the mind in the face of 
being, and the absolute freedom of the mind, Merleau-Ponty, on the 
contrary, concentrates on describing the concrete character of the subject that 
is never, according to him, a pure for-itself. Actually, he thinks that our 
existence never grasps itself in its nakedness but is expressed by our body. 
And this body is not enclosed in the instant but implies an entire history, 
and even a prehistory. (RoPP, p 163). 
Although de Beauvoir argues that Merleau-Ponty "got Sartre wrong", with his 
criticisms of the dualistic ontology he saw to be operating in Being and Nothingness, a 
94 See Whitford, Margaret, Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Sartre's Philosophy, French Forum 
Publishers, Lexington, Kentucky, 1982, p 10 and Stewart, Jon, (ed) The Debate Between Sartre 
and Merleau-Ponty, Northwestern University Press, 1998 for further discussion of this point. 
9s Quoted in The Debate between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Jon Stewart (Ed.), Northwestern 
University Press: Evanston, 1998. 
96 Whitford, Margaret, Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Sartre's Philosophy, p14. 
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number of recent scholars argue that de Beauvoir' s account of the subject is much 
closer to that of Merleau-Ponty than Sartre.97 Gail Weiss, for example, argues that 
Merleau-Ponty's 'philosophy of the ambiguous' is a direct influence on de 
Beauvoir's argument in The Ethics of Ambiguity and, with a growing number of 
others, she reads de Beauvoir as being more closely aligned with Merleau-Ponty 
(with respect to her existential ethics) than with Sartre.98 Rosalyn Diprose also 
acknowledges de Beauvoir's claim to be a follower of Sartre but argues that: 
To the extent that she does point to a generosity of flesh, this indicates an 
ontology that departs from Sartre's individualism and from a Hegelian ideal 
of unity and that moves beyond the anti-body logic of both. Insofar as she 
has a different understanding of alienation and of the role of the body in 
sexuality and other relations, Beauvoir does not so much betray a debt to 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, as Toril Moi argues, but has some common ground 
with Merleau-Ponty.99 
It is with the emphasis on embodied history and situation that links can be drawn 
between de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty because, for both, historical location is 
crucial to understanding the current situation and how one has come to be as they 
are. De Beauvoir describes this point in her review of Merleau-Ponty's work: 
Merleau-Ponty shows us that the phenomenological attitude allows man to 
access the world, and to find himself there: it is in giving myself to the world 
that I realize myself, and it is in assuming myself that I have a hold on the 
world (RoPP, p 160). 
97 See Kruks, Sonia, Situation and Human Existence:Freedom, Subjectivity and Society, Unwin 
Hyman: London, 1990, p 30; Langer, Monika, 'Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty on ambiguity in 
the Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp87-106, 
and Nancy Bauer, Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophy and Feminism, Columbia University Press: 
New York, 2001. 
98 Weiss, Gail, "Ambiguity", in Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts, Rosalyn Diprose and Jack 
Reynolds (Eds.), Acumen Publishing, 2008, p9. 
99 Diprose, Rosalyn, Corporeal Generosity: On Giving with Nzetzche, Levinas and Merleau-Ponty, 
State University of New York Press: Albany, 2002. 
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De Beauvoir is here reviewing the way in which, for Merleau-Ponty, the 'failure' of 
the phenomenological reduction helps us to learn something about ourselves, that 
is, about our inextricable ties to the world. These ties are revealed by the 
impossibility of separating ourselves from the world in an attempt to better 
understand it. 
For both Merleau-Ponty and de Beauvoir, it is the body in its historical situation that 
provides the basis for understanding existence and, as we shall see below; our 
existential freedom is intertwined with this situated embodiment. The "absolute 
freedom of the mind" described by Sartre, is (for Merleau-Ponty and de Beauvoir) 
grounded or tethered to the world through our bodies and, therefore, a subject is 
always connected to others through this body and this world. 
Heinamaa also argues that de Beauvoir's work is not simply an extension or 
application of Sartrean existentialism and that she should be read with Merleau-
Ponty (and Husserl) in mind. She argues that it is a particular understanding of the 
philosopher's task and practice that de Beauvoir shares with Merleau-Ponty, which 
follows on from Husserl.100 Heinamaa argues that the Review of Phenomenology of 
Perception given by de Beauvoir: 
demonstrates Beauvoir's commitment to phenomenology [and] it also shows 
that Beauvoir clearly saw the difference between Merleau-Ponty's and 
Sartre's interpretations of Husserl's work and that she considered Merleau-
Ponty's non-dualistic modification more promising on account of its ethical 
implications.101 
Heinamaa argues that de Beauvoir's account of embodiment in The Second Sex is 
heavily influenced by the account of embodied subjectivity developed by Merleau-
100 Heinamaa, Sara, 'Simone de Beauvoir's phenomenology of sexual difference', Hypatia, 
Bloomington: Fall 1999, Vol. 14, Iss 4, pp 114-133. 
IOI Ibid, p118. 
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Ponty in the Phenomenology of Perception and that, through Merleau-Ponty's account, 
she was introduced to Husserlian phenomenology.102 
Although she obviously shares many connections with Sartre's work and explicitly 
supports it, it can be argued that de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty share an interest 
in a number of themes which are not supported by Sartre's account. Kruks argues 
that these themes include "the interdependence of freedoms, or Mitsein, immanence, 
social institution, the generality of situations and of the body" and she concludes 
that, "what we might call a philosophy of the socially situated subject can be better 
anchored in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological ontology" than in Sartre's.103 
A key theme of this thesis is to demonstrate that the relationship between self and 
other is crucial to de Beauvoir's ethical account and her insistence that this relation 
is always in a state of tension is developed in a positive way, enabling the possibility 
for loving and compassionate relations between individuals (as well as for hostile 
and oppressive relationships). Kruks argues that both Merleau-Ponty and de 
Beauvoir, unlike Sartre in Being and Nothingness, emphasise the importance and the 
possibility of harmonious intersubjective relations. For Merleau-Ponty, the subject is 
"consciousness engorged with the sensible" and in The Second Sex, de Beauvoir's 
subject is "never pure for-itself" but rather an embodied consciousness, a socially 
situated and conditioned freedom".104 Merleau-Ponty, in divergence from the 
Hegelian-Sartrean 'subject-in-conflict' of the master-slave dialectic, argues that 
102 Heinamaa, Sara, "The body as instrument and as expression", in The Cambridge Companion 
to Simone de Beauvoir, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p66. 
Kristana Arp argues that de Beauvoir takes the Husserlian account of intentionality and the 
existential-phenomenology of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty further than either were able to 
with her recognition of the always sexed and gendered subject and she writes that 
"Beauvoir's description of intentionality as a site of contesting desires [the desire to be being 
and the desire to disclose being] may be read as a critique of the blind spots in Sartre's and 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenologies: for according to Beauvoir, our relationship to the 
otherness of Being cannot be adequately described as wholly reciprocal or wholly contesting 
and appropriative. It is both, and it is in being both that the ambiguity of our condition lies". 
Arp, Kristana, 'Gendering the Perceiving Subject' in Feminist Phenomenology, Fisher and 
Embree (Eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London: 2000. 
103 Kruks, Sonia, Situation and Human Existence, p115. 
104 Ibid, p33. 
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although there is always the possibility for conflict in human relations, that there is 
also the possibility for harmonious intersubjective relations. Kruks writes, "Indeed, 
[Merleau-Ponty] may be best read as presenting human existence as a dialectic of 
communication and conflict, in which, although the former is always possible, it is 
never assured". ms 
Nancy Bauer also explores the aspect of self-other relations in her examination of de 
Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty's ontologies, and she claims that de Beauvoir gives a 
re-reading of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic that, although always in tension, is 
not inherently conflictual.106 Crucially, de Beauvoir writes that the reciprocal relation 
between self and other will be held "sometimes in enmity, sometimes in amity, 
always in a state of tension" (TSS, p93, emphasis added). Unlike de Beauvoir and Sartre, 
however, Merleau-Ponty does not give as central a role to the master-slave dialectic 
in his examination of self-other relations. 
CARTESIANISM AND THE MIND-BODY RELATION 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is complex, and time does not permit a thorough 
analysis here. However, a brief account of some of his key themes will be required 
in order to explicate how his philosophy can support de Beauvoir' s ethics of 
ambiguity. 
Merleau-Ponty, like other existential philosophers of his time, was critical of the 
oppositional dualisms he saw to be operating in traditional philosophical accounts 
of perception. In these traditional accounts the mind was privileged over the body 
(in intellectualism) or the reverse (in empiricism) and, in both cases, a separation 
was maintained between the mind and body as distinct but interacting entities 
almost 'accidentally' situated in the world. Like de Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty was 
critical of this Cartesian belief that saw the mind 'telling' the body what to do and as 
10s Ibid, (Kristana Arp also discusses this aspect of Merleau-Ponty's work and its parallels 
with de Beauvoir's work in Arp, K, The Bonds of Freedom: Simone de Beauvoir's Existentialist 
Ethics, Open Court: Chicago, 2001). 
106 Nancy Bauer, Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy and Feminism, Columbia University Press: 
New York, 2001. 
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being responsible for meaning.107 According to Merleau-Ponty, we should not be 
seeking understanding of a Cartesian consciousness that locates itself via the "I 
think that" but rather we must see our relationship with the world as the 
possibilities and limits associated with "I can" (PP, p159). In this way, we see that 
our body is in fact our anchorage in the world, that our 'mind' is incarnated, and that 
it is our body that provides the possibility for relation and understanding. The 
world and the things around us acquire significance through the ways we inhabit 
them bodily, via our particular situation, and Merleau-Ponty describes this as an 
'intentional arc' "which is the unity of consciousness, embodiment and the world 
made manifest through embodied experience" .108 
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty criticises both empiricism and 
intellectualism (two enduring tendencies in modem thought since Descartes) for 
their failure to identify, or acknowledge, the relationship between consciousness 
and body, or perception and bodily motility and experience. He rejects the dualistic 
viewpoints that see the objects of perception as being purely exterior to 
'consciousness' and determination of it, and also, the possibility of a 'pure 
interiority' - a perceiving subject that constructs the world. Moreover, both 
empiricism and intellectualism entail a search for certainty about how we can 
'know' anything about the world. Both are looking for an absolute ground for 
knowledge. 
For the empiricist, the search for truth and knowledge is based on the theory that all 
knowledge originates in experience and this is confined to perceptual experience 
107 Discussion about this problematic dualistic understanding of mind and body had arisen 
some time before Merleau-Ponty, and the questioning of the particular Cartesian dualism is 
demonstrated in Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia's criticism of Rene Descartes. In her letters to 
Descartes, Elisabeth questioned how the 'mind' could possibly move the material body if it 
has no driving force itself and exists outside, or in separation from, the material. Although 
this may seem like an obvious criticism, the dualistic understanding that Elisabeth 
questioned is evident in many philosophical accounts of mind/body relations and, in 
popular discourse, this dualism is often used to describe the relation between body and 
mind (Tollefsen, Debra, 'Princess Elisabeth and the problem of mind-body interaction, 
Hypatia, Bloomington: Summer, 1999, Vol. 13. Issue 3, pp 59-79). 
108 Cerbone, David, Understanding Phenomenology, Acumen: Chesham, 2006, pllO. 
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that is understood as involving raw sense data or impressions (for example in Locke 
and Hume). On this account, the mind is passive and 'cognises' the sensations given 
to it through/by the body, from the world. The mind combines sensations rather than 
creating them - it is the passive spectator in perception. Things are real if we can 
trace them back to events in the world that the intellect has not 'altered'. Empiricists 
ground knowledge and truth in the world and argue that imagination can 'distort' 
what is given to us by the world. According to the empiricist there is an 'objective' 
world, which can be separated and understood aside from the subject who perceives 
it. 
A major criticism Merleau-Ponty made of the empiricist argument was against the 
idea of separate and distinct faculties, where each of the senses was seen to receive 
its respective stimuli in separation from the other senses (the ear receives a sound, 
the eye light and colour, the tongue taste and the skin touch). On this argument, it is 
the mind that aggregates these separate events into the perception or understanding 
of something which exists in the world. The empiricist argument maintains a 
separation between the perceiver and the world, where the mind does the 
organising by combining sensed datum that is 'given' to it by the faculties. For the 
empiricist, perception (ultimately) is equivalent to the reception and combination of 
basic units of experience. Merleau-Ponty describes it thus: 
... whereas sight, touch and hearing are so many ways of gaining access to 
the object, these structures found themselves transformed [by empiricism] 
into compact qualities derived from the local distinction between the organs 
used. Thus the relationship between stimulus and perception could remain 
clear and objective, and the psycho-physical event was of the same kind as 
the causal relations obtaining 'in the world' (PP, pp84-85). 
Merleau-Ponty argued against the empiricist's passive and receptive consciousness 
(the 'receiving mind') which imagined the body as the conveyer of stimuli through 
separate senses or faculties that the mind subsequently 'orders' or arranges into 
concepts. The passivity entailed in this account leaves us 'out' of the world, in 
separation from it and poses a consciousness that is separate from our body. 
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Intellectualism, Merleau-Ponty's term which seems to amount to a curious mixture 
of what has traditionally been called idealism or rationalism, on the other hand, sees 
consciousness or the mind as the determiner of meaning, so that there is no meaning 
separate from the consciousness that perceives it. Intellectualism wants to ground 
knowledge in the "de-personalised knowing subject" where relations between 
things are in our thoughts rather than in the world, so that all relations are 
produced by the mind: they do not exist in the world in separation from 
consciousness. 
Meaning, therefore, is either outside of consciousness or all meaning depends upon 
consciousness.109 Merleau-Ponty argued against the dichotomous logic of the debate 
that: 
In the first case [empiricism] consciousness is too poor, in the second 
[intellectualism] too rich for any phenomenon to appeal compellingly to it. 
Empiricism cannot see that we need to know what we are looking for, 
otherwise we would not be looking for it, and intellectualism fails to see that 
we need to be ignorant of what we are looking for, or equally again we 
should not be searching. They are in agreement in that neither can grasp 
consciousness in the act of learning, and that neither attaches due 
importance to that circumscribed ignorance, that still 'empty' but already 
determinate intention which is attention itself (PP, p 32). 
In Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty criticises both empiricism and 
intellectualism for not having an appreciation of the "embodied" nature of the 
experience of perception, arguing that what they failed to see was the 'integrity of 
bodily self-experience'.11° For both intellectualism and empiricism then, the 
separation between consciousness and world is maintained and the mind/body 
dualism carried on. Both of these traditional accounts negate the ambiguous relation 
between the body-subject and the world. 
109 See Dillon, Martin, "The Cartesian Origins of Empiricism and Intellectualism" in Merleau-
Ponhj's Ontology, Northwestern University Press: Illinois, 1997 (Second Edition). 
11° Cerbone, David, Understanding Phenomenology, Acumen: Chesham, 2006, plOO. 
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THE BODY-SUBJECT 
Merleau-Ponty demonstrates that past accounts of the subject and the relationship 
between 'consciousness' and 'world' in philosophy, psychology and in science, are 
flawed as they do not give weight to the central importance of the body in 
perception and experience. Instead, they maintain a separation between 
consciousness and world that privileges an 'inner self', a Cogito, or that sees the 
body as causally determined by its surroundings in an objectivist manner. He, on 
the other hand, argues for a body-subject that is firmly embedded with others in the 
world and he criticises traditional accounts of the subject for not recognising the 
importance of the body to experience and for maintaining too radical a distinction 
between body and mind, self and other and self and world: 
Analytical reflection believes that it can trace back the course followed by a 
prior constituting act and arrive, in the 'inner man' - to use St Augustine's 
expression - at a constituting power which has always been identical with 
that inner self. Thus reflection is carried off by itself and installs itself in an 
impregnable subjectivity, as yet untouched by being and time. But this is 
very ingenuous, or at least it is an incomplete form of reflection which loses 
sight of its own beginning ... The real has to be described, not constructed or 
formed ... The real is a closely woven fabric. It does not await our 
judgement. .. (PP, xi). 
Merleau-Ponty's project was to describe the world as it is perceived and 
experienced and, as such, the living human body is central to his exploration. 
Rather than rationality, the Cogito or a disembodied mind, Merleau-Ponty focuses 
on the lived-body, the body-subject which is not mere material 'flesh' but which is 
our means of responding to the world. He writes that "I cannot understand the 
function of the living body except by enacting it myself, and except in so far as I am 
a body which rises towards the world" (PP, 87 emphasis added). De Beauvoir summarises 
this point in her review of his work, which she says demonstrates the way that our 
body is not an object or a 'thing' in the same way as other things in the world, 
because it is our way of being in and "having" a world: 
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Our body is not first posited in the world the way a tree or a rock is. It lives 
in the world; it is our general way of having a world, it expresses our 
existence, which signifies not that is an exterior accompaniment of our 
existence, but that our existence realizes itself in it (RoPP, p161) 
This point, that we do not experience our bodies as objects in the world is an 
important one for both de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty and it demonstrates their 
links to Husserl's phenomenology. Like Sartre and Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty was 
interested to examine what phenomenology could do to overturn the prevalent 
rationalist discourse evident in philosophy, and he sought to bring philosophy 'back 
to the world' and to lived experience using (a re-thought) Husserlian 
phenomenology. 
A key point of Husserl's account of lived-experience, which Merleau-Ponty took up, 
is the distinction made between the two different ways in which we experience 
material bodies; these being the lived bodies of other people and other creatures 
(Leib) and those of inert objects in the world (Karper), such as rocks, objects 
constructed by humans and metals - or 'mere things'. The concept of the lived-body 
is based on the German Leib, by which Husser! describes the 'living body' or 'the 
body-as-lived'. This is distinct from the term Karper, which is associated with the 
material or physical object and is linked to the English 'corpse'.111 As David Cerbone 
argues, this distinction is important for Husserl, in that it demonstrates his aim to 
dissociate the idea of the body from the material, from the object that carries, 
supports (or hinders) the mind or soul in Cartesian thought. I understand myself 
through all the relations I have with the world, both spatio-temporal and 
conceptual, and I understand the world - at the same time - through its relations 
with me. I am in the world and of the world, and I must understand myself through 
this world and it is my body which I am that enables this experience. As Merleau-
Ponty argues, we must abandon "the [idea of the] body as object, partes extra partes, 
and [go] back to the body which I experience at this moment" (PP, 87, emphasis added). 
The body should not be understood as an object or thing with reducible and 
m Cerbone, David, Understanding Phenomenology, p85. 
50 
separate parts which have no interdependence and which exist alongside, beyond 
and exterior to each other. The body is lived in the world as a whole, within a 
horizon and in relation to other objects and other bodies.112 
For Merleau-Ponty, the body is a "permanent presence" in perceptual experience 
but it is distinct from the "defacto permanence of certain objects" and is not an 
"organ compared to a tool which is always available" (PP, p91). This is an 
important point, that the body should not be viewed as a 'tool' that a separate 
(inner) entity that is 'me' drives or uses, rather, I am my body and my body is me. It 
is the means by which I can interact with and experience the world but is in no way 
distinct from an underlying or overarching 'me'. As Merleau-Ponty argues; "[t]he 
body is not one more among external objects, with the peculiarity of always being 
there. If it is permanent, the permanence is absolute and is the ground for the 
relative permanence of disappearing objects, real objects" (PP, p92). As de Beauvoir 
describes it, "thus, perception is not a relationship between a subject and an object 
foreign to one another; it ties us to the world as to our homeland, it is 
communication and communion" (RoPP, p162). 
We must not forget that the particular body we have makes possible or limits the 
kinds of things and objects we can experience. A male body cannot experience the 
sensations of childbirth; an 'able' body does not experience what it is like to 
continually negotiate the world with a disability; and a 'black' body will be lived 
differently within a context of racism and oppression than will a body of the 
dominant race (whether it be a body with a disability, a sexed body or a chronically 
ill body). 
Both Merleau-Ponty and de Beauvoir have been criticised for failing to adequately 
account for differences such as these in their philosophies and I acknowledge the 
lack of explicit analysis of such bodily differences in their work. However, the 
philosophies of ambiguity that both develop do allow for an analysis of the 
112 Sara Heinamaa argues that Simone de Beauvoir's existential-phenomenological account of 
the lived and sexed body is also influenced by Husser!, through Merleau-Ponty's account of 
the lived-body in the Phenomenology of Perception. 
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importance of differences and particularity. For example, within Merleau-Ponty's 
account is the acknowledgement that we cannot 'know' the other's experience in the 
same way that they do, or experience the world in exactly the same way and he 
writes that: 
. . . my human gaze never posits more than one facet of the object, even 
though by means of horizons it is directed towards all the others. It can 
never come up against previous appearances or those presented to other 
people otherwise than through the intermediary of time and language (PP, 
80). 
A body is informed by its history, its relations to others and its intentionality. The 
body, therefore, is not just 'immanence', but also contains within itself and its 
relationship with the world the potential for transcendence. Here "[t]he body is the 
vehicle of being in the world, and having a body is, for a living creature, to be 
intervolved in a definite environment, to identify oneself with certain projects and to 
be continually committed to them" (PP, p94, emphasis added). 
The interconnection between the social and biological is also crucial to de Beauvoir' s 
account of human existence and it is important to note that social as well as physical 
situatedness contributes to the formation of one's sense of self and subjectivity in 
Merleau-Ponty's work. For him, a key factor in this sense 'of self is the role of the 
body's motility (its capacity to move itself and to move itself over its own parts), 
which gives the body its early sense of its boundaries, limits and integrity via 
feelings. This is the key to the idea of the body-subject for Merleau-Ponty - the 
capacity for motility, feeling and perception. However, it must also be recognised 
that these capacities develop in social situation. We become subjects through bodily 
relations with our sense of self, others and objects in the world - in a society. 
Situation involves time, place, others, self, history and the socio-political order and 
understanding is therefore interpretative, for as de Beauvoir says in The Second Sex, 
"On their own, these facts have no significance". In her review of Phenomenology of 
Perception de Beauvoir describes it thus: 
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If I exist as a subject, it's because I am capable of tying together a past, a 
present and a future; it's because I make time ... Perceiving space, perceiving 
the object, is unfolding time around me, but the perceptual synthesis always 
remains incomplete because the temporal synthesis is never completed 
(Review of PP, p163). 
Like de Beauvoir's analysis of 'woman' in The Second Sex, Merleau-Ponty's account 
of the body-subject requires recognition of our inability to 'do without' our body. 
The absence of our body is inconceivable and the body cannot be seen in the same 
way as another object (as it is in much science, religion and philosophy). This is 
because an object "is an object only insofar as it can be moved away from me ... Its 
presence is such that it entails a possible absence. Now the permanence of my body 
is entirely different in kind" (PP, 90). Although this also means that the other's 
body can be seen as an object as it can be moved away from me, applying the 
account of ambiguity to self-other relations also entails a reciprocity, where we 
recognise that 'I', like the other, is always both self and other in a continued state of 
tension and never reducible to either. This ambiguous nature of human existence 
and experience is foundational to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy and he argues that 
"what enables us to centre our existence is also what prevents us from centering it 
completely, and the anonymity of our body is inseparably both freedom and 
servitude" (cf PP, p346, my emphasis). This quote resonates with de Beauvoir's 
argument about our ambiguous and paradoxical nature in The Ethics of Ambiguity, 
where she writes: 
In spite of so many stubborn lies, at every moment, at every opportunity, the 
truth comes to light, the truth of life and death, of my solitude and my bond 
with the world, of my freedom and my servitude, of the insignificance and the 
sovereign importance of each man and all men ... (TEA, p9, emphasis added). 
This understanding of the ambiguous body-in-situation (which is always seeking 
but never finding equilibrium) is further examined when Merleau-Ponty discusses 
the breaking down of the distinction between inner self and outer world, between 
public and private. In this sense, subjectivity is no longer sought in the private 
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domain of the 'mental' but is revealed in the interaction or relation between these 
realms - where we understand 'realms' as neither discrete from, nor identical with, 
each other.113 
In summary then, there are many links which can be drawn between the work of de 
Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty that further assist my aim of rethinking authenticite 
with ambiguity. This is not to say that the work of either should be equated with the 
other, but to reposition de Beauvoir away from many of the particularly Sartrean 
connotations that have influenced readings of her work. The relationships and 
differences between the philosophies of Sartre, de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty are 
further examined below and in subsequent chapters but for now, let us return to de 
Beauvoir (with Merleau-Ponty in mind). 
RETURNING TO SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR: A FEMINIST RE-READING 
How ever-many parallels and similarities can be drawn between de Beauvoir' s 
work and that of other (male) philosophers, there is no point in attempting to deny 
the importance of the relationship between Sartre and de Beauvoir, and the impact 
it had upon both their lives and their work. It is important to take note of de 
Beauvoir's insistence that what she was doing was something different to Sartre's 
philosophical work but nonetheless greatly influenced by the existentialism Sartre 
developed in Being and Nothingness. She did not want to produce what she saw as a 
purely philosophical method or account of existence, but rather wanted to explore 
the implications of existential philosophy in everyday circumstances - both in her 
novels and in her analyses of the human condition in her more explicitly 
philosophical works. All of these genres reveal the usefulness of de Beauvoir' s 
existential account of lived existence and, what I want to take up in this thesis, is the 
manner in which this philosophy offers a powerful descriptive and explanatory 
account of some complex contemporary social and political situations. Her account 
113 Reynolds, Jack, 'Maurice Merleau-Ponty', The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, James 
Fieser and Bradley Dowden, (eds), last accessed 11 June 2008, URL 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/m/merleau.htm 
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of ambiguity and authenticite also provides a foundation for responsible ethico-
political decision-making today. 
As mentioned above, a number of social and political feminist philosophers have 
advocated a 'return to de Beauvoir' as a means for moving beyond many of the 
problems that have plagued feminist, social and political philosophy. Most 
specifically, feminists such as Sonia Kruks and Nancy Bauer claim to find in de 
Beauvoir's work a way beyond the problems inherent in the equality/difference 
debate that limits feminist theory.114 As will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 
four, the assumptions underlying this equality/difference debate, far from being 
confined to feminist philosophy, have been implicit in most philosophical theory 
throughout Western history and have manifested in the mind/body debate, the 
subject/object divide and in arguments over biology 'versus' culture, or 'nature' 
versus 'nurture'. What underlies these arguments is an implicit assumption about 
the metaphysical or ontological status of what come to be seen as dichotomous 
terms. The reductive metaphysic that underlies both the arguments for (essential) 
difference and arguments for (essential) equality sees binaries as given, as existing a 
priori in the world, and each term is viewed as inherently separate and opposing, as 
mutually exclusive. 
As Kruks argues, in feminist theory in particular, and in identity politics in general, 
a key underlying issue in debates over equality and difference is a concern with 
'how to theorise the subject' or, how to understand the 'self'. I argue that this 
understanding of self and subjectivity is the first step in ethical questioning, and that 
the recognition of our fundamental ambiguity provides the foundation for ethical 
action. Only with an authentique realisation of how each subject exists in relation to 
a total situation (including biology; psychology; other people; the spaces inhabited 
and the social structure in which the subject lives) can we begin to develop ethical 
114 Others such as Karen Vintges, Debra Bergoffen, Margaret Simons, Barbara Andrew, Kate 
Fullbrook and Edward Fullbrook, Toril Moi, Eleanor Holveck, Gail Weiss and Penelope 
Deutscher have advocated for a re-reading of de Beauvoir for her philosophical importance 
and originality as well as for her particular contributions to feminist theory. See 
bibliography for full textual references for these authors. 
55 
relations with others. By recognising that we, and those around us, are thoroughly 
situated and that the meanings and values we have come to see in the world are 
likewise situated, we have the beginnings of an ethical foundation. Without this 
recognition, we can fall prey to the trap of believing that value and meaning are 
created ex nihlio or are static, inherent, or that they should not or cannot be changed. 
THE (IN)FAMOUS DE BEAUVOIRIAN INCONSISTENCIES: WHAT DID SHE 
REALLY MEAN? 
The paradoxes and inconsistencies that are seen by many to arise in de Beauvoir' s 
philosophy have often resulted in a condemnation of her work. For example, Celine 
Leon has written of de Beauvoir that she "does not speak with a single voice. Either 
she wishes to have it both ways, or she takes with one hand that which she gives 
with the other"115 and Penelope Deutscher asks in her examination of 'the notorious 
contradictions of Simone de Beauvoir'; "[i]s any feminist philosopher of the 
twentieth century better known for her contradictory arguments than Simone de 
Beauvoir?". Deutscher examines how we should understand the tensions that are so 
evident in de Beauvoir's work and argues that the account of freedom expressed in 
The Second Sex is contradictory. She argues that whilst women are (existentially) 
free, at the same time, de Beauvoir also describes their oppression and, in her 
description of female bodies and sexuality, appears to be arguing that women are in 
fact limited by their biology. 116 
As we have seen, some commentators have argued that this 'paradoxical' tendency 
is evidence of a tension between de Beauvoir' s own position and her attempt to 
remain true to Sartrean categories.117 Along these lines, Sonia Kruks argues that: 
"many of the inconsistencies in The Second Sex reflect the tension between her formal 
115 Leon, Celine, cited in Deutscher, Penelope, Yielding Gender: Feminism, Deconstruction and 
the History of Philosophy, London: Routledge, 1997, p 169. 
116 Deutscher, Penelope, Yielding Gender, p 169. 
117 Moira Gatens makes this claim in Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on Equality and 
Difference, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991. 
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adherence to Sartrean categories and the fact that the philosophical implications of 
the work are in large measure incompatible with Sartreanism".118 
As we will see in subsequent chapters of this thesis, the apparent contradictions in 
de Beauvoir can be better understood - although the tension implied never 
overcome - by taking seriously the different levels of freedom that operate in her 
philosophy. In addition, these contradictions can be re-thought by taking seriously 
her insistence that whilst we are all ontologically free, we are also always situated 
and our facticity, therefore, places limits upon our capacity to engage with our 
freedom. 
MORE THAN A MISINTERPRETATION? 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Toril Moi argues that many of the apparent 
contradictions in de Beauvoir's work arise due to problems with the translation of 
the original French text into English by Zoologist H.M. Parshley and the many 
omissions and philosophical misinterpretations that resulted from this 
(mis)translation. Moi calls for a re-translation of The Second Sex in order to recoup 
what is missing from the Parshley edition (as well as a number of the French 
editions) and she argues that generations of feminists have been misled by 
Parshley's translation. Moi names Penelope Deutscher as being one of those who 
reads contradictions into de Beauvoir' s work because of Parshley' s lack of 
philosophical knowledge and his 'elementary' mistranslations from French to 
English.119 
Although Moi' s arguments are pertinent, and it is well past time for a new 
translation of The Second Sex, Parshley's mistranslation - on its own - cannot 'explain 
away' all the apparent inconsistencies and paradoxes in de Beauvoir's work. 
Moreover, importantly, de Beauvoir would not want them to be explained away. 
118 Kruks, Sonia, Situation and Human Existence: Freedom, Sub7ectivity and Society, Unwin 
Hyman: London, 1990, p99. 
119 Moi, Toril, 'While we wait: The English translation of The Second Sex', Signs, Summer 2002; 
Vol.27, no 4, pplOOS-1035. 
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To a large extent, the divergent readings of de Beauvoir are the result of a persistent 
misunderstanding of her account of freedom and her arguments concerning the 
importance of ambiguity in understanding existence. Her claims - that both 
immanence and transcendence are integral to existence; that freedom and the limits 
of situation are inextricably connected; that one can be fundamentally 'free' and yet 
oppressed; and that subjects are always also at the same time objects - are read as 
'contradictory' in a context in which the terms proposed are seen to be mutually 
exclusive. For de Beauvoir, however, these ambiguities, paradoxes, or 
'contradictions' are part of our human experience, and she wants us to maintain the 
tension implied by this ambiguity in order to be authentique. Whilst readers are now 
recognising the importance of such a tension in de Beauvoir's work, many (as we 
have seen above) have criticised her for her contradictory accounts, particularly in 
her descriptions of the lives of women. 
RE-READING SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR WITH MOIRA GATENS: CHANGING 
INTERPRETATIONS 
In order to illustrate how a misunderstanding of the importance of ambiguity and 
paradox in de Beauvoir' s work results in a typical misreading, I will now examine 
the changing ways in which Australian feminist philosopher Moira Gatens has read 
de Beauvoir. Gatens is, in my opinion, a productive and influential social, political 
and feminist philosopher, who has made significant contributions to feminist 
debate. However, Gatens has made a number of explicit examinations of the legacy 
of de Beauvoir on feminism and, over time, has read her in a number of different 
ways. She has interpreted her as being limited by the masculine biases of Sartre's 
existential theory, perpetuating a dualism that sees woman's inferiority located in 
her biology; she has read de Beauvoir as an existential theorist who only 'accidently' 
overcomes the limits of Sartre's theory; and, most recently, has re-read her as a 
feminist and social philosopher who provides a radical and productive account of 
sexual difference that is neither essentialist nor constructivist. Although Gatens 
shares similar aims with de Beauvoir with respect to acknowledging the significance 
of the role of the body in human experience, she has only recently made these 
shared aims explicit in her 'second look' at de Beauvoir's account of biology. These 
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different readings, by the same philosopher, provide a good illustration of the 
complexity of de Beauvoir's work. 
The most quoted line from The Second Sex, "one is not born, but rather becomes, a 
woman", has been famously taken up by those arguing for a distinction between 
'sex' and 'gender' and de Beauvoir has historically been claimed as the 'mother' of 
this (social constructivist) distinction. Gatens is well-known for her arguments 
against this claim, however, seeing de Beauvoir' s account as more complex than the 
clear-cut binary assumed in the sex/gender distinction allows.120 In a re-thinking of 
her earlier work, Gatens has recently taken up de Beauvoir's interest in biology and 
the importance it plays in 'becoming' a woman, examining the focus in The Second 
Sex on the complex interaction between the material, social and psychological 
elements of human life. Gatens is amongst a number of theorists advocating a re-
examination of de Beauvoir with contemporary 'third wave' feminist aims in mind 
and her changing interpretation illustrates the ways in which de Beauvoir' s work 
can be interpreted and critiqued from both constructivist and essentialist 
viewpoints. As Gatens now argues, however, neither interpretation (constructivist 
nor essentialist) on its own is an appropriate reading of de Beauvoir' s work. 
DE BEAUVOIR LIMITED BY MALE-BIASED (SARTREAN) PHILOSOPHY 
In two articles written in the early 1990s, Gatens argued that Simone de Beauvoir 
represented a prime example (along with others such as Mary Wollstonecraft and 
Juliet Mitchell) of a feminist guilty of taking up male-biased philosophy and 
attempting to apply - or extend it - to questions of women's identity and 
existence.121 Gatens there argued that this feminist approach to philosophy, which is 
characterised by a mode of uncritical extension, entails "the adoption of a particular 
120 Gatens, Moira, 'A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction', in Beyond Marxism? 
Interventions after Marx, Allen, J. and Patton, Paul. (eds.), Intervention Publications: Sydney, 
1983. 
121 Gatens, Moira, 'Feminism, Philosophy and Riddles without Answers', in C. Pateman and 
E. Gross, eds, Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory, Allen and Unwin, 1991, pp 13-29 
and Gatens, Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on Equality and Difference, Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1991. 
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philosophical theory (for example liberalism, existentialism, Marxism), as a method 
of analysis which then takes 'woman' as its object, as its (philosophical) problem". 
Gatens writes that this is what "Wollstonecraft attempts, vis-a-vis 
egalitarianism ... what de Beauvoir attempts, vis-a-vis existentialism... and what 
Mitchell attempts, vis-a-vis both psychoanalysis and Marxism".122 She argues that 
"[a]s is well known, the particular form of existentialism employed by Beauvoir is 
that developed by Sartre in Being and Nothingness".123 Existentialism, rather than 
being a theory which can bring 'clarity' to the question 'what is a woman?' is seen as 
being hindered by its biases against women and "its presuppositions are such that 
women, their traditional activities, their bodies, and their subjectivities are rendered 
problematical relative to men, their pursuits and their bodies" .124 De Beauvoir, 
according to this reading, does not escape these inherent problems and her use of 
the immanence/transcendence distinction is seen to be male-biased, with female 
biology associated with 'immanence' and males associated with activities such as 
freely chosen, 'transcendent' projects. 
Like many other feminists, Gatens is (or was at this stage) critical of Sartre's 
existential account of lived experience. She argued that his account is problematic 
as it is applicable only to "free and equal subjectivities that encounter each other in a 
situation of struggle for mastery" and that this "is a description that is inappropriate 
for some men in some situations, and [she argues] for all women in some 
situations".125 At this stage of her writing, Gatens aligned de Beauvoir's account of 
subjectivity with Sartre's and saw her to be limited by his 'masculine' view of 
existence, which was far from universal in its application. Importantly Gatens 
argued that it is not only the content of Sartre's account that is sexist, but that the 
122 Gatens, Moira, Feminism and Philosophy, p 17. 
123 Ibid, p48. 
124 Ibid, p48. 
12s Ibid, pp19-20 It is important to note that Gatens is here also criticising Sartre for 
developing a theory that fails to encompass all male experience, as well as female experience. 
His account of the 'Look' is seen to be problematic in its presumed neutrality and 
universality, which is in actual fact based on the particular experience of a particular kind of 
man. 
60 
very framework of existentialism is biased toward a particular (masculine) view of 
humanity, which it attempts to 'sell' as a universal account of human existence. She 
argued that existentialism was not sex-neutral and that the sexism of Being and 
Nothingness was by no means limited to Sartre's use of misogynistic metaphors and 
sex-blind examples.126 Gatens argued that "metaphysics, theories of human nature 
and epistemology ... " are not sex-neutral and that they actually "provide the 
theoretical underpinnings for the biases which become visible at the socio-political 
level".127 A prime example of this is the position of women in society, which has 
historically seen women connected to the private realm of the home and, thus, 
excluded from the public realm in which political decisions are made for 'mankind'. 
Gatens cites de Beauvoir as a feminist caught up in the phallocentric discourse that 
presumes a neutral human subject, yet which aligns this 'universal' subject with 
'masculine' values and characteristics. She argues that " ... The Second 
Sex ... entertain[s] a philosophical dualism of the most orthodox kind that 
predisposes [de Beauvoir's] work toward locating the source of women's inferior 
status in female biology".128 De Beauvoir is accused of uncritically accepting 
mind/body and nature/culture distinctions and of "treating them as being given 
rather than as social constructions that embody historical and cultural values".129 
She goes on to argue that de Beauvoir "condemns the maternal role" and "posits the 
necessity to transcend the female body and its reproductive capacities without 
questioning the ways in which the significance of the female body is socially 
constructed and its possibilities socially limited".130 
DE BEAUVOIR ON MOTHERHOOD AND THE FEMALE BODY 
One of the key arguments consistently made against de Beauvoir is that she 
denigrates the female body. As with other aspects of her work, there have been 
126 Ibid, p18. 
127 Gatens, Moira, Feminism and Philosophy, p2. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Gatens, Moira, Feminism and Philosophy, p3. 
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contradictory interpretations of her view of the body, with critics arguing that she 
sees it either as an inherent limit to women's transcendence (which woman cannot 
escape), or as something which can (and must) be overcome in order to achieve 
transcendence. That is, woman's body is either an essential and inescapable limit to 
her transcendence (so that woman is immanence, she is her body) or her 'feminine' 
body is seen as a socially constructed limit that must be overcome - in this case it 
does not have real or true meaning or significance to her being (a being which is 
characterised by transcendence). At this earlier stage of writing, Gatens saw in de 
Beauvoir's work a negative view of feminine embodiment, reminiscent of (what she 
considered to be) Sartre's account and which she believed resulted in a 
contradiction with the existential claim that 'existence precedes essence'. Gatens 
argued that de Beauvoir was implicitly committed to Sartre's view, which in some 
of the concluding chapters of Being and Nothingness associates the female body and 
immanence, pointing to the suggestion that women could not transcend their bodies 
in order to be as free as men. Gatens cites the following passage from The Second Sex 
as being representative of the limitations evident in an uncritical adaptation of the 
existential framework: 
[It] is regardless of sex that the existent seeks self justification through 
transcendence - the very submission of women is proof of that statement. 
What they demand today is to be recognized as existents by the same right 
as men and not to subordinate existence to life, the human being to its 
animality. An existentialist perspective has enabled us, then, to understand how 
the biological and economic condition of the primitive horde must have led to male 
supremacy. The female, to the greater extent than the male, is the prey of the 
species ... in maternity woman remains closely bound to her body, like an 
animal (TSS, p97).rn 
Given such claims as that just quoted, it is perhaps not surprising that de Beauvoir 
has been continually criticised for holding a negative view of maternity, 
motherhood and female bodies which, it is argued, she believes cannot be a project 
131 Also cited in Gatens, Moira, Feminism and Philosophy, p17. 
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of transcendence but are a mere 'function of the species' .132 Whilst Gatens 
acknowledges that de Beauvoir's existential framework insists that biology cannot 
determine woman's situation nor have a priori significance because it must always 
be interpreted, she also argues that for de Beauvoir, " ... woman emerges from her 
study as biologically disadvantaged".133 There appears to be a contradiction in de 
Beauvoir's analysis then, between the ultimately 'free' existential human subject and 
the embodied woman trapped by her biology. Gatens also argues that, according to 
de Beauvoir, motherhood is not a genuinely transcendent project and that their 
reproductive capacities limit women to a far greater extent than men: 
[in de Beauvoir's account] reproduction and childrearing cannot constitute 
projects for women. De Beauvoir assumes that in order for woman to take up 
a project, that is to assume the position of a transcendent subject, she must 
first transcend the female body.134 
As would be clear, this account is problematic because, for de Beauvoir, the body is 
crucial to one's situation and cannot be "transcended". However, she does argue 
that the body is lived in-situation so that a particular understanding or interpretation 
of the body can be overcome. Gatens' later work offers an answer to how we should 
interpret the apparent contradiction of such a seemingly negative account of 
women's bodies by a woman who has been hailed as a leader and key founder of 
the feminist movement. 
DE BEAUVOIR AS INTRODUCING A SOCIAL STRUCTURE TO EXISTENTIALISM 
Gatens' early interpretation of de Beauvoir is not altogether negative and she also 
claims that de Beauvoir provides a social structure to existentialism and includes 
oppression as another possible manifestation of human experience - something 
132 It should also be noted that, again, the mistranslation of terms by Parshley has led to 
misunderstandings such as this when he obscures important distinctions made by de 
Beauvoir about engaging with the world in maternity dependent upon one's situation. See 
Scarth, Fredrika, The Other Within: Ethics, Politics and the Body in Simone de Beauvoir, Roman 
and Littlefield: Lanham, 2004 
133 Ibid, p52 
134 Ibid, p53 
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which Sartre had failed to do with his account of 'radical freedom'. Whilst crediting 
de Beauvoir with introducing this social aspect to existentialism, Gatens argues that 
this "gives rise to several confusions and inconsistencies in [de Beauvoir's] account 
of woman's being" .13s 
As noted above, the 'notorious contradictions' of de Beauvoir's work have drawn 
much attention and, as Penelope Deutscher has discussed in a more recent work, it 
can be fruitful to pay attention to the tensions in the work of past philosophers in 
order to uncover the potential within them and to do justice to historical and critical 
appraisals of past feminists.136 Gatens was interested to examine what the 
limitations were for de Beauvoir with her adoption of the existential method, 
especially with regard to what this method allowed her to say about women. In this 
examination, she credits de Beauvoir with developing an account of oppression in 
The Second Sex that was not evident in Being and Nothingness and argues that Sartre 
himself acknowledges de Beauvoir' s role in his later development of an account of 
the subject to such an extent that, without de Beauvoir's contribution to 
existentialism, Sartre would not have been able to offer the more subtle and 
nuanced view of freedom found in his 1964 biography of Genet.137 At the same time, 
however, Gatens also questions whether or not the "existentialism of de Beauvoir" 
is the same as the "existentialism of Sartre" and argues that de Beauvoir makes her 
own contribution to existential theory 'invisible' by talking of Sartre's theory and by 
not explicitly critiquing its faults.13s 
DE BEAUVOIR (ACCIDENTALLY) REVEALING THE LIMITS OF EXISTENTIALISM 
Gatens argues that, although she does not explicitly critique Sartre's account, de 
Beauvoir implicitly (or almost 'accidentally') reveals the problems of existentialism 
in her attempt to apply it to the situation of woman. She claims that "it is by taking 
135 Ibid. p50 
136 Deutscher, Penelope, 'Enemies and Reciprocities', MLN, September 2004;119,4, p 656. 
137 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Saint Genet: Actor or Martyr, (trans) Bernard Frechtman, 1964. 
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seriously its own claims to be a universally applicable theory of human being, that 
she, albeit inadvertently, exposes its masculine bias and limitations" .139 
This is another of the common claims made against de Beauvoir. However, I 
maintain that claims of a masculine bias fall short of the mark by not taking into 
account ambiguity and its importance throughout de Beauvoir's work. What is 
revealed in a re-reading of de Beauvoir is that within her account of existentialism 
woman is, like man, an 'ambiguous becoming', an 'openness to the future', 
possessing no 'changeless essence', a being which is at once both subject and object, 
immanence and transcendence. For de Beauvoir, the universal condition of 
humanity is characterised by ambiguity, freedom and change. We all share this 
ontological status and any attempt to define a human 'way of being' that fails to 
account for this ambiguity will result in nihilism or essentialism (seriousness). De 
Beauvoir argues that, historically, ethics has been based upon an attempt to deny 
this ambiguity. Ethical theories have, therefore, attempted to eliminate "ambiguity 
by making oneself pure inwardness or pure externality, by escaping from the 
sensible world or being engulfed by it, by yielding to eternity or enclosing oneself in 
the pure moment" as de Beauvoir herself says (TEA, p8, emphasis added). On de 
Beauvoir's account, the problematic social structure that leads to oppression is a 
result of both bad faith and ignorance. It is the denial of ambiguity that can be seen 
in the attempt to make women 'women' and men 'men'. 
RE-THINKING THE BODY WITH DE BEAUVOIR'S SITUATION IN MIND 
In her later work, Gatens recognises her own mistake in not paying heed to de 
Beauvoir's insistence that one should understand the proviso "in the present state of 
affairs" as being attached to almost every sentence in The Second Sex. She argues 
that de Beauvoir could not, within her own existential frame-work, suggest that any 
current state of affairs is ontologically prior to the historical situation in which it came 
to be. This applies to conceptions of masculinity, femininity, race, class, ethnicity, 
139 Ibid, plSl. 
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value, meaning and belief. All are interdependent, contingent and yet still very real 
in their context, but- crucially- none are 'given' outside or prior to their situation. 
This is the fundamental point of de Beauvoir' s work and, although her style of 
writing may sometimes appear to suggest otherwise, she does not advocate a 
wholesale denigration or denial of the importance and potential worth of 
mothering, child-birth or women's bodies. Her critique is of mothering, child-birth 
and the view of women's bodies in a patriarchal social order in which hierarchies 
based on sexual difference undermine the possibility for choice and freedom for 
particular members of that order. As she says ' ... woman cannot actually be forced 
to bear children, all one can do is enclose her in situations where maternity is the 
only way out for her" (TSS, p542). In de Beauvoir's work, maternity and 
childrearing are not seen to possess an inherent value (either negative or positive) 
but are interpreted by different individuals who are intimately connected to 
particular situations. She writes, "[t]he significance of pregnancy being thus 
ambiguous, it is natural that woman should assume an ambivalent attitude towards 
it ... " (TSS: p515). De Beauvoir argues that women's responses to maternity and 
child-rearing are divergent and that there is not one authentic way in which either 
should be experienced: 
For some women childbirth is martyrdom. Some women on the contrary, 
consider the ordeal a relatively easy one to bear. A few find sensual pleasure 
in it. There are some women who say that childbirth gives them a sense of 
creative power; they have really accomplished a voluntary and productive 
task. Many, at the other extreme, have felt themselves passive - suffering 
and tortured instruments (TSS: p522). 
Linda Zerilli argues that de Beauvoir's own situation in post-war France was crucial 
to her views on motherhood and maternity and that at the time de Beauvoir was 
writing, government policy in France "aggressively promoted" motherhood in what 
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de Beauvoir termed an "enforced maternity".140 At the same time as promoting 
motherhood as a virtue, legislation forbade abortion and contraception, so that 
women were left with little choice about when and how they chose to become 
mothers. Zerilli argues that one can see an element of irony in de Beauvoir's writing 
on feminine embodiment, and an attempt to break down the supposedly 'natural' 
links between women, their capacity to bear children and the necessity of doing so. 
The often almost grotesque account of maternity described in The Second Sex is taken 
up as a "subversive appropriation", threatening the dominant discourse that 
associates 'woman' with 'natural' maternity. Ambiguity, according to Zerilli, is the 
"definitive characteristic of Beauvoir' s rewriting of the drama of matemity"141 and 
this ambiguity demands a re-thinking of maternity-in-context and the social 
structures that surround it. 
De Beauvoir was a strong advocate for legal abortion and for contraception, and the 
following quote from The Second Sex illustrates the point that, for her, situation is 
crucial to the way in which one lives one's body: 
The bondage of woman to the species is more or less rigorous according to 
the number of births demanded by society and the degree of hygienic care 
provided for pregnancy and childbirth ... in the human species individual 
"possibilities" depend upon the economic and social situation (TSS, p67). 
The instances of what have been read as de Beauvoir' s denigration of the female 
body are, when placed fully in the context of her work, actually illustrative 
examples of the ways in which science, society and philosophy have come to view 
the bodies of men and women. For example, de Beauvoir writes, that the "fatiguing 
task" of gestation has "no individual benefit to woman [and] on the contrary 
140 Zerilli, Linda, M.G., 'A Process without a Subject: Simone de Beauvoir and Julia Kristeva 
on Maternity" Signs, Autumn, 1992; 18, 1. 
See also Scarth, Fredrika, The Other Within: Ethics, Politics and the Body m Simone de Beauvoir, 
Roman and Littlefield, 2004 for a full discussion of de Beauvoir's views on maternity, 
particulalry the difference between enforced maternity and what she termed "maternite 
libre". 
141 Ibid, p 123. 
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demands heavy sacrifice" (TSS, p62). However, in a footnote she clarifies this point 
by saying that "I am taking here an exclusively physiological point of view. It is 
evident that maternity can be very advantageous psychologically for a woman, just 
as it can be a disaster" (TSS, p62, £n 11). "As a matter of fact", de Beauvoir writes, 
" ... it is on account of [their] social function that the physiological differences take 
on all their signification" (TSS, p 397). Her point that the differences in which one 
experiences one's body and sexuality is impacted by one's social situation is further 
illustrated with her comment that 11 ••• the environment, the climate, in which 
feminine sexuality awakens is thus quite different from that which surrounds the 
adolescent male" (Ibid.) 
Understandably, for an avowedly existential theorist, negative connotations are 
associated with anything that appears to take the 'choice' of transcendent action and 
projects away from women. In a patriarchal society where labour, productivity and 
success are judged in the public, independent realm of the 'masculine', then child-
birth and parenting will be seen not as a project but as a function. Today however (in 
many countries), with birth control, child-care facilities and social expectations 
changed markedly from those of 1940s France, childbirth and parenting can be seen 
as important freely chosen projects, which both men and women can successfully 
participate in (or not as they chose). At the same time, however, parenting and 
maternity under de Beauvoir's account still do not retain an inherent value, and have 
the capacity to be experienced in diverse ways by various couples and individuals. 
Ambiguity is still the foundational aspect and an authentique response requires 
recognition of this. As de Beauvoir writes, "the close bond between the mother and 
the child will be for her a source of dignity or indignity according to the value 
placed on the child ... according to the presumptions of the society concerned" (TSS, 
p69). Moreover, in her discussion of the married woman she notes that the concept 
of marriage has begun to change because " ... Woman is no longer limited to the 
reproductive function which has lost in part its character as natural servitude and 
has come to be regarded as a function to be voluntarily assumed" (TSS, p425). 
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The 'transcendent subject', on my interpretation of de Beauvoir, is one who can 
freely choose her projects based on an acknowledgement of her own and other's 
freedom and who is not limited by an insistence on biology-as-destiny. At the same 
time, however, an authentique subject would also recognise the many and varied 
'limits' on her situation implied by her facticity (which includes biological capacities) 
but would not give up aiming toward the future by being bound only to current or 
traditional understandings of these limits. It would be inauthentic for anyone to 
insist that their biological circumstances were the only important aspect of their 
subjectivity. To give up the future to a particular perception of female embodiment 
would be an example of 'bad faith' because "woman is not a completed reality, but 
rather a becoming" (TSS, p66). Resisting the idea of the permanence of the present 
situation is an important part of de Beauvoir's work, as for her, our Being includes 
our past, present and our undefined future. 
Australian philosopher Max Deutscher supports this argument and he maintains 
that de Beauvoir's description of female embodiment in The Second Sex is 
misinterpreted, although he acknowledges that de Beauvoir's description of a 
woman's body as being "mysterious", "mucous" and "humid" has resonations with 
Sartre's feminine 'in-itself'. De Beauvoir writes of woman's body that " .. .it bleeds 
each month, it is often sullied with bodily fluids, it has a secret and perilous life of 
its own." (TSS, p407). Deutscher however, views this as an example of what he 
terms an 'operative phenomenology' where, rather than 'cementing' things as they 
are, he argues that "Beauvoir. .. works away from within the world as one finds it, 
eroding not only the 'facts' and generally received wisdom, but also one's intimate 
awareness of these things" .142 He argues that de Beauvoir's descriptions of the 'neat' 
phallus opposed to the 'mysterious' female genitalia, are almost satiric. One can 
read her descriptions of masculine and feminine experience as 'setting up' (to an 
extreme level) traditional views in order to reveal the inherent problems in such 
accounts. De Beauvoir's descriptions of both male and female embodiment are ironic 
when read alongside her existential assertion of meaning and value being so 
142 Deutscher, Max, Genre and Void: Looking back at Sartre and Beauvoir, Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2003, p23. 
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intertwined with situation. " ... one speaks of 'nocturnal pollution' because natural 
ends are not served: but because coffee will stain a light-coloured dress, one does 
not call it filth that will soil the stomach" (TSS, p396). Here she notes that it is often 
also said that women 'pollute' men with her 'dirty discharges' but that such 
descriptions rely upon the context in which they are understood. 
Thus, as de Beauvoir argues in the conclusion to The Second Sex, "Woman is 
determined not by her hormones or by mysterious instincts, but by the manner in 
which her body and her relation to the world are modified through the action of 
others than herself" (TSS, p734). Thus, it is the interpretation of a woman's embodied 
experience within a particular historical situation that allows for female embodiment 
to be denigrated in contrast to 'masculine' transcendence. She writes "I have 
already pointed out how much easier the transformation of puberty would be if she 
looked beyond it, like the boys, towards a free adult future: menstruation horrifies 
her only because it is an abrupt descent into femininity" (TSS, p735). Her practice as 
a novelist leads her to develop detailed and explicit metaphorical descriptions of the 
very worst possible experiences of what happens when women are tied to this 
femininity. In so doing, she highlights the way in which masculine and feminine 
lives and bodies have come to represent such distinctly opposite existences. One 
should not forget her cautionary words in The Second Sex, 
[W]hen I use the words woman or feminine I obviously refer to no archetype, 
no changeless essence whatever; the reader must understand the phrase 'in 
the present state of education and custom' after most of my statements 
(TSS, p31). 
As we saw above, in her early work Gatens does recognise the importance de 
Beauvoir places upon the ways in which social values and expectations affect our 
lived experience of our bodies. However, she continues to argue that in some 
instances de Beauvoir sees woman's reproductive role as limiting or 'binding' her to 
the species rather than providing the possibility for transcendent action. She argues 
that "[p ]erhaps even more crucially, such suggestions throw doubt on the very 
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possibility of affirming the female body as the ground of free action".143 As we have 
seen, however, situation (which includes material, social, psychological and 
economic experiences) is crucial to de Beauvoir's account. In recognition of this 
importance Gatens writes, "[de Beauvoir] stresses that biology can have no hold on 
an individual transcendence. The form and capacities of the female body cannot 
alone hold woman back from the formation of transcendent projects" and "if the 
biological condition of woman does constitute a handicap, it is because of her 
general situation".144 However, at this time Gatens still believed that de Beauvoir's 
account of female embodiment was limiting and that, contrary to her above 
acknowledgment of the import of situation that "it does not alter the fact that for de 
Beauvoir female biology, considered in isolation, is in conflict with the individual 
subject" .145 
It is here, I believe, that the problem in Gatens' earlier interpretation is revealed, in 
her claim that female biology could be considered 'in isolation' in de Beauvoir's 
work. As Gatens herself will later argue, de Beauvoir does not believe that biology 
can, ultimately, be considered in isolation from the total situation in which that 
biology is lived. As she argues in The Second Sex, "on their own, these [bodily] facts 
have no significance ... " and, in her analysis of sexual relations between men and 
women she writes, "It is the total sex situation that justifies the separate elements ... 
when body and behaviour are analysed into separate and meaningless elements, these 
elements become indecent, obscene (TSS, p408, my emphasis). 'Female' biology, in 
the same way as 'male' biology, is experienced, lived, played-out in a complex, 
worldly situation and 'isolating' biology in order to find its value, its meaning or its 
'cause', risks a reductivism. Biology is one among many of the important but also 
interdependent factors of a whole life. On its own, it cannot tell us what it means to 
be a 'man' or 'woman', and this is the thrust of de Beauvoir's argument in The 
Second Sex when she says that "biology is not enough to give an answer to the 
143 Gatens, Moira, Feminism and Philosophy, p53, my emphasis. 
144 Ibid, p54. 
145 Ibid. 
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question ... why is woman the Other?" (TSS, p69). The problem of patriarchy is that it 
has denied the becoming (the ambiguity) of man and woman and replaced it with 
absolute being. 
In her early interpretation of de Beauvoir, Ga tens wrote /1 de Beauvoir, in a fashion 
reminiscent of J.S. Mill and Taylor, concludes that in order to achieve authenticity, 
woman must overcome or transcend her biology and her role in natural life" and 
that, "man's material existence [on the other hand] presents no such problem".146 In 
a later work published in 1996, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality, 
Gatens argues that modem understandings saw the physical body as 'raw' nature 
and that these understandings reinforced a binary or oppositional split between 
culture and nature, the body and the mind. 147 Here she argues that " ... de 
Beauvoir ... entertained a clear nature/culture, body/social split, where both nature 
and the body were conceived as outside culture and outside history" 148 and that, 
One response to the differential powers and capacities of women and men in 
the context of public life is to claim that women just are biologically 
disadvantaged relative to men ... on this view, social reform can only achieve 
so much, leaving the rectification of the remaining determinations of 
women's situation to the increase in control over nature, that is, biology. 
Simone de Beauvoir retains the doubtful privilege of being the clearest 
exponent of this view .... [ de Beauvoir] assumed that the specificity of the 
reproductive body must be overcome if sexual equality is to be realised.149 
De Beauvoir, however, explicitly argues that it is only through recognising and 
embracing all aspects of our situation; our history, our finitude, our materiality, our 
capacity for transcendence, our thoughts, our emotions, our reason, our relations 
with others, our openness to the future and our freedom, that we can have a truly 
146 Gatens, Moira, Feminism and Philosophy, p54. 
147 Gatens, Moira, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality, Routledge: London and 
New York, 1996. 
148 Gatens, Moira, Imaginary Bodies, p51. 
149 Ibid, p68. 
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authentique existence. To deny the importance of any of these factors is 
inauthenticity. As de Beauvoir writes, "I exist as authentic subject, in a constantly 
Rene wed upspringing that is opposed to the fixed reality of things" (EPW, p200). 
Gatens argues that in the work of de Beauvoir and Sartre bad faith is seen as a moral 
fault, resulting from a failure to seek out and maintain transcendence. However, as 
can be seen above, de Beauvoir is explicit in her insistence that it is also an act of bad 
faith to negate one's immanence. One is in bad faith if one negates either 
immanence or transcendence because the nature of humanity is to be both at once 
and the constant struggle entailed in this ambiguity is what necessitates the need for 
an ethics. De Beauvoir states in The Second Sex that " .. .if the body isn't a thing, it is a 
situation: it is our grasp of the world and a sketch [outline] of our projects" (DS, 
1:73).150 She adds: 
These biological considerations are extremely important. In the history of 
woman they play a part of the first rank and constitute an essential element 
in her situation. Throughout our further discussion we shall always bear 
them in mind. For, the body being the instrument of our grasp upon the 
world, the world is bound to seem a very different thing when apprehended 
in one manner or another. But I deny that they establish for her a fixed and 
inevitable destiny. They are insufficient for setting up a hierarchy of the 
sexes; they fail to explain why woman is the Other; they do not condemn her 
to reman in this subordinate role for ever (TSS, p65). 
For de Beauvoir then, both material and cultural situation are fundamental to 
understanding particular subjectivities and to deny the importance of either is to fail 
to fully appreciate the complexity of human being and to live inauthentically, in bad 
faith. She writes, "it is in bad faith to give static value [to being] when it really has 
the dynamic Hegelian sense of 'to have become" (TSS, p24). Furthermore, "it is not a 
mysterious essence that compels men and women to act in good or in bad faith, it is 
150 translated by Tori! Moi in 'While We Wait: the English Translation of The Second Sex', 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 2002, vol. 27, no. 4,p 1023. 
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their situation that inclines them more or less towards the search for truth" (TSS, 
p27). 
DE BEAUVOIR, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY 
In 1991, Gatens wrote Feminism and Philosophy in order to begin addressing 
problems she saw to be evident in both feminism and philosophy; to re-assess the 
relationship between the two and to begin thinking about the ethical, social and 
political implications of binary thought and about possibilities for change. Gatens' 
project was, and still is, an extremely important one for feminism, for philosophy, 
for social theory and for ethics. However, Gatens initially missed an 'ally' in this 
project when she included de Beauvoir' s account in theory that she saw to be 
'tainted' and limited by masculine ideals and binary accounts of sexual difference. 
What we can see now is that an incorporation of de Beauvoir's theory and analysis 
proves fruitful for Gatens' contemporary concerns with the often problematic 
interactions between metaphysical theories of self and the social, political and 
ethical world. De Beauvoir's concerns with understanding human 'being' and its 
inherent ambiguity provide an appropriate methodological tool for critiquing 
dominant conceptions of both masculinity and femininity and their connections to 
the broader socio-political realm. 
De Beauvoir argues that the common basis of human experience is ambiguity in-
situation, and what is problematic is that traditional ethics fails to recognise this 
ambiguity and, instead, continues the vain and problematic search for 'eternal 
verities' or universal truths. For de Beauvoir, however, "the human species is for 
ever in a state of change, forever becoming" (TSS, p65). De Beauvoir is dealing with 
a subject-matter and putting forward an argument that is dependent upon the 
notions of ambiguity and freedom. These terms have been difficult to interpret 
partly because of de Beauvoir' s occasional imprecision and partly because of the 
situation of most interpreters within a discourse that is based upon a logic of 
dichotomy, a logic that attempts to deny the interactions between what are seen to be 
opposing (or mutually exclusive) terms. Unlike traditional philosophers, de 
Beauvoir emphasizes the ways in which human 'being' is a paradoxical and 
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ambiguous being and, rather than attempting to deny or 'overcome' this tension, 
she argues that we must learn to 'assume' it. As she suggests in the more specific 
context of love-relations between the sexes: 
Instead of living out the ambiguities of their situation, each tries to make 
the other bear the abjection and tries to reserve the honour for the self. If, 
however, both should assume the ambiguity with a clear-sighted modesty, 
correlative of an authentic pride, they would see each other as equals and 
would live out their erotic drama in amity (TSS, p737). 
SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR AND BIOLOGY: A SECOND LOOK 
In her more recent essay 'Beauvoir and biology: a second look' Gatens significantly 
re-thinks her earlier criticisms of de Beauvoir and argues against her own previous 
interpretation of the French author/philosopher as denigrating female biology and 
advocating a transcendence of female bodily conditions. In this work she writes, 
" ... despite the ever-increasing amount of commentary on Beauvoir and biology, 
many critics continue to overlook vital elements in her account of the role played by 
biology in being, or, as she insists, 'becoming' a woman" .151 
Gatens' changing interpretation is illustrative of the different ways in which de 
Beauvoir has been read, due in large part to misunderstandings of her account of 
freedom and ambiguity and the role of the body in subjectivity. Indeed, in her later 
work, Gatens explicitly acknowledges the seemingly contradictory ways in which 
de Beauvoir can be understood, using the same material to argue for a reading as a 
social constructivist, or alternatively, as a radical biologist who finds female biology 
somehow abhorrent. Moreover, Gatens' earlier claim, that feminism must work 
within philosophical, social and political arenas and her call for an alternative way 
of engaging with feminist questions that avoids having to remain entrenched within 
the 'either'/'or' camps of equality or difference, is, we can now see, supported by de 
Beauvoir. 
151 Gatens, Moira, 'Beauvoir and biology: a second look', in The Cambridge Companion to 
Simone de Beauvoir, Claudia Card (ed), Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003, p 267. 
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It appears that, all along, Gatens had an ally in de Beauvoir, who would provide an 
answer to the problems she saw in socio-political and philosophical discourse, and 
her development of a means to re-think ethics is supported by the earlier work of de 
Beauvoir. Gatens' more recent analysis demonstrates how the precise quotes from 
The Second Sex that she had earlier used to argue that de Beauvoir was a (masculine-
biased) biological determinist can actually be used to argue that de Beauvoir escapes 
the either/or dichotomy that a number of contemporary theorists see to be limiting 
feminist debates. Gatens 're-thinks' de Beauvoir's account of subjectivity, arguing 
that her views on biology " ... may yield a more radical view of the human subject 
than feminists have hitherto supposed her to have held"152 and she acknowledges 
that one must always take into account all aspects of history, temporality and 
biology - together - in order to explain the life of a subject. De Beauvoir would, of 
course, deny 'human nature' in the sense of biological determinism and/or a 
spiritual essence. She would, however, argue that the nature or condition of 
humanity is ambiguity. For de Beauvoir, it is not 'nothingness' that characterises 
human experience but lived embodied experience and situation, which are at the 
same tirrie underpinned or founded upon our fundamental ontological freedom, or 
ambiguity. 
Gatens argues that the apparent tensions in de Beauvoir' s work lead to the 
argument that she is 'either' a social constructionist 'or' an essentialist, which results 
in feminists tending to over-emphasise one or the other and that "[t]he unclarity of 
Beauvoir's thought invites these kinds of unsatisfactory 'either/or' feminist 
readings".153 On my reading, which is compatible with Gatens second look, de 
Beauvoir is neither a social constructionist nor an essentialist but, instead, provides 
an alternative option to these two extremes, where the body matters, where social 
and environmental influences are important and where situation is vital to 
understanding any subject. The following quote from The Second Sex summarises 
well de Beauvoir's views on biology and situation: 
152 Ibid, p 267. 
153 Ibid, p272. 
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Doubtless, every one casts himself into [the world] on the basis of his 
physiological possibilities, but the body itself is not a brute fact. It expresses 
our relationship to the world, and that is why it is an object of sympathy or 
repulsion. And, on the other hand, it determines no behaviour (TSS, p41). 
Readings of de Beauvoir that are limited to trying to understand whether 'biology' 
or 'culture' is the most important aspect of 'being' will continue to miss her crucial 
point. A point at which my reading diverges from Gatens however, is with her 
claim that in de Beauvoir' s work "it is through the attitudes she forms, and the 
manner of exercising her freedom, that woman will decide how her body is 
lived"154• This appears too close to the isolated subject Sartre is accused of 
describing, in that it is not just one's own attitude but the attitude and actions of 
others that can so deeply affect how one lives one's body. The strength of de 
Beauvoir' s work lies in her illustration of the significant impact one's total situation 
has on one's existence and her insistence on the inseparability of an individual from 
their situation. The impact of the decisions, attitudes and expectations of others can 
be so huge that practical choice is extremely limited (but, ontological freedom 
remains). 
As we will see in the following chapter, de Beauvoir's subject is necessarily 'inter-
subjective' and must, therefore, be examined and understood in relation to others. 
The amount of time de Beauvoir dedicates in The Second Sex to examining 'woman' 
from the biological, historical, social and psychoanalytic perspectives enables her to 
illustrate how significant the views of others are in maintaining the myth of the 
feminine. 
Ultimately, Gatens discovers in de Beauvoir a fellow philosopher concerned with 
what a thorough analysis of the situation of woman has to say about philosophy 
and about the human subject. De Beauvoir, like Gatens, is concerned with questions 
of sexual difference but not to the extent that she cannot see the applicability of her 
theory to other questions of difference, such as how class, race and religion impact 
!54 Ibid, p271. 
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upon one's lived experience. There is no insistence in de Beauvoir's work on 
'feminine solidarity' or a need to separate from 'men' or the 'masculine' as an evil 
that must be overcome. Her account of intersubjective relations and the ethics that 
develops from this, once thought through and consistently applied, recognises the 
current conceptions of masculinity and 'man' to be the result of the same 
problematic metaphysics that underlies the situation of woman: 
In both sexes is played out the same drama of the flesh and the spirit, of 
finitude and transcendence; both are gnawed away by time and laid in wait 
for by death, they have the same essential need for one another; and they 
can gain from their liberty the same glory. If they were to taste it, they 
would no longer be tempted to dispute fallacious privileges, and fraternity 
between them could then come into existence (TSS; p737). 
De Beauvoir says in The Second Sex that the existence of woman is something on 
which we can never close the book, and this recognition of the continually changing 
situation of (both men and) women is crucial if feminist arguments are to be 
relevant and applicable to contemporary situations. She writes: 
Thus we must view the facts of biology in the light of an ontological, 
economic, social and psychological context... the body of woman is one of the 
essential elements in her situation in the world. But the body is not enough 
to define her as woman; there is no true living reality except as manifested 
by the conscious individual through activities and in the bosom of 
society ... Our task is to discover how the nature of woman has been affected 
throughout the course of history; we are concerned to find out what 
humanity has made of the human female (TSS, p69). 
As will be argued throughout this thesis, it should also be a major concern in the 
contemporary setting to examine what humanity has made of the human male, and 
feminism and philosophy must search for the foundational conditions that impact 
upon multiple and varied subjectivities in order to provide an adequate account of 
social existence and ethical relations. Just as previous philosophical accounts of 
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humanity that assumed a universal male subject fail to account for all humans, so to 
do feminisms that retain the notion of a universal male and ignore the diversity of 
male experience with a narrow focus on 'man' and 'woman'. We must examine the 
ways in which misconceptions about ontology have had a continued and powerful 
affect on numerous particular, situated individuals, not just upon 'women'. 
A USEFUL CONTRADICTION? 
As we can see, de Beauvoir's sustained focus on irreducible ambiguity has led to 
varied (and opposing) interpretations of her work. What the reading of de Beauvoir 
with Gatens' 'second look' illustrates, however, is that de Beauvoir's existential-
phenomenological account of women's experience reveals that she was neither a 
social constructivist nor an essentialist. Rather, she was arguing for recognition of 
the importance of both immanence and transcendence in accounts of human 
existence. The key point of the above analysis is that her philosophy does not 
impose an opposition between mutually exclusive 'material' and 'ideal' worlds, but 
argues for recognition of the intertwining of both aspects in human becoming. What 
are often seen as mutually exclusive aspects of being are, for de Beauvoir, 
ambiguously interconnected. 
Here again we see her desire to overcome the subject/object dichotomy, which she 
argues that phenomenology is able to overcome, "one of the great merits of 
phenomenology is to have given back to man the right to an authentic existence, by 
eliminating the opposition of the subject and the object" (RoPP, p161). Here, she 
indicates the importance of this elimination of the subject/object dichotomy for 
ethics and argues that, "it is only in taking it as a basis will one succeed in building 
an ethics to which man can totally and sincerely adhere" (ibid). Authenticite, for de 
Beauvoir requires an elimination of the oppositional self-other dichotomy. 
As an alternative to the reductive dualism she saw to underlie much social, scientific 
and philosophical thought, de Beauvoir proposes a 'middle-way' account, which 
privileges neither biology nor consciousness as that which defines human being. 
The body is important and crucial to relations with others. As Merleau-Ponty 
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argues, "it is through my body that I understand other people, just as it is through 
my body that I perceive 'things"' (PP, p216). One's body does not exist in isolation, 
but is part of a complex world - in which others help to define one's 'self'. As Sonia 
Kruks argues: 
to exist is to be one's body; and to be one's body is to be a body-subject, a 
unity which precedes the dichotomies of mind and body, subject and object, 
being for-itself and being in-itself ... the concept of the body-subject 
involves... a paradoxical and ambiguous relationship in which 
consciousness and materiality, subjectivity and the world of 'things' are co-
extensive.155 
Although Beauvoir does not at any stage explicitly disagree with Sartre and take up 
Merleau-Ponty's account of subjectivity, it can be argued that her subjects share 
more with Merleau-Ponty's account of situated embodiment than with Sartre's free 
consciousness.156 The ambiguity of the body and the importance of others to the 
experience of one's body and self-understanding (or self-perception) are key themes 
for de Beauvoir, themes which she shares with Merleau-Ponty. As we have seen 
above, many feminists have been critical of de Beauvoir's perceived connection to 
Sartre, arguing that her account of the body is dualistic and, therefore, that she 
cannot overcome the immanence/transcendence problem inherent in his account of 
existentialism. 
As we have seen, Sartre's view of the self is often criticised for being an isolated one 
- where the subject alone is the source of meaning and action, whereas Merleau-
Ponty is seen to return the subject 'to the world' by placing it in a particular 
155 Kruks, Sonia, Situation and Human Existence, p116. 
156 A number of Sartre scholars agree with de Beauvoir that Sartre's work was misread and 
that his account was in fact more nuanced than many argue. In Existentialism and Humanism 
Sartre also attempts to address criticisms against existentialism and his later works, 
including the Critique of Dialectical Reason, are seen to be far more applicable to social theory. 
See Max Deutscher (2003) and Sonia Kruks (1990) for discussion of this point. 
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situation in which it both gives and receives meaning.157 The aim of this chapter has 
been to demonstrate that although we should not deny the importance of Sartre's 
work to de Beauvoir's account of embodiment, that her philosophy of ambiguity is 
also influenced by the rich descriptions of intersubjectivity she found in Merleau-
Ponty's phenomenology and (crucially) by her own experience. De Beauvoir was 
neither a social constructivist, nor a biological essentialist. Her aim was to explore 
how it is that women (and men) come to experience their bodies (and develop their 
sense of 'self') within a particular social milieu and she argues that to live with 
authenticite we must accept both our facticite and our capacity for transcendence -
that is, we must live our ambiguity. 
1s7 Stewart, Jon, (ed) The Debate Between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Northwestern University 
Press: Evanston, 1998, p xxxii. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
AN AMBIGUOUS FREEDOM 
I know myself only insofar as I am inherent in time and in the world, that is, I know 
myself only in my ambiguity 
(Merleau-Ponty, PP, p345) 
In spite of so many stubborn lies, at every moment, at every opportunity, the truth 
comes to light, the truth of life and death, of my solitude and my bond with the 
world, of my freedom and my servitude, of the insignificance and the sovereign 
importance of each man and all men ... Let us try to assume our fundamental 
ambiguity. It is in the knowledge of the genuine conditions of our life that we must 
draw our strength to live and reason for acting 
(Beauvoir, TEA, p9) 
THE ETHICS OF AMBIGUITY 
Written in 1947, prior to The Second Sex and after Sartre's Being and Nothingness, de 
Beauvoir's The Ethics of Ambiguity was not historically accorded a significant place 
amongst existential or feminist texts. Her attempt to develop an existential ethics 
based upon recognition of the ambiguous nature of humanity (in which we are at 
the same time transcendent and immanent creatures, thoroughly situated yet 
destined to an open future) was largely ignored or criticized in mainstream 
philosophy and, historically, feminists tended to celebrate The Second Sex as her 
major contribution to feminism. Toril Moi, for example, wrote of de Beauvoir's The 
Ethics of Ambiguity that "there is no point in dwelling on the details of Beauvoir's 
rather torturous efforts to explain how ethical action consists precisely in the lucid 
acceptance of this paradox"158 and de Beauvoir' s biographer, Deidre Bair, argued 
158 Moi, Toril, in Simone de Beauvoir: The making of an intellectual woman, Blackwell: Oxford, 
1994, p 150. 
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that it was "one of her least popular writings".159 De Beauvoir herself argued that 
The Ethics was "a frivolous, insignificant thing, not worthy of attention" and that it 
irritated her most of all her books because she failed to think "objectively" whilst 
she was writing it and was instead "thinking too much of herself".160 
Although it took some time for de Beauvoir to be taken seriously as a philosopher, 
more recent scholarship has recognised the importance of The Ethics of Ambiguity, 
and particularly the account of freedom given therein, to her later work and for 
contemporary social philosophy and ethics.161 A common claim is that, in this work, 
de Beauvoir overcomes the limits of Sartreanism (although implicitly) and Barbara 
Andrew argues that, by the time she wrote this text, de Beauvoir had "changed her 
idea of freedom from the radical freedom of Sartre's in Being and Nothingness" to a 
freedom that is situated in the world.162 As we saw in the previous chapter, a 
number of scholars argue that de Beauvoir introduces a social element to freedom in 
an attempt to explain how it is that oppression is possible and to assert the 
importance of others to our freedom, thus overcoming many of the criticisms 
levelled against Sartre.163 
Taking up the current concern with understanding de Beauvoir's account of 
freedom and its ability to overcome the limits of Sartrean existentialism, this section 
argues that The Ethics of Ambiguity, when grasped in its complexity, provides the 
basis for a contemporary ethics, which allows for celebration of our situated freedom 
by reuniting the concepts of authenticite and ambiguity. The above-quoted passage, 
159 Bair, Deidre, Simone de Beauvoir: a Biography, Vintage: London, 1991, p 321. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Karen Vintges, for example, argues that we need to understand this earlier work in order 
to fully appreciate de Beauvoir's later arguments in The Second Sex, 'Simone de Beauvoir: A 
Feminist Thinker of Our Times', Hypatia, Vol 14, no 4, Fall 1999. Kristana Arp argues that The 
Ethics of Ambiguity is the most important of de Beauvoir's philosophical essays prior to The 
Second Sex, see Arp's The Bonds of Freedom: Simone de Beauvoir's Existential Ethics, Open Court: 
Chicago, 2001, p 1. 
162 Andrew, Barbara, S, 'Beauvoir' s place in philosophical thought', in The Cambridge 
Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, edited by Claudia Card, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 
p32. 
163 See for example, Kruks, Sonia, Situation and Human Existence, 1990. 
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from The Ethics of Ambiguity, sums up de Beauvoir' s argument well. There she 
argues that, no matter how we try to deny it, the truth of our fundamental freedom 
and ambiguity arises continuously and cannot be overcome. Human life is 
characterized by an ambiguous freedom, where each is at once fundamentally free 
(on an ontological level) and situated or limited (on a 'practical' or 'effective' level). 
This ambiguous existence is experienced /1 at every moment" and, rather than 
denying this ambiguity as traditional ethics has sought to do, de Beauvoir argues 
that we should accept it and draw from it our strength to live and our reason to act. 
Importantly for her this entails a 'willing assertion' of our freedom, as well as the 
freedom of others, and this assertion of our ambiguous freedom is vital for 
authenticite. 
De Beauvoir's ethics depends on an ontological ambiguity. Our ethics derives from 
our ontology and the way in which we understand the world will significantly 
impact upon the decisions we make about how to act in the world. Ambiguity, as 
we will see, relates to an ongoing tension between our ontological freedom 
(transcendence) and our practical freedom (immanence) as well as to the ongoing 
tensions between our thirst for life and our mortality, between 'self' and 'other', 
between our individuality and our undeniable connection with the world. On this 
understanding, our ethical actions will be based not only upon recognition of our 
ambiguous existence, but on a willingness to engage with this ambiguity, to maintain 
the tension that ambiguity implies, and to ensure others also have the opportunity 
to engage with their freedom by refusing to see them as a 'thing'. The maintenance 
of this tension is crucial to de Beauvoir' s ethics and she argues that it needs to be 
preserved rather than collapsed in a theoretical account of ethics and in our practical 
relation to the world. Neither the transcendent nor the immanent aspect of human 
existence should be privileged and interdependence is, therefore, a key concept for 
de Beauvoir. As we shall see, interdependence relates also to the way in which our 
projects intersect with others and to the way that meaning and values arise, with 
others, in a shared world. 
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RE-DEFINING AMBIGUITY 
As we saw in chapter one, the common or 'everyday' understanding of the concept 
I 
of authenticity differs substantially from the existential understanding of 
authenticite. I have argued that this is because the 'authentic' has come to be 
associated with the 'genuine' 'real' and 'true' and with the idea of a true or genuine 
self or "essence". This interpretation of what is authentic is troubling because it is 
connected to a metaphysics that privileges distinction and certainty and because the 
related account of autonomy does not adequately account for the importance of 
others to identity. 
Likewise, the concept of ambiguity has also come to represent certain ways of being 
that have different connotations to those put forward in existential and 
phenomenological accounts of existence, the implications of which are significantly 
different to the understanding of ambiguity that this thesis wants to celebrate. 
Although there is not such a clear distinction between the way in which ambiguity 
is understood by de Beauvoir and the 'everyday' understanding, it is in the valuing 
of this concept that an important difference emerges. 
The term ambiguous comes from the Latin ambiguus, meaning doubtful or shifting 
and which is based on the word ambigene, meaning to 'go round'. The Latin ambi 
has the meaning 'on both sides', or 'both ways', and the ous comes from Latin osus, 
'having many or much, characterized by or of the nature of'. So, if something is 
ambiguous, it has the character or nature of being 'on both sides' or 'both ways'. 
According to the commonly held definition, 'ambiguity' entails: hesitation, doubt, 
or uncertainty as to one's course; it is the ability to be understood in more than one 
way; it represents an uncertainty; or is an instance of double meaning, or an 
expression having more than one meaning.164 Whilst this understanding is not in 
164 Shorter Oxford Dictionary, Fifth edition, Volume 1, Oxford University Press, 2002, p 66. 
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itself problematic, it is commonly held that, if something is ambiguous, it is obscure, 
it is doubtful regarding classification and, most significantly, it is unreliable. 165 
Contrast these definitions of ambiguity with the commonly used term 'authentic'; 
where the adjective defines something as being 'real, actual, genuine or original; 
reliable and trustworthy'.166 One can see that there is an apparently great distance, 
perhaps even an inherent opposition, between something that is 'genuine, true, real 
and reliable' and something that is 'equivocal, doubtful, obscure, indistinct and 
unreliable'. On their usual understanding then, these two terms would appear to be 
opposing, rather than intertwined as I wish to argue. As we saw earlier, however, 
'authentique' in the particularly French existential understanding put forward by 
Sartre and de Beauvoir (which has its roots in Heidegger' s understanding of 
Eigentlichkeit), has a meaning connected to the concept of 'good faith', that is, to the 
recognition of fundamental freedom and the responsibility that comes with it. Good 
faith (being 'authentique' in existentialist terms) in fact requires that one recognise the 
uncertainty, the double meaning, the 'being both ways', the ambiguity of the world 
and of the meaning that has sprung forth within it (and which is intimately 
connected to us). Authenticite requires acknowledging the continual tension and 
relation between our existence as both subject and object, both immanence and 
transcendence, both self and other, and it denies a privileging of either aspect of our 
being. 
The problematic contemporary understanding of authenticity as it relates to identity, 
and which is implicit in the debates explored in subsequent chapters of this thesis 
(over race, class, religion, value and sex - or combinations thereof), denies ambiguity 
and, I argue, can be equated with the state of 'seriousness' identified by de Beauvoir 
in The Ethics of Ambiguity as the most common response of humans to their 
fundamental freedom. That is, the subject creates a rigid (essentialist) identity for 
his or her self, for the world, and for others, in order to deny the fundamental 
freedom that appears 'like a black hole' at their feet. The common understanding or 
165 Ibid. 
166 Shorter Oxford Dictionary, Fifth edition, Volume 1, Oxford University Press, 2002, p 153. 
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use of 'authentic' equates authenticity with the 'genuine' and 'real' by forgetting or 
denying the ambiguity of phenomena. This has a psychological aspect because, as 
Diprose comments, "any ambiguity in the other's difference threatens the security of our 
own identity".167 
In this thesis, however, authenticite will become intimately and inextricably re-
connected to ambiguity, in opposition to much contemporary ethical thought and 
political action, where currently the 'authentic' and the ambiguous are seen to be 
incompatible. Recuperating the concept of ambiguity, in order to reunite it with 
authenticite in (de Beauvoir's) existentialist terms, means that the indeterminacy and 
lack of clarity that ambiguous phenomena are traditionally condemned for become 
characteristics that are celebrated in an ethics that has its foundations in the 
acknowledgement of paradox and tension. 
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty argues that, "we must recognise the 
indeterminate as a positive phenomena" (PP, p7) and, for him, ambiguity can be 
seen as constructive and affirmative, able to be lived as an 'openness' to the world. 
He argues that philosophy (and science) should not cut-off the world in vain 
attempts to reduce or determine objects or subjects and that, "[t]he determinate 
quality by which empiricism tried to define sensation ... conceals rather than reveals 
subjectivity" (PP, p7). What this means is that, by trying to reduce perception down 
to the reception of separate 'primary' sensations that exist in separation from our 
perception of them (rather than recognising the connections between intentionality 
and the world of sensation) subjectivity is hidden behind what appear to be 'causal', 
external phenomena, and the simultaneously passive-active character of perception 
is concealed. 
167 Diprose, Rosalyn, Corporeal Generosity: on giving with Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, 
State University of New York Press: Albany, 2002 (emphasis added). 
It should be notes, however, that although it is a common response to freedom, a spirit of 
seriousness is not necessarily a conscious response, but an unconscious reaction to our lack of 
being. 
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Merleau-Ponty uses two different terms in his work which can be translated as 
11 ambiguity" but which have different meanings. The first is /1 equivoque" which is 
translated as "the essence of human existence and [means that] everything we live 
or think has always several meanings" (PP, p169). The second is ambigurte, which 
implies tension, dialectic or paradox - and this is the term I wish to make use of. 
Sonia Kruks argues that, for de Beauvoir too, ambiguity "refers to a paradoxical 
reality, in which each of two aspects of a single existent carries equal weight" and 
that; 
... human existence is ambiguous because ... facticities appear in her account 
to be of equal weight with consciousness: man is thing, body, as well as 
consciousness. He is object as well as subject, and he lives a continual 
tension between these equal and contradictory aspects of his existence.168 
As I have argued above, I dispute the reading of these aspects as contradictory in 
terms of a mutual exclusion, and argue that rather than being seen as such, we should 
view them as being related-in-tension. A key point is that de Beauvoir does not 
want to 'reconcile' these 'contradictions' but to maintain them in what she calls an 
'existential conversion', an idea that will be examined later in the thesis. 
This chapter, therefore, provides a definition of ambiguity as tension and play, 
rather than contradiction, and suggests that this understanding of ambiguity allows 
for an ethics that is not reduced to absurdity. 
Because of her insistence that there is no one thing (such as Nature or God) to guide 
or define us, de Beauvoir has been criticised for proposing an 'absurd' account of 
existence (as Marcuse argued), which denies any hope or meaning in the world. 
Matthew Braddock, for example, has also recently argued that for Sartre and de 
Beauvoir, "we live in an absurd universe where people lack fixed natures and are 
free to create their natures by their own choices".169 
168 Kruks, Sonia, Situation and Human Existence, pp91-92. 
169 Braddock, Matthew, 'A Critique of Simone de Beauvoir's Existential Ethics', Philosophy 
Today; Fall 2007; Vol. 51, 3, p 304. 
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Although the denial of any inherent or fixed meaning or value is undeniably a strong 
theme in her work, de Beauvoir makes explicit the distinction between concepts of 
absurdity and ambiguity, arguing that the two should not be confused: 
The notion of ambiguity must not be confused with that of absurdity. To 
declare that existence is absurd is to deny that it can ever be given a 
meaning; to say that it is ambiguous is to assert that its meaning is never 
fixed, that it must be constantly won (TEA, p 129, emphasis added). 
As Monika Langer argues, "for Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty, ambiguity is not 
ambivalence, equivocation, dualism or absurdity. Ambiguity characterizes our 
existence and involves an irreducible indeterminacy, and multiple, inseparable 
significations and aspects" .170 Meaning is not something to be denied by de 
Beauvoir, but something to be correctly understood in order to act authentically. 
Authenticite requires understanding that we cannot 'make' ourselves in isolation 
from our bodies or the world, but that in our projects, in our transcendence, we are 
necessarily in the world and limited by the very real practical aspects of our being. 
On this understanding ambiguity is not "vagueness" or indeterminacy, nor is it 
contradiction (in terms of two terms being mutually exclusive). As we saw above, 
the term 'ambi' means an "encompassing of both", or, being both ways. This relates 
to the idea of the body being both inner and outer, humans being both subject and 
object, self and other, for-itself and in-itself, transcendence and immanence. It refers 
to the active/passive nature of the body, to a tension and interplay; it is a dialogical 
relation and describes one's capacity to shape and flex in response to the world. 
What a closer look at ambiguity shows us is that we are neither determined by our 
body, by laws, or by values, nor are we free from our body, from laws, from values 
or from meaning. We live the tension of both aspects of our existence, our 
immanence and our transcendence, in a constant struggle for balance and must 
choose to willingly assume this in order to be ethical. 
170 Langer, Monika, 'Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty on ambiguity' in The Cambridge Companion 
to Simone de Beauvoir, Claudia Card (ed), Cambridge University Press, 2003, p 90. 
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Importantly then, an ethics based on ambiguity does not simply mean that the value 
of a particular event (the abuse or killing of another living creature for example) can 
be viewed or interpreted in 'various ways' as we saw in the dictionary definition. 
Rather, it is an ontological claim. Ambiguity in this sense does not mean that one 
can look at an ethical dilemma and say, "the answer is ambiguous" (so, one might 
ask, why bother even dwelling on it?); rather, what is ambiguous is the very being of 
those questioning and answering and the world they are deliberating about. 
Ambiguity does not simply equate to relativism or subjectivism. This ambiguous 
ontology is pre-reflective, it is prior to cognition. The human condition and the world 
which we interpret is characterised by ambiguity. To be authentique, however, we 
must be able to reflect on, and assume, this condition when making decisions about 
how to act in the world and we must recognise that there are no absolutes in terms 
of laws that can always dictate how one should act. The key recognition that will 
make possible a (recuperated) authentique ethical action is that, whilst our existence 
is characterised by absolute freedom in existential terms, we exist in a worldly 
situation in which particular values and meanings have developed and have 
significance. 
Ambiguity, understood on these terms, does not entail a denial of all values or 
meaning and is not an absurdity or relativism. For de Beauvoir and for Merleau-
Ponty, because situation must always be taken into account when acting ethically, 
we cannot deny the importance of current values and meanings or the reality of 
current ways of being. However, we must recognise these values and meanings as 
being dependent upon particular situations for their significance (and, ultimately, for 
their very existence). Understanding ambiguity provides us with the basis for an 
ethics, with a foundation from which to formulate principles for action. As Merleau-
Ponty argues: 
The study of perception could only teach us a "bad ambiguity", a mixture of 
finitude and universality, of interiority and exteriority. But there is a "good 
ambiguity" in the phenomenon of expression, a spontaneity which 
accomplishes what appeared to be impossible when observed only the 
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separate elements, a spontaneity which gathers together the plurality of 
monads, the past and the present, nature and culture into a single whole. To 
establish this wonder would be metaphysics itself and would at the same 
time give us the principle of an ethics.171 
So, ambiguity does not apply just to determining whether or not an act is 'good' or 
'bad', but refers also to the ontological status of the world in which ethical questions 
can even be asked. Ambiguity is the state of the world, and of our existence within 
it; authenticite refers to the way in which we take up this ambiguity and incorporate 
it, deliberately, in our lives. 
De Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty are concerned with refuting and overturning the 
ideals and aims of traditional European philosophy, which considered the task of 
philosophy to be the production of objective principles of knowledge that would be 
universally true and certain. 172 Both saw the methods and ideals of science as being 
inadequate for philosophy, and also to be inadequate for the quest to understand 
human existence and, I argue, for understanding everyday experience, which is 
influenced by both philosophy and scientific discourse. De Beauvoir writes on this 
point that, " ... science condemns itself to failure when, yielding to the infatuation of 
the serious, it aspires to attain being, to contain it, and to possess it" (TEA, p79). She 
writes of science and philosophy, which aim to deny ambiguity: 
At the present time there still exist many doctrines which choose to leave in 
the shadow certain troubling aspects of a too complex situation. But their 
attempt to lie to us is in vain. Cowardice doesn't pay. Those reasonable 
metaphysics, those consoling ethics with which they would entice us only 
accentuate the disorder from which we suffer (TEA, p 8). 
171 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological 
Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics, William Cobb (trans.), James M. Edie 
(ed), Northwestern University Press, 1964. 
172 Note the connection here to the problematic understanding of 'authenticity' I wish to 
critique, which is aligned with this search for clarity and certainty. 
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According to de Beauvoir's understanding of existentialism, objective, universal, 
and absolute knowledge is an unattainable ideal, the search for which has blinded 
philosophers to the basic features of human existence. This quest for universality 
fails because it denies (or ignores) the possibility of ambiguity, from the very outset, 
by defining its search as being a quest for objective truth about the world and our 
relationship to it. The aim (according to philosophers like Merleau-Ponty and de 
Beauvoir) should not be to attempt to grasp the ultimate nature or reality of the 
world in abstract systems of thought but, instead, what becomes important is an 
investigation of human being, situated 'in the world'. This is not a wholesale 
dismissal of scientific investigation or of the desire to further understand the world, 
and, as de Beauvoir writes, " ... [science] finds its truth if it considers itself a free 
engagement of thought in the given, aiming, at each discovery, not at fusion with 
the thing, but at the possibility of new discoveries" (TEA, p79). 
As discussed previously, the phenomenological method underpins de Beauvoir's 
work and the focus on being-in-the-world is particularly important for her, 
demonstrating particular links to the concept of being-in-the-world as defined by 
Heidegger in Being and Time. What this concept meant for existential 
phenomenologists is that we are 'in the world' and cannot be separated from it in 
the way that philosophies based on the Cartesian method of radical doubt would 
suggest. Science and traditional philosophy have tried to demonstrate our 
'objectivity' and 'detachment' from the world we observe in order to prove its 
truthfulness. Being-in-the-world, in contrast, is about our embeddedness, our 
situatedness, our connections to our world and all that surrounds us and is 
concerned with trying to describe these relations and connections rather than trying 
to understand ourselves 'in spite of' them. It is about how we relate to our projects, 
our contexts, our historical location, in a way that is not abstract, or objective but is 
related to and involved with us. If we are to make ethical decisions that affect 
ourselves, our environment and others, we must have an account that considers our 
'worldliness' - our belonging to and being part of the world itself - an account that 
recognises the impossibility of separating or excluding parts of our world or 
ourselves to get a better view of what 'lies beneath' (to uncover inherent moral 
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values for example). Rather than trying to achieve a final understanding through 
scientific objectivity and distance, we must understand things we experience in the 
world practically. As Heidegger puts it "the less we just stare at the hammer-thing 
and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our 
relationship to it become" (BT, §15).173 It is important to note here that I am not 
advocating that the primacy of practical engagement with the world is sufficient for 
an ethics, but am stressing that reflective awareness of ambiguity is also required for 
authenticite. As I mentioned above, however, intellectual reflection, in itself is not 
sufficient for an ethics and both reflection and action are required on this account. 
As de Beauvoir says, "this living confirmation can not be merely contemplative or 
verbal. It is carried out in an act" (TEA, p27). 
An ethics that bases itself in ambiguity will recognise the mutual imbrications of 
self, other, meaning and world and bring this recognition to ethical questioning and 
action. As Merleau-Ponty argues, it is with our experience of and in the world (and 
with others in this world) that we must begin our questioning, not in attempts at 
gaining a falsely detached objective distance. He writes: 
I am not the outcome or the meeting-point of numerous causal agencies 
which determine my bodily or psychological make-up. I cannot conceive 
myself as nothing but a bit of the world, a mere object of biological, 
psychological or sociological investigation. I cannot shut myself up within 
the realm of science. All my knowledge of the world, even my scientific 
knowledge, is gained from my own particular point of view, or from some 
experience of the world without which the symbols of science would be 
meaningless. The whole universe of science is built upon the world as 
directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous 
scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we 
173 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, (trans.) John Macquarie and Edward Robinson, 
Blackwell Publishing: London, 1962, p 98. 
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must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world ... (PP, ix, emphasis 
added). 
This returning to the world (or to 'the things themselves' as Husserl urges) is not 
common in moral theory, however, and de Beauvoir argues in her review of 
Merleau-Ponty's work that traditional ethics attempts to educate children by 
removing their subjectivity and by convincing the child that he is: 
... subjected, like the others, to universal laws written in an anonymous heaven. 
Science enjoins him to escape out of his own consciousness, to turn away 
from the living and meaningful world that this consciousness disclosed to fC, 
d::. 
him, and for which science tries to substitute a universe of frozen objects, 0::: 
f,J'.) 
independent of all gaze and all thought (RoPP, p 159, emphasis added). :J 
~ Characteristically, she argues, people respond in two ways to their freedom, "some F-
throw themselves resolutely toward the foreign things and strive to forget that they 
are losing themselves; [whereas] others choose a turning inward toward oneself, but 
it then seems to them that the rest of the universe escapes them" (RoPP, p 160). De 
Beauvoir argues, conversely, that ethics can only be based on the elimination of the 
subject/object opposition and that Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception is 
able to provide the means for this elimination and, therefore, provide the base for an 
ethics. 
Her argument is that it is possible to develop an existential ethics that celebrates our 
ambiguity. One cannot find 'oneself' within (in isolation from others or the world), 
nor can one lose oneself in appeals to the universal (by equating oneself with 
mankind for example), because as de Beauvoir points out "if he dreams of 
expanding himself to infinity, he immediately loses himself" (PC, p113). The most 
important point is that, no matter how he may try to deny it, man does not stop 
being-there. 
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FREEDOM 
As we have noted, a major aim for de Beauvoir in The Ethics of Ambiguity is to 
correct misunderstandings of the existential account of freedom explicitly 
developed by Sartre, which had been condemned for enclosing humanity "in a 
sterile anguish, in an empty subjectivity" and for failing to provide us with "any 
principle for making choices" (TEA, plO). Rather than viewing it as negative, as 
critics of existentialism had done, de Beauvoir saw recognition of ambiguity to be 
the means by which to elaborate upon the existential task of revealing our 
fundamental freedom and the possibility for ethical relations entailed in such a 
revelation. She writes that: 
[f]rom the very beginning, existentialism defined itself as a philosophy of 
ambiguity. It was by affirming the irreducible character of ambiguity that 
Kierkegaard opposed himself to Hegel, and it is by ambiguity that, in our 
own generation, Sartre, in Being & Nothingness, fundamentally defined man, 
that being whose being is not to be, that subjectivity which realizes itself 
only as a presence in the world, that engaged freedom, that surging of the 
for-oneself which is immediately given for others (TEA, plO). 
According to de Beauvoir, rather than denying the possibility of ethics with 
recognition of freedom, "an ethics of ambiguity will be one which will refuse to 
deny a priori that separate existents can, at the same time, be bound to each other, 
that their individual freedoms can forge laws valid for all" (TEA, p18). Proving that 
an existential account of freedom does not inevitably lead to a denial of the 
possibility of any ethics is thus a major aim of her work. 
THE PARADOX OF FREEDOM 
One of Sartre's main claims in Being and Nothingness is that we cannot give-up our 
fundamental freedom - although most of us continually seek to do so, in bad faith 
(mauvais Joi). For him, and for de Beauvoir, the condition of human being is freedom 
and he writes that: 
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Human freedom precedes essence in man and makes it possible; the essence 
of human being is suspended in his freedom. What we call freedom is 
impossible to distinguish from the being of "human reality". Man does not 
exist first in order to be free subsequently; there is no difference between the 
being of man and his being free ... (BN, p 25). 
Sartre argues that our situation provides the 'context' for our experience of freedom, 
and that we can never be reduced to the 'facts' of our existence because of our 
capacity to interpret and 'negate', or 'nihilate', these facts. What this means for 
Sartre is that we must take absolute responsibility for our lives because there is no 
external justification for our acts. He argues that the common act of denying 
freedom, by living as though determined or without choice, results in 'bad faith'. 
For example, if we identify ourselves with our possessions, with our class, position 
in society, or with our job, we are in bad faith because we are according absolute 
value to these things and equating this value with our own being. Equally, although 
Sartre does not pay sustained attention to this aspect of bad faith, those who 
associate only with the transcendent aspect of their existence by denying their 
'facticity' (arguing that their material situation has no meaning at all) are also living 
in bad faith. For Sartre, the paradox of freedom entails that "there is freedom only in 
a situation, and there is a situation only through freedom" (BN, 598-99). 
THE PROBLEM OF RADICAL FREEDOM 
Although Sartre attempted to account for the importance of situation in his 
description of this paradox (and later in Existentialism is a Humanism and elsewhere), 
a sustained point of attack has been on the account of 'radical freedom' developed 
in Being and Nothingness. Sartre famously argued there that "the slave in chains is as 
free as his master"(BN, p 550) and he has been heavily criticised for this statement, 
as it fails to account for the oppression and social circumstances of varied 
individuals who are, quite obviously, not 'free'. David Levin, for example, in his 
analysis of the limits and potential of existentialism to provide us with an ethics 
today, argues that: 
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... existentialism is so blinded by its passionate concern for the existence 
of the individual, and so committed to the affirmation of individual 
freedoms, that it has, for the most part, with Merleau-Ponty the 
exception, neglected the individual's sociability: questions and problems 
related, for example, to our historicality, our belonging within tradition, 
our socialization, and the roots of social and moral life in the nature of the 
individual.174 
Existentialism has been criticised for its failure to account for the social situation of 
subjects due to the claim that we are all as 'free' as each other. Sonia Kruks, for 
example, argues that, although Sartre was attempting to critique Cartesianism and 
the idea of the 'thinking subject' in Being and Nothingness, he "ends by reconfirming 
the Cartesian identity of consciousness and freedom, and by asserting the absolute 
autonomy of individual autonomy" and, thus, he fails to adequately address the 
"relation of subject to social structure".175 In the face of a history defined by the 
oppression of so many groups and individuals the obvious question is "how we can 
be free and enslaved at the same time?" 
In response to this question, a number of recent scholars have argued that de 
Beauvoir' s account of the limits of freedom in situations of oppression is socially 
mitigated, whereas Sartre's account of selfhood is considered by many to be 
'distinctly masculine'.176 Nancy Hartsock, for one, calls Sartre's account of the 
subject a 'walled city' account, in which the subject is both radically separate from 
174 Levin, David Michael, 'Existentialism at the end of Modernity: Questioning the I's Eyes', 
Philosophy Today: Spring 1990; 34, 1, p90. 
175 Kruks, Sonia, Sztuatzon and Human Existence, p15. 
Although she does see that Sartre's account of freedom in Being and Nothingness was 
individualistic and failed to adequately account for socially located subjects, Kruks argues 
that his later work developed into an argument that attempted to account for shared or 
social existence "where freedom admits of degree and is socially mediated" and she argues 
that this more nuanced version of freedom is resolved in the Critique of Dialectical Reason 
(Kruks, Sonia, Situation and Human Existence, p30). 
176 Kruks, Sonia, Situation and Human Existence, p31. 
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and inherently hostile toward others.177 Levin has argued that "Sartre makes the 
psycho-social pathology of everyday vision - an eye whose gaze is predatory, 
aggressive and sadistic, violent - into the normal case, without even so much as a 
passing acknowledgement of any other existential possibilities" .178 Kerry Whiteside 
describes Sartre's inability to account for the social location of subjects so that it 
would appear that, no matter one's circumstance, one can 'be' whatever one wants 
simply through reinterpretation: "Sartre's notion of freedom ... cripples social theory 
by making it seem that individuals can overcome all physical and social obstacles 
simply by reinterpreting their meaning" .179 
What is evident in these criticisms of Sartre's early account of freedom is a perceived 
failure to recognise the importance of self-other-world relations and the importance 
of one's facticity or one's situation to one's experience of freedom. The importance 
of such relations, however, is addressed by de Beauvoir in both The Ethics of 
Ambiguity and The Second Sex (as well as in her novels and various articles), where 
she attempts to account for the limits of freedom and explain the possibility for 
oppression even when humans are still seen to be ultimately (ontologically) free. As 
Kruks argues, de Beauvoir "pushed the early Sartrean notion of the subject as 
absolute freedom to its limits and beyond" with her exploration of oppression.180 
A CONTRADICTORY FREEDOM? 
We can see then that there are many who criticise Sartre's existentialism and 
Margaret Whitford argues that Sartre's account of freedom "has given rise to 
perhaps more misunderstanding than any other aspect of his philosophy ... [with] 
the majority of his early critics being unanimous in condemning the doctrine as self-
177 Gatens also discusses this aspect of Sartre's work in Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives 
on Equality and Difference, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, Ch 3, p50. 
178 Levin, David Michael, 'Existentialism at the end of Modernity: Questioning the I's Eyes, 
p91. 
179 Whiteside, Kerry, H, Review of Situation and Human Existence: Freedom, Subjectivity, and 
Society, by Sonia Kruks, in The Review of Politics, Vol. 53. No. 3. Summer, 1991, p574. 
180 Kruks, Sonia, Situation and Human Existence, p17. 
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contradictory and self-defeating".181 Whitford argues, however, that different 
concepts of freedom are referred to in different circumstances within Sartre's work 
because freedom has more than one meaning for him. She argues that the 
distinction he makes is between an irreducible ontological freedom and a 'freedom in 
situation', which is limited: 
The argument that there is a contradiction in Sartre between the conception 
of freedom as total (ontological freedom) and the conception of freedom as 
limited (freedom in situation) arises because of the confusion Sartre creates 
by being insufficiently careful in his use of the term freedom. The 
contradiction is only apparent, in fact, because ontological freedom is the 
condition and the prerequisite of freedom in situation.182 
De Beauvoir herself acknowledges the potential for the existential account of 
freedom to be read as contradictory and she asks in The Ethics of Ambiguity, 
" ... whatever the case may be, we believe in freedom. Is it true that this belief must 
lead us to despair? Must we grant this paradox: that from the moment a man 
recognises himself as free, he is prohibited from wishing for anything" (TEA, p23). 
There she also asks if the positing of an ontological freedom contradicts the 
existential assertion that one must 'take up' this freedom and engage with it in order 
to be authentique: 
... Does not this presence of a so to speak natural freedom contradict the 
notion of ethical freedom? What meaning can there be in the words to will 
oneself free, since at the beginning we are free? It is contradictory to set 
freedom up as something conquered if at first it is something given (TEA, 
p24). 
As with her discussion of female biology (which was examined in the previous 
chapter), the apparently contradictory nature of de Beauvoir's argument for 
freedom and oppression has come under scrutiny by her readers and quite different 
181 Whitford, Margaret, Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Sartre's Philosophy, p56. 
182 Ibid, p57. 
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interpretations have emerged. Barbara Andrew argues that the reason "the 
complexity of Beauvoir' s idea of freedom is only now being taken up by feminists" 
is to a large extent " ... because her analysis of situation and ambiguity and how they 
lead to a new idea of freedom are only now being fully understood".183 
Andrew argues that, whilst Sartre was "impeded by his notion of radical freedom", 
de Beauvoir "was able to develop a social philosophy early on".184 In addition, 
Kruks, Langer, and Eva Gothlin all see closer links between Merleau-Ponty's notion 
of freedom than with Sartre's.185 Many philosophers influenced by de Beauvoir 
agree that what she offers is an account of freedom that acknowledges the impact of 
social situation and, thus, implicitly overcomes the limits of Sartre's account. 
Penelope Deutscher, for example, writes that, unlike Sartre, who 'evades' an account 
of freedom that allows for differences in the lived experience of one's body, 
"Beauvoir' s concern was with the social change that could increase the possibilities 
for ethical freedom of all subjects and allow a qualitatively improved relationship to 
the anticipation of one's future" .186 
Even as these interpretations acknowledge de Beauvoir' s ability to move beyond the 
limits of Sartre's work, a number argue that in de Beauvoir's account there is a 
potential for ontological freedom to be impaired or reduced in certain situations. 
Penelope Deutscher, for example, argues that in de Beauvoir' s later work on ageing 
that ontological freedom, not just practical freedom to engage in activities, is limited 
as one's future becomes shorter.187 Kruks also makes a similar claim, arguing that in 
de Beauvoir's earlier work, Pyrrhus et Cineas, the lack of an open future for 
183 Andrew, Barbara, S, 'Beauvoir's place in philosophical thought', in The Cambridge 
Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, Claudia Card (ed.), Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2003, p39. 
184 Ibid, p32. 
185 As we saw in chapter two, a number of scholars argue that de Beauvoir influenced 
Sartre's account of freedom rather than the other way around. (For example, Kate Fullbrook 
and Edward Fullbrook and Margaret Simons). 
186 Deutscher, Penelope, 'Beauvoir's Old Age', in The Cambridge Companion to Simone de 
Beauvoir, p298. 
187 Ibid. 
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particular human beings, which is the result of oppression, "implies a modification 
of the for-itself, of ontological freedom" and that the distinction between ontological 
and effective freedom in de Beauvoir's work begins to break down.188 Below I argue 
that, although practical and effective freedom can be limited on her account, that 
ontological freedom cannot be reduced and that oppression is the result of one's 
capacity to engage with one's ontological freedom being severely limited by other 
people. As we will see, the concepts of 'power' and 'liberty' - which are 
conceptualised as different levels of freedom - allow for an explanation of the 
possibility for oppression without conceding that one's ontological freedom can be 
diminished. As de Beauvoir argues, human existence is characterised by this 
ambiguous freedom and, she says, "In the servitude of the serious, the original 
spontaneity strives to deny itself. It strives in vain, and meanwhile it then fails to 
fulfil itself as moral freedom" (TEA, p26, emphasis added). Here, we see that "the 
original spontaneity", our fundamental freedom, is rejected by those who want to 
secure themselves as given; however, as they strive to solidify themselves in the 
serious, they deny their capacity for authenticite in "moral freedom". Ultimately, 
those who attempt to deny our fundamental freedom are unable to do so; they 
strive "in vain" because this freedom cannot be denied. 
LEVELS OF FREEDOM IN DE BEAUVOIR'S WORK 
There is some debate over what both Sartre and de Beauvoir mean when they talk of 
our irreducible freedom and Kristina Arp argues that what is most significant and 
useful in de Beauvoir' s attempts at addressing the criticisms against existential 
theory is the distinction between different levels of freedom that she develops. De 
Beauvoir's task is to address the apparent contradiction that, whilst we are all 'free' 
and are responsible for defining ourselves, that others can (and do) impact upon us 
in very real and significant ways, such that we are not all equally free to engage in 
projects. 
iss Kruks, Sonia, Situation and Human Existence, p9l. 
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In her essay on morality, Pyrrhus et Cineas written in 1943, as well as later in The 
Ethics of Ambiguity, de Beauvoir (like Sartre) argues that there are different modes or 
levels of freedom in human existence. She argues that "this is what Descartes 
expressed when he said that the freedom [liberte] of man is infinite, but his power 
[puissance] is limited" and she asks, "how can the presence of these limits be 
reconciled with the idea of a freedom confirming itself as a unity and an indefinite 
movement?" (TEA, p28). How, in other words, can we reconcile our fundamental 
freedom with our facticity? 
Kruks notes that de Beauvoir had expressed doubts in her autobiographical work 
about Sartre's claim that all are as free as others and she used this distinction 
between freedom (liberte) and power (puissance) to attempt to reconcile her belief 
that situations can be 'graded' or differ in the extent to which they impact upon 
one's freedom.189 In Pyrrhus et Cineas, de Beauvoir also attempted to address the 
problem of reconciling fundamental freedom with the limits of situation when she 
argued that: 
... his power [puissance] is finite, and one can increase it or restrict it from 
the outside. One can throw a man in prison, get him out, cut off his arm, 
lend him wings, but his freedom [liberte] remains infinite in all cases (PC, 
p124). 
What can be limited is one's opportunity to engage with one's freedom in order to 
carry out projects in the world. In such cases, our ontological freedom is still 'there' 
and cannot not be there, however, in some circumstances, some people are unable to 
recognise and engage with this level of freedom and are, therefore, prevented from 
'taking it up' authentically. In other situations, people can have their puissance 
limited, even to the point of being thrown into prison, but still recognise their 
freedom and live with authenticite within their very limited situation. 
189 Kruks notes that de Beauvoir comments on the problems she saw in Sartre's account of 
absolute freedom in her autobiography Force of Circumstance. See Situation and Human 
Existence, p90. (Beauvoir, Simone de. Force of circumstance. (trans.) Richard Howard. UK: 
Andre Deutsch and Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965.) 
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As we saw above, according to this distinction, liberte is infinite whereas puissance 
can be affected externally by other people. Both levels of freedom, however, are 
connected and the importance of neither aspect can be overcome or denied. De 
Beauvoir asserts, "a man is freedom and facticity at the same time. He is free, but not 
with that abstract freedom posited by the Stoics; he is free in situation" (PC, p124, 
emphasis added). 
Kruks argues that de Beauvoir is unable to sustain this distinction consistently, 
however, and that a reduction in ontological freedom is made possible in situations 
of oppression: 
... it is the lack of an 'open' future which begins, in Beauvoir's account, to 
imply that there is a qualitative modification of transcendence itself; this is to 
say also that the lack of an open future implies a modification of the for-
itself, of ontological freedom.190 
I disagree with the analysis that there is a possibility for the diminishment of 
ontological freedom itself. For de Beauvoir we always retain our ontological freedom 
(it is infinite), this is what makes us human and this freedom cannot be reduced or 
limited. We would not be human if we were not ontologically free. Our liberte is our 
freedom from essence, our lack of being, our transcendence or our 'emptiness' - it is 
the freedom from the given and the lack of determination, the indeterminacy, that 
lies at the heart of our existence and, to suggest that this could be altered or 
reduced, is to suggest that we could be determined or fixed. Our ontological 
freedom (our liberte) remains infinite; it cannot be touched or altered without making 
us into 'things'. However, our capacity to recognise and engage with this freedom 
(our puissance) can be limited, as can our capacity to act on our situation, and, as 
Andrew argues, "for Beauvoir, everyone is equally metaphysically capable of 
190 Kruks, Sonia, Situation and Human Existence, p91. 
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freedom. However, [some] are situated in ways that make it less likely that they can 
act on their freedom" .191 
Arp also disagrees with Kruk's interpretation of the potential for ontological 
freedom to be reduced, and her position is that "... even the most severely 
oppressed, always retain their ontological freedom" and it is this freedom that 
makes us human.192 De Beauvoir maintains the irreducibility of freedom that Sartre 
argues for when he says that 'the slave in chains is as free as his master', however, 
she overcomes the obvious faults with this claim with her account of power 
(puissance) and moral freedom (authenticite). Arp argues that, in The Ethics of 
Ambiguity, de Beauvoir introduces the new concept of 'moral freedom' into 
existentialism, which is distinct from ontological (or 'natural') freedom and from 
'power' or practical freedom.193 She argues that the introduction of moral freedom -
the "conscious affirmation of one's ontological freedom" - is able to overcome the 
problem posed for existential ethics by the concept of radical ontological freedom. 
De Beauvoir' s analysis of this level of freedom provides a means to answer the 
criticisms that, without inherent value, there can be no basis for ethics and Arp 
argues that, in her examination of freedom, de Beauvoir "comes to the rescue" of 
existential ethics.194 
OPPRESSION 
That which can be either diminished or enhanced, depending upon our situation, 
then, is our 'puissance', our power, or our effective freedom and our capacity to 
recognise our ontological freedom. Crucially, this freedom can be so impacted upon 
that some people become oppressed. In situations of oppression, other people treat 
the oppressed like a 'thing' and try to deny them their ontological freedom. Because 
they cannot, ultimately, make the other into a thing by removing their ontological 
191 Andrew, Barbara, 'Beauvoir's place in philosophical thought', The Cambridge Companion to 
Simone de Beauvoir, Claudia Card (ed.), Cambridge University Press: 2003, emphasis added. 
192 Arp, Kristana, The Bonds of Freedom: Simone de Beauvoir's Existential Ethics, Open Court: 
Chicago, 2001, p7. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid, pp 1-3. 
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freedom, the way that tyrants oppress is by limiting the other's puissance and by 
denying them the capacity to engage with or to affirm their freedom. In this way, the 
future of the oppressed person is 'cut off', it is limited and they are unable to make 
decisions to affect their future. 
De Beauvoir argues that what is evil about this kind of treatment is the denial of the 
other's freedom, the denial of their existence as a free and ambiguous being, a being 
that is at once subject and object: 
Neither death nor suffering nor captivity are abominable in themselves. An 
abomination arises only at the moment that man treats fellow men like 
objects, when by torture, humiliation, servitude, assassination, one denies 
them their existence as men (EFE, p 248). 
An important point that de Beauvoir elaborates on in her essay An Eye for An Eye 
(which she wrote to explain the reasons that she did not sign a petition by other 
intellectuals to pardon Robert Brasillach for his collaborationist acts during the war) 
is that it is other people who oppress. When a person deliberately tries to make 
anolher into a 'thing' a situation occurs in which "hatred grasps at another's 
freedom in so far as it is used to realize the absolute evil that is the degradation of a 
man into a thing" (Ibid). 
Our capacity to develop and exercise our practical freedom is influenced from the 
outside (by other people) and our 'situation' is crucial to our ability to even begin to 
recognise our existence as fundamentally free. De Beauvoir argues that situations 
which result in oppression are not due to "natural" occurrences, and it is not 
'things' that oppose men but "other men". Freedom is not denied by the obstacles 
we encounter in terms of the 'resistance of things' - in fact, in facing such obstacles 
the world is disclosed to us. Material obstacles such as earthquakes, floods, disease 
and drought can, and do, prevent us from doing and achieving certain things 
(practically) but, crucially, such circumstances cannot take away our meaning. It is 
"only man [who] can ... rob [us] of the meaning of [our] acts and [our] life because it 
also belongs only to him alone to confirm it in its existence, to recognize it in actual 
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fact as a freedom" (TEA, p82). Oppression then, is the result of other people denying 
us our transcendence and our ambiguous freedom, "certainly man is wretched, 
scattered, mired in the given, but he is also a free being" and it is when this freedom 
is denied that oppression occurs (EFE, p257). 
The examination of what makes oppression possible is a recurring theme 
throughout many of de Beauvoir's texts and, in The Second Sex, she defines 
oppression as being 'immanence inflicted on another'. There she says that it is a 
'moral fault' if the subject consents to being reduced to immanence, but that it results 
in frustration and oppression if it is inflicted upon him. In both cases, however, she 
sees reduction to immanence as an absolute evil (TSS, p xxxiii). 
As we saw in chapter one, a spirit of seriousness is linked to a desire for solid values 
and de Beauvoir argues that oppression exists because people experience nostalgia 
for childhood; a nostalgia for a time where freedom was not recognised and 
absolute values confirmed our place and meaning in the world. She writes, "the 
misfortune which comes to man as a result of the fact that he was a child is that his 
freedom was first concealed from him and that all his life he will be nostalgic for the 
time when he did not know his exigencies" (TEA, p40). Others take care of us as 
children and we follow the rules set by parents and other adults, rules which seem 
to us to be fixed. Children are, of course, ontologically free (as we all are), but they 
are not accountable for their actions nor for their failure to recognise their freedom 
because their situation is such that it is not yet revealed to them.195 As de Beauvoir 
writes: 
Childhood is a particular sort of situation: it is a natural situation whose 
limits are not created by other men and which is thereby not comparable to a 
situation of oppression; it is a situation which is common to all men and 
which is temporary for all; therefore, it does not represent a limit which cuts 
off the individual from his possibilities, but, on the contrary, the moment of 
195 See also, Langer, Monika, 'Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty on Ambiguity', in The Cambridge 
Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p97. 
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a development in which new possibilities are won. The child is ignorant 
because he has not yet had the time to acquire knowledge, not because this 
time has been refused him (TEA, p141). 
With adolescence, however, comes the discovery of freedom and responsibility; 
each must begin to choose how to live one's newly discovered freedom and "the 
individual must at last assume his subjectivity" (TEA, p39). The response of the 
adolescent can either be a retreat from or an embracing of freedom and the 
responsibility that comes with it (and will most often be a movement between these 
two responses). De Beauvoir acknowledges that this is a confusing and often 
difficult time for most and she describes it thus: 
Whatever the joy of this liberation may be; it is not without great confusion 
that the adolescent finds himself cast into a world which is no longer ready-
made; he is abandoned, unjustified, the prey of freedom that is no longer 
chained up by anything (TEA, p39). 
Because subjects experience this confusion and nostalgia for a time when they were 
not held responsible for their actions, many seek to find rules and values to replace 
those they have lost. Religion, social norms, moral rules and values provide the 
safety of escape from freedom and, when the contingency of such values is denied 
and they are held as absolutes, oppression becomes possible. To secure the self, as 
we have seen, requires that we also secure the other in the place that we are 
comfortable with. Securing the 'self' and the moral values and rules that provide 
safety requires that we deny our ambiguity in favour of absolutes. 
THE IMPACT OF OTHERS 
Oppression, then, is a situation in which a person is limited in terms of their 
capacity to engage with their freedom, by other people or by institutions established 
and maintained by others. A person who has a physical disability, for example, is 
not 'oppressed' by the disability, as this is part of their complex, worldly situation. 
As long as they are still free to choose how they respond to this situation they can 
still have practical freedom and their ontological freedom can be lived with 
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authenticite. Likewise, a woman is not 'oppressed' by her body or by her maternity. 
Oppression occurs when other people maintain institutions and belief systems that 
disallow certain others to have an open future in which they can 'take-up' their fully 
recognised ontological freedom. Oppression occurs when people are treated as 
though determined wholly by external forces, which limits their capacity for free 
choice. As de Beauvoir argues in The Ethics of Ambiguity, "freedom realises itself 
only by engaging itself in the world" (TEA, p29) and this interaction with the world 
gives a 'content' to freedom. For de Beauvoir "life is occupied in both perpetuating 
itself and in surpassing itself; if all it does is maintain itself, then living is only not 
dying, and human existence is indistinguishable from an absurd vegetation" (TEA, 
p83). The oppressed are "those who are condemned to mark time hopelessly in 
order merely to support the collectivity" for whom life is "a pure repetition of 
mechanical gestures" (TEA, p82-83). As de Beauvoir notes, a favoured task of 
political oppression has been to condemn subordinates to performing meaningless 
tasks in order to undermine their humanity and crush their spirits: 
There is no more obnoxious way to punish a man than to force him to 
perform acts which make no sense to him, as when one empties and fills the 
same ditch indefinitely, when one makes soldiers who are being punished 
march up and down, or when one forces a schoolboy to copy lines (TEA, 30-
31 ). 
Arp argues that oppression consists in "denying one the ability to develop moral 
freedom by creating a future of one's own in joint projects with others" and that this 
can be done by "curtailing a person's power or ability to interact with the material 
world" .196 This means that the appropriate definition of oppression consists not in 
the purely material circumstances of an individual. It lies also in their capacity to 
determine their own future and, importantly, in their capacity to see their own 
ontological freedom and to take this up in an ethical relation with the world. 
196 Arp, Kristana, The Bonds of Freedom, p124. 
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Our practical or effective freedom (our capacity to act in the world) is affected by 
our history, our social location, and our cultural and economic situation. Together, 
all of these factors impact upon our capacity to 'take up' our ontological freedom. 
Our situation affects the way in which we are able to define our future and our 
engagement with the world and with others. For example, as we saw earlier in this 
thesis, the experience of childbirth and mothering in France in the 1940s impacted 
upon women's freedom due to the social expectation that the majority of women 
would devote their lives to having babies and being mothers and wives. This, as 
well as legislation governing abortion and contraception, limited the choice of many 
women to decide for themselves how to live their lives and how to experience their 
bodies. The external pressures of society were internalized so that many women 
came to think that their only option was to be married, have children and take care 
of the home. This was not seen as a choice, but as destiny.197 Their ontological 
freedom remained unchanged (they still remained free of an 'essence' that defined 
them or determined their being) but they were cut off from realising it., Therefore, 
women were not able to fully engage with their ontological freedom because society 
determined them as material beings and their futures were limited practically by the 
institutions with which they must interact. These women were, therefore, 
oppressed. 
De Beauvoir argues that, conversely, men have traditionally been able to live their 
freedom more than women due to the social and institutional limits imposed upon 
women because of the particular bodies they have. She argues that man "has many 
more concrete opportunities to project his freedom in the world" due to the social 
circumstances in which he exists (TSS, p638).198 It is important to note here that these 
197 Fredrika Scarth discusses the distinction de Beauvoir makes between 'enforced maternity' 
and "maternzte libre". The latter term describes maternity carried out 'in freedom', which can 
occur if legislation and social circumstances are such that women can freely chose to 
conceive a child and give birth, rather than having this forced upon her by her situation. 
Scarth, Fredrika, 'The Other Within: Ethics, Politics and the Body in Simone de Beauvoir, 
Hypatia, Summer 2006, Vol. 21, Issue 3, pp 217-223. 
l9B Although I agree with de Beauvoir's underlying point here about institutions limiting the 
capacity of certain groups and individuals to take up their freedom, I would argue that 
many men have also been limited because social expectation has also defined masculinity in 
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are 'concrete' opportunities and she is not referring to a reduction of ontological 
freedom but, rather, to how this freedom is engaged with or 'practiced', to the 
opportunity to freely engage in chosen projects. She is not arguing that it is 
women's bodies that oppress them, but the way in which their bodies are inscribed 
with social meanings in particular situations. As Gatens describes it, oppression is a 
situation in which social values impact upon the material well-being of an 
individual such that their life-chances are limited to a greater extent than others.199 
We saw in the previous chapter that women have, traditionally, had their life-
chances limited because of the way in which their bodies have been interpreted 
within patriarchy. 
De Beauvoir is not arguing that women should be more like men - or that all 
humans should live a particular way - but that some men have been in a position 
that enables them to live their freedom more 'freely' than women because of their 
social location and the way their bodies are interpreted. An important point to note 
is that all those men who do not recognise their own ambiguity, and who deny the 
ambiguity of women, have been living inauthentically because they have not 
willingly 'taken up' their freedom. Moreover, it should be noted that the concept of 
masculinity described in The Second Sex is also problematic for many men, as well as 
for women, because it is a conception of masculinity based upon a denial of freedom 
and a solidification of value. 
Here then, we see that authenticite, which is the 'moral' element of freedom, is not so 
much another 'level' of freedom as Arp suggests, but a recognition of our 
ambiguous freedom and a willing assertion of this. Authenticite requires action on 
our part; it requires reflection and effort. It is not enough for one to be ontologically 
free and practically free, to be authentique a person must recognise their ambiguity 
and willingly assume it. 
a particular and limited way and has denied the ambiguity of their situation. The equation 
of man with rationality and reason is just as problematic as the equation of women with 
emotion and the body - as both deny the ambiguity of the human condition. 
199 Gatens, Moira, 'Beauvoir and Biology: A Second Look', in The Cambridge Companion to 
Simone de Beauvoir, Claudia Card, (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
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MYSTIFICATION 
Although she is critical of those who fail to take up their freedom once they become 
aware of it, de Beauvoir also acknowledges the possibility of an existence which 
does not recognise its own freedom at all due to its situation. She writes of such a 
situation: 
... certain adults can live in the universe of the serious in all honesty, for 
example, those who are denied all instruments of escape, those who are 
enslaved or who are mystified. The less economic and social circumstances 
allow an individual to act upon the world, the more his world appears to 
him as given (TEA, pp47-48). 
Those who exist in such a state of mystification are oppressed and their practical 
freedom is severely limited by their economic and social circumstances and, also, 
they are unable to 'assume' or 'affirm' their ontological freedom because they have 
not been able to recognise it. De Beauvoir argues that "ignorance and error are facts 
as inescapable as prison walls" and that there are some who "have no instrument to 
attack the civilization which oppresses them". Therefore, their behaviour "can be 
judged only in this situation" (TEA, p38). Their capacity to recognise and express 
their ontological ambiguity is diminished and in such circumstances it becomes the 
task of the "enlightened" to reveal their freedom to them. 
Langer argues that, for de Beauvoir, the acknowledgement that people can remain 
in a child-like state of mystification means that it is possible for a person to "have 
their freedom destroyed".200 However, whilst I agree that one's effective freedom or 
power can be limited, I assert that on de Beauvoir' account one's ontological 
freedom is never 'destroyed', even if one is oblivious to it because, as she says, our 
liberte is infinite. It is impossible for this freedom to be destroyed, for this would 
require a person to have fixed meaning and value, to have an 'essence' or inherent 
existence that preceded their being in the world and that was independent of their 
situation - if one 'lost' their ontological freedom they would become a 'thing'. 
200 Langer, Monika, 'Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty on Ambiguity', p99. 
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Oppression and mystification are possible because people can have their ontological 
and practical freedom denied and hidden from them - so that they remain in a 
position where they are unable to engage with and respond to their ontological 
freedom. People cannot, however, lose their ontological freedom. 
Whilst she sees much that is worthwhile in The Ethics of Ambiguity, Arp argues that 
de Beauvoir's theory of freedom still "comes up short" with regard to her ability to 
account for the moral status of the oppressed.201 She argues that, for de Beauvoir, 
those who are oppressed have a lesser moral status than those who are free to 
assume and take up their ontological freedom in practical ways. Arp interprets this 
as meaning that, for de Beauvoir, those in such a situation have less capacity to 
develop moral freedom and that their moral status is somehow affected.202 
I argue that the point de Beauvoir aims to make here is that, like many of the 
women she describes in The Second Sex, those who are so oppressed that they cannot 
even see their ontological freedom (those who are mystified) are not guilty of a 
moral fault but are victims of circumstances which deny them the ability to act 
authentically. If one is raised to believe that a higher being or a higher power (such 
as God or Nature) has determined their lives, and this belief is instilled from birth 
through every social institution and expectation encountered, then they can hardly 
be held accountable for believing this. As we ~aw above, "ignorance and error are 
facts as inescapable as prison walls" and de Beauvoir recognises that there are some 
(including slaves of the eighteenth century and some women of the harem) who 
"have no instrument to attack the civilization which oppresses them". She states 
that the behaviour of such people "can be judged only in this situation" (TEA, p38, my 
emphasis) and that "certain adults live in the universe of the serious in all honesty" 
(TEA, p47-48). 
There are beings whose life slips by in an infantile world because, having 
been kept in a state of servitude and ignorance, they have no means of 
201 Arp, Kristana, The Bonds of Freedom, p119. 
202 Ibid, p123. 
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breaking the ceiling which is stretched over their heads. Like the child, they 
can exercise freedom, but only within this universe which has been set up 
before them, without them (TEA, p37). 
It is only when one recognises the possibility of freedom and resignedly denies it that 
a moral culpability is implied (Ibid). It is when one consents to one's infantilisation or 
oppression that one is considered morally culpable. If one does recognise one's 
freedom, one can either persist in 'the vain desire to be' or one can 'actively make 
oneself a lack of being'. They key is that one must.first be in a position to be able to 
recognise one's ambiguous freedom. 
It could be argued that, if we are to grant that some people cannot be held 
accountable for their beliefs if they exist in a situation of mystification, that such an 
account could excuse Nazism. De Beauvoir deals with this question in An Eye for an 
Eye, where she says that "one cannot hate those youthful 16 year old followers of 
Hitler in whom Nazism affirmed itself with such savage violence, but who never 
had the possibility of criticizing it" (EFE, p256). In this work, de Beauvoir examines 
the point of view of what she calls charity, where it can be argued that to judge the 
actions of another "one would have to bring ... his entire past - the totality of his 
engagement in the world - into account" to understand his conduct. There she says 
that, from the point of view of charity, "one could explain even Hitler's conduct if 
one knew him well enough" (EFE, p255). De Beauvoir grants that in instances of 
petty crime in particular it is wise to consider the totality of the 'criminal's' 
circumstances to make a decision on whether or not to punish or to seek 
rehabilitation. However, she argues that there are cases "in which no redemption 
appears possible, because the evil that one runs up against is an absolute evil. Here 
[she says] we reject the point of view of charity" (EFE, p257). Such situations in 
which charity should be rejected are those in which "a man deliberately tries to 
degrade man by reducing him to a thing" and in such cases "nothing can 
compensate for the abomination he causes to erupt on earth" because it is there that 
"the sole sin against man" resides (EFE, p257). In these cases, the perpetrator does 
not recognise the other as a subject but as a thing. 
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Because existentialism denies the possibility of a supreme punishment by God, de 
Beauvoir acknowledges that it is up to us to effect punishment for such evil, to hold 
the perpetrator responsible for his acts. She explains that it is for this reason that she 
did not sign the petition to try to save Brasillach. However, she tells us that she 
considered the evidence in coming to her decision; how his actions fitted with his 
life and other political views and that she did not wish for him to die but could not 
excuse his behaviour because he could have decided to do other than he did. He 
freely chose to act in a way that lead to the deaths of others, his decision was a 
choice and he demonstrated an assumption of his freedom and, therefore, 'owned 
up' to his punishment (Ibid). 
There are various situations and various ways in which people respond to their 
freedom, if they are aware of it, and de Beauvoir does grant that some are 
positioned such that they are not aware in any way of their freedom. As described 
above, however, de Beauvoir sees the progression from childhood (where the child 
is free from responsibility and his world appears to be truly given) to adolescence 
(where freedom begins to reveal itself and responsibility emerges) to be a natural 
one, so that the majority of people - unless severely oppressed - would, at least in 
some way, begin to experience their existential freedom. What she tells us in An Eye 
for an Eye is that in all circumstances we must consider the overall situation in our 
assessment of the 'guilt' of the perpetrator and consider whether or not their actions 
resulted in another being treated as a 'thing'. How we are to make decisions upon 
what stage of recognition one is at will not, of course, be a simple matter and, as 
with de Beauvoir's theory more generally, we are not provided with simple answers 
about 'right' and 'wrong' or 'good' and 'bad' but advised to consider actions within 
their complex situations. 
OVERCOMING INDIVIDUALISM -THE IMPORTANCE OF OTHERS 
As we can see in the above discussion of the different levels of freedom, the 
ambiguity of our condition means that we are both free and dependent at the same 
time. We are born without an 'essence' and our being is not determined, but we are 
situated in a 'collectivity' in which we depend on others and on which meaning 
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depends. We must, therefore, recognise our own and others freedom in a reciprocal 
relation, because, if we (as human) are ontologically free, then so are the others 
around us. 
De Beauvoir argues that "only the freedom of others keeps each one of us from 
hardening in the absurdity of facticity" (TEA, p71). What she means by this is that 
we must define our projects and understand value and meaning in relation to others 
with whom we share the world. On their own our projects do not have a full 
meaning, this meaning is given by others and maintained or dissolved in the future 
by others. De Beauvoir' s insistence that each subject is both free (transcendent) and 
dependent (immanent) means that she cannot be accused of accepting a 'radical 
freedom', because such a freedom denies dependence. For de Beauvoir, value 
comes from freedom but meaning develops in context, with others. The other gives 
meaning to my projects and I need others to "attest to [my] finite presence" (PC, 
p113.) 
Ontological freedom is, throughout de Beauvoir's work, distinct from (though 
intimately connected to) our capacity to act 'freely' in the world. As Debra Bergoffen 
maintains: 
When Beauvoir identifies us with freedom, she is not using the term to 
designate the process by which we decide to do one thing rather than 
another. She is using it to designate the transcending nature of our being. 
As human I am perpetually transcending myself toward a yet to be defined 
future in which I seek to establish myself in my concrete particularity.203 
Bergoffen argues that de Beauvoir's development of the concept of situated freedom 
allows her to answer the question "how can I, a radically free being who is 
existentially severed from all other human freedoms, transcend the isolations of 
freedom to create a community of allies?"204 Our situation impacts upon the way in 
203 Bergoffen, Debra, 'Introduction to Pyrrhus et Cineas' in Simone de Beauvoir Philosophical 
Writings, Simons et al (eds.), University of Illinois Press: Urbana, 2004, p83. 
204 Ibid, p85. 
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which we experience our freedom and, whilst this is the case for all of us, certain 
social institutions allow some to live their freedom more 'freely' than others. 
In Pyrrhus et Cineas, de Beauvoir notes that my actions are continually defining and 
re-defining my future and my presence in the world and that "we never act except 
by creating limits for ourselves" (PC, p121). As she says, "Immobile or in action, we 
always weigh upon the earth. Every refusal is a choice, every silence has a voice. 
Our very passivity is willed; in order to not choose, we still must choose. It is 
impossible to escape" (PC, p 126). Whilst these comments do appear rather Sartrean 
in tone (we cannot escape our responsibility, we are condemned to be free) and she 
does not here account for the limits of oppression and mystification, in both The 
Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex de Beauvoir addresses this with a more 
nuanced account of freedom and our capacity to choose our actions. Her point here 
is two-fold, however. Firstly, everything I do has an impact on the world (no matter 
how insignificant) and upon others and, secondly, I am not determined to be any 
particular way. If I choose not to act, that is still an 'action' in the sense that I must 
decide not to move and because I could have decided to do something else. 
AN OPEN FUTURE 
This theme, of the importance of the other to my sense of self, is taken up again in 
The Ethics of Ambiguity. There de Beauvoir writes, "To be free is not to have the 
power to do anything you like; it is to be able to surpass the given toward an open future; 
the existence of others as a freedom defines my situation and is even the condition 
of my own freedom" (TEA, p91, emphasis added). She links 'individual' freedom 
with that of others, arguing that without them, my future would be closed, " ... my 
freedom, in order to fulfil itself, requires that it emerges into an open future: it is 
other men who open the future to me; it is they who, setting up the world of 
tomorrow, define my future" (TEA, p82). Equally, I define and open the future for 
others. To limit or close off this opening is unethical, as it denies ontological 
freedom and assigns future possibilities as though they were determined from 
'elsewhere'. 
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It could be argued that whatever I do closes off some possibilities for the future as 
much as it opens them and this was de Beauvoir's point when she said "we never 
act except by creating limits for ourselves". Our choices foreclose certain 
possibilities as they open up others. Closing off the other's future is more than just 
the closing off that occurs when I choose to act in one way however (in choosing one 
potential employee over another for example). It involves denying the other the 
ability to engage with their freedom by making them into a 'thing' and treating 
them as collateral or as means to an end. Closing off the other's future entails 
denying their ambiguity, seeing them as an object and treating them as such. As Arp 
argues the "meaning bestowed by the future on my actions comes from other free 
subjects who in concert with or in opposition to me create the future in the present 
through their projects and plans".205 Oppression, therefore, becomes possible, as 
one can deny this open-ended future and instead limit and restrict others from 
freely choosing to move toward an open future. For example, when institutionalised 
racism and sexism severely limit the capacity of people of a particular 'race' and 
people of a particular sex from choosing their futures. When laws and social 
institutions operate such that, according to them, certain individuals and groups are 
seen to exist only in terms of their race or their sex, then these individuals are 
denied an open future and thus the freedom to transcend their immanence. 
De Beauvoir argues that in the case of such mystification, where someone has no 
access to even conceive of, let alone begin to change, then "it is necessary to bring 
the seed of his liberation to him from the outside; his submission is not enough to 
justify the tyranny which is imposed upon him" (TEA, p85). A person's own 
judgement of whether or not they are oppressed is not enough to determine if 
oppression actually exists in their case. Her claim is that it can be determined by 
someone else from the 'outside', even though removing them from their situation 
may well be against the explicit wishes of the oppressed. For example, feminists 
may view the situation of a woman living in a harem to be a situation of oppression, 
while the women of the harem may not consider themselves to be oppressed. In 
20s Arp, Kristana, The Bonds of Freedom, p71. 
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such a case, the decision to intervene is made from 'the outside' without a call for 
help from the "oppressed". 
One has to tread very carefully here, as it is easy to see how quickly the 'protection' 
and 'liberation' of others from tyranny can be used as an excuse for acts of violence 
against the 'oppressor'. In an acknowledgement of this point de Beauvoir writes: 
Certainly it is not a question of throwing men in spite of themselves, under 
the pretext of liberation, into a new world, one which they have not chosen, 
on which they have no grip ... these false liberations overwhelm those who 
are their victims as if they were a new blow of blind fate (TEA, p85-86). 
We must, according to de Beauvoir, put the oppressed 'in the presence' of their 
freedom and then leave it up to them to attain liberation. We cannot force people to 
be free and we must respect the other's decision as to whether or not they should 
attain liberation. As authentique subjects, we have a responsibility to ensure that 
others have the possibility to attain practical freedom and to develop authenticite by 
engaging with their freedom. However, we cannot force them to take up either 
aspect of their existence. If someone chooses to deny their ontological freedom and 
to live without practical freedom, they are choosing to live in bad faith and, 
although we should work towards helping them to see the possibilities of an 
authentique acceptance of ambiguity, we cannot make them live this authenticite. All 
we can do is to encourage them to choose to embrace it. 
COMPLICITY 
De Beauvoir wrote in The Second Sex that: 
In truth ... the nature of things is no more immutably given, once for all, than 
is historical reality. If woman seems to be the inessential which never 
becomes the essential, it is because she herself fails to bring about this 
change (TSS 19) 
Whilst she does argue that many women are placed in a situation which prevents 
them from fully engaging with their freedom, and that some live in a state of 
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mystification, de Beauvoir argues that, for others, it is far easier to remain in bad faith 
than to accept responsibility for one's own future: 
To decline to be the Other, to refuse to be party to the deal - this would be 
for women to renounce all the advantages conferred upon them by their 
alliance with the superior caste. Man-the-sovereign will provide woman-
the-liege with material protection and will undertake the moral justification 
of her existence; thus she can evade at once both economic risk and the 
metaphysical risk of a liberty in which ends and aims must be contrived 
without assistance (TSS, p21, emphasis added). 
In this sense, women are no different from men in terms of the various ways in 
which they can choose to respond to their freedom, once they recognise it. Many 
women have happily sought to maintain the status quo in order to evade facing 
freedom and the effort this would entail. This does not mean that women are in any 
way more culpable, but that they are situated (metaphysically) in the same way as 
the men with whom they share the world. That is, they are ontologically free and 
practically situated. 
RESPONDING TO OPPRESSION 
Of course, when one denies universal value and ethics, the question can be raised as 
to how we decide, if there are no universal values and laws, when is it ethical to 
intervene in the situation of others? The question can be asked - under what 
circumstances should I act to bring about changes in a situation that I believe is 
impinging on the freedom of another? According to Arp, de Beauvoir's key to 
determining whether or not it is moral to intervene on behalf of another, or to 
intervene in their decisions, is to ascertain "whether or not an act works to open up 
a future for the person involved" .206 De Beauvoir illustrates this point in The Ethics of 
Ambiguity: 
206 Arp, Kristana, The Bonds of Freedom, p107. 
119 
An individual lives in a situation of falsehood; the falsehood is violence, 
tyranny: shall I tell the truth in order to free the victim? It would first be 
necessary to create a situation of such a kind that the truth might be bearable 
and that, though losing his illusions, the deluded individual might again 
find about him reasons for hoping (TEA, p143). 
It is not enough to alter the situation of the oppressed (by removing the perpetrator 
or the victim for example) without first ensuring that the new situation is one in 
which the victim will have the possibility to act freely to determine his or her own 
future. To remove someone from a situation in which he or she lacks freedom, and 
to place that victim into another situation in which they lack freedom is not 
liberation. As de Beauvoir says, "To put it positively, the precept will be to treat the 
other. .. as a freedom so that his end may be freedom; in using this conducting wire 
one will have to incur the risk, in each case, of inventing an original solution" (TEA, 
p142). This also reflects her emphasis that there is no 'one size fits all' answer when 
it comes to ethics, and that we must continually question our assumptions and our 
ends when deciding how to act. 
As discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters of this thesis, there are 
countless examples of what we would now term 'cultural imperialis~' in colonial 
encounters, where colonisers justified interfering in indigenous people's customs 
and lives for the 'benefit' of the indigenous women and children in that society. 
Historically, the policies that lead to the removal of indigenous children from their 
families in Australia is an example of an attempt by many at 'beneficence' which, 
one can see with hindsight, resulted in huge problems for indigenous families that 
still have repercussions today.207 De Beauvoir acknowledges the potential for such 
207 Human Rights and Equal Oppurtunity Commission (HREOC), Bringing Them Home· 
Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children 
from Their Families, tabled in Australian Federal Parliament, 26 May 1997. The Inquiry into 
the separation of Aboriginal children from their families examined the past laws, practices 
and policies that resulted in the separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children 
from their families and the effects of those laws, practices and policies. The inquiry also 
made recommendations on the appropriateness of current laws, policies and practices 
relating to the placement and care of Aboriginal children in Australia. 
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problems and warns against taking an attitude of the "enlightened elite" who 
decide for others that they should be "freed from the burden of backwardness" 
(TEA, p138). 
AVOIDING PATERNALISM 
While we should all work towards ensuring that others are free to engage with their 
futures, it is still the case that one cannot be forced to be free and de Beauvoir argues 
strongly against paternalism. She says: 
We [existentialists] object to the inquisitors who want to create faith and 
virtue from without; we object to all forms of fascism which seek to fashion 
the happiness of man from without; and also the paternalism which thinks 
that it has done something for man by prohibiting him from certain 
possibilities of temptation, whereas what is necessary is to give him reasons 
for resisting it (TEA, p138) 
The aim when making decisions about how to interact with others is to avoid 
paternalism, where we assume that our way of life and knowledge is superior to 
others and that we can 'fix' their problems for them from the outside. As we will 
see in the following chapter, this paternalistic attitude has been characteristic of 
colonisation processes and, also, is evident in feminisms which fail to recognise 
differences amongst women. 
Paternalism rests on the assumption that the ends and values I aspire to are absolute 
and universal and that, therefore, all should aspire to these in order to live a good 
life. Paternalism is, therefore, another manifestation of a spirit of seriousness and 
reflects a failure to authentically engage with freedom. This can be the case even 
when one believes that one's actions are morally sound and virtuous. 
AN ETHICS BASED UPON AMBIGUOUS FREEDOM 
We have seen that, although fundamental ambiguity is the universal condition of 
humanity, de Beauvoir argues that philosophers have traditionally tried to mask 
this aspect of the human situation. Rather than celebrating ambiguity as 'possibility' 
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they have denied it by creating and maintaining dualisms which privilege one aspect 
of the duality over the other. This masking has been characterised by a striving "to 
reduce mind to matter, or to reabsorb matter into mind, or to merge them within a 
single substance" (TEA, p7), and, according to de Beauvoir, those philosophers who 
have accepted the 'dualism': 
... have established a hierarchy between body and soul which permits of 
considering as negligible the part of the self which cannot be saved. They 
have denied death, either by integrating it with life or by promising to man 
immortality. Or again they have denied life, considering it as a veil of 
illusion beneath which is hidden the truth of Nirvana (TEA, pp 7-8). 
As we have seen, her aim is to reveal how an ethics is possible without absolute 
meaning and inherent value and her focus is on examining the possibility of 
developing an ethics for the situated individual based on freedom, not for 
prescribing overarching universal morals. She writes in a criticism of Universalist 
prescriptive ethics, " ... [t]he Stoics impugned the ties of family, friendship and 
nationality so that they recognised only the universal form of man. But man is man 
only through situations whose particularity is precisely a universal fact" (TEA, p144, 
emphasis added). 
Much like Merleau-Ponty, in his critique of empiricism and intellectualism's failure 
to account for fundamental features of bodily experience (including motility and 
perception), de Beauvoir argues that traditional ethics have failed due to the 
underlying desire of those prescribing ethical principles to escape their fundamental 
ambiguity. She writes: 
... the ethics which [philosophers] have proposed to their disciples has 
always pursued the same goal. It has been a matter of eliminating the 
ambiguity by making oneself pure inwardness or pure externality, by 
escaping from the sensible world or by being engulfed in it, by yielding to 
eternity or enclosing oneself in the pure moment (TEA, p8, emphasis added). 
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De Beauvoir is here illustrating a tendency toward bifurcation in traditional 
philosophical thought, which is exemplified by dualisms that deny our 
fundamentally ambiguous freedom. As Monika Langer argues, both Merleau-Ponty 
and de Beauvoir were arguing for ambiguity in a situation where Cartesian 
philosophy had sought to eliminate it, "because it considers uncertainty and 
indistinctness to be highly undesirable epistemologically and ethically".208 
When a subject experiences their irreducible freedom (and the responsibility that 
comes with this) they have a tendency to feel fear and anxiety in the face of it and to 
attempt to 'flee' their freedom by creating the illusion of absolute meanings and 
values for themselves and for others. By denying their own freedom and the 
freedom of others they aim to 'overcome' this Angst and to dispel the weight of 
responsibility that comes with it. Importantly, this denial can take the form of 
reifying the material or the 'mental' - and those who deny either aspect of the human 
condition are seen to be living in bad faith. 
Although traditional philosophical accounts have tended to refuse to acknowledge 
the ambiguous condition of human existence, de Beauvoir argues that it is with the 
fundamental ambiguity that lies at the heart of all existence, that we must begin in 
order to develop an appropriate ethics. She argues that we cannot locate a reason for 
acting or the strength to live in abstract universal principles, nor in reductive 
accounts of 'self' that seek to find an essence to explain existence. In The Ethics of 
Ambiguity she attempts to demonstrate that existentialism can provide for an ethics 
that entails a responsibility towards and a connection with others and she argues 
that in such an ethics: 
... freedom realises itself only by engaging itself in the world: to such an 
extent that man's project toward freedom is embodied for him in definite 
acts of behaviour ... To will freedom and to will to disclose being are one and 
the same thing (TEA, p78). 
zos Langer, Monika, 'Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty on Ambiguity', in The Cambridge 
Companion to Simone de Beauvozr, Claudia Card, (ed), Cambridge University Press, 2003, p89. 
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I will return to this theme in the final chapter of this thesis, where I examine in more 
detail the ways in which de Beauvoir puts forward a life-affirming philosophy 
whilst remaining true to the existential conviction that the world is devoid of 
inherent value. There I examine further how we can balance our irreducible 
ontological freedom with our need for, and our responsibility to, others. 
SUMMARY 
The first section of this thesis has been concerned with examining the concepts of 
ambiguity, freedom and authenticite and with how these concepts intersect to form 
the basis for a sophisticated and plausible contemporary ethics. The purpose of 
examining these concepts is to demonstrate that an existential ethics, as developed 
by de Beauvoir, has something to offer us in contemporary society. Following de 
Beauvoir's method of analysing the way in which philosophy and the 'everyday' are 
interconnected, the next section will look at the ways in which philosophical 
understandings of ambiguity impact upon the everyday lives of people in the world. 
As Debra Bergoffen argues, de Beauvoir begins with concrete, situated individuals 
and expands out to analyse the human condition, which includes examination of 
subjectivity, our relations and relatedness with others and our embeddedness in the 
world.209 For de Beauvoir, philosophy is lived, it colours and shapes our world and 
our relations with others and it is not an 'abstract theoretical system' developed in 
isolation from the world. 
De Beauvoir' s focus on the importance of the other is an example of her attempt to 
reveal the potential for joy in existence - in contrast to the miserablism that Sartre 
was criticised for. Bergoffen notes that the theme of joy in our relations with others, 
which contrasts with Sartrean conception that 'hell is other people', is evident in The 
Ethics of Ambiguity and is taken up and further developed in The Second Sex. She 
writes that de Beauvoir's ethic "is permeated by a mood foreign to Sartre's 
209 Bergoffen, Debra, "Introduction to Pyrrhus et Cineas" in Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophical 
Writings, Simons et al (eds.) Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004, p80. 
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writings ... " that is, the mood of "joy".210 Bergoffen argues that The Second Sex should 
be read with the following question in mind "what are the communicative 
possibilities of the human situation?". I do not wish to dwell specifically on the 
notion of the erotic here, but on what Bergoffen rightly acknowledges as a key 
component of de Beauvoir' s ethics, that is, her analysis of the possibility of joy in 
our relation with others - a joy that is possible even with acceptance of the 
fundamental freedom that underpins existence. Existentialism, for de Beauvoir, 
does not entail a denial of meaning, relationships and joy but on the contrary, 
allows for these to occur by recognising that tensions that is implied in ambiguity. 
We will see in the final chapter that this joy can be further developed as a sense of 
wonder - as a disclosure of the world. 
Some of the key themes taken up thus far include: the need for an unearthing of 
implicit metaphysical assumptions within both feminism and philosophy; a re-
thinking of the importance of the body to understandings of self; a rethinking of 
self-other relations that are not (necessarily) based upon conflict; and the idea of self 
as ambiguous and relational. 
The following chapters will demonstrate that, far from being a philosophical 
abstraction, an ontological misunderstanding of the self-other relation can be 
revealed in sexism, racism, homophobia, oppression and political tyranny. The 
misunderstanding of the connections between ambiguity, authenticite and freedom 
is what supports religious and political persecution and prejudice. To reiterate my 
earlier arguments: the problem that we are addressing is the failure to recognise our 
ambiguous freedom and to instead posit an 'authentic' (inherent) 'self' and - against 
(or in opposition to) this self- to posit a reified 'other' or 'others' whose authenticity 
is measured in relation to particular values and characteristics. 
210 Bergoffen, Debra 'Out from Under: Beauvoir's Philosophy of the Erotic' in Feminist 
Interpretations of Simone de Beauvoir, Simons, Margaret, (ed.), The Pennsylvania University 
Press: Pennsylvania, 1995, p185. 
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SECTION TWO: 
EXPLORING THE CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 
OF AN ETHICS OF AMBIGUITY 
If a theory convinced me, it did not remain exterior to me, it changed my relation to 
the world, coloured my experience .... for me philosophy was a living reality 
(Beauvoir, Prime of Life, p254) 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
RECLAIMING AMBIGUITY FOR A FEMINIST AUTHENTICITE 
[p]erhaps it is now time to stand back from that familiar content [of issues 
concerning 'women'] in order to get a clearer idea of what might have emerged as 
distinctive about the practice of feminist philosophy, and to ask whether that 
practice might appropriately be broadened to take account of other pressing issues 
of contemporary societies 
(Genevieve Lloyd)211 
[Through an engagement between feminist philosophy and other areas] entrenched 
assumptions on both sides will be opened to new challenges, their adequacy will be 
tested and they will be enriched by alternative perspectives 
(Alison Jagger and Iris Marion Young)212 
In this chapter I argue that feminist philosophy has not been immune to the 
problematic assumptions about self-other relations discussed in the first part of this 
thesis, and that the current aim of feminist philosophy must be to examine how 
such understandings affect our social and political lives. I touched on this subject in 
chapter two, with my examination of the receptions of de Beauvoir's work and the 
different interpretations given by Moira Gatens of de Beauvoir' s existential account 
of the body. Building on this previous analysis, the major thrust of my argument in 
this current chapter is that contemporary social philosophy and feminism needs to 
reclaim the concept of an ambiguous freedom in order to develop an authentique 
way in which to speak about the experience of men and women within particular 
contexts. 
As has been examined in the first section of this thesis, de Beauvoir's account of 
ambiguity provides a valuable framework for re-thinking self-other relations and 
211 Lloyd, Genevieve, 'No-One's Land: Australia and the Philosophical Imagination', Hypatia, 
Vol. 15, 2000, p26. 
212 Jagger, Alison, and Young, Iris Marion, A Companion to Feminist Philosophy, Blackwell 
Publishing: London, 2000. 
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the way in which ethical action depends upon an appropriate understanding of this 
relation. De Beauvoir wrote, in Pyrrhus et Cineas: 
My relationships with things are not given, are not fixed; I create them 
minute by minute. Some die, some are born and others are revived. They are 
constantly changing ... Thus our relationship with the world is not decided 
from the onset; it is we who decide. But we do not arbitrarily decide just 
anything. What I surpass is always my past and the object such as it exists 
within that past. My future envelopes that past; the former cannot build 
itself without the latter (PC, p94). 
As we saw above, de Beauvoir's examination of the way in which a subject is 
temporally, materially and historically situated in the world allows for a philosophy 
that can explain oppression whilst maintaining freedom. Her ambiguously 
embodied subject is in and of the world but is always more than this because of the 
subject's capacity to transcend into to an open future, in which there is always the 
potential for situations to be lived and interpreted differently. It is this recognition 
that allows for recognition of the significant differences that define subjects in the 
world, without resulting in reification of this difference. 
GOING BEYOND THE 'WOMAN' QUESTION: A WORLD OF COMPLEX 
RELATIONS 
This chapter affirms, as others such as Genevieve Lloyd and Moira Gatens have 
argued, that feminism ought to go beyond an explicit focus on 'women' in order to 
have relevance to contemporary socio-political situations. In this context, feminist 
strategies of questioning assumptions (about female identity and social relations) 
can (and should) be applied to broader questions about human being-in-the-world 
and our relations with others. 213 
213 See for example Genevieve Lloyd's, 'No-One's Land: Australia and the Philosophical 
Imagination', Hypatia, Vol. 15, 2000, pp 26-39 and Mary Walsh's interview with Gatens, 
'Twenty years since "a critique of the sex/gender distinction": a conversation with Moira 
Gatens', in Australian Feminist Studies, Volume 19, Number 44, July 2004, pp 213-224. 
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Although there is an explicit focus on women in The Second Sex, de Beauvoir's work 
is an attempt to examine more broadly how humans make and understand meaning 
in an ambiguous world and how we should respond to each other based on 
recognition of this ambiguity. As we see in The Ethics of Ambiguity, the responsibility 
of each person to the others with whom we share this world is a strong theme for de 
Beauvoir and our authenticite depends upon accepting the responsibility that comes 
with our fundamental freedom. There she writes: 
Since we do not succeed in fleeing it, let us therefore try to look the truth in 
the face. Let us try to assume our fundamental ambiguity. It is in the 
knowledge of the genuine conditions of our life that we must draw our 
strength to live and our reason for acting (TEA, p9). 
The foundational points of de Beauvoir's philosophy, as outlined in the preceding 
chapters, can be utilised to support the contemporary feminist call for an unearthing 
and rethinking of the assumptions that are implicit within traditional Western 
philosophy. Ambiguity allows us to examine how, as women, we exist in this 
particular society, in this particular age and what our female bodies mean for us 
now. In addition, importantly, it also allows us to think about what our bodies might 
mean for us in an open future because, as de Beauvoir says, "when we have to do 
with a being whose nature is transcendent action, we can never close the books" 
(TSS, p66). 
WHAT IS FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY? 
Alison Jagger and Iris Marion Young define feminist philosophy as "a body of 
scholarship which began in the early 1970s as one branch of women's studies ... 
[with an initial goal of] ending the invisibility of women in much disciplinary 
knowledge".214 Jagger and Young maintain that feminist philosophy has "helped 
transform basic philosophical paradigms in many subfields", with feminists initially 
214 Jagger, Alison, M, and Young, Iris Marion, (eds), A Companion to Feminist Philosophy, 
Blackwell Publishing:London, 2000, p 1. 
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using the existing tools and techniques of philosophy to address issues of specific 
concern to women.21s 
It is contestable, however, that feminist philosophy began in the 1970s, and feminist 
thought has certainly had a much longer history than thirty or forty years. Within 
Australia (as with the United States and the United Kingdom) feminist theory has 
developed through many stages. Feminist arguments are evident in the early claims 
for liberal equality between the sexes made by Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart 
Mill and Harriett Taylor in the eighteenth century, in the suffrage movement of the 
nineteenth century, and the Women's Liberation movement that gained such 
momentum in the 1970s.216 
It is difficult to define what feminism, feminist theory or feminist philosophy is and 
perhaps we should be content to say, as Moira Gatens has noted, "There is not a 
. 
feminist theory but feminist theories."217 For the purposes of this chapter I will define 
feminist philosophy broadly as a philosophy concerned with examining particular 
questions about women and their relationship to the world, in terms of their 
physical, epistemological and ontological existence. Feminist philosophy examines 
how social, political, and philosophical thought has impacted on what it means to be 
a woman and how this impacts, practically, on the lives of women in the world. 
What is of concern to feminist philosophy and feminist theory is the question of 
how one should understand 'sexed being'. Most often, the focus of feminist thought 
has been on such questions as what it means to be female, to be a woman, or to have a 
woman's body and history in a particular social milieu. The answers to these 
questions differ markedly, however, and, as we saw in chapter two, Gatens has been 
critical of many feminist theorists for limiting themselves by extending existing 
philosophical theories to try to explain the social condition of women. The result of 
215 Ibid. 
216 For a historical account of the developments and divergences in Australian Feminism see 
Marilyn Lake, Getting Equal: A History of Australian Feminism, Allen and Unwin: New South 
Wales, 1999. 
217 Gatens, Moira, Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on Equality and Difference, Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1991, pl. 
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the method of extension has been a tendency within feminism to remain caught 
within an 'equality' or 'difference' debate when it comes to understanding women's 
experience. What Gatens and other contemporary feminists seek to explore is a way 
beyond this rift, so that women's experience can be understood outside of this 
binary, which (as de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty have both helped us see) has its 
roots in deeply held philosophical dichotomies. Gatens' main criticism of feminist 
theory has been that it does not delve deeply enough in its engagement with 
philosophy and does not question the metaphysics and epistemologies it takes up, 
which are presumed to be 'sex neutral'.218 
While a thorough analysis of the development of feminist philosophy over time is 
not necessary here, I will briefly examine some of the key differences in feminist 
thought and the conceptions of existence that underpin them. I also want to look at 
the way in which these conceptions are important to the either/or debate evident in 
feminism and to demonstrate that de Beauvoir' s ambiguous freedom provides a 
means to move beyond it. 
LIBERAL FEMINISM 
Liberal feminism has its historical foundations in the late eighteenth century (with 
Wollstonecraft, Taylor and Mill) and is based on two primary principles. Firstly, 
that one can (and should) extend the liberal conception of the individual to include 
women; and, secondly that women should be accepted on equal terms with men in 
the public realm. Liberal feminists argue that sex should be 'irrelevant in the public 
sphere' and instead seek equal treatment for all individuals regardless of their sex.219 
Put simply, this strand of feminism seeks equality for all persons based on the 
conception of an underlying universal reason and rationality that is seen to be 
common to humankind. 
218 Ibid, p2. 
219 See Tapper, Marion, 'Can a Feminist be a Liberal?' in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 
Supplement to Vol. 64; June 1986, pp37-38 for discussion of liberal feminism. 
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Although its aim is to overcome prejudice, traditional liberal theory has been 
criticised by feminist and other social and political philosophers for failing to 
account for positive difference and particularity, and for presupposing an 
'autonomous' and rational subject that seems to be problematised by the evident 
variety of experiences and associated 'subjects'. The three main aims of John Rawls' 
liberal theory of justice for example, in which he introduces the idea of making 
ethical decisions from behind a 'veil of ignorance', are: to respect the moral equality 
of all persons; to 'mitigate the arbitrariness of natural and social contingencies'; and 
for all rational persons to accept responsibility for their choices. 220 
Liberal or 'equality' feminists have also been criticised for erasing difference m 
order for women to compete equally with 'man' in what is seen by others as a 
masculine world. Mary Wollstonecraft (perhaps the earliest liberal feminist) argued 
that both men and women had equal powers of reason and that, with equal access 
to education, both sexes would prove to be capable of using this reason. According 
to Wollstonecraft, women's emotional disposition was the result of social forces, not 
of nature, and she argued that improved education would overcome the limits 
associated with women's situation.221 This argument was also taken up in the 1960s, 
with feminists arguing for equality in the economic and social realm.222 
The classical liberal feminist aim has been to erase gender roles and to do away with 
biased gendered laws and policies in order for women to compete equally with 
men. On this account, 'gender' is seen to be socially constructed and related only 
arbitrarily to one's sex. Other liberal feminists have argued that not only should 
these laws and policies be changed to include women but, also, that women should 
be compensated for past injustices and affirmative action taken to ensure equal 
representation in future. For example through designated positions for women in 
22° Kymlicka, Will, Contemporary Political Philosophy An Introduction, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford and New York, 2002 (2nd Edition). 
221 Wollstonecraft, Mary, A Vindication of the Rights of Women, Norton, 1967. 
222 The appeal to equality has been used by various groups, including the suffragettes and 
other women's groups in the late 191h and early 201h centuries. 
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the police forces, politics, education, universities and various other public 
institutions. 
A core component of liberal democratic theory (which is included in the United 
States constitution) is that /1 all men are created equal". However, what is left off the 
end of this statement is that not all 'men' are created the same. Feminists such as bell 
hooks have been critical of liberal feminism (and liberal theories of the subject more 
broadly) for not taking into account the life experiences of non-white and poor 
women. Moreover, many have been critical of liberal feminism more generally for 
trying to extend what they see to be an already biased theory to include women, 
thus perpetuating the idea of a 'rational', sex-neutral subject and denying the 
significance of one's physicality.223 
THE PROBLEM OF THE UNIVERSAL, SEX-NEUTRAL SUBJECT 
Perhaps the most problematic assumption within traditional philosophy, and that 
which has been unwittingly perpetuated by many feminist theorists, is that the 
human subject, as described and investigated by philosophical inquiry, is a sex-
neutral or universal subject. As Marion Tapper argues: 
... the problem is that, despite the purported sexual neutrality of those 
principles and values, the public is already organised in ways which not 
only remark sexual differences but do so in a way which privileges men and 
makes the public a man's world. This is at least to the extent that it is 
organised around the needs of men, conceived as people abstracted from the 
private, domestic world, assumptions about manliness, and the assumption 
that it is men who occupy the public world.224 
As we saw in chapter two, due to its implicit assumptions, past philosophy cannot 
simply be taken up (or taken-over) by feminists and extended to include the thus-far 
223 bell hooks, Feminist Theory. From Margin to Center, South End Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 2000, pp 1-2. 
224 Tapper, Marion, 'Can a Feminist be a Liberal?' in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 
Supplement to Vol. 64; June 1986. Tapper rightly notes that this "leaves open the possibility 
that men may not be satisfied with such roles, ideals and assumptions". 
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excluded woman. This is because the discipline itself has been developed within a 
political situation in which a particular metaphysical viewpoint, particular ideas, 
biases and assumptions have excluded all that is associated with "woman", perhaps 
most notably, the natural, the embodied and the emotional. Therefore, these 
viewpoints must be brought to light and examined because, otherwise, attempts to 
change political and ethical relations so that women can be 'free human subjects', 
limit and confine her to following the path of traditional 'masculinity' (and just as 
significantly, limit men to this narrow understanding of the subject also). 
The major point of such criticisms is that what constitutes a 'free human subject' has 
been defined within a phallocentric discourse, which assumes the transcendent 
masculine ideal to be the ideal for humanity. Therefore, what must be re-thought is 
what influences our understanding about what constitutes a 'free human subject'. It 
is not only the concept of 'femininity' that must be assessed for its problematic 
metaphysical assumptions, but also the notion of 'masculinity' and the assumption 
that these two (presumably distinct) ways of being are the natural terms to which 
we should tum for an analysis of human subjectivity. The idea of the 'neutral', 
universal human subject is equally as inappropriate for those (many) men whose 
particular experience falls outside that depicted by the 'masculine' subject. We can 
see this illustrated, for example, in Franz Fanon' s description of being seen as "a 
Negro" on a train in France. He writes, "All I wanted was to be a man among other 
men. . . I wanted to be a man, nothing but a man" .225 However, as Gayle Salamon 
suggests, being seen as black precludes Fanon from being viewed as a man. 
"Indeed", she writes, "normative manhood is characterized by a certain anonymity, 
a social designation confirmed by the company of other men, an ability to meld into 
the throng of other men".226 Fanon's blackness, in this situation, separates him from 
the other men on the train - he stands out as distinct from them, thus unable to 
meld into the ideal of universal man. 
22s Fanon, Franz, Black Skin, White Masks, Pluto Press, 1986, pp 112-13. 
226 Salamon, Gayle, 'The Place Where Life Hides Away': Merleau-Ponty, Fanon, and the 
Location of Bodily Being', Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, Volume 17, 
Number 2, 2006, p109. 
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In her examination of the relationship between feminist thought and philosophy, 
Gatens demonstrates that philosophy has not been a neutral system "infected" by 
the personal prejudices of particular philosophers. Her claim is that philosophical 
methodology itself must be questioned. As she points out, the questions asked by 
philosophy are "foreclosed by the method", and the method employed will 
determine "what can and cannot be said about woman [and man] within the terms 
of particular philosophical theories".227 
Thus, the history of philosophy is identified as being "the history of man defining 
man as having a particular relation to some essential faculty or power".228 This 
power can take the form of rationality, transcendence or productive labour, and the 
crucial factor within philosophy is that the relation of 'man' to this power is seen as 
a fundamental aspect of his subjectivity. Problematic in the feminist aim of 
extending past philosophy to include women then, is the assumption that this 
power is sex-neutral, that it does not relate to one's bodily-subjectivity, and that it is 
universally applicable to all human subjects.229 Therefore, instead of questioning the 
ways in which these conceptions of power, rationality and transcendence have been 
constructed within philosophical discourse, the strategy of extension involves 
attempting to take-up and claim them as essentially human faculties and powers. 
Simply aligning 'man' with such definitions has neglected to account for all those 
(like Fanon) who have been historically excluded from active political participation 
due to their difference from the 'universal human norm'; whether this difference is 
based upon race, age, sexuality, social position, physical ability, psychology or a 
conglomeration of many of these factors. The universal, 'neutral' human not only 
fails to account for many women's experiences but fails to account for 'difference' at 
all. bell hooks articulates this point well when she asks the pertinent question: 
221 Gatens, Moira, Feminism and Philosophy, p20. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. 
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"Since men are not equals in white supremacist, capitalist, patriarchal class 
structure, which men do women want to be equal to?"23o 
As Lloyd and Gatens have posited, what is ignored in the assumption that 
rationality, (a particular conception of) transcendence and productive labour are 
universal and essentially sex-neutral attributes of human subjectivity, is that these 
concepts have been constructed within a dichotomous metaphysical discourse. This 
discourse has seen the world as being carved up into categories of opposition, with 
attributes such as reason, transcendence, intellect, strength and culture associated 
with a particular kind of man (namely the kind who have historically had the 
opportunity to become philosophers). The opposite of these attributes, i.e. emotion 
or passion, immanence, embodiment, weakness and nature have been associated 
with woman or the feminine.231 Historically, men of a different class or racial/ethnic 
background have also been denied the universality of reason and rationality and 
have also been aligned more closely with nature and passion. 
If historical accounts of subjectivity have been based on these assumptions, it is not 
then a simple task to merely allow woman (or the excluded male or transsexual etc.) 
to share in all the 'masculine' attributes and treat them as an 'equal' human being. 
'Equality' under this guise only results in further denigration of the 'feminine' and 
with women having to make their way in a 'masculinised' world by overcoming or 
denying their difference. As mentioned earlier, the problem of much philosophical 
theory is the assumption of the universal applicability of what past philosophy has 
made of human nature. As Lloyd argues in The Man of Reason, to uncritically accept 
either side of the male/female dichotomy evident in philosophical thought, is to 
230 hooks, bell, "Feminism: A Movement to End Sexist Oppression", in Phillips, Anne (ed) 
Feminism and Equality. Readings in Social and Pol1t1cal Theory,New York University Press, New 
York, 1987, p 62 (emphasis added). 
Genevieve Lloyd has recently argued that particular groups of women are also in a position 
to be exclusionary towards other men and women. For example white middle-class women 
in their encounters with lower classes, or people of different races. In The Second Sex de 
Beauvoir also notes,the tendency of women to align themselves with those of similar race 
and class, rather than with the same sex. 
231 Tapper, Marion, 'Can a Feminist be a Liberal?', p38. 
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accept a distorted version of what femininity and masculinity are. Moreover, as 
Marion Tapper argues, the liberal framework forces an unnecessary choice between 
an outright denial of sexual difference or an admission that women are inherently 
different and inferior. 
This either/or choice is problematic for feminist thought as it negates the ambiguity 
and tension we have been exploring and, instead, reinforces the perception of a 
mutual exclusion of the two 'aspects' of a dichotomy. Ann Snitow describes it thus: 
Most feminist thought grapples unavoidably with some aspect of the 
equality-difference problem at both the level of theory and of strategy ... Do 
women want to be equal to men (with the meaning of "equal" hotly 
contested), or do women see biology as establishing a difference that will 
always require a strong recognition and that might ultimately define quite 
separate possibilities inside "the human"?232 
In The Second Sex, de Beauvoir examines the emergence of different claims about 
women's being and argues that 'anti feminists' were, at most, "willing to grant 
'equality in difference' to the olher sex" (TSS, p23). However, she argues that the 
'equal but separate' formula, whether applied to sex, class, race or caste, results in 
'extreme discrimination' because it appeals to essentialism and that, on this account, 
difference is reduced to the inferior. "The eternal feminine", the "black soul" and the 
"Jewish character" are all examples for de Beauvoir of an acceptance of difference 
that is ultimately oppressive (TSS, p23, emphasis added). This is because each relies 
upon the idea of an absolute identity (an underlying 'soul', an 'essential' or 'eternal' 
character) and such absolute identities result in oppression when those seen to 
posses them are unable to engage fully with their fundamental freedom. 
In contrast to those who demand equality in difference, de Beauvoir argues that we 
must move beyond such reductive and limited accounts of identity and begin anew: 
232 Snitow, Ann, 'A Gender Diary', in Conflicts in Feminism, Marian Hirsch and Evelyn Fox-
Keller (eds}, Routledge: New York and London, 1990. 
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People have tirelessly sought to prove that woman is superior, inferior, or 
equal to man ... [However] if we are to gain understanding, we must get out 
of these ruts; we must discard the vague notions of superiority, inferiority, 
equality, which have hitherto corrupted every discussion of the subject and 
start afresh (TSS, p27). 
However, this does not mean denying, in toto, that such differences exist. Starting 
afresh means looking at how ambiguous subjects 'become' in situation and looking 
at the relationships that exist between them and the world that they share, rather 
than relying on age-old reductions and distinctions. On this account, starting afresh 
also means willingly affirming the tensions that exist between facets of our being 
and between ourselves and the others with whom we share the world. 
DO MEN AND WOMEN ACTUALLY EXIST? 
If, as we have seen above, such concepts as 'masculine' and 'feminine' are so loaded 
with historical significations and appear to be so limited by the binary logic implied 
in their common use, a difficult question to address is 'why continue to speak in 
terms of 'man' and 'woman' at all? Should we not employ less loaded and more 
contemporary terms that avoid such problematic exclusions? Or, would it be more 
promising to do away with distinctions all together? 
Commonly, one is either a man or a woman, male or female (in fact the first question 
usually asked of new parents is 'is it a boy or a girl?'). This strict male/female 
categorisation is of course problematised by transgender people and 
hermaphrodites, however, as de Beauvoir writes, societies do tend to think in terms 
of 'the two', and she says: 
In truth, to go for a walk with one's eyes open is enough to demonstrate that 
humanity is divided into two classes of individuals whose clothes, faces, 
bodies, smiles, gaits, interests, and occupations are manifestly different. 
Perhaps these differences are superficial; perhaps they are destined to 
disappear. What is certain is that they do most obviously exist (TSS, p14-15, 
emphasis added). 
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Could we just stop talking in terms of male/female and speak about people instead, 
in order to overcome the problems of binary thinking? As we saw above, however, 
the problem of universalism has been a significant one for feminism. The equation 
of the universal human with traditional masculine attributes is criticised by those 
who argue that maintaining and recognising difference is valuable and that 
particularity rather than universality is important to ethical encounters between 
beings. As we have seen previously, our bodies are a crucial part of our existence as 
ambiguous subjects-in-the-world. Therefore, denying the importance of our facticite 
would result in bad-faith because we would be ignoring part of our ambiguous 
condition. 
There are a number of issues with liberal, or equality, feminism then - not the least 
of which is how to conceive of bodily difference. However, it should also be 
remembered that feminism, like other political movements, has had to respond to 
the particular needs and contexts in which it developed. The project of claiming 
practical freedom or equality to access the world of men was radical for its time. As 
Marilyn Lake has argued, liberal feminism was successful in gaining many of the 
changes it sought because at that time it was believed that "if women were to 
achieve economic independence they would need to disavow sexual difference and 
become workers just like men".233 
A RADICAL DIFFERENCE 
In response to the argument that the differences between men and women were 
socially constructed and could, therefore, be overcome a more radical 'difference' 
feminism emerged in the 1970s.234 This school of thought, which has been termed 
'gynocentric' feminism, emphasised differences in terms of "the unique situation 
and characteristics of women".235 However, an often criticised problem within 
233 Lake, Marilyn, Getting Equal: A History of Australian Feminism, Allen and Unwin: NSW, 
1999, my emphasis. 
234 See for example Mary Daly's, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism, The 
Women's Press, 1978. 
235 Nicholson, Linda, (ed), The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theon;, Routledge: New York 
and London, 1997, p3. 
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feminisms of difference was a tendency to ignore the differences amongst women, 
which led to a homogeneous vision of what it meant to be a woman and to an idea 
of 'universal womanhood' that is as exclusionary as the idea of a universal man.236 
Equally as problematic as denying the importance of difference, is the assumption 
that women should revalue and reify all that has been associated with the feminine 
and celebrate particularly feminine ways of being. It is, in fact, the idea of the 
mutually exclusive and hierarchical relation between these terms (nature/culture, 
man/woman, mind/body, sex/gender, reason/passion etc.) that is the problem. This 
is especially so when the opposing terms are equated with masculinity and 
femininity and understood as being fundamental to human existence. 
Celebrating what have been associated with feminine traits is not, in itself, the 
problem and this political strategy (like liberal feminist strategies) has been 
successfully used to lobby for social change. For example, there was a prevailing 
belief in early Australian feminism that women "shared distinctive values and 
priorities that, once translated into government policy, would create a different type 
of state - a welfare state".237 In the 1930s feminists arguing for representation of 
women in politics and the public realm based their claims on a female temperance 
and goodness that would help to bring a more moral and caring aspect to society. 
Their argument was that: 
Woman's point of view is not the same as man's. Her sense of values is 
different, she places a greater value on human life, human welfare, health 
and morals .. .It behoves women to use their power, to the fullest extent 
possible to bring greater security and happiness into the lives of the whole 
comrnunity.238 
Despite the fact that appealing to an inherent 'goodness' in women has served as an 
arguably successful political strategy, it has at the same time reinforced the 
236 Ibid. 
237 Lake, Marilyn, Getting Equal, p51. 
238 The United Associations of NSW, Cited in Lake, M., Getting Equal, p52. 
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reification of such attributes and is, ultimately, based upon a metaphysics that 
denies ambiguity by solidifying sex and gender roles. Women, on this account are 
naturally, inherently more caring and compassionate creatures whose role is, thus, 
to look after the health and wellbeing of others. While such characteristics are by no 
means negative in themselves, much moral theory has used arguments about the 
'natural' roles of man and woman to reinforce 'laws' and codes of conduct that suit 
the needs or desires of those in power at the time or to maintain a particular social 
order. Religious values and the laws of nature have been used to argue for the 
oppression of particular groups or individuals: after all, if something is determined 
by God or given in nature, who has the right to argue against it? 
Traditionally, 'difference' feminists have wanted to acknowledge the importance of 
women's characteristics and materiality and to assert some sort of collective identity 
in order to overcome oppression. Nevertheless, as we saw in the previous chapter, if 
oppression consists in the denial of an engagement with freedom, the notion of 
identity can itself become oppressive. The risk is that the identity that one wants to 
celebrate becomes solidified, and therefore oppressive, because it denies ontological 
freedom by determining particular ways of engaging with the world based upon 
this 'identity'. There is a real risk that identity politics can itself become the 'tyrant' 
that oppresses by maintaining a spirit of seriousness in which the future of 
particular subjects is closed-off by social and institutional expectation, which ties the 
subject to one particular aspect of their existence. For example, if women's identity 
is linked to maternal instinct, to a special 'intuition', or to an inherent caring and 
compassionate nature and women and girls are encouraged through social norms to 
believe that they are defined in such a way (and their freedom to be otherwise is not 
acknowledged) then they will be oppressed, because their future is closed off to 
them. In the same way, when masculine identity is equated with a lack of caring or 
lack of emotion, with reason and rationality or with brute force, then boys and men 
are also inhibited from engaging fully with their freedom and the many differences 
that characterise men's lives are ignored. As Kwame Appiah argues, such a politics 
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fails to see that rather than existing as separate 'selves', "we are already 
contaminated by each other ... ".239 
Cressida Heyes notes in her analysis of contemporary identity politics, that the 
appeal to an 'authentic' identity can "put pressure on participants to identify [a 
single] axis as their defining feature, when in fact they may well understand 
themselves as integrated selves who cannot be represented so selectively or even 
reductively".240 Identity politics (in this form) necessarily involves an exclusion of 
'others' and other ways of being in order to prioritise particular aspects of existence 
as the most meaningful or fundamental. In this way, it ignores ambiguity and 
results in a problematic understanding of authenticity. 
As we have seen above, however, the liberal attempt to in effect deny the importance 
of differences by asserting that all humans have access to the natural and equal 
powers of reason is also problematic. As Marion Tapper states, "the fact that 
women and men experience themselves and each other differently needs to be taken 
into account in understanding our social and political situation".241 This is not just 
about surface change, or about revaluing particular traits and roles, but about re-
thinking the assumptions that support the way identity and being are thought. As 
Tapper argues: 
What is required is not merely arguments and examples to prove that 
women are not inferior, or laws to prevent discrimination, but to change the 
significance or meaning of sexual difference, to change the way in which it is 
thought. And this requires changing the conditions and structures in which 
such meaning is produced.242 
239 Appiah, Kwame., cited in Stasulias, Daiva, 'Authentic Voice: Anti-racist politics in 
Canadian feminist publishing and literary production' in Feminism and the Politics of 
Difference, Sneja Gunew and Anna Yeatman (eds}, Allen and Unwin: Australia, 1993, p55. 
240 Heyes, Cressida, 'Identity Politics', The Stanford Encyclopeadia of Philosophy, (Winter 2007 
edition}, Edward N. Zalta (ed). 
241 Tapper, Marion, 'Can a Feminist be a Liberal?' p43. 
242 Ibid. 
142 
The important task that contemporary feminism grapples with is, consequently, to 
work out how to account for difference without falling back into essentialism and 
without undermining the political and social power of collective experience and the 
significance of cultural identities. It is for this reason that re-thinking authenticite 
through ambiguity can enhance a contemporary feminism of difference, because it 
allows us to examine the differences between subjects as well as the shared 
experiences that shape their lives and identities. Ambiguity allows us to 
acknowledge the importance of embodied existence whilst keeping open the 
possibilities of the future. 
WHAT IS WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE? CAN A WOMAN SPEAK FOR WOMEN? 
Although it can be both socially and politically useful to speak as a group in order 
to achieve social change, as we have seen, there are problems inherent in attempting 
to capture 'the' voice of a group in terms of an inherent group identity. Debra 
Bergoffen argues that, although de Beauvoir's early work Pyrrhus et Cineas was not 
an explicitly feminist text, it nevertheless raises a key question that is central to 
feminism. That is, the question as to "under what conditions, if any, may I speak 
for/in the name of another?"243 This important and complex question speaks to 
contemporary identity and representative politics. 
De Beauvoir, it seems, wanted to say that certain people could speak more 
'truthfully' for others, dependent upon their situation, and she argues that women 
are better placed to speak about the experience of femininity than are men. This is 
because of women's intimate experience of what it means to have a female body, in 
a particular situation, an experience that men cannot know in the same way: 
Still, we know the feminine world more intimately than do the men because 
we have our roots in it, we grasp more immediately than do men what it 
means to a human being to be feminine; and we are more concerned with 
such knowledge (TSS 27). 
z43 Bergoffen, Debra, 'Introduction to Pyrrhus et Cmeas' in Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophical 
Writings, Simons et al (eds) University of Illinois Press: Urbana, 2004, p80. 
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De Beauvoir grants that a female-embodied human being has a different experience 
of the world than a male-embodied human and, therefore, that sexual difference is 
important and significant.244 
As Iris Young and Alison Jagger have noted, both Western academic philosophy 
and feminist philosophy have tended to "neglect or marginalize philosophical and 
theoretical ideas from Eastern and Southern hemispheres" and Western philosophy 
of feminism has largely been dominated by US Anglophone philosophy, which has 
often neglected to recognise its own contextuality.245 Although de Beauvoir's overall 
framework is able to overcome the problem of marginalisation with her notion of 
ambiguous subjectivity, many of her claims in The Second Sex do represent a 
particular type of woman's experience and this should be acknowledged in the 
reading of her work. 
Vicki Kirby also makes the claim that, at times, "feminism's ... claim to self-
legitimation is enabled by othering" and that feminism is often "built on the 
othering of some women". 246 Many feminists, who are explicitly seeking to overcome 
the dichotomous logic of what they see to be traditional and masculinist academic 
I 
thinking, actually remain within the framework themselves. According to Kirby 
"this very notion of 'overcoming' repeats and reinvests the logic of a Hegelian 
Aufhebung (preservation and transcendence) that systematically denies the very 
differences that [these feminists] would want to acknowledge" .247 
244 We must remember, however, that although de Beauvoir argues that women experience 
what it is to be feminine in a different way than do men, she is not arguing that a particular 
feminine experience is inherent to those with female bodies. Her claim is that those who 
have female bodies will have been 'coded' feminine through their bodies in a particular 
social and historical location. 
245 Jagger, Alison and Young, Iris (eds), A Companion to Feminist Philosophy, Blackwell: 
Oxford, 2000, p3 .. 
246 Kirby, Vicki, 'Feminisms, reading, postmodemisms: Rethinking complicity', in Feminism 
and the Politics of Difference, Sneja Gunew and Anna Yeatman (eds), Allen and Unwin: 
Australia, 1993, p25. 
247 Jbid. 
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The inclusion of some women implicitly, but necessarily, implies the exclusion of 
others, and other differences that can play a large part in defining the position of 
particular groups of women in society risk being under-examined if sexual 
difference is prioritised over other differences and particularities. 
In an illustration of the criticisms made of 'white academic' feminism, Australian 
Aboriginal writer Jackie Huggins argues that " ... white women cannot be seen as 
powerless in the face of male power as they are in fact collaborators in the use of 
white (male) power against Black people".248 She argues that, for many Aboriginal 
women, interactions with 'white women' are not necessarily made easier because of 
a shared sex: 
... many [Aboriginal women] say they prefer to deal with white men because 
they can escape the missionary-style zeal that some feminists employ in their 
belief that because they are feminists they are experts on all women and that 
Aboriginal women need 'raising up' to their level of feminist 
consciousness.249 
Huggins is correct in her assertion that feminists must be continually careful to 
avoid setting themselves up as the arbiters of all that defines 'woman' and as 
holders of ultimate knowledge on women's experience and needs. However, there is 
also a problem implicit in Huggins' criticism of white feminists, in that she resorts to 
a reification of both 'black' and 'white' women (and men) in her argument. For 
example, she argues that Aboriginal women have an understanding of sisterhood 
which white women have only borrowed from black civil rights movement and 
which, for white women "is yet to be fully understood" because they still suffer 
from "the legacy of a patriarchal culture which divides them" .250 In her 
categorisation of 'white' and 'Aboriginal' women Huggins perpetuates a view of 
248 Huggins, Jackie, 'A contemporary view of Aboriginal Women's relationship to the White 
Women's Movement', in Australian Women Contemporary Feminist Thought, Norma Grieve 
and Ailsa Burns (eds), Oxford University Press: Melbourne, 1994, p74. 
249 Ibid. 
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both which is based on the problematic oppositional metaphysics we have been 
analysing in previous chapters. One is either "white" or one is "Aboriginal" .251 
Another claim made against academic feminists is that they often portray the issues 
that interest them as being of concern to all women and ignore what may be of real 
concern to particular women in particular situations. The demand for equal wages, 
freedom from housework or cheaper child care for example, would be unlikely to 
rate as priorities for women living in situation in which scarcity of food, poor 
sanitation, war and violence define her daily life. For those who struggle daily with 
famine and disease, the number of female academics in university departments is 
not going to be a significant concern. Huggins articulates this point when she 
argues that, people in the Aboriginal community, 11 •• • have too many other 
barramundis to fry which concern [the] whole community and not just half".252 
Not all 'white' academic feminists fail to recognise their relative privilege and 
standpoint and, from the perspective of a white academic writing about the history 
of feminism in Australia, Marilyn Lake concedes that: 
White feminists have had to acknowledge the privilege of our whiteness and 
our advantage, along with that of non-Aboriginal men, as the beneficiaries of 
Aboriginal dispossession. We have had to come to terms with the fact that 
feminism might not be the most appropriate or urgent politics for all 
women; that feminism [as Ien Ang writes] is a 'limited political home'. For 
different oppressions are differences not necessarily of degree, but of kind.253 
The question then, becomes, how can women who are concerned about the ways in 
which other women are portrayed, treated or conceive of themselves, engage in the 
debate without perpetuating a woman-centric philosophy that denies (or does not 
251 I will return to this point in the following chapter, where I examine the implications of the 
notion of 'authenticity' to identity politics. 
252 Ibid, p78. 
253 Lake, Marion, Getting Equal, pl5. 
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recognise) ambiguity? Is there an authentique way in which to engage with questions 
of sexual difference? 
IS THERE AN AUTHENTIC FEMINIST VOICE? 
The question of the relationship between feminism, as a discipline/discourse 
concerned with women and their rights and place in the world, and other areas in 
which 'difference' is an issue, has been raised by many working in the areas of 
feminism and politics.254 Such questions as to the appropriateness of white, middle-
class, female academics speaking on behalf of 'women' as a whole, or of particular 
groups of Western women speaking on behalf of women in other parts of the world 
and from diverse backgrounds have troubled many.255 One of the main concerns has 
been that 'speaking for' can solidify a way of being such that one voice is deemed as 
the 'authentic', and others lose their power to articulate difference. 
Questions about the extent to which differences such as race, class, social location, 
sexuality, bodily ability etc. impinge upon or, in fact, may prove to be more 
important than questions of sexual difference, have been raised repeatedly. For 
example, post-structuralist theorists Anna Yeatman and Sneja Gunew argue that, for 
feminism to survive as a movement for social change, it must be able to deal 
appropriately with difference.256 
For them, the task of contemporary feminism is to examine the problem of essential 
identities inherent in politics, philosophy, literary and cultural studies, and to 
"intervene whenever such 'identities' are being constituted, whether in nationalist 
or gender or class terms".257 This means that feminists must "insist on the 
differences among women" rather than adhering to an identity politics that reifies 
the similarities between women. They argue that post-modernism has attempted to 
address the issue of identity politics by undermining the idea of an autonomous, 
254 See for example Gunew, S., and Yeatman, A., (eds.) Feminism and the Politics of Difference. 
255 See for example Ortega, Mariana, 'Being Lovingly, Knowingly Ignorant: White Feminism 
and Women of Colar', Hypatia. Bloomington: Summer 2006. Vol. 21, Issue 3. 
256 Gunew, S., and Yeatman, A., (eds.) Feminism and the Politics of Difference, p xxiv. 
257 Ibid, p 11. 
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individual subject and, instead, talks in terms of multiple and fragmented 
subjectivities. 258 
In her examination of debates over what constitutes an 'authentic' voice in literature 
and over who is authorised to write or speak for whom, Gunew raises the issue of 
what she terms the 'burden of authenticity'. This burden arises when a person from a 
minority group (for example a person from an indigenous background) is seen to 
only be able to speak as part of that group and unable to comment on broader social 
issues - their contributions are read as linked to the 'universal' particularities of the 
group.259 What this means is that the shared differences, by which the group 
distinguishes itself from those who do not belong to the group, come to be seen as 
primary to the individual's identity and their capacity to contribute to socially. 
The problem with maintaining such fixed accounts of identity is that it results in the 
absorption of alterity. Here again, we see the 'authentic' linked to a static account of 
identity and the tension and interplay inherent in the development of any 
subjectivity is denied; the ambiguity of one's being is ignored and, in its place, is a 
notion of authenticity that is based on the serious: 
Whenever such thinking prevails, we are merely in the business of juggling 
with traditional categories, privileging women rather than men, or some 
women at the expense of others, without changing the power structure 
behind such constructions. Such logic is homogenizing and universalist, 
built on the principle of exclusion and tyranny of the familiar.260 
Gunew and Yeatman attempt to undermine such an account of the authentic, in a 
bid to 'situate the subject', "defining the intersections and contradictions of 
258 As Alan Schrift and Sonia Kruks have argued, post-structuralism and post-modernism 
owe a lot to existentialism and the method of undermining the idea of an autonomous 
individual is a key example of this (see Schrift, 'Judith Butler: Une Nouvelle existentialiste?' 
in Philosophy Today, Spring 2001, Vol 45, Issue:l, pp 12-23 and Kruks, Situation and Human 
Existence). 
259 Gunew, S, & Yeatman, A, (eds.) Feminism and the Politics of Difference, Allen & Unwin, 
1993, p 12. 
260 Ibid, p xiii. 
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competing interest groups" .261 They want to admit difference, to acknowledge 
incommensurability, to move beyond identity politics and they want to ask what it 
is that makes a voice or position authentic.262 They see a problem with those who 
"project the burden of authenticity onto the minority", resulting in what Daiva 
Stasiulis describes as an experience of being "haunted by the burden of authenticity". 
This burden results in some being seen to have 'privileged access' to the 'truths' of 
gender, class, race or ethnicity. For many, this signifies a return to "the essential 
sovereign subject as guarantor of meaning, putting us back into the realm of truth 
claims and power structures which regulate the authority to speak".263 
As we saw above, both strategically and politically, identity politics has worked by 
asserting inherent difference as a means to combat policies of assimilation. By 
maintaining and celebrating the distinctness of one group from others, de Beauvoir 
notes that the process of 'othering' is a means by which groups define themselves 
against others, "Proletarians say 'We'; Negroes also. Regarding themselves as 
subjects, they transform the bourgeois, the whites, into 'others"' (TSS, p19). 
Politically this strategy is used to create a sense of solidarity, however, what often 
results from this strategy is a binary politics, which does not leave space for other 
differences than those being strategically engaged with. Identity politics becomes an 
oppositional debate between 'black and white', 'Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal', 
'proletariat' and bourgeoisie'. What de Beauvoir noted in the 1940s, however, was 
that women have lived dispersed amongst men without a sense of 'self' and, 
therefore, have never been able to assert a collective 'we' - she argues that it is this 
inability to define or assert a 'we' in contrast to an other that has contributed to the 
extent of women's oppression (TSS). It would seem then, that what is needed is a 
means for women to achieve 'solidarity' in order to overcome oppression. However, 
as this chapter and others have maintained, it is not sufficient to define a sense of 
'woman' either through radical difference or opposition to 'man', or through an 
261 Ibid, pxiii. 
262 Ibid, pxiv. 
263 Ibid, pxxi. 
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argument that women are inherently the same as men (that is, rational beings). 
Attempting to locate the 'authentic woman' in radical biological difference or in 
social construction is not the answer to overcoming women's oppression. Seeing the 
answer as needing to fall within either of these camps only reinforces the binary 
between body and culture, rather than recognising important connections. This 
binary results in a reification of both the feminine and the masculine and, thus, 
negates ambiguity. 
In an examination of the way in which such a binary operates in the cultural 
domain, Stasiulis provides a critical analysis of what she terms the "essentialist 
position on authentic voice", a position that arose in the debate over appropriation 
of 'voice' in Canadian feminist and literary communities. Although she agrees that a 
person's social location and history, at both individual and group levels, impact 
upon what one chooses to write about and one's capacity to write "authentically" 
about them, she points out that "this is not a determined and fixed relation" .264 The 
fact that such identities are not fixed is not always recognised, however, and 
problems of essentialism arise when a person is equated with a particular aspect of 
their situation and deemed to be an 'authentic' voice or example of the group. In 
describing this process, Stasiulis identifies what she terms a "credentialism" (of 
gender, race, class etc.), which is used to prove that one can write or speak with 
authenticity or credibility. This entails situating and identifying one's 'credentials' 
to speak about a particular experience by connecting oneself with an identity that 
can authentically speak on that experience. 
Stasiulis, however, argues that "essentialism is inherent in any position that 
assumes that the race, gender and class of the writer is the guarantee of the 
authenticity of the text".265 She notes that essentialist notions of authenticity are 
especially problematic in cultures where immigration and 'inter-marriage' result in 
bi-cultural or multi-cultural experience because such 'merged' identities struggle for 
264 Stasiulis, Daiva, "Authentic Voice: Anti-racist politics in Canadian feminist publishing 
and literary production", in Gunew, S, & Yeatman, A, (eds.) Feminism and the Politics of 
Difference, Allen & Unwin, 1993, p36, my emphasis. 
26s Ibid, p41, my emphasis. 
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recognition as a genuine or authentic expression of lived experience. As will be 
further discussed in the following chapter, this idea of authenticity often results in 
an appropriation of the ideas of the 'prehistoric Aborigine' and the valorisation of 
traditions by non-Aboriginal people in an attempt to achieve spiritual 
enlightenment and where, as Stasiulis notes "contemporary [or urban] First Nations 
people are [seen] ... as deviants, drunks and prostitutes".266 
This criticism of the idea of an 'essential' voice is not to deny that people can share 
experiences and identities that are common; experiences based on a particular 
sexuality, culture, or on racist oppression, for example. However, Stasiulis notes 
that such an expression of the idea of authenticity is "slippery, limiting and prone to 
essentialism". As an example she cites a policy developed by the Canada Council 
that insists that writers must consult and collaborate with 'others' before they can 
write about them. Such a policy discounts the "hyphenated identities" and "hybrid 
realities" that constitute the 'other'. Moreover, this policy "problematically assumes 
that by virtue of their birth or social identities, some individuals are the legitimate 
'keepers' of a culture".267 Discussion of the problems that surround the concept of 
authenticity in relation to cultural identity will be discussed in more depth in the 
following chapter. What I wish to point out here is that the concept of what is an 
'authentic' experience and an 'authentic' voice is limited by the understanding of 
humanity and existence that underlies it. 
As we can see, the task of contemporary feminism is not an easy one, as it must find 
a balanced way in which to explore the specificities of sexual difference without 
ignoring or negating other facets of identity and without resorting to essentialism. 
Linda Martin Alcoff writes that contemporary feminism is caught within a 'double 
bind' where it must " ... reveal the culturally mediated and changeable character of 
what have been portrayed as natural formations of identity, of gender and of 
sexuality" at the same time as critiquing "the conception of philosophy as 
266 Ibid, p44. 
267 Ibid, p55. 
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independent of corporeal experiences or social agendas".268 In short, she argues that 
feminists must repair the mind/body split and acknowledge that bodies really do 
matter but without resorting to biological determinism. 
A key point of this thesis has been to demonstrate that de Beauvoir's analysis of the 
relation between self and other insists upon recognition of the situation and context 
in which each has come to be. This situation includes one's history and 'social' 
context, as well as one's materiality - so that one's experience is of a lived-body. 
Whilst de Beauvoir is true to the existential claim that 'existence precedes essence', 
and that our fundamental freedom from determination underpins our existence, she 
also acknowledges that one's situation and one's life experience have significance. It 
is possible, on her account, to choose to align oneself with a particular group in 
recognition rather than denial of freedom. It is the acknowledgement of how one 
becomes aligned with others that allows for an authentique politics of solidarity. Her 
work demonstrates that it is possible to base one's political and/or social affiliations 
upon what are significant differences from others within the community and to do 
so without being inauthentique, what must be acknowledged in this to avoid a spirit 
of seriousness, is the ambiguity of difference. 
NOT JUST A 'WOMAN' QUESTION 
Feminist philosophy has undergone substantial change over its history, with many 
sub-branches emerging and, as with 'mainstream' philosophy, a plethora of 
philosophical arguments and viewpoints have developed, which I have only 
skimmed here. Of interest to this section is the current focus of contemporary 
feminist philosophy on unearthing assumptions within both philosophy and 
feminism. As Jagger and Young state, feminist philosophy is now "investigating the 
overt and covert ways in which the devaluation of women may be inherent in the 
most enduring ideals, the central concepts, and the dominant theories of 
268 Alcoff, Linda Martin, 'Philosophy Matters: A Review of Recent Work in Feminist 
Philosophy', Signs, Vol. 25, No. 3, Spring, 2000, p859. 
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philosophy".269 A large part of this unearthing therefore involves a deconstruction of 
conceptual dichotomies within philosophy, dichotomies that go beyond the 
male/female distinction to look at the accounts of freedom, subjectivity and 
ontology that provide the theoretical foundation for dualisms of various kinds. 
Jagger and Young, in their companion to feminist philosophy, argue that large parts 
of Western philosophy (as we saw in chapter one) have had a "conception of human 
nature that represents individuals as essentially separate from others, insatiably 
appetitive and with interests typically in conflict, a conception thought to reflect 
men's experience of adversarial market relations".270 A problem I also wish to 
examine here is the reification of 'men's experience', which results in an exclusion of 
the experience of various males. I imagine that we would all agree, at the very least, 
that not all men would experience 'adversarial market relations' in the same way -
and that the many factors of a male's lived experience, including his age, social and 
economic position, sexuality, level of education, physical and mental ability and 
ethnicity would affect how such relations were understood. The idea that there is 
such a thing as "men's experience of adversarial market relations" assumes that all 
men experience the world in the same way. It is important, therefore, that as well as 
acknowledging that philosophy has historically excluded particular women (and 
their bodies) with its claims of a universal, neutral human way of being, that 
feminist philosophy must also acknowledge that both philosophy and feminism 
have, with many of the same assumptions, excluded the particular experience of 
many males. 
Because of a tendency, to either reify or ignore 'man' in feminist approaches, the 
relationship between the concepts of male and female is not adequately examined 
nor is the effect of such a binary account on the lived experience of particular males. 
This is problematic because the 'masculine other', which is either vilified or ignored, 
reinstates the binary that feminists seek to dismantle. The reification of the 
269 Jagger, Alison, M, and Iris Marion Young (eds), A Companion to Feminist Philosophy, 
Blackwell Publishing, 2000. 
270 Ibid, p 2. 
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masculine undermines the feminist aim of overcoming the binary between 'man' 
and 'woman'. 
De Beauvoir is also guilty, at times, of positing a masculine 'one' (opposed to the 
feminine Other) and for failing to account for differences between particular men 
and particular women in The Second Sex. For example, she argues that "man thinks 
of his body as a direct and normal connection with the world" which is arguably not 
the case for all men and which omits the experience of men with physical 
disabilities who find their connection with a world designed largely for able-bodied 
people to be impeded. De Beauvoir has also been accused of not accounting for 
differences between those of the same sex when she talks about 'women' as distinct 
from 'the American Negroes', the 'ghetto Jews' and the 'proletariat' as though there 
are no female American negroes, no female Jews and no women of the working 
classes (TSS p19). 
However, although she does at times appear to ignore the many variables of 
subjectivity by focusing on sexual difference, de Beauvoir' s account does 
acknowledge that not all men are privileged in society. She writes: 
In the economic sphere men and women can almost be said to make up two 
castes; other things being equal, the former hold the better jobs, get higher 
wages, and have more opportunity for success than their new competitors. 
In industry and politics men have a great many more positions and they 
monopolize the most important posts .... they enjoy a traditional prestige that 
the education of children tends in every way to support, for the present 
enshrines the past - and in the past all history has been made by men 
(TSS, p20-21, my emphasis). 
Although it is not emphasised, she does say 'other things being equal' in an 
acknowledgement that not all men have equal access to the social and political 
power she describes. Although her account does not give sustained attention to the 
differences of particular men and women, her philosophy of ambiguity does 
provide a framework for further examining such difference. For example, in her 
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introduction to the first book of The Second Sex, where she alerts us that her use of 
the terms 'woman' and the 'feminine' refer to 'no changeless archetype', and we can 
also understand that her denial of 'eternal verities' must apply also to 'man' and the 
'masculine'. Moreover, in acknowledgment of the connections between identities, 
de Beauvoir says, "male and female can be defined only correlatively" (TSS, p35). 
We must remember that hers is an account of existential phenomenology, where 
each is free from an inherent essence, but where each is also bound to the situation 
in which one has become and where each is also open to an undefined future. 
The task of feminism, including the aims of de Beauvoir in The Second Sex, has been 
to a large degree to bring to light the discrepancies in the way that women have 
been treated due to their existence as 'women'. The feminist aim has been, through 
various methodologies, to demonstrate that women are deserving of the right to be 
treated as worthwhile human beings. Genevieve Lloyd argues in The Man of Reason 
that feminists have rightly been concerned with problems facing women in 
patriarchal social orders and the ways in which these have arisen in response to 
particularly 'masculine' ideals. Lloyd argues there, however, that masculinity must 
also come under critique. By examining both femininity and masculinity (and the 
way these concepts interact with one another and with other aspects of identity), we 
will be provided with richer alternatives for men and women. Lloyd contends that: 
The denigration of the 'feminine' is to feminists, understandably, the most 
salient aspect of the maleness of the philosophical tradition. But the issue is 
important for men too. The lives of women incorporate the impoverishing 
restraints of Reason's 'nether world'. But maleness, as we have inherited it, 
enacts, no less, the impoverishment and vulnerability of 'public' Reason. 
Understanding the contribution of past thought to 'male' and 'female' 
consciousnesses, as we now have them, can help make available a diversity 
of intellectual styles and characters to men and women alike. It need not 
involve a denial of difference. Contemporary consciousness, male or female, 
reflects past philosophical ideals as well as past differences in the social 
organization of the lives of men and women. Such differences do not have 
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to be taken as norms; and understanding them can be a source of richness 
and diversity in a human life whose full range of possibilities and experience 
is freely accessible to both men and women.271 
It is not just in order to examine and ameliorate the experience of women under 
patriarchy that ambiguity and authenticite should be re-thought, but in order to 
examine the ways in which subjectivities are formed in situation and how re-
thinking these might open up the future by allowing subjects to more authentically 
engage with their freedom. One cannot engage with an examination of femininity 
without examining the concept of masculinity that has been defined as its opposite. 
Moreover, as Lloyd argues, the conceptions of masculinity and femininity are 
'inherited' from philosophy's past; they are not set in stone. 
CONTEMPORARY 'THIRD WA VE' FEMINISM 
The concept of 'woman' does not exist in isolation, therefore, and Lloyd argues that 
it is time for feminist philosophy to be revealed as providing a means by which we 
can address other issues of concern to contemporary societies.272 In her discussion 
of the relations between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians and the land, 
Lloyd argues that the employment of "feminist reading strategies that attend the 
imaginary open up ways of rethinking processes of inclusion and exclusion", 
processes that go beyond a male/female divide.273 She focuses specifically on the 
issue of the relation between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians and 
argues that, within this debate, the feminist strategies of re-reading and critiquing 
mainstream philosophy can be applied to ideas of race and the way in which these 
ideas have been developed in political discourse. 
In support of the argument that feminist philosophy need not (and should not) be 
limited to examinations of 'women's issues' Jagger and Young assert that " 
271 Lloyd, Genevive, The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy, Routledge: 
London, 1993, p107, emphasis added. 
2nuoyd, Genevieve, 'No-One's Land: Australia and the Philosophical Imagination', Hypatia, 
Vol. 15, 2000, p 26. 
273 Ibid. 
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feminist philosophy has become sufficiently mature and well established that it is 
time to give ... more direct engagement with philosophical work that is not self-
identified as feminist". Feminist philosophy, they argue, "should intervene more 
regularly and vigorously in the broader philosophical conversation".274 
Although acknowledging that early feminist challenges included "making visible 
the excluded feminine", Lloyd sees that one of the key challenges for contemporary 
feminism is to maintain this visibility, but without being limited by insisting too 
strongly on an identification with "feminist" perspectives: 
'We feminist philosophers' are not the bearers of clearly bordered identities 
occupying stable, though newly won, speaking positions. Feminist 
philosophy is not insulated from the multiplicity of identity that is a feature 
of our present. We are not always in the position of the excluded other. We 
are shifting subjects, taking on multiple identities, multiple positions in 
relation to power. If we are serious about engaging with our present, we 
cannot afford to let that engagement be circumscribed by postures of 
opposition to the "male" past of philosophy. The challenge is to refine the 
strategies for thinking our way into that past and its processes of exclusion 
and constitution, and for appropriating its intellectual possibilities the better 
to understand not only the exclusions we have suffered but also those in 
which we have been complicit.275 
The strategies employed by feminists to critique the maleness of philosophy, which 
has presumed that individuals are somehow essentially "separate" from the social 
roles they occupy and the relationships they hold, can thus be used to examine how 
the bias in traditional philosophical accounts of humanity is limiting current 
conceptions both within and outside the tradition (as well as at its boundaries). 
The 'third wave' feminist approach to philosophy can be summarised as a critical 
analysis of both feminism and philosophy in order to reveal and examine the 
274 Jagger, Alison and Young, Iris, A Companion to Feminist Philosophy, p 6. 
275 Lloyd, Genevieve., 'No-One's Land: Australia and the Philosophical Imagination', p39. 
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implicit biases and assumptions that operate within traditional Western thought at 
both institutional and symbolic levels. One of the fundamental assumptions 
revealed (and critiqued) by this feminist analysis is the belief that there is a 
universal, sex-neutral human 'way of being' that underlies all experience. What 
third wave feminists are keen to reveal is the way in which implicit assumptions 
underlying understandings of 'reason' are based upon a dichotomous metaphysic 
that results in and depends upon the exclusion of many. They argue that the liberal 
account of subjectivity negates the importance of sexual-difference (along with other 
difference) with its assumption of a universal human norm. Importantly, the third 
wave approach to feminism is also critical of the opposing 'radical' feminist claim 
that we are our biology, and that women should reclaim and revalue all that has 
previously been denigrated in its association with femininity. The problem 
identified with this radical difference methodology is that essentialism based upon 
biology fails to account for the diversity of lived experience in a cultural milieu, and 
also depends upon a metaphysic that sees 'man' or the 'masculine' associated with 
'reason', control and the mind, and woman with nature, emotion and the body. 
This bifurcation, which posits an essential male and an essential female way of 
being, is limiting for both men and women and continues with the type of binary 
distinction that fails to account for various, particular identities and differences. 
SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, AMBIGUITY AND THIRD WA VE FEMINISM 
Contemporary American philosopher Nancy Bauer argues that "philosophical 
feminism not only has the potential to revolutionize philosophy but actually 
demands a reappraisal, from the ground up, of what it is to be a human - a thinking 
sexed being".276 Although many, including the translator of The Second Sex did not 
consider it to be a work of philosophy, Bauer argues that, in this work, de Beauvoir 
undertakes a serious rethinking of what it means to be human and that, with this, 
comes a serious rethinking of what philosophy is. 
276Bauer Nancy, Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy and Feminism, p 21. 
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This re-conceptualisation of philosophy through feminist critiques of the underlying 
assumptions in past and present understandings of human 'being', reveals strong 
linkages between metaphysical understandings of existence and the ways in which 
these understandings are played out in 'everyday life'. This method of critique 
involves an examination of the way in which metaphysical assumptions affect and 
are affected by socio-political understandings, traditions, discourse and imaginings. 
The Second Sex, according to Bauer, is a challenge to philosophy to transform itself, 
through an examination of the total, situated existence of woman - that is, through a 
phenomenological engagement with the world. 
Bauer points out that, through questioning how it is that women have come to exist 
in a certain way; through a certain scepticism entailed in the questions "what is a 
woman?" and "do women exist, really?", de Beauvoir reveals that the scepticism 
previously employed by Cartesianism fails to provide an adequate means to answer 
questions about 'sexed being' (or, I would argue, about any 'situated being'). 
Cartesian scepticism, under Bauer's analysis, does not provide an answer to the 
question of sexual difference, nor can it rule-out the importance of sexual difference. 
De Beauvoir here sets aside her assumptions about the existence of women, using 
the phenomenological method to question that which we take for granted - that is, 
the understanding that there is such a thing as 'woman'. In doing so she neither 
denies the existence of women nor does she presuppose it - rather, she questions the 
very meaning of such an understanding. As I have discussed above, in her account 
of human existence - and in this instance her account of the 'human female' - de 
Beauvoir will not concede that woman is defined either through her body (although 
she believes that one's facticity is important to lived experience) or by some 
"mysterious" female essence. Her task is to examine the situation of woman 
through an analysis of historical development in order to come to an understanding 
of what this term means, without either reifying or denying the existence of 
'woman'. De Beauvoir takes up a position that asserts neither essential difference 
nor essential sameness. The account of existence put forward by de Beauvoir, which 
underlies her examination of the situation of woman, is of an always-situated and 
always-related 'being' that cannot be understood through separation from the world 
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in which it comes to be. It is not just the tension of the 'self-other' relation that is 
crucial to understanding being, but the relation of self-others-world, a relation that 
includes one's historicity as well as the intricacies of the current situation. 
As Bauer argues, there has long been a perceived contradiction between feminism 
and philosophy, a contradiction that for many has been viewed as irreconcilable. 277 
Traditionally, feminism has been seen to be concerned with 'everyday' practical, 
political issues, whereas philosophy has 'universal', 'abstract' ideals and concepts as 
its focus. Often, this has resulted in a perceived separation of the two, with both 
discourses/areas disregarding the importance of the other. However, what Bauer 
argues, similarly to Moira Gatens in Philosophy and Feminism, is that in actuality the 
two have very important things to offer one another and these need to be thought 
together. This is because feminism reveals the need to re-think implicit assumptions 
in Western philosophy and metaphysics regarding the situated subject, and 
philosophy, when re-thought, reveals the manner in which problematic 
assumptions are taken up without examination and used in many feminist 
arguments. As Bauer argues, traditional philosophy as a discourse has lacked the 
resources to account for sex-difference in particular, and 'difference' in general, and 
has rarely seen this as a problem. This 'ignorance' or denial of difference is evident 
in the continued insistence on searching for universal human laws and a universal, 
objective, sex-neutral way of being. Like Gatens, Bauer argues that, unfortunately, 
"the debate between essentialists and anti-essentialists now dominates feminist 
theory". 278 
THE TASK OF PHILOSOPHY 
An important task for third wave feminism, therefore, is to devise a means to 
theorise philosophically, but to do so in a way that does not lose sight of social and 
political goals. The task of radically critiquing both philosophy and feminism does 
277 Remember, again, Parshley's claim that The Second Sex is not a book on philosophy, but a 
book on woman 
278 Bauer, Nancy, Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy and Feminism, p38. 
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not entail a reduction to one discourse as the ground for the other, but continually 
reasserts the interdependence of each. 
Importantly, this philosophical work must strive to break down the distinction 
between everyday, lived experience and the abstracted 'objective' philosopher. 
Another crucial factor in feminist philosophy, a factor that must be passed-on and 
incorporated into general philosophy, is that theory must "remain tethered to the 
everyday". For too long, Bauer argues, there has been a sharp distinction between 
the philosophical and the mundane,279 and this binary has contributed to 
misconceptions both about the way in which philosophy should be done, and about 
the way in which humans are in the world.280 Bauer argues that The Second Sex 
overcomes this distinction by examining the natural relationship between the 
metaphysical and the everyday, and that it is, therefore, a paradigmatic example of 
the possibilities of feminist philosophy.281 The metaphysical question posed in The 
Second Sex is "what is a woman?" and the everyday answer for de Beauvoir, is "I 
am".282 The question for contemporary feminists (as it was for de Beauvoir) is not 
whether or not there is an essential sameness between women and an essential 
difference between the sexes. Rather, the question is, "what is to be made of the fact 
that I am a woman?" and, more broadly "what is to be made of the fact that I am 
human?" 283 
What is pertinent in de Beauvoir's work is her attempt to account for 'the way 
things are' through a relational ontology that can be examined through the practical 
'everyday' experience of a French woman in the 1940s. As discussed above, 
although she completed her Agregee de Philosophie at the Sorbonne with Merleau-
Ponty and Sartre, de Beauvoir did not consider herself to be primarily a 
philosopher. Bauer (amongst others) argues against this self-appraisal, suggesting 
279 The term 'mundane' has the meaning "of or pertaining to this world, worldly, earthly" as 
well as meaning "pertaining to the everyday, dull, routine", Shorter Oxford Dictionary, p1861. 
280 Bauer, Nancy, Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy and Feminism, p 24. 
281 Ibid, p41. 
282 Ibid, p42. 
283 Ibid, p44, emphasis added. 
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that such works as The Second Sex in fact give an example of how philosophy itself, 
through a rethinking of its links with 'everyday experience', can be rethought and 
made more pertinent to contemporary issues. In asking such fundamental 
questions as 'what does it mean to be a human in this world and what is the relation 
between self and others?' and by investigating these questions through a thorough 
historical analysis of what it means to be a woman in the West, de Beauvoir brings 
philosophy to the world, rather than seeing it as a discipline isolated from the 
'mundane' existence of the 'everyday'. In fact, the mundane and the everyday are 
re-thought in a way that directly links them with such philosophical questions. If a 
supposedly 'neutral' and 'universal' philosophy is unable to account for the 
particular, everyday, lived experiences of human beings, then it is failing in its task 
of examining or understanding human being. If we take seriously de Beauvoir' s 
questioning and methodology, philosophy must concern itself with questions of 
how we can understand the world and ourselves in situation, in the world.284 
The following passage from The Ethics of Ambiguity is an illustration of this belief 
that one's situation is crucial to understanding oneself: 
I remember having experienced a great feeling of calm on reading Hegel in 
the impersonal framework of the Bibliotheque Nationale in August 1940. But 
once I got into the street again, into my life, out of the system, beneath a real 
sky, the system was no longer of any use to me: what it had offered me, 
under a show of the infinite, was the consolations of death; and I again 
wanted to live in the midst of living men (TEA, p158). 
We can see important linkages between de Beauvoir's quest to provide a 
phenomenological account of lived experience in the 1940s with some of the aims of 
contemporary feminism. This is particularly the case with respect to the argument 
for a philosophy of ambiguity put forward by Gatens. Gatens sees such a 
philosophy to be evolving through particular feminist critiques of universal, male-
284 Ibid. 
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dominated philosophies and, as I argued in chapter two, hers is a philosophy that is 
compatible with de Beauvoir's own. As Gatens suggests: 
To view human being as a social product devoid of determining universal 
characteristics is to view its possibilities as open-ended. This is not to say 
that human being is not constrained by historical context or by rudimentary 
biological facts but rather that these factors set the outer parameters of 
possibility only. Within these constraints, if they can be called that, there is 
an almost limitless variety of possibilities.285 
Like de Beauvoir, Gatens is critical of feminist theory that attempts to answer, once 
and for all, the question 'what is a woman?' She writes that to fix woman's essence 
in a search for the underlying 'ground' or meaning of 'woman': 
... result[s] in the destruction of the productive ambiguity of a present 
femininity that is lived out in a female body that for historical reasons is at 
present an existence that is simultaneously extremely rich and painfully 
contradictory. To investigate how this lived femininity has been constructed 
involves living with and experimenting with these ambiguities.286 
As we have seen in The Ethics of Ambiguity de Beauvoir explicitly criticises 
philosophers for turning away from the ambiguity of existence and seeking to find 
universal truths to replace it. There she writes, "as long as there have been men and 
they have lived, they have all felt this tragic ambiguity of their condition, but as 
long as there have been philosophers and they have thought, most of them have 
tried to mask it" (TEA, p 7). 
The urging for feminist philosophy to recognise ambiguity is not to suggest that the 
insights, strategies and arguments of feminism will be made redundant. However, 
feminism must acknowledge and accept that the hard-fought battles and significant 
2ss'Gatens, Moira, 'Feminism, Philosophy and riddles without answers' in Feminist 
Challenges: Social and Political Theon;, Carole Patemen and Elisabeth Gross (Eds), Allen and 
Unwin, 1986, p28. 
2s6 Ibid, emphasis added. 
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breakthroughs within the feminist movement must apply also to any who suffer at 
the hands of oppression, bigotry, hatred and prejudice. That is why an ethics based 
on ambiguity is so useful today, because it recognises that it is not just 'women' who 
suffer because of their sex but that there are many who suffer because of the 
reification of their 'otherness' and, ultimately, because of the pervasive tendency to 
downplay or to deny ambiguity. 
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 
As we have seen, the emphasis of much contemporary feminist theory is on 
reuniting or recognising the links between philosophy and 'the everyday' and on 
how metaphysical assumptions about such links influence political decision-
making. 
As discussed in part one of this thesis, de Beauvoir' s ethics is drawn from a 
phenomenological concern with the situated subject. In her existential-
phenomenological account the subject is always seen to be in situation, always a 
part of a series of intricate and particularised circumstances, which includes a 
particular political setting. In this sense, de Beauvoir is concerned with "the actual 
present-day political situation that each human confronts", and not with abstract 
political theory.287 De Beauvoir observes that traditional political theory tends to 
take a standpoint that abstracts from concrete individual experience and is more 
concerned with 'universal' theories of 'nature' and 'reason' than with particular 
situations. She writes, "Politics always puts forward Ideas: Nation, Empire, Union, 
Economy, etc. But [she argues] none of these forms has value in itself; it has it only 
in so far as it involves concrete individuals" (TEA, p145). 
For de Beauvoir, all subjects are situated, all situations have a political dimension 
and, therefore, ethical persons "cannot escape taking a political position of some 
kind". Therefore, she argues, "Every political choice is an ethical choice" (TEA, p 
148). 
287 Arp, Kristana, The Bonds of Freedom, p112. 
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CONCLUSION 
To summarise the main points of this chapter, the problematic point made by liberal 
or equality feminist ethics has been that one should not appeal to pre-existing or 
natural difference between people in order to make ethical or political decisions. 
The aim in appealing to equality and neutrality is to undermine sexist arguments 
that propose women are inherently inferior to men based on 'feminine' 
characteristics. Liberal ethics, therefore, requires a methodology of equality and 
transparency, were appeals to 'natural' difference are shunned as essentialism that 
limits women's existence.288 An ethics of equality, it is argued, must appeal to the 
neutral, universal human subject and not prescribe rights and actions based upon 
difference, because difference is seen to be always culturally inscribed. Liberal 
ethics, therefore, is based on the understanding of the universal human subject as 
being abstracted from his or her particular situation. 
However, while it has had some success in undermining prejudice, this view of 
ethics is not able to address the significance of specific and particular (embodied) 
experiences. It is unable to give an account of ontology that recognises the 
importance of 'being-in-the-world' for subjectivity and does not recognise that the 
"universal" characteristics it proposes as being neutral are, themselves, a social 
construction. 
A radical feminism of difference, on the other hand, can be seen as a reaction to this 
liberal appeal to a universal human way of being. Radical difference feminism 
(particularly in its extreme form) reclaims and celebrates particular characteristics 
such as motherhood, a capacity for caring and a concern for others in an attempt to 
revalue what has previously been denigrated in patriarchy. In doing so, however, it 
does not always account for difference amongst women and tends toward the claim 
that certain traits are inherent to certain beings, based upon the bodies that they 
have. As Claire Colebrook (amongst others) has noted, within the discourse of 
288 Colebrook, Claire, 'From Radical Representations to Corporeal Becomings: The Feminist 
Philosophy of Lloyd, Grosz and Gatens', in Hypatia, Vol. 15, 2000 p77. 
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feminism, the sex/gender distinction has generated substantial debate.289 On one 
side the 'equality feminists' argue for an understanding of the social construction of 
gender, which can be separated from biology. Radical difference feminists, on the 
other hand, argue that gender arises from sexual differences, which are biologically 
determined. Consequently, sexual difference becomes either an ahistorical, 
determining, 'given' essence, or it is seen as purely an arbitrary and disembodied 
representation.290 The body, therefore, is either essentially sexed or essentially 
neutral ('blank'). 
Contemporary third wave feminism, in response, investigates the potential to break 
down this dichotomous understanding of sex and gender and to reveal the 
interrelated character of situated (ambiguous) existence. This approach emphasises 
inter-relatedness and becoming, where difference is acknowledged and continually 
brought to bear upon our actions in the world, without being reduced to biological 
essentialism. What those such as Gatens and Lloyd are interested to uncover in 
their work on the relationship between feminism and philosophy, are the ethical 
implications of this critical engagement, not just for feminism, but for philosophy 
and socio-political discourse as a whole. Gatens argues that the present concerns of 
philosophy reflect changes in the social needs and desires of the time and, like de 
Beauvoir, she proposes a philosophy that entails a rejection of universal truths, a 
philosophy that focuses "on becoming rather than being, on possibilities rather than 
certainty and on meaning or significance rather than truth" .291 
What is proposed by this approach is a breaking down of the traditional splits 
between theory and practice, a rethinking of the dichotomies evident in philosophy 
and acknowledgement of the ways in which these splits reflect and affect the social 
289 Ibid. 
See also Moira Gatens', 'A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction', in Allen, J. and Patten, 
Paul. (eds), Beyond Marxism? Interventions after Marx, Sydney: Intervention Publications, 
1983. 
290 Colebrook, Claire, 'From Radical Representations to Corporeal Becomings: The Feminist 
Philosophy of Lloyd, Grosz and Gatens', in Hypatia, Vol. 15, 2000, p78. 
291 Gatens, Moira, 'Feminism, Philosophy and Riddles without Answers'. 
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and political needs and desires of the communities in which they operate. Central to 
this argument is the belief that the alignment of these dichotomies with masculinity 
and femininity must be re-thought if they are to be overcome. Gatens sees this 
philosophy as productive and ongoing, as an open-ended project of the future on 
which, as de Beauvoir says, "we can never close the book". 
The understanding of subjectivity proposed in contemporary third wave feminist 
accounts results in a non-hierarchical account of being that enables us to talk about 
'difference' without reverting to discussion of 'essential' natures. Woman is no 
longer seen as the opposed 'lack' - the antithesis of 'man' - but is understood 
through her multiple and ambiguous relations to her total situation, and, 'man' also 
is no longer simply the patriarchal enemy but also a situated and ambiguous 
becoming in a world of relations. 
The work of de Beauvoir is, therefore, crucial to a critical engagement with the 
concept of authenticite, as her existential-phenomenological methodology involves a 
continued attentiveness to assumptions and 'blind spots'. She reminds us that we 
must look to the total situation for answers to particular questions rather than 
attempting to define universal and unchanging moral laws. Her work focuses on 
unearthing the foundational ambiguity of humanity and critiquing the tendency for 
philosophy (and humanity more generally) to create absolutes in the face of this 
paradoxical freedom. As we have seen, an authentique voice on de Beauvoir' s 
account will be one that recognises and celebrates its own and the other's 
ambiguity. 
There is a recognition within de Beauvoir' s work of the interdependent nature of 
those terms so often seen to be opposites, as Gatens writes, " ... for her the situation of 
the existent is composed of both facts and values, nature and culture, both biology 
and consciousness".292 In both The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex, de 
Beauvoir brings to light the interplay between biology and culture - revealing that a 
web of related functions operates to influence woman's existence. For de Beauvoir, 
292 Gatens, Moira, 'Beauvoir and Biology: A Second Look', p22, emphasis added. 
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biology, culture, history, the economic situation in which she comes to be, as well as 
her creativity and intellect are all factors that outline a woman's life. Moreover, as 
Gatens states, "in the final analysis, none of these factors may meaningfully be 
separated from the others, and taken together they form the contours which 
constitute the overall shape of a life".293 What is valuable about de Beauvoir's 
account is the way in which her analysis captures the connection, instability and 
movement of the continual tension between what are often seen as opposing factors; 
self-other, subject-object, subject and world. Rather than attempting to overcome 
this tension, de Beauvoir encourages us to accept the task of realising it in order to 
live a fuller, more authentique, life. 
Rather than viewing feminism as a separate 'women's' discourse, and The Second 
Sex as a book on women, we should see both as useful tools in working out what it 
means to be human, to be "a thinking sexed being" as Bauer puts it. We can look to 
the ways in which the insights of feminist theory - or a philosophy of sexed, 
situated being - can help to re-think political and ethical relations and how we can 
use this knowledge to inform our relations with one another. 
What this means is that the authentique voice of woman may be black, white, deaf, 
blind, old, young, American, French, Islamic, Christian, middle-class or working-
class, but, each authentique voice will be particular and will never be the voice of 
'woman' per se. A key point is that the authentique voice will recognise its 
particularity, and with this, recognise that it is a voice, not the voice. One can 
endeavour to represent other's voices where it may be required (for a political gain, 
to bring to light injustice, to overcome prejudice) but one cannot speak as the 
authentic voice for others and should not attempt to represent them without means 
for seeking input and clarification (through dialogue). What is important about this 
account of difference is the recognition and acceptance of ambiguity - which 
involves the continued tension between 'self' and 'other' but without attempting to 
nihilate, nor reify, the differences that distinguishes us. 
293 Ibid, p6. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
AUTHENTICITY, AMBIGUITY AND THE THREAT OF THE OTHER 
... exclusion is an inevitable consequence of any attempt to establish a tradition. To 
have an identity at all, a tradition must be selective, partial. 
(Robert Bernasconi).294 
Identity requires differences in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness 
in order to secure its own self-certainty. 
(William Connolly).295 
... delimitation marks a boundary that includes and excludes, that decides, as it 
were, what will and will not be the stuff of the object to which we then refer. This 
marking off will have had some normative force, and indeed, some violence, for it 
can construct only through erasing; it can bound a thing only through enforcing a 
certain criterion, a principle of selectivity. 
(Judith Butler).296 
In previous chapters we have been examining how it is that de Beauvoir' s notion of 
an ambiguous freedom can provide a means for moving beyond dichotomous 
conclusions in situations where questions about sexed identity are being asked. This 
chapter functions as a further applied analysis, or 'case study', of the ways in which 
problematic understandings of authenticity can affect socio-political situations and 
impact in important ways upon understandings of identity and subjectivity. The 
historical analysis described herein illustrates the ways in which everyday, 'lived', 
experience is impacted upon by underlying ontological assumptions about the ways 
that identities develop, and how identities are lived-out in response to these 
294 Bernasconi, Robert, 'Almost Always More Than Philosophy Proper', in Research in 
Phenomenology; 2000; 30, pl. 
29s Connolly, William, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2002. 
296 Butler, Judith, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex", Routledge: New York, 
1993, p ii. 
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assumptions. This particular chapter describes the way that misconceptions of 
existence are reflected in a situation where individuals are arguing over who is, and 
who is not, an 'authentic' Aborigine. 
Through a brief historical analysis, I aim to illustrate how processes of exclusion and 
constitution, which are based on a denial of ambiguity, have affected 
understandings of what constitutes authentic Aboriginal identity within 
Tasmania.297 Ironically, the conflict over who is - and who is not - a 'real' Aborigine, 
takes place within a context where for over one hundred years Aboriginal 
Tasmanians were seen to be an 'extinct race'. Since the death in the late 1800s of the 
woman many believed to be the last 'full-blooded' Aborigine, the recognised 
descendants of the original Tasmanians have occupied a precarious position in 
legislation, science and the cultural imaginary. 
Against this historical backdrop, I argue that many current assumptions about what 
it means to be 'authentically' Aboriginal lean toward essentialism by privileging 
what are seen to be irreducible differences. Moreover, such assumptions reflect a 
problematic and outmoded scientific discourse, which (ironically) saw such a 
profound exclusion of Aboriginal people and culture throughout Tasmania's 
history. The problematic concept of authenticity that arises in this debate is limited 
by an underlying metaphysics that fails to recognize the dynamic and ambiguous 
nature of human existence. This problematic understanding of authenticity is linked 
to a "spirit of seriousness", and is opposed to the idea of authenticite that we have 
been examining in previous chapters. 
297 Tasmania is a small island State off the coast of Australia. I do not claim here to have done 
justice to an historical analysis of the development of contemporary Tasmania. Time 
permits only a very cursory glimpse at some key points in order to illustrate my claim that 
the concepts of ambiguity and authenticzte impact upon the lived-experience of everyday 
people. 
For contemporary analyses of the history of Aboriginal and settler relations in Tasmania see 
for example: Henry Reynolds, Fate of a Free People: A Radical Re-Examination of the Tasmanian 
Wars, Penguin Books Australia, 1995; Lyndal Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, St. Leonards, 
N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 1996. For an alternative reading and critique of the first two works 
see Keith Windschuttle, The Fabrication of Aboriginal History· Vol. 1, Van Diemen's Land, 1803-
1847, Macleay Press: Sydney, 2002. 
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I conclude that, by re-thinking the connections between authenticite and ambiguity 
(which entails the different levels of freedom discussed above), we can develop a 
framework that enables an articulation of shared experience and culture without 
resorting to essentialist discourse. Ambiguity, as articulated by de Beauvoir, allows 
shared (embodied) experiences to be expressed, without negating the differences 
between (and freedom of) subjects within a group. In this way, one difference is not 
privileged over another, and 'absolutes' are not insisted upon. By embracing 
ambiguity and freedom the authentique subject will not become the tyrant that 
oppresses but will insist upon a continued questioning of identities and their 
relationships to others and will allow for an open future in which belonging will not 
necessitate a denial of ambiguity. 
FRAUDULENT IDENTITIES? 
On the nineteenth of October 2002, the local paper carried a photo of a group of 
people gathered outside the Federal Court building in Hobart, Tasmania. Three of 
these people sat together on the steps, one with head in hands, while another strode 
angrily in front of them.298 
The president of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal had just passed a ruling that 
129 people were legally entitled to have their names included on what was known 
as the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) electoral roll.299 At 
the same time, these people had their Aboriginality 'confirmed' by the court. This 
judgment was made in response to a previous denial of the eligibility for those 
people to vote in the ATSIC elections. Their claims to Aboriginality had earlier been 
rejected by an Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee (IIAC), which was 
established specifically to adjudicate when objections to individual's eligibility to 
293 The Saturday Mercury, 19th October, 2002. 
299 The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) was a government funded 
organization established by the Hawke Labour Government in 1990. The role of ATSIC was 
to administer indigenous health, welfare and education services. ATSIC was to be 
administered by Aboriginal people elected to positions by other indigenous people. The 
electoral roll was an attempt to prevent what was perceived as 'vote rigging' by ensuring 
that only Aboriginal people could vote in the election. After a great deal of controversy and 
accusations of corruption, ATSIC was disbanded by the Liberal Government in 2005. 
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vote in the elections were made. The IIAC was comprised of both archivists and 
'recognised' members of the Tasmanian Aboriginal community and this committee 
had assessed archival evidence to reach their conclusion that numerous people who 
had registered to vote in the ATSIC elections could not prove their Aboriginality.300 
The purpose of the electoral roll was to determine who could legitimately vote in 
the upcoming Tasmanian ATSIC elections, and who could run for a position on the 
ATSIC. Over one hundred of those people who had been identified as 'non-
Aboriginal' by the committee and who were, therefore, deemed ineligible to vote, 
had taken the matter to the Federal Court, appealing against their removal from the 
roll and objecting to the selection criteria used in determining Aboriginality. In 
order to be considered Aboriginal, the challenged applicants were then required to 
produce official documents tracing their heritage back to traditional Aborigines at 
the time of European arrival. The rules governing the ATSIC electoral roll included 
the clause that "The submission must provide evidence that the applicant is an 
Aboriginal person or a Torres Strait Islander".301 
Those who were unable to provide evidence in the form of a record of ancestry, and 
who were thus denied Aboriginality by the IIAC, argued that oral history, as well as 
family photographs and letters should also be considered as 'evidence', along with a 
demonstration of their ongoing participation in the Aboriginal community in 
Tasmania. 
Significantly, the findings of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal report that those 
making representations to legitimise their inclusion on the ATSIC roll make 
repeated reference to what they saw to be traditional Aboriginal cultural ways to 
300 Marina Fusescu's Aboriginality in Tasmania, Issue Brief 2000, no. 3, September 2000, 
Tasmanian Parliamentary Library, provides a more comprehensive background to the 
dispute over identification in Tasmania. 
See also Gardiner-Garden, John, 'Defining Aboriginality in Australia, Current Issues Brief, no 
10 2002-03, Social Policy Group, 3 February 2003, for discussion of the ways in which 
legislation has changed regarding Aboriginal identification. 
301 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (Regional Council Election) 
Amendment Rules, 2002 (No.2). 
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prove their authenticity or legitimacy. There are numerous claims to ancestors with 
'dark' skin, to women who were "thick-set yet quick", to their participation in 
activities such as hunting, fishing and gathering, and to relatives having an "affinity 
with animals" in order to demonstrate their connection to 'authentic' Aboriginal 
life.302 Others provided photographs to the court as evidence of relatives who 
display the "physical characteristics of an Aboriginal person". One made reference 
to an ancestor who "had dark skin and talked like an Aborigine". It is evident that 
the bodies of ancestors (and particularly their skin colour) are seen to be important 
to those attempting to authenticate themselves because it is their "blackness" that is 
being questioned. 
Social philosopher Patrick Johnson argues that, in such situations, when one 
individual or group appropriates 'blackness' to the exclusion of others "individuals 
or groups appropriate this complex and nuanced racial signifier [blackness] in order 
to circumscribe its boundaries or to exclude other individuals or groups".303 In this case, 
those seeking 'authentication' were attempting to demonstrate what was perceived 
to be a legitimate physical link between themselves and a 'real', 'authentic' 
Aborigine. 
Johnson warns, however, that it is important to remain aware of what he calls the 
"arbitrariness of authenticity", and the "ways in which it carries with it the dangers 
of foreclosing the possibilities of cultural exchange and understanding" .304 In other 
words, if we do not remind ourselves of the ambiguity of that which we deem to 
signify a genuine way of being, then we run the risk of solidifying particular traits or 
characteristics and limiting the possibilities of an open future. It can be argued that 
the applicants in this case appealed to such traits in their attempts to prove their 
authenticity but that, by tying Aboriginality to an affinity with animals, to particular 
302 Findings of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 18 October, 2002, Hobart Tasmania 
(55,66,ll l,155,156,178,l92,195,196,248, 249, 321,340, 394). 
303 Johnson, Patrick, E., Appropriating Blackness: Performance and the Politics of Authenticity, 
Duke University Press: Durham, London, 2003, pp2-3 (my emphasis). 
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facial characteristics or ways of speaking, they deny the ambiguity of identity and 
its potential to change and adapt over time. 
After almost two weeks of hearings and deliberations, the Court found in the favour 
of most of the applicants, agreeing that oral history and family documentation could 
be used as evidence, and, using the 'three part definition' of Aboriginality as its 
guide, the Court found "that they and each of them are persons of the Aboriginal 
race of Australia".3os 
Members of the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre (TAC)306 were incensed by the court 
ruling, and claimed that only Aboriginal people could and should decide who is a 
member of their community. One member for the TAC argued that the stories of 
the applicants were false, and called on the Government to "come up with a fool-
proof solution that will not enable impostors and frauds to pass through the net" .307 
Others, especially those who had their claims to Aboriginality upheld, saw it as 
proof that the TAC had for too long dictated the criteria for identity and, in doing 
so, had excluded many whose claims are valid. Understandably, feelings on both 
sides were strong and the debate raised questions for many in the Tasmanian 
community about what it meant to be Aboriginal and how decisions could be made 
by governments about the validity of claims. Many felt that their hard-fought battles 
for recognition and for indigenous-specific services were being taken-over by 'new 
people' who did not share their history. The following quote represents this view 
well: 
30s The three part definition states that to be considered an Aboriginal person the individual 
must, firstly, show Aboriginal descent; secondly, self identify as an Aborigine, and thirdly, 
be recognised as an Aborigine by the Aboriginal Community. For full details see: Findings of 
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 18 October, 2002, Hobart Tasmania, p9. 
306 The TAC is a funded non-government organisation providing information, legal, health, 
counselling and recreation services to the Aboriginal community in Tasmania. It has also 
worked to repatriate cultural artifacts and human remains, which have been held in 
museums and international collections. The TAC has been accused of being exclusionary by 
other groups claiming Aboriginality in Tasmania who have been denied access to services. 
307 The Hobart Mercury, 191h October, 2002, p 7, (emphasis added). 
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... the difference is, we've been Aboriginal all our lives, we've been there, 
done the hard yards, suffered the government policies, finally started to get 
somewhere and the new people start to identify and they are corning in and 
getting [the benefits] anyway.308 
In response to an article written by Tasmanian author and political commentator, 
Richard Flanagan on this fraught topic,309 Michael Mansell, a well-known member 
and advocate of the TAC argued that "the ATSIC process is an exercise by the 
federal government to find the legal mechanism to rid Aborigines of white imposters 
[sic] seeking an advantage". However, he asserted that, "apart from some several 
thousand of Flanagan's white colleagues trying to falsely claim to be Aboriginal for 
the purpose of rorting the system, the question of who is Aboriginal is not in 
dispute" .310 
According to Mansell, he and the TAC are quite clear on the fact that "there are 6000 
Aborigines in Tasmania, made up of people of the Aboriginal families whose 
ancestors were Aboriginal before the British invasion and who, in the two hundred 
years since, have known no other identity".311 On this view, Aboriginal identity is 
linked to a time prior to 'invasion' and has been maintained in opposition to any 
other identity since that time. 
A major issue for Mansell, and for many others, is that the numbers of people 
identifying officially as Aboriginal in Tasmania has increased substantially over the 
past twenty years (from around 2,500 in the 1981 Census, to nearly 16,000 in 2001). 
The concern is that loosening the 'boundaries' will mean that anyone can identify 
and, therefore, claim to represent the needs of the Aboriginal community. The 
question then becomes, how does one prove one's Aboriginality (and should one 
308 Dickson, Leonie, The Saturday Mercury, Tasmania, 4September1999, (emphasis added). 
309 Flanagan, Richard, 'The Lost Tribe', The Guardian, Monday October 14 2002 
310 Mansell, Michael, "Tasmania - Australia's Answer to America's Deep South", 21st October 
2002, published on The Koori History Website http://www.kooriweb.org/foley/indexb.html, 
last accessed 9 June 2008, (emphasis added). 
311 Ibid, (emphasis added). 
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have to), and what constitutes proof or evidence of belonging? Another irony is 
evident in that those attempting to prove their Aboriginality were asked to make 
use of archival records kept by the colonial authorities to prove a legitimate link to 
'pre-colonial' ancestors. Due to the fact that many were unable to unearth such 
archival "evidence", oral history and photographs became central to the appeals of 
claimants. 
Although Mansell takes umbrage with much of Flanagan' s assessment of the 
situation, he would appear to agree with Flanagan' s claim that there is a problem 
inherent in using oral history alone as 'proof' of Indigeneity. On this topic, Flanagan 
writes: 
The problem with oral history is that it is also a wonderful quarry for the 
creative and the fraudulent. Alongside those families who, despite the lack of 
documentary evidence, all acknowledge to be Aboriginal, there has 
flourished in the past 10 years many families whose claims to Aboriginality 
are fiercely contested. Their tales of descent from lost tribes seem, to the 
sceptical, highly dubious, bordering on the fabulous, and have no basis in 
the historical record.312 
How then, can one determine what it means to be a 'real' Tasmanian Aborigine in 
the absence of 'hard' historical evidence? What are the necessary requisites so-to-
speak? Moreover, if those claiming Aboriginality cannot agree on this, how should 
the government respond? How does one decide what constitutes an 'authentic' claim 
to Aboriginality? As we have seen, authenticity is a fraught concept, and its use has 
been problematic in philosophy and social discourse. 
As Cressida Heyes has noted, the concept of authenticity is not easily aligned with 
the theories of any one group. Interestingly, both liberal and difference theorists 
have used it for their own aims: 
312 Flanagan, Richard, 'The lost tribe', The Guardian, Monday October 14 2002, (emphasis 
added). 
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While doctrines of equality press the notion that each human being is 
capable of deploying his or her practical reason or moral sense to live an 
authentic life qua individual, the politics of difference has appropriated the 
language of authenticity to describe ways of living that are true to the 
identities of marginalized social groups.313 
It is the latter use of the term that is being employed in the current debate over 
identity in Tasmania, with Aboriginality being determined via its difference from 
the 'white' community and also, in some cases, via its difference from the 
'impostors' who seek to undermine the coherence of this identity. 
As Regina Bendix argues, what is challenging about the concept of authenticity is 
the implication of "the existence of its opposite, the fake," and, she argues, that it is 
this "dichotomous construct that is at the heart of what makes authenticity 
problematic".314 I will come back to this claim later and argue that, although the 
concept of authenticity as commonly used is problematic, a re-thought authenticite in 
fact assists to overcome dichotomous constructions. 
AUTHENTICITY: 'GENUINE, 'REAL AND 'TRUE' 
In a recent publication examining the relationship between political theory and 
Indigenous rights, political theorist Sonia Smallacombe analyses the contemporary 
interest in Indigenous culture and looks at conceptions within socio-political 
discourse of the 'authentic' Aborigine. Her analysis reveals the ways in which much 
contemporary understanding of authentic Indigenous identity reflects assumptions 
about a closeness to the pre-colonial, and ignores the possibility of changing 
traditions and developing identities.315 Heyes also notes this tendency to 
313 Heyes, Cressida, "Identity Politics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2007 
edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed). 
314 Bendix, Regina, In Search of Authenticity: The Formation of Folklore Studies, University of 
Wisconsin Press: Madison, 1997, p 9. 
315 Smallacombe, Sonia, 'On Display for its Aesthetic Beauty: How Western Institutions 
Fabricate Knowledge about Aboriginal Cultural Heritage', in Political Theory and the Rights of 
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'authenticise' that which is associated with the traditional or pre-colonial, and she 
writes that "[f]or many proponents of identity politics this demand for authenticity 
includes appeals to a time before oppression, or a culture or way of life damaged by 
colonialism, imperialism, or even genocide".316 To illustrate this claim, Heyes 
provides a quote from a proponent of a return to traditional indigenous values. 
Here we see· the idealisation and romanticisation of the indigenous, contrasted with 
what is seen as an inherently flawed contemporary (non-indigenous) system: 
Indigenous governance systems embody distinctive political values, 
radically different from those of the mainstream. Western notions of 
domination (human and natural) are noticeably absent; in their place we find 
harmony, autonomy, and respect. We have a responsibility to recover, 
understand, and preserve these values, not only because they represent a 
unique contribution to the history of ideas, but because renewal of respect 
for traditional values is the only lasting solution to the political, economic, 
and social problems that beset our people.317 
Claims such as this seem to either explicitly or implicitly, depend on an 
understanding of identity and authenticity that is static and that exists in separation 
from an 'other' identity against which it is defined. The traditional, indigenous way 
of life is represented as being inherently good, as being 'naturally' peaceful and 
harmonious, and the colonisation process is marked as that which has infected and 
tainted this way of life. 
In order to examine how the tendency to focus on an 'authentic' pre-colonial way of 
being has developed, Smallacombe examines the social imaginary of the nineteenth 
century, arguing that Australia was founded on the beliefs of terra nullius, ideas of 
'the doomed race' and those that underlay Social Darwinism. These notions, along 
Indigenous Peoples, Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton, Will Sanders (eds), Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, pp 152 -162. 
3l6 Heyes, Cressida, "Identity Politics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2007 
edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed). 
317 Taiaiake, Alfred, quoted in Heyes, Cressida, "Identity Politics". 
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with the imagery surrounding the ideas of the 'noble savage' and natural selection, 
saw the exclusion of Aboriginal people and their culture from the emerging Nation. 
In this system of exclusion, indigenous Australians were constructed as 'the Other' 
and what Smallacombe terms the nation's 'collective amnesia' functioned to justify a 
European-based culture and identity for the British Colony.318 
During the period of colonisation, a fascination for the Other and the rise in science 
as the dominant discourse resulted in an interest in the anatomy of Indigenous 
Australians. While Indigenous bodies, both living and dead, were shipped around 
the globe to be observed, probed and experimented upon, or used as exhibitions in 
side-shows and museums, back in their own countries, they were excluded from 
participating in the development of the new Nation, and policies of annihilation and 
assimilation were put into place. 
Smallacombe argues that, since the 1970s, however, there has been an increase in the 
appropriation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people's culture in the 
construction of Australia's national identity. She questions whether or not this 
growing interest is evidence of a genuine desire to remedy the social and economic 
position of Aboriginal people, or if it is evidence of a cultural appropriation that 
ignores the plight of thousands of Indigenous Australians whose identity falls 
outside that defined as 'authentic' within the current socio-political context. 
Smallacombe suggests that it has been more of the latter and uses the following 
quote from an Australia Day speech given by (now retired) Governor-General Bill 
Hayden to illustrate this point: 
Aboriginal creativity has taken its place as a major influence in our national 
consciousness. We're receptive to what Aboriginal artists, dancers, writers 
and performers have to say. In a very real sense they are helping to reshape 
our own concept of self and of country - of the way we see and feel things as 
Australian - and as others see us.319 
318 Smallacombe, 'On Display for its Aesthetic Beauty', p154. 
319 Bill Hayden, Australia Day Speech, January 1996, quoted in Smallacombe, p 155. 
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As can be seen in the above quote, in many 'affirmations' of Aboriginal culture and 
heritage, there is a celebration of 'traditional' aspects of Aboriginality, and either a 
forgetting or an outright denial of the validity of the experience of other Aboriginal 
people. The social problems that impact so significantly on many indigenous 
Australians are seen to be a result of a clash between 'white' and 'Aboriginal' ways 
of being. At the same time as we are celebrating the art, music, food, dress and 
spirituality of the 'First Australians', there is an ignorance of the experience of 
dispossession, ill-health and exclusion that characterises large sections of Aboriginal 
Australia. Moreover, this celebration entails a denial of the 'authenticity' of those 
urban Aboriginal people of mixed descent who fail to meet the ideal of the 'real' 
Aborigine. The 'authentic' Aborigine in this imaginary is the one who is close to 
nature and who represents the lost past of pre-colonial Australia.320 
Smallacombe argues that such comments as those cited above reflect a "hunger for 
the 'exotic', 'primitive' and 'the unknown', which is part of the fascination for 'the 
Other" .321 Australia was defined through the exclusion of Others and today, this 
selective inclusion of Indigenous culture into Australia's national identity results in 
another exclusion. The 'authentic', 'real' Aborigine is upheld as an example of the 
spiritual and cultural roots from which Australia as a Nation has sprung, and the 
'inauthentic' Aborigine is moved to the margins. This binary distinction between 
'real' and 'inauthentic' Aboriginal people and Aboriginal experience denies the 
possibility that there could be other experiences, or in fact very different and unique 
but, nonetheless, authentique experiences of Aboriginal identity within Australia. As 
Manuhuia Barcham comments, attempts to assert the rights of indigenous people 
have resulted in a situation in which: 
... theorists and practitioners alike have created a reified and ahistorical 
idealisation of the indigenous self whereby the constitution of oneself as an 
320 Sneja Gunew also points out that in the context of multiculturalism in Australia, that "the 
usual way diversity is celebrated is through a multicultural food festival" as if to suggest 
that food or diverse cuisine is the only valuable contribution from migrants (Feminism and the 
Politics of Difference, p16). 
321 Smallacombe, Sonia, 'On Display for its Aesthetic Beauty', p156. 
180 
'authentic' indigenous self has been conflated with specific ahistorical 
assumptions concerning the nature of Indigeneity, a process intricately 
linked to the continued subordination of difference to identity.322 
Important in this argument is the recognition that the selective incorporation of 
'traditional' Aboriginal customs and culture into the cultural imaginary of the 
"Nation", and into legislation, functions to marginalise or deny the experience of 
many other Aboriginal people. It also reveals a perspective that refuses to 
acknowledge the changing nature of identity and implies that Aboriginal people can 
only have cultural authenticity if they remain closely aligned with the pre-colonial. 
As Smallacombe points out, this has serious implications for legal claims, as well as 
limiting views within identity politics. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Daiva Stasiulis also makes this point in her 
discussion of the representation of indigenous people in literature, where she argues 
that " ... the prehistoric Aborigine is valorised, so that contemporary First Nations 
people are [seen as] either. .. vague glimpses or ... deviants, drunks and 
prostitutes" .323 Stasiulis sees the appropriation of prehistoric cultural attributes as an 
attempt to overcome the 'white' sense of alienation and otherness through 
"indigenisation". 
The above examples demonstrate that these issues are by no means limited to 
debates over Indigeneity in any particular country. In an analysis of recent struggles 
within New Zealand over post-treaty assets and organisational representation due 
to the Government legitimisation of Iwi over non-Iwi, or urban Maori, Barcham 
argues that "the tensions leading to the emergence of these struggles can be traced 
322 Barcham, Manuhuia, '(De)Constructing the Politics of Indigeneity', in Political Theory and 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton, Will Sanders (eds), Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2000, pp137-138. 
323 Stasiulis, Daiva, 'Authentic Voice: Anti-Racist politics in Canadian feminist publishing 
and literary production', p44. 
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to fundamental disagreements over issues of identity and authenticity, including the 
question of who and what constitutes an 'authentic' indigenous subject".324 
As we have seen above, similar ideas about what constitutes authentic Aboriginality 
are also evident in Tasmania today, and are taken up by members of both 
indigenous and non-indigenous communities. As Barcham argues (supporting my 
claim that a re-thought notion of authenticite based on ambiguity can provide a 
means to re-think the problematic metaphysical assumptions that underlie such 
debates) "the importance of the interplay [between] ... multiple and shifting 
identities has been ignored in the recognition of atemporal difference through the 
reification of Indigeneity to an ideal of immutability" .325 So, rather than looking at how 
we have become what we are via our relations with others, there is a privileging of 
identity as if that way of being is ahistorical and atemporal and, therefore, cannot 
change if it is to maintain authenticity. 
A QUESTION OF HISTORY? 
In late 2002, not long after the Federal Court ruling on the Indigenous Electoral Role 
was handed down, historian Keith Windschuttle published a text which polarised 
the community and brought into question the historical validity of much of 
Tasmania's 'black' history. In his work, Windschuttle criticises heavily what he 
terms 'black armband history' and accuses several prominent historians of skewing 
their historical accounts in order to paint a particular picture of 'black and white' 
relations in Tasmania.326 
While time does not permit a thorough critique of Windschuttle's claims or the 
counter-claims of those he criticises here, I make note of the epilogue to his book, 
which deals specifically with the issue of authenticity as it relates to Tasmanian 
Aboriginal people and their place in the history of the island. Windschuttle' s is the 
324 Barcham, Manuhuia, '(De)Constructing the Politics of Indigeneity', p137. 
325 Ibid, p146 (emphasis added). 
326 Windschuttle, Keith, The Fabrication of Aboriginal History: Vol. 1, Van Diemen's Land, 1803-
1847, Macleay Press: Sydney 2002. 
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epitome of approaches to the question of identity which are underlain by the 
metaphysics of seriousness described above. The kind of historical analysis 
undertaken in his work reveals a focus on historical 'truth' and 'fact' and he is 
unable to acknowledge the possibility of subjective interpretation being included in 
the reports provided by historical figures. For Windschuttle, 'Science', 
(documented) 'History' and 'Anthropology' are factual and objective discourses that 
should be utilised to determine 'fact' from 'fiction' in this debate. 
Windschuttle takes up the question of how one can determine who can 
authentically claim to be a Tasmanian Aborigine and aims to show how historical 
'fact' can provide an answer to this question. In criticism of claims by members of 
the Aboriginal community that indigenous remains and 'artefacts' should be 
returned to the Aboriginal community from museums and universities, 
Windschuttle poses the question: 
When [the representative] talks about 'our people', 'our past' and 'our 
culture', who are the people she is referring to? Apart from her own 
assertions, which are not infallible, how is anyone to ascertain who the 
modern members of this people and this culture really are? How can anyone 
tell that the platform from which [she] and her colleagues speak is 
legitimate? 
Although this is a pertinent question, and one which lies at the heart of the problem 
we are examining here, Windschuttle does not provide a satisfying answer. His 
claim is that, "with the death of the last full-blooded Aborigine [in 1876] ... the 
indigenous population had been exterminated, although mixed-blood descendants 
today still identify themselves as Tasmanian Aborigines".327 Windschuttle argues 
that Aboriginal culture and identity "was an invention in the 1970s by modern 
urban political activists" rather than something that had "survived down the 
generations through the island community".328 He suggests that it became 'popular' 
327 Windschuttle, Keith, The Fabrication of Aboriginal History, p13. 
328 Ibid, pp 424-433. 
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in the 1970s to 'discover' Aboriginal ancestry and claims that, at this time, 
government legislation also provided "financial relevance" for people to claim 
Aboriginality. 
Despite the fact that he acknowledge that changing social perceptions meant that 
people felt more able to identify as Aboriginal without fear of persecution in the 
1970s, he maintains that, "It is equally clear that a great incentive is access to the 
more generous welfare payments available to Aborigines than to whites".329 Note 
here, that on his account, there is a split in which there are "Aborigines" (or those 
who claim to be) and "whites". His account does not lend itself to nuance or 
complexity. To him, the contemporary 'urban' culture is not an authentic one, but 
an invention or a fabrication in order to claim welfare payments and land rights. 
Reflecting a scientific approach to identity based on the idea of blood quantum, he 
makes the claim that "DNA testing could possibly confirm the authenticity of some 
who claim to be descendants [of traditional aborigines]" and goes on to say that, 
whilst he acknowledges that there may be other lineages than those recognised by 
the TAC, that: 
Today, most of the fifth-generation descendants of these alternative lineages 
would have no greater Aboriginal connection than to one of their 32 great, 
great, great grandparents, but [he says] this is true of a number of their 
factional rivals as well. Of course, anyone with such a slender link who 
seriously claims to be Aboriginal can only be regarded with cynicism by 
outsiders. But as long as government largesse is available, the charade is 
sure to continue.330 
As evidenced by such remarks as those above, public perception often sees claims to 
Aboriginality as linked to a welfare mentality; however, I would assert that this is 
not simply a debate over who has the right to access services and funds dedicated to 
the needs of Aboriginal people. It is also a question about who has the right to speak 
329 Ibid, pp 433-434. 
330 Ibid, p 435. 
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for and as a Tasmanian Aboriginal, and who can speak on behalf of the Aboriginal 
community. It would seem that the identities of some Aboriginal people in 
Tasmania are threatened by 'others' whose claims cannot be 'authenticated'. At the 
same time, those who are unable to prove their relationship to a Tasmanian 
Aboriginal person living in the 1800s through archival records struggle to justify 
their claims and are accused of maintaining.fraudulent identities. 
This is not a clear-cut question of finance, but a question of belonging. As feminist 
philosopher Judith Butler has argued, it is through the exclusion of some aspects 
that a thing is defined - it is via its relationship and distinction to another thing or 
subject that an identity is formed and it is this which makes the idea of belonging 
possible: 
... delimitation marks a boundary that includes and excludes, that decides, as 
it were, what will and will not be the stuff of the object to which we then 
refer. This marking off will have had some normative force, and indeed, 
some violence, for it can construct only through erasing; it can bound a thing 
only through enforcing a certain criterion, a principle of selectivity.331 
The next section of this chapter provides an outline of the way in which 
Enlightenment discourse, which privileged Reason and Civilisation over the 
'natural' during the development of Tasmania, enhanced,processes of exclusion and 
constitution in colonial encounters, thus contributing to the dichotomous and 
essentialist perspective that underlies much of the debate over Aboriginal identity 
in Tasmania today. 
LOOKING BACK - A TASMANIAN STORY: FORMING AND ISLAND IDENTITY 
In September 1803, a ship loaded with both convicts and sailors arrived at what was 
to become known as Risdon Cove. The site was intended to flourish into a new 
settlement, and its establishment took place against a political backdrop that was 
unfolding thousands of miles away. Overcrowding in Britain, of both the cities and 
331 Butler, Judith, Bodies That Matter. On the Discursive Limits of "Sex", Routledge: New York, 
1993, p ii. 
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the floating cells used to house those found guilty of crimes, had resulted in a 
political decision being made to remove large numbers of 'criminals' from England 
altogether - to reduce pressure on resources in England, but also to lay claim to the 
Great South Land.332 Van Diemen's Land, as the island of Tasmania had previously 
been named, showed signs of providing access to profitable whaling grounds and to 
tall eucalypts that would make good timber for ship-building. The new arrivals on 
the island were, thus, negotiating their identities in this new and strange 
environment, surrounded by and embedded in the cultural imagery that they 
brought with them from Britain, but separated by a geographical distance of 
thousands of miles. 
In her work on missionary writing and Empire, historian and post-colonial theorist 
Anna Johnson argues that Britain was undergoing a crucial period of social reform 
in the early 1800s and that, at this time, "many of the cultural narratives central to 
British self-imagining were (re)invented."333 Johnson argues that there was also a 
great renewal of religiosity in Britain during this era, and that it characterised a 
period of exploration and colonisation, which entailed encounters with various 
cultures and peoples; encounters which were seen to provide access to 'knowledge' 
about these others and, crucially, to add to knowledge about Britain at the same 
time. Through its encounters with Others, the Empire was able to recreate images 
of itself as the arbiter of morality and goodness; as a leader in cultural, intellectual 
and technological development; and as the beneficent patriarch bestowing 
Christianity and civilisation on the rest of the world. The definition of the Empire 
was, therefore, re-created and re-established at the same time as the creation of the 
colonised. Johnson comments that ideas about race, class and gender were all 
under negotiation at this time and Britain believed itself to possess the moral 
332 As convict records show, the majority of the crimes that saw people sentenced to 
deportment to the penal colonies included theft, robbery and burglary. Some were sentenced 
for transportation for seven years for thefts of such things as coats, handkerchiefs, pigs, 
sheep and chickens. See for example, The National Archives of Ireland Convict Database, 
which holds records of the crimes and sentences of convicts sent to Australia. URL 
http://www.nationalarchives.ie/search/index.php (last accessed 14 June 2008). 
333 Johnson, Anna, Missionary Writing and Empire, 1800-1860, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, p4. 
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imperative to bring the colonised into "civilised society".334 These ideas of cultural 
imperialism and perceived superiority are examples of what could be termed a 
'colonial seriousness' and the detrimental effects of the failure to recognise the 
fundamental freedom of those being 'civilised' are still blindingly evident today. 
SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS, THE DOOMED RACE AND IDENTITY 
By the 1820s the Aboriginal population in Van Diemen' s Land had diminished 
substantially and the relationship between the original occupants and the 
newcomers had been fraught with conflict. From 1829 to 1834 George Augustus 
Robinson was employed by then Governor, Colonel George Arthur, to gather 
together all remaining Aborigines on the mainland of Van Diemen' s Land and move 
them to a reserve on Flinders Island, a small Bass Strait island in the Fumeaux 
Group off the North East Coast. This reserve was named Wybalenna (meaning black 
men's houses), and the history of this place is characterised by disease and death for 
the Aboriginal people who lived there. Many children were removed from their 
families to live with white people, in an attempt to teach them the 'benefits' of 
civilisation. However, new food and new diseases, along with such sudden changes 
to their way of life had a disastrous effect on the small population and many became 
extremely ill and died.335 
As discussed in previous chapters, Genevieve Lloyd has been interested in an 
examination of the operation and processes of exclusion and constitution in 
philosophical thought and socio-political discourse. Lloyd undertakes this 
examination through her discussion of the Stolen Generations, and an analysis of 
the imagery involved in the policy of assimilation. She considers the way in which 
our 'collective imaginings' have functioned to support the ideas that allowed 
Europeans to claim 'settlement', rather than ownership-through-invasion, of 
334 Ibid. 
335 For accounts of the conditions on Wybalenna see for example Lyndall Ryan, The 
Aboriginal Tasmanians, St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996; Cassandra Pybus, 
Mannalargenna's Daughters, Outback Heat, Vol. 15, 2000; and Henry Reynolds, Fate of a Free 
People: A Radical Re-Examination of the Tasmanian Wars, Penguin Books Australia, 1995. 
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Australia, and argues that the Enlightenment ideals of 'reason' and of property and 
ownership functioned to: 
... rationalise European presence as embodying the most fully human way of 
relating to land. Colonisation [then] is imagined as the historically inevitable 
unfolding of nature in the spread of enlightenment, and the participation of 
indigenous peoples in its fruits.336 
According to Lloyd these visions of the human race, "emancipated from its 
shackles, released from the empire of fate and from that of the enemies of its 
progress, advancing with a firm and sure step along the path of truth, virtue and 
happiness", are reflective of a dichotomised understanding of existence. Such an 
understanding sees 'Nature' on the negative side and 'Reason' on the other as 
positive and given prior to cultural or social understandings. Transcendental 
reason, truth, objectivity and virtue become the dominant concepts against which all 
'Others' are defined. The 'natives' then, with their traditional beliefs, religions and 
cultures are seen as opposed to all that is 'good' and 'pure' in civilisation. Their 
difference from those who are 'colonising' marks them as 'Other', but the colonisers 
fail to see their own otherness in this relationship and view themselves as the 'One'. 
Lloyd argues that what lay beneath the policies and actions of white Australians in 
the colonisation process did not necessarily represent a malign and brutal intent but, 
rather, the failure to recognise difference. 337 Policies of assimilation, the removal of 
indigenous children from their families, and the forced destruction of indigenous 
cultures, were seen as benefits of a civilised and more developed people sharing 
their knowledge with the native inhabitants. I would argue that what we see here is 
a failure to recognise ambiguity. Once again we see an example of the colonial 
seriousness, which ultimately denies the freedom of both colonised and coloniser in 
a construction of identity based upon assumptions about existence and values that 
negate ambiguity. 
336 Lloyd, Genevieve, 'No-One's Land: Australia and the Philosophical Imagination', Hypatia, 
Vol. 15, 2000, p34 
337 Ibid, p36. 
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As Kwame Anthony Appiah argues, during the formation of identity the 'other' is 
created in part (although not consciously) to assist in the clarification and 
solidification of one's own identity or group identity. He writes in an historical 
illustration of this point that: 
the Malay came to know one another as such only after and in opposition to, 
the arrival of the Chinese; the Hindu became Hindu only when the British 
created the class in the early 19th Century, to take in those who weren't 
members of the famous monotheisms, and the identity gained salience only 
in opposition to South Asian Muslims.338 
As we have seen previously, de Beauvoir analyses this human tendency towards 
self-construction through the exclusion and opposition to the 'not me' in The Second 
Sex. There she writes, "Otherness is a fundamental category of human thought" and 
she describes the process of 'Othering' as follows: 
Thus it is that no group ever sets itself up as the One without at once setting 
up the Other over against itself ... Jews are 'different' for the anti-Semite, 
Negroes are 'inferior' for American racists, aborigines are 'natives' for 
colonists, proletarians are the 'lower class' for the privileged (TSS, p17) 
Without a broader social setting in which to identify differences from 'Others', that 
which defines the 'One' would not have the same significance. The relation between 
the Other and the Self is a reciprocal one, and each plays off the difference of the 
other in order to maintain the distinction that defines them.339 Self-identity depends 
upon one's worldly situation and the way in which the self-other relation is played 
out. Identity is not something that stands alone or exists in isolation. Even if one 
wants to change and adopt a particular identity, this is done in negotiation with the 
'external' world. 
338 Appiah, Kwame Anthony, The Ethics of Identity, Princeton University Press, 2005, p64. 
339 Although it should be noted that de Beauvoir argues that in the situation of women, this 
has not historically been the case and women have assumed the status of the 'Other' without 
recognising the reciprocity of this relationship. 
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The distinction between civilisation and savagery, wilderness and containment, 
nature and reason, all impacted upon the Tasmanian imaginary in the nineteenth 
century, and with this, upon colonial legislation and the construction of identity. In 
creating images of the Aboriginal Tasmanians as uncivilised and childlike, and as 
inevitably doomed to extinction, colonial society at the same time contained its own 
image of itself as reasoned, rational, beneficent, moral and ordered - attempting to 
keep itself safe against the threat of disorder (and ambiguity). 
The 'benevolence' of the colonisers was based on the founding assumption that 
scientific knowledge, 'culture' and education lead to the inevitable progress of 
humanity. What they failed to recognise was that this ostensibly universal account 
of humanity was defined by notions of Reason and Civilisation that were dependent 
upon the exclusion of the 'other' for their coherence. The following quotation 
describes the way in which popular conceptions of Aboriginal identity were affected 
by the scientific theories of the time: 
... a new idea took hold in the late 19th century, backed with the ballast of 
the most advanced scientific thought. Nothing seemed to offer more striking 
proof to the late Victorian mind of the infernal truth of social Darwinism 
than the supposed demise of the Tasmanian Aborigines. They were an 
inferior race, a meek and primitive people doomed to die out, and the 
coming of the English, with their diseases and guns, had merely hastened 
the inevitable.340 
In demonstration of this belief, in 1843, the wife of the Governor of Tasmania, Lady 
Jane Franklin, wrote to her sister in England, describing a young Aboriginal girl the 
Franklins had adopted. Along with a portrait of the girl, known as Mathinna, she 
included some of the girl's hair in the package sent to England: 
... I send you now some of her woolly hair - in this particular the inhabitants 
of this island differ to those of Australia who have curly hair. Mathinna's 
portrait is extremely alike .. .! think you will find people much interested in 
34° Flanagan, Richard, 'The Lost Tribe', The Guardian, Monday October 14, 2002. 
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this portrait and the hair - she is one of the remnant of a people about to disappear 
from the face of the earth.341 
The idea that the Tasmanian Aborigines were destined to die-out was a dominant 
one in the nineteenth century, and this assisted in the justification that these people 
should be scientifically examined because of their uniqueness.342 
THE LAST TASMANIAN 
The idea that the Tasmanian Aborigines were doomed to extinction was prevalent 
throughout much of the colonising period and, in 1876, this belief was confirmed for 
many when Trugannini, the woman believed to be the last 'full-blooded' Tasmanian 
Aborigine, died in Hobart. Trugannini's death took place at a time when Science 
was seen as benefiting the progress of humanity and, in the name of Science, 
attempts were made to secure her skeleton for the Royal Society of England. Rather 
than being seen as remains to be treated with respect, Trugannini' s skeleton was 
regarded as a 'specimen' that should be preserved for the benefit of scientific 
research and, ultimately, for the benefit of human kind. In a plea to convince others 
that Trugannini' s remains should be held by the Royal Society one man wrote: 
... this specimen must beyond all others be ever regarded as truly genuine, and 
as the last of a race must always be unique .. .It must therefore be difficult to 
conceive that any portion of an enlightened and rational community could 
object to having a skeleton carefully preserved in the National Collection ... 343 
The enlightened and rational, according to this kind of argument, are those who 
saw Trugannini' s skeleton as a specimen of interest to science and the progress of 
341 Tasmanian Archives: NS 279/2/4, Letter from Lady Jane Franklin to her sister, 14 February 
1843, my emphasis. 
342 For further discussion of this point see for example Lyndall Ryan's, The Aboriginal 
Tasmanians, St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996. 
343 For extensive discussion of the relationship between science and Aboriginal Tasmanian 
remains see John J. Cove, What the Bones Say: Tasmanian Aborigines, Science, and Domination, 
McGill-Queen's Press, 1995. 
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humanity. Those who believed this must have been great in number, or in power 
and influence, because Trugannini' s skeleton was kept as a museum artefact for 
nearly one hundred years. 
Even in the 1970s, when contemporary Tasmanian Aborigines were asserting their 
claims to Aboriginality in a very public manner, the idea that science proved that 
the Tasmanian Aborigines were extinct was still evident. This belief can be seen in 
the following attempt by one man to justify the role his family had played in the 
research conducted on the remains of Aboriginal people: 
With the realisation that the race was about to become extinct there was in the 
1860s a growing scientific interest in London to acquire an entire skeleton of 
a Tasmanian Aborigine for the collections of the Royal College of Surgeons ... 
I believe that, if the three members of my family ... were so involved in such 
an activity, it was purely in the interests of science and humanity in general ... and 
that they acted entirely through love of science and in the hope that both science 
and humanity might be assisted by the study of such a skeleton deposited at the 
centre of the scientific world. 344 
Here again is the assumption that, through Science, humanity progresses in its 
understanding of what it means to be fully human and the 'other' becomes the 
specimen against which humanity is defined. As William Connolly writes, in this 
way, " ... doubts about self identity are posed and resolved by the constitution of an 
other against which that identity may define itself".345 
Whilst there is, at least in a banal way, a certain truth in the claim that science has 
something to offer our understanding of humanity, Connolly is rightly critical (as 
was de Beauvoir) of the way in which the desire to maintain particular values or 
social norms, which are seen as being "God-given", results in a definition of that 
344 Crowther, William (Sir), March 1976, quoted in, Ellis, V, Trucannini: Queen or Traitor?, 
DBM Publishing Company: Hobart, 1976, emphasis added. 
345 Connolly, William, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2002. p ix-x. 
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which opposes these values and norms as 'evil'. This results in attempts being made 
"to protect the purity and certainty of a hegemonic identity by defining as 
independent sites of evil. .. those differences that pose the greatest threat to the 
integrity and certainty of that identity" .346 The problem in the reification of the 
differences that characterise identities is that the ambiguity of these identities is 
ignored or denied in favour of 'certainty'. As Connolly argues: 
An identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have 
become socially recognized. These differences are essential to its being. If 
they did not coexist as differences, it would not exist in its distinctness and 
solidity. Entrenched in this indispensable relation is a second set of 
tendencies, themselves in need of exploration, to conceal established 
identities into fixed forms, thought and lived as if their structure expressed 
the true order of things. When these pressures prevail, the maintenance of 
one identity (or field of identities) involves the conversion of some 
differences into otherness, into evil, or one of its numerous surrogates. 
Identity requires differences in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness 
in order to secure its own self-certainty.347 
AMBIGUITY 
In historical encounters with the colonisers, the 'first' Tasmanians were defined as 
Other with the notion of terra nullius and their 'failure' to occupy the land.348 They 
were constituted as Other when imperial subjects tried to bring 'culture' to the 
346 Ibid. 
347 Connolly, William, Identity/Difference, p 64, my emphasis. 
348 The term terra nullius is Latin for 'land of no one', or 'empty land' (land that does not 
belong to anyone). The concept was used in International Law to enable one nation to 'settle' 
a country without the need for a treaty or for payment. The philosophical idea underpinning 
the concept of terra nullius was based on the Lockean concept of property ownership and 
those deemed to inhabit a land without property laws were not therefore seen to 'own' it -
making the land and its resources 'no one's' and thus open to claim of discovery. For 
discussion of the concept of terra nullius see for example Damien Short' s "Reconciliation, 
Assimilation, and the Indigenous Peoples of Australia", International Political Science Review I 
Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Oct, 2003), pp 491-513. 
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colony, and they were constituted as Other when seen as the doomed race against 
which British culture defined itself as superior. 
When Trugannini died, and the myth of the Last Tasmanian was born, the 
descendants of the 'Original Inhabitants' came to occupy a precarious position in 
the Tasmanian Imaginary; they existed somewhere between 'black' and 'white'. Up 
until (and even after) the public and political campaign of the 1970s, when the 
families of Aboriginal women taken to the Bass Strait islands began their very 
public fight for recognition, it was common for the Aboriginal people of Tasmania 
to be referred to as an 'extinct race'.349 Those who were recognised as descendants 
of the Tasmanian Aborigines were considered to be 'half-castes'.350 Their ambiguous 
position was also evident in state legislation. Although for the previous seventy 
years people of 'mixed descent' living on Cape Barren Island had been officially 
identified by the Government as 'part-Aboriginal' under the Cape Barren Island 
Reserve Act of 1912, a State Government decision changed this in 1951 when the Act 
was 'extinguished' and the Islanders were then deemed to be 'non-indigenous'.351 
This change of external identification occurred in the same year that the third 
(national) Native Welfare Conference agreed that assimilation should be the aim of 
native welfare measures. The policy and theory of assimilation assumed that "in 
the course of time ... all persons of Aboriginal blood or mixed blood in Australia will 
live like other white Australians do" .352 This coincided with the broader aim within 
Australia to 'uplift' Aborigines by encouraging and helping them to live like the 
'white' population. Assimilationist policies, as Lloyd argues, were not necessarily 
aimed at brutally removing Aboriginal people from sight due to malign intent. 
349 See for example, Lloyd Robson's A History of Tasmania, in which he writes that the 
Tasmanians were "dispossessed and destroyed by their invaders and conquerors in an 
impressive example of extermination". A History of Tasmania: Volume 1, Oxford University 
Press: Melbourne, 1983, p vii. 
350 Ryan, Lindal, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996, p 2. 
351 Cove, John J., What the Bones Say, McGill-Queen's Press, 1995, pp 81-87. 
352 Commonwealth of Australia, Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the 
Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families [Commissioner: R. 
Wilson] (Sydney: Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1997). 
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Many who argued for such policies did so on humanitarian grounds, based on the 
liberal ideal of equality or on religious beliefs that all humans were shaped in God's 
image. As Moran notes: 
Assimilation was a project that drew upon humanitarian impulses, and 
notions of justice and egalitarianism. It meant that the Australian nation was 
finally embracing those long excluded and denigrated. However, such 
intentions were structured by a settler-colonial relationship that assumed the 
disappearance of Aboriginality.353 
As we have seen above, appeals to a liberal equality and a 'universal human good' 
necessarily exclude some aspects of human culture and ways of being in order to 
maintain the 'neutral' human.354 Whether based on ideas of racial superiority and 
hatred or on ideals of emancipation and human rights, the idea that those of 'mixed 
descent' were in essence 'the same' as the rest of the population undermined and 
denied the significance of both bodily and cultural difference: 
By stressing that Aborigines were really no different to whites, and in fact 
were animated by the same values, beliefs and aspirations, fears about 
national unity and cultural homogeneity, such as they were, could be 
allayed.355 
The denial that Tasmania had an Aboriginal population meant, amongst other 
things, that as 'white' people they were not entitled to Government support as a 
special status group and, also, the risk of land claims was reduced. The official 
denial of Aboriginality, however, contrasted strongly with the treatment of the 
Islanders as "other' by the rest of the community- and perhaps most significantly-
it contrasted with their own beliefs about their own identity and belonging. The 
353 Moran, Anthony, "White Australia, Settler Nationalism and Aboriginal Assimilation", 
Australian Journal of Politics and History: Volume 51, Number 2, 2005. 
354 For discussion of the various philosophies and beliefs underlying policies of assimilation 
see for example, Anthony Moran, "White Australia, Settler Nationalism and Aboriginal 
Assimilation", pp. 168-193. 
355 Ibid, p 179. 
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criteria for identity were based on the prevailing metaphysical assumptions of the 
era, and blood-quantum was seen as the crucial determinant of Aboriginality.356 If 
conceptions of identity at this time were based on the assumption of static, 
unchanging, biological facticity, then the changing nature of the Tasmanian 
Aboriginal community would have been 'proof' of its 'inauthenticity'.357 
As noted above, in the 1970s members of Tasmania's Aboriginal population began 
to fight publicly to reassert their essential difference from 'white' Tasmanians. As 
with other forms of identity politics, this assertion of inherent difference became 
increasingly important in order to distinguish a group and to assert value to those 
ways of being that had been denigrated or denied previously. However, as seen in 
feminist debates, asserting difference by revaluing what has in the past been 
denigrated often serves to perpetuate essentialist and exclusionary understandings 
of identity. This is not simply because of the difficulty in overcoming hierarchies 
associated with dichotomised ways of thinking, but also because of the ambiguous 
position occupied by those asserting Aboriginality in Tasmania. 
The contemporary debate in Tasmania, which sees different groups in conflict over 
who is a 'real' aborigine and who is a 'fraud', provides an example of the 
problematic distinction between authentic and inauthentic Aboriginal 'ways of 
being' highlighted by Smallacombe and others. In Tasmania today, the debate takes 
place within an historical context in which, for a long time, no-one was granted legal 
recognition as a Tasmanian Aborigine. Flanagan has described Tasmania as an 
"Island of Ironies" and one of these ironies is that those who fought for so long for 
recognition of Aboriginality, are now fighting against what they see to be a 
356 Blood quantum refers to the idea that the 'amount' of Aboriginal blood one had defined 
their Aboriginality. People were defined as 'full-blood', half-caste and quarter-caste. This 
terminology was used in legislation up until the 1970s (from 1912 to 1951 in Tasmania). For 
further discussion see, for example Gardiner-Garden, 'Defining Aboriginality in Australia, 
Current Issues Brief, no 10 2002-03, Social Policy Group, 3 February 2003. 
357 Anthony Moran notes that anthropologists working to 'uplift' Aborigines in NSW in the 
early to mid 1900s saw a distinction between the 'mixed' blood people and the 'full-
blooded', who were still seen to possess a 'significant Aboriginality'. Removing children 
from those of mixed-descent was seen to be an acceptable practice in a way that was not for 
'full-blood' children. See Moran, op. cit, page 184. 
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fraudulent rise in claims to Aboriginal identity by people who may have ancestral 
links but who, they argue, have not lived as Aborigines. 
To recapitulate my previous points, what I hope to have demonstrated in this 
chapter is that this debate remains limited by an underlying assumption in the 
cultural imaginary that surrounds it: that is, you either are, or you are not an 
Aborigine. As we saw above, what also adds to this problematic is the tendency to 
view 'real' Aborigines as being closer to 'nature' and spirituality, or to identify 
Aboriginality through biology and blood-quantum. This is the same kind of 
discourse that has dominated the last two centuries of the island and which saw 
Aboriginal people explicitly excluded from the development of Tasmania as a State. 
Excluded physically, in the Government 'round up' that removed many people to 
Flinders Island and, culturally, in that the development of the Tasmanian identity 
included the belief that, with Trugannini, the last of the Tasmanian Aboriginal 
people had died. 
The return to 'authenticity', which appears to be characterising contemporary 
national discourse, has seen a growing interest in indigenous culture and history. 
However, as Smallacombe points out, the irony is that although it was explicitly 
excluded from the development of Australia as a nation, indigenous culture and 
spirituality are now being selectively incorporated into our national imaginary and 
'sold' as an Australian way of being. At the same time, this idea of 'authentic' 
Aboriginality denies the authenticity of the common experience of those taken from 
Aboriginal families as small children and raised within other families and 
institutions. Also problematic is the idea that a subject is either indigenous or non-
indigenous, which leaves a difficult space for those many people who feel their 
identities are somewhere 'in-between' these two definitions. When government or 
private enterprise selects particular, Aboriginal traditions as 'authentic' there is 
always a risk of excluding other significant aspects of indigenous identities. 
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A PHILOSOPHY OF AMBIGUITY AS A POSSIBILITY FOR THE FUTURE: AN 
AUTHENTIQUE IDENTITY? 
Although Appiah argues that one can in many ways determine one's own identity 
and adjust one's way of being to fit a particular identity, he maintains that there are 
certain elements of life over which individuals do not have control. He uses one's 
sexuality, race, sex and level of physical or intellectual ability as examples of such 
elements. He concludes that it is, therefore, not just 'up to us' to adopt an identity 
(or not), because one must respond to facts which are determined outside of the self. 
Appiah writes, "the meaning of who I am isn't just in my head; my ethical projects 
flow from a universe of social facts".358 In the face of this situation, where one must 
in a sense negotiate both one's facticity and one's social situation, Appiah asks the 
question as to how one determines who is an 'X' within a setting that supports self-
determination. He asks, "how, in short, are we to establish the boundaries of the 
group deserving deference?" and he imagines the risk of a situation in which "a vast 
brigade of state-employed ethnographers [is] tasked with certifying this or that 
practice as legitimized by this or that social group".359 
We can see here how this argument relates to the debate over Tasmanian identity 
discussed above, where the government has attempted to establish an 'independent' 
advisory committee to determine if certain people could satisfy set criteria and prove 
their Aboriginality. 
On a practical level (and we are exploring here how philosophical assumptions 
about identity play out in everyday life) it becomes extremely difficult for those in 
the Government and non-Government sectors to liaise with or seek input from 
members of the Tasmanian Aboriginal community when there is such debate over 
who belongs to that community and who can represent it. Short of asking for 
'certification', groups seeking the advice or opinion of indigenous people (for 
example when designing a service for them) have to act on the faith that those who 
claim to be able to represent Aboriginal needs and points of view are actually able to 
358 Appiah, Kwame, Anthony, The Ethics of Identity, p 198. 
359 Ibid, p76. 
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do so. Obviously, this presents difficulties and runs the risk of certain groups or 
individual's being excluded if they do not fit with the socio-political understanding 
of what an 'authentic' Aborigine is. This risk is further increased if particular groups 
feel the need to define themselves in relation to this perception of the authentic 
Aborigine and are, therefore, not able to acknowledge the changing needs and 
issues of their community (and the different individual needs within that 
community). 
The philosophy of ambiguity developed by de Beauvoir, which is critical of the 
failure of both 'essential equality' and 'essential difference' and which proposes an 
ontology that is engaged, fluid and relational, looking to the world without 
assumptions of inherent essence, provides a means to move beyond the impasse in 
current debates. As we have seen, her aim is to give an account of human 'being' 
and existence that does not depend on dichotomies and binary oppositions but 
reveals the interdependence of subject, world, thought and discourse. This approach 
emphasises ambiguity rather than denying it, and provides an ethics of becoming, in 
which 'interrelatedness' is acknowledged and continually brought to bear upon our 
actions in the world. 
The situation in Tasmania reveals the ways in which those structures and theories -
such as legal, scientific and political systems - which have been assumed to give a 
neutral and 'objective' account of humanity, have in fact developed through 
exclusion of the 'Other'. As we have seen, Tasmania developed through the 
exclusion of Aboriginal people and culture, as part of both legislation and in the 
cultural imaginary - therefore, what must be re-thought is the dichotomous 
metaphysic that underlies current socio-political discourse and which limits current 
debate. The assumptions about what it means to be 'authentic' need to be critically 
re-thought, because such assumptions are reflective of the claim that we can have 
objective knowledge about 'reality' and 'truth'. As Moira Gatens has argued, looking 
at ourselves within our historical context and with a focus on our underlying 
assumptions enables us to think about how we want to be in the future. As she puts 
it, "we need to understand and remember how we became what we are, not in order 
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to live what we have become as our 'truth', but rather as our conditions of 
possibility for that which we may become".360 
Recognition of our situated totality, of our mutual connectedness and historicity, 
and of the possibility of ambiguity provides a different understanding of 
authenticity, in which there is not one Aboriginal way of being and in which many 
different experiences can be authentique. There must, however, be some connection 
to a particular history and situation. As we have seen above, it is not possible to 
simply 'adopt' any identity in isolation from one's situation because one's body and 
one's past are a significant part of one's identity. 
Understandings of identity, then, must account for freedom-in-situation. This means 
it is acknowledged that an individual is not inherently and 'absolutely' a particular 
'thing' in isolation, but that there are certain elements of their situation that they 
share with others, which lead to a strong identification with a particular identity 
(their history, their social position, their body, their family relations). 
This does not, however, answer "once and for all" the question as to how one 
should determine Aboriginality, and in fact, would assert that this question will 
never be finalised. Re-thinking authenticite and ambiguity provides a means from 
which to start this questioning, by critically engaging with constructions of identity 
as determined by legislation and within the cultural imaginary. At present, many of 
those caught up in this debate are limited by an approach that has grown from a 
dichotomous metaphysical base, and which has seen science as an arbiter of truth 
and impartiality. Re-thinking authenticity through ambiguity, so that what we have 
is an understanding of authenticite, entails a critique of identity and the problem of 
'seriousness' that arises in the face of our fundamental freedom. 
Whilst it does deny the possibility of an inherent and essential Aboriginal 'essence', 
ambiguity does not deny the possibility of an identity that is embedded in history 
and which takes into account one's lived, embodied, experience. De Beauvoir would 
argue that it is possible to share a group identity, with shared goals, aims, stories 
360 Gatens, Moira, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality, p77. 
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and histories - but that each within that group is always, at the same time, a 
particular individual whose 'self' is defined in relation to 'others'. These 'others' are 
not just those outside the group, but also those within it. It must be recognised that 
Aboriginality, as a way of being, is defined through the exclusion of 'non-
Aboriginal' ways of being and in relation to the 'non-Aboriginal'. The self-other-
world relation is at play here and our views of each other and of ourselves cannot be 
distinguished from this relation. The desire to associate 'real' Aboriginality with 
pre-colonial history faces the problem of not acknowledging the vast history that 
has occurred since that time and the many definitions that "Tasmanian" identities 
have undergone. Moreover, it assumes that there was a single, 'real' Aboriginality 
prior to colonial history. Those who claim Aboriginality today cannot claim an 
identical relation to land, custom and social orders that their ancestors had prior to 
the arrival of British colonists. The intervening centuries and all that has occurred 
during this time mean that changing relations are, of course, inevitable. Tasmanian 
people now exist in a particular spatio-temporal location and their identities are 
negotiated in relation to this particular situation, of which their ancestry is only a 
part. This does not mean, however, that their identities are any less authentique than 
those of their predecessors, but recognises that they are different. 
TEMPORALITY AND SITUATION 
Merleau-Ponty's body-subject, as examined in previous chapter, provides us with 
another means to examine a notion of ambiguous identity here. Unlike traditional 
metaphysical accounts, the body-subject for Merleau-Ponty must be ambiguous and 
indeterminate because of its location in a 'temporal situation'. He says that: 
My hold on the past and the future is precarious and my possession of my 
own time is always postponed until a stage when I may fully understand it, 
yet this stage can never be reached, since it would be one more moment 
bounded by the horizon of its future, and requiring in its turn, further 
developments in order to be understood (PP 346 cf 426). 
201 
The urging here is for recognition of our always-situated existence in a temporal 
location, which is never fully realised and which is importantly connected both to 
our history and to our fears, hopes and beliefs about the future. This conjures an 
image of an always-moving, continually-developing subject-in-situation, who is 
never entirely bound by, nor entirely free from, what has gone before and the 
possibilities of what is yet to come. This subject must continually acknowledge and 
negotiate the temporal location so that, as Merleau-Ponty says, we can "never say 
'I' absolutely" (PP, 208). Our 'self', the 'I', is never final or fixed under this account 
but is in continued relation to the spatial and temporal situation so that who 'I' am 
today (or even at this very moment) is not a final product but a stage in the ever-
developing story of my life. 
As Debra Bergoffen describes this, "Existential freedom as structured by time 
renders my identity unstable .. .it is a never-ending story. As finite I necessarily fail 
to bring closure to myself or my projects".361 This way of thinking about a 
temporally located subject - a subject that is always developing and negotiating its 
'self' in relation to a situation - provides a useful tool for debates over identity. If 
the ambiguous 'self' (which cannot be reduced to biology, history, consciousness or 
a particular relation - but is an interweaving of all these things) can be 
acknowledged, then one can argue for the importance of historicity and 
intersubjectivity (or identity in relation to numerous factors) without reducing the 
subject to essentialist claims that determine their identity. In terms of 'identity 
politics', where particular individuals seek recognition or demand rights based 
upon their 'belonging' to a group, these individuals are recognised as both 
belonging to, and yet simultaneously not reducible to, that group identity. There are 
important life experiences, important historical facts that are shared and unite 
subjects in the world - factors that distinguish them from others who have not 
shared the same experience (which can include the way their bodies are lived). 
However, there are also important factors that distinguish them from one another 
and which can be lived and interpreted differently (which also includes their bodily 
361 Bergoffen, Debra, "Introduction to Pyrrhus et Cineas" in Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophical 
Writings, p 83. 
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differences). As such, one can insist upon the importance of historical location, the 
importance of lived experience in relation to situation (which includes one's 
biological/material existence), without relying upon the traps of essential 
determinism that limit individuals to reductive accounts of identity. Within limits, 
one can choose aspects of one's identity, whilst other aspects are dependent upon 
how one is perceived by others and upon material or biological factors. Here we see 
the wa.y that de Beauvoir's notion of freedom-in-situation provides the framework 
to think authentically about questions of identity. 
Like de Beauvoir' s interdependent subject who exists always in connection with 
others in the world, Merleau-Ponty's subject-in-situation is seen as a "knot of 
relations". The subject is part of a network, in which interdependence is the 
condition for existence and reducing or pulling apart this knot or network to find 
the 'ground' or essence of being, in separation from the inter-dependence, will 
always result in imposed dichotomies and dualisms that limit expression and 
understanding. 
Merleau-Ponty's aim of re-orienting philosophy and subjectivity by re-uniting it 
with 'the world' provides a means for exploring the implications of 'difference' 
without resulting in the idea that one is essentially determined by that difference. If 
we understand essentialism to be the argument that there is an 'essence' underlying 
all the seemingly irrelevant and contingent relations and aspects of human 'being', 
an essence that can be gotten closer to through a reductive account of existence that 
searches for a 'ground' or 'core', we can see how this kind of account is 
demonstrated in a great deal of scientific and philosophical discourse, which 
reduces human being down to either biology or culture. Both cultural determinism 
and biological determinism remain constrained by the underlying dualism that 
Merleau-Ponty and de Beauvoir critique, which fails to recognise interconnections 
and the relational dependence of 'nature' and 'culture' as if the two were separate 
entities and human action were not 'natural'. 
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CONCLUSION 
In an examination of the concept of authenticity in relation to black identity, Patrick 
Johnson argues that the development and maintenance of identities is difficult and 
problematic, especially given the deconstructive and post-structuralist turns, which 
have resulted in a thorough critique of traditional understandings of being. He 
writes, in support of a theory of being that incorporates the body: 
... negotiating any identity is a dangerous adventure, particularly in a post-
modern world in which we have come to recognise that identities are made, 
not given. We must also realise that the post-modern push to theorize 
identity discursively must be balanced with theories of corporeality and 
materiality. 362 
Johnson rightly acknowledges that with the 'deconstructi0n' of identity comes the 
risk of a denial of the importance of the body to being and to identity. He urges us 
to balance our desire to rid ourselves of notions of essentialism and rigid identity 
with theories that also account for our corporeal existence. A philosophy of 
ambiguity allows us to do this "balancing" by insisting on maintenance of the 
tension implied in our ambiguous existence. Such a philosophy allows recognition 
of the importance of body to being but without a biological determinism because, if 
we take seriously de Beauvoir's notion of freedom-in-situation, we see that one's 
facticity is important and significant but that it is not deterministic. 
De Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty offer us the means to theorise identity with 
reference to both materiality/corporeality and transcendence or 'freedom from 
essence'. As we saw in the previous chapters, de Beauvoir's notion of freedom 
enables us to argue that one is both free and situated at the same time - to examine 
how one can recognise the significance of the factors of one's embodied situation 
without resorting to the argument that it must be understood in this particular way. 
362 Johnson, Patrick E., Appropriating Blackness, p 218. 
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A philosophy of ambiguity, as developed by de Beauvoir, does not 'pull the rug 
from underneath us' without a means to move forward but, rather, provides us with 
tools to live with authenticite in our relations with others. It shows us that in order 
to be ethical, to be authentique, we must first understand the complex relation 
between the other and our self - between our self and the world. We must 
acknowledge and celebrate our own and the other's ambiguous becoming-in-
situation, through our engagement with others. As Merleau-Ponty shows us in 
Phenomenology of Perception, perception is not only the means by which I make sense 
of the world around me but the means by which I make sense of myself in relation to 
the world. I am formed through my engagement with the world and with others 
and, therefore, I can never say "I" absolutely. 
Just as we can never say "I" absolutely, I am not proposing a final answer on how 
one can define what it means to be an Aborigine 'absolutely'. Whilst this may be an 
uncomfortable conclusion for some, especially for those who wish to be able to 
identify what it is that makes a person an 'authentic' Aborigine, it is this conclusion 
that must be reached in order to develop an authentique account of identity. What 
ambiguity and authenticite show us is that, although we are not left with a definitive 
answer, we are provided with a means to rethink how we engage with others. What 
ambiguity and authenticite offer us is a way to think about how we are in relation to 
others and how we have all come to be within this particular situation. We can then 
ask questions as to how government might respond to people who share some 
similar life experiences but who are not exchangeable for one another? How do we 
account for difference without reifying the 'otherness' of the other? In short, how 
can we relate with authenticite to the difference of the other in a way that takes into 
account their ambiguity? 
Whilst this chapter has raised and begun to address these questions, the following 
chapter deals more explicitly with how we might engage with others when we 
recognise their fundamental freedom and their situation - with how we might have 
positive and worthwhile relationships with others if they are, as de Beauvoir asserts, 
totally free from a given essence. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
RESPONDING ETHICALLY TO THE FREEDOM OF THE OTHER 
... in order to see the world and grasp it as paradoxical, we must break with our 
familiar acceptance of it and, also, from ... this break we can learn nothing but the 
unmotivated upsurge of the world. 
(Merleau-Ponty, PP, p xv) 
We think that the meaning of the situation does not impose itself on the 
consciousness of the passive subject, that it surges up only by the disclosure which a 
free subject effects in his project. 
(Beauvoir, TEA, p 20). 
As we have seen throughout the preceding chapters, the existentialism associated 
with Sartre and, in many instances with de Beauvoir, has been criticised for putting 
forward a "miserablism", for focusing too narrowly on the individual at the expense 
of others and, therefore, as being unable to provide us with a means to "move 
forward" in contemporary situations. Sartre's account of freedom has drawn 
continued criticism for its conflictual nature and has been described as a philosophy 
in which "our relations with other people are characterized by insecurity, danger, 
confrontation and conflict" .363 His philosophy of self-other relations has been 
described as follows: 
... the hostile look becomes a paradigm for relations with others in Sartre's 
philosophy because his subject-centred philosophy forces him to 
conceptualize relations with others as circular, each person trying to reduce 
others to objects in order not to be objectified themselves.364 
363 Atkins, Kim, Self and Subjectivity, Blackwell: London, 2004, p89. 
364 Whitford, Margaret, Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Sartre's Philosophy, French Forum 
Publishers: Lexington and Kentucky, 1982, p 25. 
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We have seen that this account of relations between subjects has its foundations in 
Hegel' s so-called 'master-slave dialectic' and Sartre's account of what is 
fundamental to self-other relations is described by 'the Look', most evocatively 
exemplified by the person caught peering through a keyhole. What is portrayed in 
the Look is "an experience of annihilation of one's subjectivity" where the self is 
reduced to an object when looked at by the other, the judging gaze. For Sartre then, 
freedom entails surging up in the world as "confronting others" who try to objectify 
us and we do the same by trying to objectify them.365 
Although Sartre did later attempt to address criticisms of negativity and 
individualism in Existentialism is a Humanism and other works, critics continue to 
argue that in Being and Nothingness there seem to be only two options for Sartre -
that one is either a subject or an object. As one recent analysis of Sartre has stated: 
There seems to be no possibility of mutual recognition between individuals 
in this picture of human relationships. If we are inevitably a subject or an 
object, sadistic or masochistic, a master or a slave, then human relationships 
can only oscillate between these two polarities without ever approaching a 
more complementary or reciprocal intersubjectivity.366 
While many have read de Beauvoir as a disciple or follower of Sartre, this thesis has 
taken up the arguments of some more recent interpretations to position de Beauvoir 
away from such a reading. Nancy Bauer, for one, rightly argues that de Beauvoir's 
interpretation and appropriation of the master-slave dialectic and the self-other 
relation differs in important ways to Sartre's. Bauer argues that: 
... a careful reading of The Second Sex reveals that the idea that human beings 
harbor a 'fundamental hostility toward every other consciousness' does not 
365 Langer, Monika, 'Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty on Ambiguity', p92. 
366 Reynolds, Jack, Understanding Existentialism, Acumen: Chesham (UK), 2006, p 99. 
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entail for Beauvoir - as it does for Sartre - the impossibility of non-hostile 
human relations.367 
Bauer argues that de Beauvoir takes this conclusion from Hegel' s Phenomenology of 
Spirit, which she saw to entail an "optimism" that we can actually negotiate the 
hostility we have toward one another in order to achieve "reciprocal recognition". 
In this recognition we acknowledge each other as human and Bauer reads de 
Beauvoir' s appropriation of Hegel to be different to Sartre's and more easily aligned 
with Heidegger's concept of Mitsein, which she maintains that Sartre 
misinterprets.368 De Beauvoir herself describes the experience of being in the world 
with others as involving an engagement with the world through our bodies: 
Every human event possesses a metaphysical signification beyond its 
psychological and social elements, since through each event, man is always 
entirely engaged in the entire world; and surely there is no one to whom this 
meaning has not been disclosed at some time in his life. In particular, it often 
happens that children, who are not yet anchored in their little corner of the 
universe, experience with astonishment their "being-in-the world" as they 
experience their bodies (LM, p 273). 
If we take the arguments of the preceding chapters seriously, and recognise both 
our own and the other's fundamental freedom, we must ask the question as to 
whether or not it is really possible to avoid the conflictual relations with others 
described by many existential philosophers since Hegel. The ultimate question, once 
we have placed ambiguity and freedom at the centre of an ethics, is: how can we 
respond ethically to the freedom of the other in a way that affirms existence and 
acknowledges the potential for joy in our relations with them? 
The answer this thesis has proposed thus far is that we should begin our response to 
the other in the way in which de Beauvoir has suggested: that is, with recognition of 
367 Bauer, Nancy, "Beauvoir's Heideggerian Ontology" in The Philosophy of Simone de 
Beauvoir: Critical Essays, Margaret Simons (ed.), Indiana University Press, 2006, p 68. 
368 Ibid. 
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authentique freedom and ambiguity. In this final chapter, I propose that the life-
affirming aspect of such a response is further supported with a focus on wonder, 
and with willing attention to the openness and generosity evident in de Beauvoir' s 
work. What becomes crucial in de Beauvoir's account of ambiguity is the 
recognition of the tension in the self-other relationship, and significantly, the 
potential for joy in this relation. As Eva Gothlin argues "Beauvoir presupposed that 
human relationships can be characterized either by conflict and oppression or by 
friendship and solidarity: it is the second form that she sees as most authentic 
[authentique], when human being is in its "truth".369 
The task of this final chapter, therefore, will be to examine the ways in which the 
concept of authenticite, which we have been exploring in the preceding chapters, 
points to and is strengthened by the concepts of generosity and wonder. Here, 
authenticite, which entails both 'freedom' and 'ambiguity', is used to open up ways 
of thinking about subjectivity and existence, with 'generosity' and 'wonder' 
becoming the attitudes we take-up towards one another, together with this 
understanding of the importance of freedom and ambiguity. 
This concept of wonder, in the sense of an attitude toward the world, conjures 
images of openness at what we are faced with, or what we encounter. An attitude of 
wonder insists on a prejudicative openness that allows for what we encounter to 
speak for itself in one sense, but also to remain unspeakable and ungraspable on 
another level. That is, to maintain its alterity. If we take this attitude toward those 
'others' that we are attempting to understand (at least in some way) and respond 
appropriately to, we welcome the alterity that they possess in their relation with us, 
and cease attempting to force them into a pre-determined state of being. To allow 
ourselves to 'wonder' at the being of others, and to celebrate their alterity, forces us 
to continually insist upon their possibility and potential to be other than, or more 
than, what we experience them as being. As de Beauvoir herself writes, "mutually 
recognising each other as subjects, each will remain for the other an other ... " (TSS, p 
740). 
369 Gothlin, Eva, 'Reading Simone de Beauvoir with Martin Heidegger', p59. 
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Demonstrating, again, the shared links between her work and that of Merleau-
Ponty, de Beauvoir describes this relation of openness to (and of) the other in her 
review of Phenomenology of Perception, " ... at the same time as they offer this familiar 
aspect, things offer another side, they also are silence and mystery, an Other who 
escapes us. They are never completely given but, on the contrary, always open 
(RoPP, p163, my emphasis). 
RESPONDING TO FREEDOM 
De Beauvoir writes, "Every man is originally free" (TEA, p25), however, as we have 
seen, she acknowledges that humans often attempt to create solid identities and 
meanings in order to deny their freedom. The existentialist claim is that it is far 
easier to identify oneself with a position in society, with religion, with a job or 
sporting team, or with one's possessions, than to admit that one must continually 
make and re-make oneself and one's meaning through projects and with reference 
to others. She writes of this striving for solidification into 'thing-hood': 
... Fleeing his freedom, his subjectivity, he would feign lose himself in the 
bosom of the Whole. This is the origin of his cosmic and pantheistic dreams, 
of his longing for oblivion, for sleep, for ecstasy, for death. He never 
succeeds in abolishing his separate ego, but he wants at least to attain the 
solidity of the in-itself, to be petrified into a thing (TSS, pp 268-269). 
A major aim of the preceding chapters has been to demonstrate that this common 
attempt at solidification into the 'in-itself', into a 'thing', is unethical and inauthentic 
and that to be ethical (authentique) requires that one also will oneself free. This means 
that, when faced with our fundamental freedom, we do not flee it, we do not seek to 
lose ourselves or make ourselves 'be' through others or through possession of 
material goods, we do not assert our existence as given once and for all by God or 
by Nature. On the contrary, we work with our freedom, we reaffirm it in our 
everyday lives and in our encounters with others and we bring it to bear on our 
ethical decision-making. Accordingly, morality only becomes possible because there 
are different ways in which people can and do respond to their original freedom. 
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Ultimately, one can will oneself free or one can choose not to will oneself free. The 
final choice of response, once freedom is recognised, is always up to each 
individual. As de Beauvoir says, "our very passivity is willed; in order to not 
choose, we still must choose not to choose. It is impossible to escape" (PC, p126). 
However, whilst our freedom is, ultimately, "inescapable", we have seen that de 
Beauvoir acknowledges that people can, and do, respond in different ways to 
recognition of this situation: 
One may hesitate to make oneself a lack of being, one may withdraw from 
existence, or one may falsely assert oneself as being, or assert oneself as 
nothingness. One may realize his freedom only as an abstract independence, 
or, on the contrary, reject with despair the distance which separates us from 
being. All errors are possible since man is a negativity, and they are 
motivated by the anguish he feels in the face of his freedom (TEA, 34). 
While de Beauvoir argues that the response that most take toward their freedom is a 
spirit of seriousness that represents bad-faith, she also recognises that our relations 
with others open up experiences of meaning and value that are rich in their 
complexity. She acknowledges that our relations with others offer opportunities for 
love, harmony and companionship - as well as the potential for domination and 
conflict that has been presented in the Hegelian-Sartrean self-other relation. This is 
not to refuse the self-other relation, and de Beauvoir does not deny that conflict, 
hatred and domination can and do arise, but she does deny that these are the only 
possible attitudes or responses to such a relation. So, unlike Sartre who wrote that 
"the essence of the relations between consciousness is not the Mitsein, it is conflict" 
(BN, p555) de Beauvoir sees our relations with others and the world to be in tension, 
but with the possibility for anger, hatred, domination and conflict being as real as 
the possibility for love, harmony, acceptance and respect. Importantly, the tension 
in self-other relationships means that individuals will be continually changing, 
learning and adapting and, so too, will their responses to others. De Beauvoir writes 
of the tension implied by disclosure, "but the disclosure implies a perpetual tension 
to keep being at a distance, to tear one-self from the world, and to assert oneself as a 
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freedom" (TEA, pp 23-24). This tension is ongoing, it is not something to be 
overcome. 
Monika Langer argues that a key point of difference from Sartre is that de 
Beauvoir's account of ambiguity and potential ethics "emphasizes attachment, joy, 
and a positive bond with others, whereas Sartre emphasizes uprooting, nausea and 
conflict with others".370 Even as de Beauvoir acknowledges that "the fundamental 
ambiguity of the human condition will always open up to man the possibility of 
opposing choices" (TEA, 118) and, therefore, the potential for violence, she argues 
that conflict is not inevitable. She saw great potential in existentialism and argued, 
against criticisms of nihilism, negativity and individualism, that: 
... the existentialists are so far from denying love, friendship, fraternity that 
in their eyes it is only in human relations that each individual can find the 
foundation and the accomplishment of his being (ESN, p37, emphasis 
added).371 
Here we see a significant difference from the negative account of self-other relations 
described by critics of existentialism and, in Tize Ethics of Ambiguity, de Beauvoir 
further demonstrates how ambiguity and freedom are crucial to an ethics that 
allows for positive relationships between subjects. To live our freedom authentically 
we must realize how we are connected to others, that we are 'bound' to others and 
that our freedom is bound to theirs: 
In order for the idea of liberation to have a concrete meaning, the joy of 
existence must be asserted in each one, at every instant; the movement 
toward freedom assumes its real, flesh and blood figure in the world by 
thickening into pleasure, into happiness ... if we do not love life on our own 
370 Langer, Monika, 'Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty on ambiguity', p90. 
371 "L'Existentilisme et la suggesse des nations". Kristana Arp cites this article written for Les 
Temps Modernes in 1945, which demonstrates the important ways de Beauvoir's account 
differs to that of Sartre's in Being and Nothingness. Arp, K, The Bonds of Freedom, p 36. 
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account and through others, it is futile to seek to justify it in any way (TEA, 
135-36).2 
For de Beauvoir, freedom is not a "thing" or a "quality naturally attached to a 
thing" but rather it "merges with the very movement of this ambiguous reality 
which is called existence and which is only by making itself be" (TEA, p25). By 
this, she means that the failure of man to attain 'being' as a solid state is definitive of 
the human condition - we cannot 'be' being, this failure is inherent in our 
ontological condition. However, in de Beauvoir's terms, our response to this failure 
to be does not necessarily entail pain and negativity but can actually result in 
openness and joy. She asserts that, unlike in the Hegelian dialectic, existentialism 
seeks a 'conversion' rather than a synthesis or surpassing and that in authenticite 
"the failure [to be] is not surpassed but assumed" (TEA, p13 emphasis added). She 
writes, "To attain his truth, man must not attempt to dispel the ambiguity of his 
being but, on the contrary, accept the task of realising it' (TEA, p 13). Hegel' s 
reconciliation entails the raising and preserving of a contradiction through synthesis 
whereas, for de Beauvoir, this reconciliation is problematic because it evades 
ambiguity. De Bcauvoir wants to preserve the ambiguity and paradox, to maintain 
the tension it implies, rather than reconciling it in the Hegelian Aufhebung. 
Man is never anything more, or less, than an ambiguous-becoming-in-situation and 
de Beauvoir acknowledges that this can generate Angst. However, she claims that 
recognition of this ambiguous becoming can also generate a sense of joy: 
[m]y contemplation is an excruciation only because it is also a joy. I cannot 
appropriate the snow-field where I slide. It remains foreign, forbidden, but I 
take delight in this very effort toward an impossible possession. I experience 
it as a triumph, not as a defeat (TEA, p12). 
Rather than seeing fundamental freedom as reason for despair or anxiety, de 
Beauvoir argues that "on the contrary, it appears to us that by turning toward this 
freedom we are going to discover a principle for action whose range will be 
universal" (TEA, p23). Others are fundamental to this account and, as Kruks points 
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out, de Beauvoir introduced a different idea of social relations to Sartre quite early 
on with her claim, in Pyrrhus et Cineas, that these relations were not inevitably 
conflictual. There she argued that our existence is affirmed by others, and that "only 
the freedom of the other is able to give necessity to my being" (PC, p96).372 
MEANING AND THE FREEDOM OF OTHERS 
A fundamental claim throughout her work is that our connections with others are a 
crucial part of the revealing or unveiling of meaning in the world and, in The Ethics of 
Ambiguity, de Beauvoir writes, "one can reveal the world only on a basis revealed by 
other men" (TEA, p71). In addition, she writes, "if I really were everything there 
would be nothing beside me; the world would be empty. There would be nothing 
to possess, and I myself would be nothing" (TEA, p71). Others are crucial and, for 
de Beauvoir, my freedom and my capacity to act ethically require the freedom of 
others. 
As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty shares a similar belief in the importance of others 
to an understanding of self and, in Signs, he writes that "whenever I try to 
understand myself, the whole fabric of the perceptible world comes too, and with it 
comes the others who are caught in it" (Signs, p15). The self-other relation, and the 
need for recognising our responsibility to others, is a key theme in de Beauvoir' s 
work and is crucial to an authentique ethics of ambiguity. Like Merleau-Ponty, she is 
concerned with demonstrating the potential for positive self-other relations based 
on recognition of ambiguity. 
As we saw above, Heinamaa argues that de Beauvoir was influenced by Husserl 
through her reading of Merleau-Ponty and that she adapts the concepts of 
intersubjectivity and corporeality from Husserl' s later phenomenology in an effort 
to explain the self-others relation in a way that overcomes (or at least offers an 
alternative to) the Hegelian subject-in-conflict.373 De Beauvoir argues that, rather 
372 Kruks, Sonia, Situation and Human Existence, p87. 
373 Heinamaa, Sara, 'The body as instrument and as expression', in The Cambridge Companion 
to Simone de Beauvoir, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p66. 
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than a Hegelian synthesis, the existential conversion "should be compared to 
Husserlian reduction" where each man puts "his will 'in parentheses' and" is 
thereby "brought to the consciousness of his true condition" (TEA, p14). The 
phenomenological reduction shows us that the presence of the world cannot be 
contested, that we cannot "do without" our bodies or the world: 
And just as phenomenological reduction prevents the errors of dogmatism 
by suspending all affirmation concerning the mode of reality of the external 
world, whose flesh and bone presence the reduction does not, however contest, so 
existentialist conversion does not suppress my instincts, desires, plans and 
passions. It merely prevents any possibility of failure by refusing to set up as 
absolutes the ends toward which my transcendence thrusts itself, and by 
considering them in their connection with the freedom which projects them 
(TEA, pl4, my emphasis). 
The existential conversion situates us, it maintains our connection with the world 
and with our freedom, it reminds us that the goals we aim at are not absolute but 
are ends established in freedom, and in situation. 
In a similar vein, and also reflecting a more positive emphasis than Sartre's work 
tends towards, Merleau-Ponty writes (against Kant) that the phenomenological 
reduction should be thought of as a sense of 'wonder in the face of the world' and 
that, when conceived of properly, this reflection: 
... does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of consciousness as 
the world's basis; it steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly up 
like sparks from a fire; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to 
the world and thus brings them to our notice; it alone is consciousness of the 
world because it reveals the world as strange and paradoxical (PP, xv, my 
emphasis). 
This 'strangeness' and paradox, which is revealed to us in the phenomenological 
epoche, is illustrative of openness and wonder. What Merleau-Ponty wants to 
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demonstrate is that we can never see the world other than from an embodied (and 
therefore historically situated) perspective; "the most important lesson which the 
reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction" (PP, pxv). We are 
in the world in a particular relation to all that surrounds and interacts with us and 
we cannot step "outside" of our bodies to conceive of the way the world is 
'objectively'. As Merleau-Ponty writes, "we are caught up in the world and we do 
not succeed in extricating ourselves from it in order to achieve consciousness of the 
world" (PP, p5). However, rather than trying to reveal all the secrets of the world, 
to reveal all in detail and make all understood, the task of phenomenology is to 
"reveal the mystery of the world and the mystery of reason" (PP, xxiv, my emphasis). 
This explicit discussion of mystery is important for this thesis, as it supports my aim 
to emphasise the importance of wonder in a positive, life-affirming ethics. Whitford 
argues that Husserl's phenomenology provided Merleau-Ponty with a means to 
reintroduce a "wonder before the world" which, for him was "the genuine 
philosophic attitude" .374 Perhaps the most significant point is that the aim of 
philosophical questioning should not be an ultimate reduction or a static 'Truth' but 
an openness to experiencing the world. Merleau-Ponty argues that it is the task of 
philosophy to 'question' its own assumptions and he writes: 
The philosopher, as [Husserl's] unpublished works declare, is a perpetual 
beginner, which means that he takes for granted nothing that men, learned 
or otherwise, believe they know. It means also that philosophy itself must 
not take itself for granted, in so far as it may have managed to say something 
true; that it is an ever-renewed experiment in making its own 
beginning ... (PP, xv-xvi). 
OVERCOMING UNIVERSAL MAN 
As we have seen in previous chapters, de Beauvoir shares the assertion of 
contemporary feminist philosophers that we must question our assumptions about 
being, in order to overcome implicit biases within philosophy. Central to the 
374 Whitford, Margaret, Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Sartre's Philosophy, p 14. 
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questioning of our own aims, which de Beauvoir also urges us to undertake, is the 
question of our implicit assumptions as well as our explicit beliefs about humanity. 
This is because ethics and politics continually talk of acting 'for the good of man' or 
in 'man's best interests' when the good suits a particular group, often at the expense 
of another's freedom. There are countless examples of this throughout history and 
many pertinent examples in contemporary conflicts, where a dominant group uses 
the rhetoric of 'for the good or benefit of mankind' to justify limiting the actions of 
another, or to justify their own actions. De Beauvoir's existential ethical 
questioning, however, begins, not with the task of determining if an action is good 
for man, but with the question "is the cause of Man the cause of each Man?' (TEA, 
p112) and de Beauvoir argues that "Universal, absolute man exists nowhere" (Ibid.). 
She makes the claim that the attempt to posit a 'universal, absolute man' is the result 
of bad metaphysics, where certain ideal characteristics are set up in opposition to 
those which are seen as less desirable, and then attributed with the status of 'the 
given'. Thus, a method of self-creation entails in which the 'excluded other' helps to 
define the 'One' whose values, beliefs and ideals are seen to be determined a priori 
and inherent to their 'essence'. Existentialism aims to overcome such reductions 
through its insistence on a continual questioning and by returning us to the world. 
She writes: 
... for Existentialism [unlike for Hegel], it is not impersonal universal man 
who is the source of values, but the plurality of concrete, particular men 
projecting themselves toward their ends on the basis of situations whose 
particularity is as radical and irreducible as subjectivity itself (TEA, p 17-18). 
For de Beauvoir, the ambiguous nature or reality of human existence sees each 
individual embedded within a total situation, in a position of being both self and 
other, subject and object, for-itself and for-others. It is this ambiguity which provides 
the basis for ethical responsibility and she claims that " ... coming to recognise and 
accept oneself in one's ambiguity is the necessary pre-condition of the moral life" 
(TEA, p81). Moreover, she argues "if one denies with Hegel the concrete thickness 
of the here and now in favour of universal space-time, if one denies the separate 
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consciousness in favour of Mind, one misses with Hegel the truth of the world" 
(TEA, p121-22). De Beauvoir wants to reveal the importance of the particular 
considerations of how one should live one's life, and to contest ethics that appeal to 
the universal at the expense of the particular. Her own personal experience of living 
through war in France, as well as her broad philosophical studies, demonstrated to 
her that one cannot "lose" oneself in the Universal, that we must each find a way of 
living that is relevant to our own situation and which is based, ultimately, on our 
fundamental freedom. 
As Debra Bergoffen notes, "the meaning of our situated freedom, the material 
conditions of justice, the possibilities of the appeal, and the risks of violence are 
issues that will concern Beauvoir throughout her life" .375 Bergoffen summarises de 
Beauvoir' s ethics in Pyrrhus et Cineas as follows: 
[In de Beauvoir's work] the abstract Cartesian method and the universal 
optimistic Hegelian dialectic are rejected. In their place, Beauvoir develops a 
method of reflective description that appeals to concrete examples and 
focuses on the particulars of the existential singular to delineate the 
paradigms and ambiguities of the ethical injunctions of our existential 
freedom. 376 
As we have seen throughout this thesis, the key concepts of authenticite, ambiguity 
and freedom support each other and the ethics that de Beauvoir proposes. On their 
own, none suffices to support an ethical framework but, when understood as 
intimately connected, and as underlying our existence and our relations to others, 
these concepts provide the foundation for a positive ethics. A component of any 
ethical decision for de Beauvoir will be a questioning of the complex situation in 
which decisions must be made and an understanding of one's own existential 
freedom and the freedom of others. What I have tried to demonstrate in this thesis, 
however, is that this freedom is not a denial of the importance of others or of the 
375 Bergoffen, Debra, "Introduction to Pyrrhus et Cineas" in Simone de Beauvoir. Philosophical 
Writings, Simons et al (eds) Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004, p 86. 
376 Ibid. 
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world but is embedded in a shared world with others. Meaning, value and 
significance are seen to arise in this shared world. What must be brought to bear on 
our actions and our deliberations is the ambiguous nature, not only of these 
meanings and values, but of our selves. 
A key point that has been alluded to but not yet fully dealt with in this thesis, is that 
an important part of authentique relations with others entails recognition and 
acceptance of the 'mystery' of the other, That is, of their alterity and their 
irreducibility. This alterity is important, especially in its connections with an 
attitude of wonder and generosity, which I argue are crucial to an authentique ethics 
of ambiguity. 
DIALOGUE AND ASYMMETRICAL RECIPROCITY 
We have seen that the complexity of the self-other relationship (and assumptions 
about this relationship) impact unwittingly on social policy and ethics. Iris Marion 
Young is another social and political philosopher concerned, like de Beauvoir, with 
analysing traditional ethical principles and some of the problematic metaphysical 
assumptions that operate within them.377 I will briefly take up Young' s analysis 
here, as her account of 'asymmetrical reciprocity' provides another way to think 
about the ambiguous self-other relations we have been examining, with social aims 
in mind. 
Young argues that the common use of the suggestion to 'think from the position of 
the other' when making ethical decisions appeals to problematic assumptions that 
must be re-thought. Although she concedes that attempting to think from the 
perspective of another has some benefits (for example in its capacity to draw people 
"away from selfishness or parochialism in their reasoning about moral issues") 
Young argues that what is problematic about such an appeal is the belief that 
subjects are 'symmetrical' and can be substituted for one another, that each has the 
377 Young, Iris Marion,' Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder and Enlarged 
Thought', Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of Gender, Political Philosophy and Policy, Princeton 
University Press: New Jersey, 1997. 
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potential, capacity or ability to really see what it is like to be the other.378 Young 
critiques this idea of exchangeability and argues that what most often happens in 
such appeals is a 'reduction to the same', or a reduction to the point of view of how 
the 'exchangee' imagines they would feel in the other's place. Giving examples of 
incidents in North American social research, in which such a presumed symmetry 
lead to poor social policy, she demonstrates how such a seemingly beneficial mode 
of developing ethics can, in fact, lead to a misinterpretation of the other's wants, 
needs and desires, which is then implemented in legislation and policy.379 Young 
gives an example of a survey conducted to determine the needs of people with 
disabilities with respect to their access to health fund rebates. The survey was 
conducted by asking able-bodied people how they would feel about certain 
situations if they were disabled and their responses were then used to determine 
policy which had practical effects upon people with disabilities. Rather than 
interviewing those with disabilities and hearing from them what they needed, the 
surveyors used the 'evidence' of how able-bodied people thought they would feel in 
order to develop policies that impacted upon those who actually lived with 
disabilities. The resulting legislation was ultimately found to be discriminatory to 
people with disabilities and was eventually overturned. However, what this 
example demonstrates is that it can be extremely difficult for a person to imagine 
what the lived-situation of another is like, especially if their world's are experienced 
very differently. 
Whilst the concept of reciprocity is important for Young's account of ethical 
relations, she argues that we must recognise the asymmetry of our own and the 
other's situation and take into account the fact that we each have different and 
particular histories and situations. Young' s argument has some alignment with de 
Beauvoir's assertion in The Ethics of Ambiguity that, rather than aiming for universal 
ethical norms, we should be attentive to particular individuals and recognise how 
they have come to be in complex situations. Attempting to develop 'universal' ethics 
37s Ibid, p38. 
379 For discussion see Young, pp41-42. 
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denies the importance of difference, and forgets that there is no such thing as a 
'neutral' universal man. 
Young argues that a successful theory of ethics, which recognises difference and 
particularity, requires recognition of asymmetrical reciprocity and she sees 
'reversibility' and 'symmetry' of perspectives to be concepts that impede the project 
of developing a theory of communicative ethics.380 On this view, attempting to 
adopt one another's standpoint is a mistaken move, which fails to recognise the 
impossibility of actually seeing things from the point of view of others and which 
masks the importance of difference. She posits the idea of asymmetrical reciprocity 
as an answer to this problem and emphasises a focus on particular history and social 
position, a recognition that reveals the relations between subjects to be asymmetrical 
and connected. Young argues that a "communicative theory of moral respect 
should distinguish between taking the perspective of other people into account, on 
the one hand, and imaginatively taking their positions, on the other".381 The 
emphasis in this instance is on 'dialogue' and 'understanding across difference' and 
it is crucial to recognise that this does not entail 'reversibility' or 'exchange'. This 
asymmetrical reciprocity has some synergies with de Beauvoir's account, which 
emphasises that we all share the common ambiguous situation of being at the same 
time self and other, but that in recognising the fundamental freedom that we share 
we must also recognise the practical and situational differences that separate us and 
make us unique and irreducible subjects. 
3so Young gives an analysis of the work of Seyla Benhabib on communicative ethics and 
argues that her own account of asymmetrical reciprocity has more to offer. The theory of 
communicative ethics comes from Jurgen Habermas' reformulation of Kantian Categorical 
Imperative. Habermas argued that the validity of norms must be justified intersubjectively -
that is in dialogue between individuals. Through communication, dialogue and argument 
we can come to an agreement on meaning and the validity of norms. Habermas uses the 
tools of "role taking" or "perspective exchange" in his theory of communication, and it is 
this that Young addresses in her argument that we cannot simply reverse roles to 
understand how it is for the other. See for discussion Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmyr 
(eds), The Communicative Ethics Controversy, MIT Press: Cambridge and Massachusetts, 1990. 
381 Young, Iris Marion, p39. 
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As we saw in chapters four and five, there is a very real risk entailed in trying to 
adopt another's standpoint: that is, the risk that the other loses their 'voice' and is 
spoken for by someone who does not understand their situation. Such examples of 
this loss of voice and 'speaking for' others have been demonstrated in colonial 
discourse and also historically in situations where dominant groups in a society 
speak for those who are denied the capacity to speak for themselves. In speaking for 
others the dominant group reinforces their own view of how the other feels, or of 
what life is like for the other, without actually listening to them. Young writes, 
"when asked to put themselves in the position of a person in a wheelchair, they [the 
able-bodied] do not imagine the point of view of others; rather, they project onto 
those others their own fears and fantasies about themselves".382 Young suggests a 
method of 'careful listening' as a solution, which enables sharing some 
understanding of aspects of each other's lives, but which does not equate to being 
able to take up another's standpoint. Careful listening actually requires recognition 
of the impossibility of reversibility, and, the recognition of ambiguity. 
A stance of 'respectful distance' is often what is required when one person or group 
attempts to understand another, and Young gives the example of indigenous 
peoples and the taking-up (or over) of their cultural practices by non-indigenous 
people who want to 'experience' indigenous life. As described in previous chapters, 
what is obscured in this attempt at taking up another's culture is the complex 
shared history that is integral to particular rituals and stories and, also, the risk of 
reification entailed in problematic accounts of cultural authenticity. Moreover, as 
was discussed in chapter four, this 'speaking for' can also be a problem for some 
feminists who, in seeking to ameliorate the position of particular groups of women, 
fail to recognise the differences in social position that may prevent them from 
understanding how it is for those other women. Ethnicity, age, economic status, 
ability etc. all play a part in marking the differences that distinguish women from 
each other - even though they may share some similarities in life experience and 
embodiment. 
38Z Ibid, p42. 
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Young makes several pertinent points against the idea that we must take the 
perspective of the other in moral decision-making processes, which are worth 
examining briefly here. Firstly, she argues that the concept of symmetry obscures 
difference. What she means by this is that (as we have seen above) there are many 
factors that combine to make a person's lived situation and many ways in which 
these factors can be interpreted. The fact that people share some common traits 
does not mean that each can be "exchanged" in a symmetrical relation for one 
another. Young argues that the idea of reversibility elicits a conception of reflection, 
mirroring, seeing oneself as another and vice versa. For her this attempt at seeing 
oneself as another supports "a conceptual projection of sameness ... at the expense of 
their differences".383 As we saw in the discussion of maternity and childbirth in 
chapter two, the 'fact' that women share the capacity to bear children does not mean 
that the experience of maternity, childbirth and parenting will be identical for all 
who take it up. We also saw in the discussion of indigenous identity that the 
assumption of 'authentic' Aboriginality also risks obscuring important differences 
that mark the lives of Aboriginal people. 
Secondly, Young argues that it is ontologically impossible to substitute one for 
another. Social positions depend upon relations and interactions and, Young argues, 
it is not possible to simply extricate one person from their particular situation and 
'slot' them into another and to retain each position as identical. We can see here a 
close link between Young's claim and de Beauvoir's argument that each subject is at 
once both subject and object in a complex relation and she emphasises the 
irreducibility of the self-other relation. The particular body that one has/is is also key 
here, as this is not something that is exchangeable, or as Merleau-Ponty terms, not 
something which can be 'moved away' from me. 
Thirdly, Young argues that politically undesirable consequences can arise from such 
attempts to exchange standpoints with others. Here we see the problem of 
hierarchies, top-down imperialism and oppression. There is always the risk of 
imposing or projecting our own desires, fears and beliefs upon others and, in trying 
383 Ibid, p44. 
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to speak for another, we run the risk of 'arrogating' another's view, which 
ultimately" ... threatens to violate or do away with it altogether".384 Again we see a 
correlation with de Beauvoir' s argument in The Second Sex that it is all too easy for 
the harem-owner to assert the happiness of his slaves in order to justify his own 
position (TSS, p 28). This final point is also demonstrated in political situations 
where one country or group justifies invading another on the grounds of "freeing" 
its inhabitants from 'backward' social practices. 
While Young concedes that some sort of reciprocal recognition is crucial to 
communication, she argues that reciprocal recognition (such as the reciprocity 
described in Hegel's account of self-other relations) actually precludes the possibility 
of reversibility of standpoints, rather than providing for it. This is because Hegel' s 
account of reciprocal self-other relations emphasises the constitution of each 
standpoint through its inter-relation with others. As de Beauvoir elaborates in The 
Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex, recognition of the interconnection between 
self and other, and the irreducibility of this ambiguous relation, is fundamental to 
developing authenticite. We must be able to recognise ourselves as being at the same 
time both self, (for ourselves) and other (for others) in relation to a particular 
situation. This self-other relation, and the tension that it implies, must be observed 
and preserved in ethical encounters - rather than denied as many traditional 
accounts have proposed. 
Young concedes that, in encounters with others, there is always the possibility for us 
to be carried 'beyond our immediate standpoint'; however we are not carried so far 
as to be in the standpoint of the other. A major problem with the concept of 
reversibility is that it neglects the importance of relation. Politically, for example, 
there exist relations of privilege and oppression, where a dominant group sets itself 
up in opposition and through the exclusion of those who are 'outside'. Therefore, 
the potential for a reversal of standpoints runs the very high risk of an unknowing 
misrepresentation of the other's situation. The idea that one can take on another's 
384 Ibid, p45 . 
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standpoint may actually prevent people listening to the other, because they already 
think they know how the other feels. 
On the other hand, if we begin with the "assumption that one cannot see things 
from the other person's perspective and [instead] wait to learn by listening to the 
other person to what extent they have had similar experiences", then we can adopt 
what Young terms a stance of 'moral humility'.385 Moral humility requires that we 
assume that there are many 'unknowns' and, therefore, that we must be open to 
careful listening in order to gain some understanding of what things are like for 
others. As Merleau-Ponty and de Beauvoir would describe it, we must "stand back" 
and suspend our assumptions in order to let the world be disclosed to us, to allow 
the 'upsurge' of the world in our encounters. 
Moral humility recognises that even if we were to 'trade places' with an other for a 
period of time, we are still not provided with access to their standpoint. This is 
because we are always aware that our 'day in the life of another' is limited and that 
we each have a different history and different relations to the world. What is 
required in ethical relations with others is a 'humble recognition' of the 'remainder' 
that comes with them (and with ourselves). Each of us has a situated history (or is a 
'situated totality' in more de Beauvoirian terms), which is not readily exchangeable 
and which alters our perceptions and experiences. Our religious background, our 
age, our sexuality and our familial relations, for example, all play a part in 
determining our world view. Attempting to speak for all Christians, all fifty year 
olds, or all heterosexual women fails to take into account many other diverse and 
important factors. Attempting to speak for humanity is by far the most reductive 
'standpoint' of all, which is why universal ethical principles which argue for the 
'good' of 'mankind' are so problematic. The key point here is that we must remain 
open to the other in our relations with them. We must strive to listen to how it is for 
them. 
3ss Ibid, p49. 
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Importantly, though, the concept of 'irreversibility' does not mean that we should 
cease trying to better understand one another and Young writes: 
... communication is sometimes a creative process in which the other person 
offers a new expression, and I understand it not because it fits with given 
paradigms, but because I am open and suspend my assumptions in order to 
listen.386 
By employing this phenomenological method we consciously suspend our 
assumptions in order to try to better understand our relationship to the world. 
People do, of course, share some aspects of experience in being human, however, 
these similarities are not enough to assume the possibility of symmetry. As 
Merleau-Ponty puts it, an approach based upon the notion of embodied, gestural 
communication, which proposes a shared world, or a shared horizon allows us to, at 
the same time, maintain an openness to the other. He writes in the Phenomenology of 
Perception: 
In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person 
and myself a common ground; my thought and his are inter-woven into a 
single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the 
state of the discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of 
which neither of us is the creator (PP, p413). 
He goes on to argue that "we coexist through a common world" and that "in the 
present dialogue, I am freed from myself, for the other person's thoughts are 
certainly his ... " (PP, p413). By overcoming the distinction between self and world, 
we are returned to the world through ambiguous embodiment so that we and the 
world are combined or co-existent. 
The account of asymmetrical reciprocity that Young puts forward is influenced at 
least in part by her readings of Emmanuel Levinas and Luce Irigaray. From them 
386 Ibid, p53. 
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she takes the idea of the 'remainder', of the 'in-between': that is the aspect of the 
relation between self and other, which cannot be surpassed. Levinas has been 
critical in his work of the (Western) philosophical tendency to attempt to reduce to 
the same or to assimilate experiences in order to attempt to know, grasp or 
understand the other. For him, the positions of each subject are irreducible and 
irreversible and each always retains an element of alterity.387 Levinas' onto-ethical 
stance is that we must respect this particularity and that it is impossible to go 
beyond this impasse. What we have here is a connection to the aporetic nature of 
ethical relations in the recognition that we cannot surpass the paradoxical 
(ambiguous) situation that is human existence. We share a common world, and 
common human traits, however each is irreducibly individual in our particular 
situation - which includes our complex connections to others. We cannot know all 
there is to know about the other, and we should accept this aspect of their otherness. 
Irigaray is also opposed to the argument (evident particularly in Descartes' 
philosophy) that value is, and should be, determined through investigation. She 
argues that we must 'welcome' what is unknown and foreign and that the way in 
which men and women should respond to each other, is with wonder,388 with a 
prejudicative openness to difference. In wonder, there is an acceptance of 
independence, difference and uniqueness in which the Other should be encountered 
and 'accepted in their irreducible alterity' .389 
A respectful stance of wonder, as described by Young and influenced by Irigaray 
and Levinas, requires asking the other for a description of how things are for them. 
This also entails recognition of the possibility of changes, new perspectives and 
experiences and, thus, the other is never fully 'comprehended' or understood and 
remains, at least in part, a mystery. 
387 Ibid, pSO. 
388 La Caze, Marguerite, 'The Encounter between Wonder and Generosity', Hypatia, 
Bloomington: Summer 2002, Vol. 17, Issue 3, p8. 
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LUCE IRIGARA Y: ON WONDER AND DIFFERENCE 
In her 1984 work, The Ethics of Sexual Difference, Irigaray argues that wonder 
provides an appropriate basis for an ethic of sexual difference. Here she challenges 
the idea that ethical subjects could be 'substituted' for one another and argues that 
sexual difference is the most basic and fundamental difference for human kind: 
To arrive at the constitution of an ethics of sexual difference, we must at least 
return to what is for Descartes the first passion: wonder. This passion is not 
opposed to, or in conflict with, anything else, and exists always as though for 
the first time. Man and woman, woman and man are therefore always 
meeting as though for the first time since they cannot stand in for one 
another. I shall never take the place of man, never will a man take mine. 
Whatever identifications are possible, one will never exactly fill the place of 
the other - the one is irreducible to the other. 390 
Irigaray' s argument that man and woman is the most "mysterious and creative 
couple" has created some resistance in feminist readings of her work, and 
understandably, accusations of heterosexual bias. Historically there has been 
significant debate over what has been read as essentialism in Irigaray' s work. Some 
argue that she sees women's bodies as having particular sexual capacities that have 
been repressed by patriarchy, whilst others argue that she uses essentialist language 
as a strategic move to undermine the oppression of the feminine. Later 
interpretations of her work have seen her as attempting to inscribe feminine 
attributes with a more positive interpretation in order to develop an ethics of sexual 
difference that celebrates rather than denigrates the feminine.391 I do not wish to 
engage at length with the debate over essentialism in Irigaray's work here, as it 
would be a divergence from the theme of this chapter. However, I do agree with 
390 Irigaray, Luce, The Irigaray Reader, Margaret Whitford (ed.), Blackwell, 1994, p171. 
391
• See Stone, Alison, The sex of nature: A reinterpretation of Irigaray's metaphysics and 
political thought, Hypatia, Summer 2003. Vol. 18, Iss. 3 for further discussion of the different 
readings of Irigaray. See also Schor, Naomi, 'This essentialism which is not one: Coming to 
grips with Irigaray', in Engaging with Irigaray: Feminist philosophy and modern European 
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both Marguerite La Caze and Iris Young, in that the account of wonder described by 
Irigaray does need to be extended so that it is applicable across all difference, 
including differences within 'each' sex (that is, within 'man' and 'woman'). 
Both Young and La Caze argue for an extension of Irigaray's application of wonder 
beyond sexual difference so that it is applied to encounters and relations between all 
others.392 A recognition of difference - which is based in wonder but which also has 
ambiguous freedom as its foundation - must go beyond sexual difference, so that 
the 'unknowable other' is not just "that which differs sexually from me" as Irigaray 
argues, but that which differs situationally from me.393 As we have seen throughout 
this thesis, the reduction to two such distinct and firm categories as sexed 'man' and 
sexed 'woman' does not allow for particular individual experience and results in a 
reification of the male and the masculine (in opposition to the female and feminine), 
which denies the possibility of vastly different male experiences. We saw this also in 
descriptions of the problems within identity politics that privilege certain aspects of 
one's being over others. Each ethical subject should be recognised as particular in 
their situation, with factors such as (but not exclusive to) sexuality, race, ethnicity, 
age, economic and social position and dis/ability playing vital roles in the ethical 
placement of an individual in a total situation. 
Irigaray correctly argues that women should not be understood on a male or 
'masculine' model. However, her account does not go far enough and should 
include the assertion that men should not be understood on a male or masculine 
model of humanity either. Neither 'sex' should be understood on such a 
supposedly universal or neutral model, nor should they be understood purely on a 
gendered model that is based upon sexual difference as the most crucial factor of a 
life. We should, rather, be understood on an ambiguous and situated model of 
human existence described by de Beauvoir. For Irigaray, an appropriate response 
between the sexes negates a reduction to the same and is based in openness and 
392 La Caze, Marguerite, 'The Encounter between Wonder and Generosity', plO. 
393 Irigaray, Luce, Elemental Passions, (Trans Joanne Collie & Judith Still) Routledge: New 
York, 1992. 
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recognition of alterity, "wonder cannot seize, possess or subdue such an object" and 
wonder provides for the 'desire' of the unknown.394 Extending wonder to human 
encounters acknowledges the fundamental freedom and ambiguity that is crucial to 
the account of authenticite offered in this thesis. 
GENEROSITY 
In her analysis of the appropriateness of wonder as the basis for an ethic, La Caze 
raises the question as to whether or not wonder alone is a rich enough concept to 
support an ethics. According to her argument, we need something more, in addition 
to wonder, to allow for such things as acceptance and respect. As Young notes, 
wonder alone runs the risk of exoticism and/or eventual contempt for the other and, 
for La Caze, 'generosity' towards others and oneself is necessary in order to prevent 
this. She writes: 
This concept of wonder is dangerous. It would not be difficult to use it to 
imagine the other person as exotic. One can interpret wonder as a kind of 
distant awe before the other that turns their transcendence into an inhuman 
inscrutability. Or wonder can become a kind of prurient curiosity. I can 
recognise my ignorance about the other person's experience and perspective 
and adopt a probing, investigative mode toward her. Both stances convert 
the openness of wonder into a dominative desire to know and master the 
other person395• 
It seems to me that the question to be raised here is, what happens after the initial 
response of wonder? What is the 'next step'? How do we respond to the other's 
alterity after wonder? Is there a risk of disdain, fear, hatred, indifference or 
contempt once we go past the initial response of wonder? In order to avoid this 
disdain or contempt, La Caze introduces Descartes' account of generosite 
(generosity), which she argues is wonder combined with love and rightful self-
regard. On her account, appropriate self-esteem leads to appropriate responses to 
394 Ibid, p172. 
395 Jbid, p56. 
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others and generosite involves seeing our own value and possession of free will for 
both our self and others.396 There are, of course, important differences between 
Descartes' account of free will and de Beauvoir's understanding of freedom from 
determination. Not the least of these is that Descartes' understanding presupposes a 
particular account of the subject - that is, a rational (disembodied) subject that exists 
'in separation' - as we saw in earlier chapters. As we have seen throughout this 
thesis, for de Beauvoir, our fundamental freedom does not preclude the importance 
of others to me, nor does it negate the significance of the situation in which I have 
become, which includes the significance of my particular body. 
Despite these differences, there are some important aspects in La Caze's 
interpretation of Descartes, which tie in with that of de Beauvoir. According to La 
Caze, generosite requires that we see that others are free in the same way that we are 
(we all have freedom from determination as a 'thing') and our aim should be to use 
(or 'take up') this freedom in a way that respects the freedom of others. The key 
point of the use of generosite to 'limit' wonder here is in allowing that we do share 
some similarities with others, if only at the most basic level of our fundamental 
freedom. 
For La Caze, generosity equals regarding others as having free will like ourselves, 
and wonder involves seeing others as different to ourselves. She argues that we need 
both for ethics and that generosity involves both a limit for wonder and a regard for 
what we share. Like Descartes, she cautions against 'wondering too much' as in this 
constant wondering lies the risk of the other being seen as alien or exotic (as Young 
also points out): 
Generosity can provide the limit which prevents wonder from falling over 
into exoticising, crass curiosity, or contempt because generosity is an 
acceptance of a fundamental sense in which we are all of worth, regardless 
of the differences which may exist.397 
396 La Caze, Marguerite, 'The Encounter Between Wonder and Generosity', pp 15-16. 
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Wonder prevents assumptions of sameness, allows for alterity, and prevents the 
idea of substituting one for the other. Generosity limits wonder by allowing for 
some similarity and for asserting that all have worth. For La Caze, wonder and 
generosity become attitudes rather than emotions. What this means is that we can 
cultivate wonder by refusing to reduce or "get to the bottom of" situations with 
which we are faced. Instead, we must recognise our own assumptions and describe 
our lived experience. We can cultivate wonder and form an attitude of generosity in 
the recognition and the willing assertion of ambiguity. 
The important point here is that we do not reduce the other to a thing by either 
denying their worth or by reifying it. As the examples of scientific desire to study 
the remains of Trugannini showed, such desires reduce the other to object and their 
inter-subjectivity is ignored. When Trugannini' s skeleton became the centre of a 
scientific debate, her situation was denied, her lived-experience as an Aboriginal 
woman in relation to both her own (pre-colonial) past and her encounters with the 
colonisers was forgotten and she was reduced to an artefact. 
Debra Bergoffen makes a similar point about the importance of maintaining 
openness and generosity in our encounters with others. She argues that de 
Beauvoir's account of ambiguity allows for alterity - so that the other is never fully 
known by us; there is always a part of the other that we cannot see, touch, 
understand/grasp: "the other, as other, is something strange, free, and forbidden" .398 
For Bergoffen, following de Beauvoir's lead, "the proper way to affirm the 
strangeness of the other is to allow their freedom to elude us - to renounce all forms 
of direction or possession, to forgo all projects".399 She argues that we must respect 
the strangeness of the other. We should not seek to possess, contain or own the other 
and must remain aware that they are not a solid entity ("X") but an ungraspable 
other in relation to us. We must allow the other their freedom. This 'allowing' is an 
398 Bergoffen, Debra, "Between the Ethical and the Political: The Difference of Ambiguity", in 
The Existential Phenomenology of Simone de Beauvoir, W. O'Brien and L. Embree (eds), Kluwer 
Academic Publishers: Netherlands, 2001, p191. 
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active decision and a continued effort to remain open to the other; to avoid trying to 
'grasp' or 'posses' the other while at the same time maintaining our connection to 
them. 
TWO-FOLD INTENTIONALITY 
In order to examine the potential for ethical relationships between ultimately free 
beings, Bergoffen seeks to explicate what she sees as a 'two-fold' intentionality in de 
Beauvoir's work. On this account, de Beauvoir's analysis of relationships shows us 
that consciousness is a relating activity which takes "two basic forms and expresses 
two different desires".400 Bergoffen describes this two-fold intentionality thus: 
Determining that this duality of conscious life is contesting but relational, 
[Beauvoir] allows for a subject that is singular rather than unified and refers 
to us as ambiguous rather than divided. Further, conceived of as 
intentionality, the ambiguous subject discovers that its boundaries are 
permeable. It is always in some sense outside itself; always in some sense 
toward the other/otherness; and always in some sense permeated with 
others/othemess.401 
What she describes here is the subject as connected irretrievably to others and 
situation, a self with 'permeable' boundaries, but nonetheless a 'self'. 
An important aim of this thesis has been to demonstrate that an ethics of ambiguity 
can be applied to current contemporary social and political situations, where 
conceptions of self and 'authenticity' prove to be limiting debates. I have tried to 
show that the ethical and political are connected in the sense that what underlies 
both is our conception of the self-others relation and that the way this relation is 
conceived impacts upon how we act in the world. 
Bergoffen, however, argues that there is a 'gap' between the ethical and the political 
which we should not rush to close and that The Ethics of Ambiguity is not just about 
400 Ibid, p189. 
401 Ibid. 
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distinguishing the legitimate from the illegitimate political project as some have 
argued. She argues that there is a difference between the existentialism described 
by de Beauvoir in The Ethics of Ambiguity and traditional existentialism, in that it 
describes a difference between political relationships and ethical relationships. 
Bergoffen argues that the political seeks the other's freedom in order to work on 
joint projects that strive for liberation, whereas the ethical seeks the freedom of the 
other without asking anything in return - the ethical relationship "asks nothing of 
the other's freedom".402 
What this means is that we can live our responsibility to the other in two ways: 
politically by engaging the other in joint projects that seek liberation, and ethically, 
by 'clearing the space for the other's lived freedom'. This two-fold intentionality can 
be described as follows. As beings inhabiting the world together we can be seen to 
share desires, conditions, goals and projects and that is what the political focuses on. 
Politics seeks to engage others in projects that aim toward a shared need or goal. 
Political freedom emphasises the roles that each of us play in ensuring that the 
conditions of freedom are met. Ethics, on the other hand, is about the way in which 
we live our "humanity in radically different ways. It attends to the ways in which 
we are, as other to each other, vulnerable to the other's desire to negate and/or 
assimilate our otherness".403 
So, as we saw in the previous chapters many forms of identity politics, in forgetting 
the original response of openness, attempt to assimilate the otherness of others in 
order to achieve political ends. These political ends are not, in themselves, 
illegitimate but they run the risk of being so if they negate the link between the 
original moment of openness, which allows for a strangeness that eludes us, by 
reducing the other to the same. Political projects seek a change, they want to make 
particular things happen, often to realise the conditions of freedom (variously 
interpreted), to achieve liberation, to overcome oppression. Whilst the political is 
informed by the ethical, Bergoffen argues that the two modes are distinct. The 
402 Ibid, p190. 
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political can be guided by the ethical but the ethical must come first as it is the 
original mode of response - the sense of 'wonder' at the other or the world. On 
Bergoffen's account, the political actions and decisions represent the second 
intentional moment, whereas ethical concerns pertain to the first intentional 
moment - the desire to disclose being, to let being be, to allow openness. On this 
understanding, the political can be legitimate or illegitimate depending on whether 
or not it is informed by the ethical. Those that seek mastery and who forget that 
meaning is disclosed in 'letting be' are perverse; these are the 'tyrants' who trick the 
oppressed into believing in their own inherent worthlessness by denying their 
ambiguity. 
Projects which reject the call of the first intentional moment are illegitimate, those 
that heed this call and attend to it are legitimate: but all projects are political because 
they desire to bring about meaning, change, an outcome. The ethical, however, "is 
identified with the desires of disclosure that refuse to impose a meaning on the 
world". Ethics, on such an account, is "a generosity marked by an aimlessness that 
is receptive to the unfolding that we call world".404 
In more 'Levinasian' terms, the ethical is about 'letting be' and keeping a space for 
the other's 'otherness' open. "Political acts take up projects. Ethical acts are gifts" 
according to Bergoffen. Ethical acts "express a generosity that asks nothing, neither 
recognition nor reciprocity, from the other, for as soon as something is asked, the 
other's vulnerability is compromised, its freedom is now caught up in the law of 
exchange" .405 
The call of the first intentional movement is to disclose being and Bergoffen 
conceives the ethical as a lived openness to the world. The ethical does not expect 
anything in return. Generosity is non-judgmental. Reciprocity and recognition then 
are not to be equated with the ethical - for both demand something of the other: 
404 Ibid, p 194. 
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As gifts, ethical acts are situated beyond/outside the political field of 
exchange, debt and accountability. Asking neither for reciprocity nor 
recognition - asking for nothing in return - these acts enact the desires that 
take delight in the otherness of the world and the other of freedom that 
eludes us. Guided by these generous desires, we do not move to transform 
the giveness of the "is" into the ideal of an "ought" .406 
The urging is to break away from the idea that reciprocity is necessary in order for 
an act to be ethical. For, as Bergoffen says, "the parent-child relationship is 
generous, not reciprocal" and we should not assume that relationships must be 
reciprocal in order to be ethical. Bergoffen argues that reciprocity and recognition 
have been privileged as masculine in patriarchy and that our bond with others has 
been equated with the feminine and, hence, seen as weak: 
Patriarchy has inverted the relationship between disclosure and possession. 
It sexes as male the secondary mode of transcendence associated with the 
desire to possess the world and privileges it as the original mark of the 
subject. It sexes as female the inaugural mode of transcendence associated 
with the desires of disclosure. It marks these desires as weak and passive 
and identifies them as the signature of the secondary, inessential Other.407 
In patriarchy, the demand for recognition is linked to violence and risk, for example, 
in Hegel's master-slave dialectic, which is a "battle to the death", even if in reality 
such an outcome is averted. Those who seek recognition in this way are associated 
with the masculine. However, if we understand our response to the world and to 
the other in terms of a two-fold intentionality, we can see that there is an original 
moment of intentionality for all of us that is characterised by "openness, 
relationship and joy". This is a human moment, not a feminine moment. Bergoffen 
argues that the meaning of humanity is perverted by patriarchy's division of human 
406 Ibid, p 194. 
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experience in which autonomy and independence are valued as the marks of the 
(masculine) subject and the valuing of the bond, generosity and the gift is associated 
with its feminisation, so that these moments of response are separated and given 
different value dependent upon who demonstrates them and in which context.408 De 
Beauvoir shows us that authenticite, on her terms, must acknowledge both 'modes' 
of our ambiguous being. 
AN AMBIGUOUS MARRIAGE? 
Bergoffen argues that de Beauvoir's phenomenological account of two-fold 
intentionality in The Ethics of Ambiguity is exemplified in the marriage (erotic) 
relationship. For Bergoffen, the couple demonstrate that they are at once private, 
individual beings in an intimate and erotic relationship and also, at the same time, 
they are subjectivities in a social and political world in which judgments must be 
made and actions taken. De Beauvoir's 'two-fold' subject is an instance of the way 
in which intentionality is experienced and lived in two distinct ways. Firstly, the 
initial or spontaneous facet of intentionality is the receiver of worldly input - this is 
the 'openness' to the world, to the other, that comes before judgement and prejudice 
and which is represented, for Bergoffen, in the intimate, erotic encounter. This 
'letting-be' is the disclosure of the world to consciousness, and is associated with 
wonder and a 'gift' to the other. 
The second aspect or facet of intentionality is the more practical, judgment-oriented, 
'meaning-making' role of consciousness, in which new experience and data is 
incorporated into past knowledge and understanding and with which new ideas, 
judgements and responses are made. Whilst it may seem that Bergoffen is 
proposing a dualistic account here, this is not the case; a philosophy of ambiguity 
stresses that each subject possesses (or is comprised of) both these intentional aspects 
and needs both to function ethically in the world. Both are crucial to our capacity to 
relate to others and the world and neither aspect is privileged over the other. 
Bergoffen describes marriage (or the relationship of the couple) as: 
408 Jbid, p198. 
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... the place where the desires of the erotic body and the demands of the 
body politic intersect and as alerting us to the fact that we will not have a 
politics of justice unless and until we attend to the ethical meanings and 
political implications of erotic desire.409 
Bergoffen's aim is to examine how State interactions with marriage reflect the 
ethical views of that State and the level to which ethics and the political are 
connected. Any political state that fails to recognise the two-fold character of the 
marriage relationship is, for Bergoffen, "perverting the erotic ethical meaning of 
marriage". This perversion occurs whether the state sees marriage as either an 
"exclusively political institution" or as an institution that is "irrelevant to the 
political" .410 She asserts that: 
Those societies that legitimate heterosexual desire [through legislation which 
only gives marriage rights to heterosexual couples] ... only recognise the 
desires of those couples they define as legitimate. Structurally then, the rule 
of authority continues to trump the voice of desire. Marriage's past 
continues to pervert its ethical and political meaning.411 
Bergoffen argues that an examination of intentionality, ambiguity and the erotic 
"point to crucial strains of Beauvoir's thinking and to ways of exploring the ethical 
and political meanings of marriage". As she suggests, two-fold intentionality, or 
ambiguous inter-subjectivity, provides an ethics that can move beyond dichotomous 
understandings of self-other relations and reveals the importance of our historical 
and temporal location to our accounts of ethics. For example, in her critique of the 
effects of patriarchal marriage on wives in The Second Sex, de Beauvoir writes: 
The fact is that every human existence involves transcendence and 
immanence at the same time; to go forward, each existence must be 
409 Bergoffen, Debra, 'Marriage, autonomy, and the feminine protest', Hypatia, Fall 1999, Vol. 
14, Issue 4, p3. 
410 Ibid. 
411 Ibid, p3. 
238 
maintained, for it to expand towards the future it must integrate the past, 
and while intercommunicating with others it should find self-confirmation. 
These two elements - maintenance and progression - are implied in any 
living activity ... (TSS, p 449). 
Here again we see the argument expressed in The Ethics of Ambiguity that the 
ambiguous nature of humanity is something to be recognised and worked with, 
rather than ignored or denied. For Bergoffen, the ethic of generosity, which she 
argues comes from recognition of ambiguity is " ... a possible ethic [only] for those 
men and women who understand that it is neither as men nor as women, but rather 
as ambiguously desiring, fleshed and embodied beings that they occupy the place of the 
subject".412 
De Beauvoir makes a similar claim in The Second Sex when she argues that: 
If love or desire evokes the full consent of both partners; the delight the 
lovers give and take in mutual recognition of their freedom is what lends 
strength and dignity to physical passion; under these circumstances nothing 
they do is degrading, since nothing is a matter of submission, everything is a 
matter of willing generosity (TSS, p 463, my emphasis). 
Therefore, for a relationship to be considered authentique on de Beauvoir' s account, 
we must first recognise our own and the other's fundamental freedom. With this 
comes the acknowledgement that marriage, sex roles and gender are all part of our 
ambiguous historical situation and have no inherent meaning other than that which 
has developed in socio-political context (for Bergoffen this would be the first 
intentionality and she associates this with the 'ethical'). Secondly, it is not enough 
that we recognise this freedom, but we must "take it up" and work to ensure others 
are able to live and express their freedom (this for Bergoffen would be the 'political' 
412 Bergoffen, Debra, "Between the Ethical and the Political: The Difference of Ambiguity", 
in The Existential Phenomenology of Simone de Beauvoir, W. O'Brien and L. Embree (eds), 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 2001, p 203, emphasis added. 
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aspect of meaning-making and judgment). A marriage relationship is, therefore, 
both ethical and political-it is 'two-fold'. 
Participants in a relationship must be free both ontologically and practically and 
have that freedom accepted at all times (ethically). This entails a free choice to enter 
and remain in a marriage/relationship, which is recognised as being an ongoing 
project. In The Second Sex de Beauvoir argues that marriage is a flawed principle 
due to the enforcement of necessity and demand upon what should be freely given 
actions. Here she is criticizing the inscription of value and removal of choice that 
came especially in traditional patriarchal accounts of the marriage relation which, 
for women of her time, also entailed a loss of independence and identity. Contrary 
to some interpretations, the desire to make such a commitment to another person is 
not inherently unethical and, as Bergoffen describes, such a commitment can 
actually represent the ethical assumption of our own and the other's freedom and 
our responsibility to them. The unethical aspect of marriage as an institution comes 
in ascribing it with inherent value and meaning, which, in actual fact has developed 
in a patriarchal and heterosexist context and which, thus depends upon the 
exclusions of others. Marriage, or committed relationships, are unethical when do 
not acknowledge the openness to the other of the first intentional moment, when 
they a lack a sense of wonder. 
As de Beauvoir writes in The Second Sex, there is potential for erotic relationships to 
be lived in freedom, based on a pure generosity, if those who participate in the 
relationship are free to engage authentically with their freedom: 
The couple should not be regarded as a unit...rather each individual should 
be integrated as such in society at large, where each (whether male or 
female) could flourish without and then attachments could be formed in pure 
generosity with another individual equally adapted to the group, attachments 
that would be founded upon the acknowledgement that both are free (TSS, p 
497, my emphasis). 
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The promise, the contract and the commitment of marriage would, then, have to be 
recognised for what they are; that is, concepts ascribed weight and given meaning 
within a particular historical context. Marriage would require a commitment to 
continually working to open the future to each partner and the limitations implied 
by marriage would have to be continually freely chosen by each. This does not 
mean that each partner does 'as they please' without thought of the other, because, 
recognition of ambiguous freedom entails recognition that what I do creates the 
situation in which the other must act. This would mean that marriage would be 
continually adapting and attempting to be open towards the future, and the 
responsibility of each not to 'close off' the future of the other would require 
continued recognition of the ultimate freedom of each. The concepts of 'wonder' 
and generosity would here come into play, and each partner would participate fully 
in both aspects of a two-fold intentionality, which would see openness and wonder 
toward the other at the same time as the need for 'meaning-making' and practical 
decision-making in interaction with the world. 
In her analysis of the various ways in which people respond to their freedom, de 
Beauvoir briefly discusses what she calls a 'generous passion'. A subject who takes 
up this attitude "accepts the distance that necessarily separates him from his 
beloved instead of trying to eliminate that distance" and, in doing so, he 
acknowledges "the loved one as another free subject" .413 She writes: 
It is only as something strange, forbidden, as something free, that the other is 
revealed as another. And to love him genuinely is to love him in his 
otherness and in that freedom by which he escapes ... One cannot love a pure 
thing in its independence and its separation, for the thing does not have 
positive independence ... Passion is converted to genuine freedom only if he 
destines his existence to other existences through the being - whether thing 
or man - at which he aims, without hoping to entrap it in the destiny of the in-
itself (TEA, p67). 
413 Arp, Kristana, The Bonds of Freedom: Simone de Beauvoir's Existential Ethics, Open Court: 
Chicago, 2001, p63. 
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As we have seen in previous chapters, one of the most crucial factors of de 
Beauvoir's account of ethical response is her insistence that we must not close off 
possibilities for other human freedoms; we must recognise the "bond of each man 
with all others" (TEA, p70) and we must not attempt to reduce them to things. So, if 
the passionate man fails to recognise freedom in its entirety and instead "seeks 
possession; he seeks to attain being" then he fails to be authentique because he " ... 
makes himself a lack of being not that there might be being, but in order to be" 
(TEA, pp 64-65). 
Passion itself is not the problem here though, and it is possible to have a generous 
passion that accepts freedom. De Beauvoir writes in Pyrrhus et Cineas that our 
actions should be guided by "a lucid generosity" and she (like Young) dismisses the 
notion of exchange, arguing that generosity is founded on freedom, and that to 
attempt to compensate someone for an act of generosity denies this freedom: 
A tip given in thanks for a generous act is insulting. It is a way of denying 
the act its freedom by supposing that it was not done freely, for nothing, but 
out of self-interest. Generosity wants and knows itself to be free and asks for 
nothing but to be recognized as such (PC, p124). 
Generosity then, tempers wonder, but is also influenced by the sense of openness to 
the other that wonder implies. Through generous acts we allow the other to be 
disclosed to us and, also, allow the other their freedom. We do not seek recognition 
for generosity and, in wonder, we do not seek to unearth or overcome the ambiguity 
of the other. Our relation with others is characterised by this tension, a desire to 
know and understand the other but also an acknowledgement that there is a 'gap' 
that we cannot overcome. It is our task, in order to be authentique, to maintain this 
tension and to acknowledge and affirm the ambiguity of self, of the other and the 
relation that holds between us. 
A key point of this thesis has been to demonstrate that ambiguity, which expresses 
our existence as irreducibly free and yet thoroughly situated beings, describes the 
ontological character of the world and that authenticite refers to the moral or ethical 
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"taking up" of this ambiguity in our encounters with others. Together ambiguity 
and authenticite, both of which require freedom, provide the basis for a 
contemporary ethics. That is, an ethics that allows us to celebrate both our freedom 
from inherent meaning and the significant meanings that exist in the world. 
The second part of this thesis, by focusing on an application of an ethics of 
ambiguity in socio-political settings, demonstrates that de Beauvoir' s philosophy 
can, and does, provide us with a means to move beyond the impasse described by 
some critics of existentialism. By acknowledging the significance of our ambiguous 
situation - material, social, historical and psychological - we are able to celebrate 
difference, to celebrate the things that we share with others, and yet to remain open 
to a future which is not yet defined. 
In opposition to those who have argued that existential freedom and ambiguity 
leave us with no basis for ethics - with a sense of despair or misery and absurdity 
that denies life - we can see that, in de Beauvoir's work (which is influenced by 
those such as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty as well as Hegel and Sartre), 
we are provided with a life-affirming ethics. This ethics does not deny the potential 
for violence, hatred and oppression - but it does deny that these are inevitable in all 
cases. It is up to each of us, together, to work toward a world in which generosity 
and joy are possibilities which can be taken up. As Barbara Andrew argues, when 
faced with the tragedy of human existence, de Beauvoir "... turns toward 
engagement and sees its possibilities as well as its dangers and potential failures. 
Her writing finds joy in moments of connection with others and the world, while it 
never forgets the potential oppression this connection may bring".414 
Furthermore, as de Beauvoir's account of ambiguity suggests, an attitude of 
wonder, which is tempered with a focus on generosity, allows the 'mystery' of the 
world and the mystery of the other to be revealed or disclosed, not as something to 
414 Andrew, Barbara, 'Beauvoir's place in philosophical thought', in Card, Claudia, (ed}, The 
Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, Cambridge University Press, 2003 pp 42-43. 
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be overcome, but as something to be maintained. It is wonder in the face of the 
ordinary that we can cultivate with a willing assumption of ambiguity: 
... while wonder may often be evoked by the self-evidently extraordinary, it 
may also arise out of the simple, sudden, immediate awareness of the 
existence of some thing; out of the recognition of the questionability, the 
strangeness, the wondrousness of things, and of our encounter with them, as 
it occurs in the most common and ordinary of ways.415 
As Nancy Bauer has argued, a strength of de Beauvoir's particular form of 
existential phenomenology is that, by returning us to the world, to an examination 
of what the 'mundane' offers us, it allows us to question the assumptions that 
underpin much traditional philosophy. By focusing on such questions as 'what does 
it mean to be a woman in this particular situation?' de Beauvoir shows us that 
philosophy must speak to our particularities and that sexed, raced, embodied being 
is key to understanding the meaning of human existence. Universal man 
demonstrates a failure to account for difference and, therefore, a failure to account 
for humanity. 
In order to act ethically, on de Beauvoir's terms, we must willingly assume our 
freedom, embrace our ambiguity and live the tension of our existence with 
authenticite. It is fitting to leave the final word to her: 
Every man casts himself into the world by making himself a lack of being; 
he thereby contributes to reinvesting it with human signification. He 
discloses it. And in this movement even the most outcast sometimes feels the 
joy of existing. They then manifest existence as a happiness and the world as 
a source of joy (TEA, p41). 
415 Malpas, Jeff, 'Beginning in Wonder', in Philosophical Romanticism, Nick Korpidis (ed.), 
Routledge: London, 2006, p 54. 
244 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission (Regional Council Election) Amendment Rules 2002 (No.2) 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Findings of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 18 
October 2002, Hobart Tasmania. 
Adorno, Theodore, The Jargon of Authenticity, Routledge: London, 2002. 
Alco££, Linda Martin, 'Philosophy Matters: A Review of Recent Work in Feminist 
.Philosophy', Signs, Vol. 25, No. 3, Spring, 2000, pp. 841-882. 
Altman, Meryl, 'Beauvoir, Hegel, War', in Hypatia, Vol. 22, no. 3, Summer 2007. 
Andrew, Barbara S, 'Care, Freedom and reciprocity in the ethics of Simone de 
Beauvoir', Philosophy Today, Celina, Fall 1998, Vol. 42, Issue 3, pp 290-301. 
Andrew, Barbara S, 'Beauvoir's place in philosophical thought', in The Cambridge 
Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, Card, Claudia, (ed.), Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2003. 
Appiah, Kwame Anthony, 'Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies 
and Social Reproduction', in Multiculturalism, Examining the Politics of Recognition, 
Amy Gutmann (ed.), Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1994, pp 149-63. 
Appiah, Kwame Anthony, The Ethics of Identity, Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, 2005. 
Arp, Kristana, 'Gendering the Perceiving Subject' in Feminist Phenomenology, Fisher 
and Embree (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht/Boston and London, 
2000. 
Arp, Kristana, The Bonds of Freedom: Simone de Beauvoir's Existential Ethics, Open 
Court: Chicago, 2001. 
245 
Arp, Kristana, 'Beauvoir as Situated Subject; The Ambiguities of Life in World War 
II France', in The Existential Phenomenology of Simone de Beauvoir, Wendy O'Brien 
and Lester Embree (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 2001, pp 175-
18. 
Bair, Deirdre, Simone de Beauvoir: A Biography, Vintage: Great Britain, 1991. 
Bauer, Nancy, 'The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Gendered Phenomenologies, 
Erotic Generosities/Sex and Existence: Simone de Beauvoir' s The Second Sex ... ' in 
Journal of the History of Philosophy, October 1999, Vol. 37, Issue 4. 
Bauer, Nancy, Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy and Feminism, Columbia University 
Press: New York, 2001. 
Bauer, Nancy, "Beauvoir's Heideggerian Ontology" in The Philosophy of Simone de 
Beauvoir: Critical Essays, Margaret Simons (ed.), Indiana University Press, 2006. 
Bayard, C & Bellous, J, 'Editor's Introduction', Philosophy Today, Vol 43, Summer 
1999. 
Beauvoir, Simone, de, Le Deuxieme Sexe, Les faits et les myths (Vol. I), Gallimard, 
1949. 
Beauvoir, Simone, de, Le Deuxieme Sexe, L'experience vecue (Vol II), Gallimard, 1949. 
Beauvoir, Simone. de, Force of Circumstance, (trans.) R. Howard, Andre Deutsch and 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, New York 1965. 
Beauvoir, Simone, de, Pyrrhus et Cineas, in Simone De Beauvoir: Philosophical Writings, 
Simons, Margaret A, with Marybeth Timmerman and Mary Beth Mader (eds.), 
University of Illinois Press: Urbana and Chicago, 2004. 
Beauvoir, Simone, de, Existentialism and Popular Wisdom, in Simone De Beauvoir: 
Philosophical Writings, Simons, Margaret A, with Marybeth Timmerman and Mary 
Beth Mader (eds.) University of Illinois Press: Urbana and Chicago, 2004. 
246 
Beauvoir, Simone, de, Review of the Phenomenology of Perception, in Simone De 
Beauvoir: Philosophical Writings, Simons, Margaret A, with Marybeth Timmerman 
and Mary Beth Mader (eds.), University of Illinois Press: Urbana and Chicago, 2004. 
Beauvoir, Simone, de, The Prime of Life, (trans.) Peter Green, World Publishing: 
Cleveland Ohio, 1962, Andre Deutsch and Weidenfield and Nicolson: London, 1965, 
intro. Toril Moi, (trans.) Peter Green, Paragon: New York, 1992 
Beauvoir, Simone, de, The Ethics of Ambiguity, (trans.) Bernard Frechtrnan, 
Philosophical Library: New York, 1948. 
Beauvoir, Simone, de, The Second Sex, (trans.) H.M. Parshley, Penguin Books: 
Harmondsworth, 1986. 
Beauvoir, Simone, de, What is Existentialism? in Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophical 
Writings, Simons, Margaret A, with Marybeth Timmerman and Mary Beth Mader 
(eds.), University of Illinois Press: Urbana and Chicago, 2004. 
Benhabib, Seyla and Fred Dallmyr (eds.), The Communicative Ethics Controversy, MIT 
Press: Cambridge and Massachusetts, 1990. 
Bendix, Regina, In Search of Authenticity: The Formation of Folklore Studies, University 
of Wisconsin Press: Madison, 1997. 
Bergoffen, Debra, 'Introduction to Pyrrhus et Cineas' in Simone de Beauvoir: 
Philosophical Writings, Simons et al (eds.) Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004. 
Bergoffen, Debra, 'Simone de Beauvoir: (Re)counting the sexual difference' in The 
Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, Claudia Card (ed.), Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2003. 
Bergoffen, Debra. 'From Husserl to Beauvoir: Gendering the Perceiving Subject' in 
Feminist Phenomenology, Fisher and Embree (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers: 
Dordrecht/Boston/London, 2000. 
247 
Bergoffen, Debra, 'Between the Ethical and the Political: the Difference of 
Ambiguity', in The Existential Phenomenology of Simone de Beauvoir, W. O'Brien and L. 
Embree (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers: Netherlands, 2001pp187-203. 
Bergoffen, Debra. 'Marriage, autonomy, and the feminine protest', Hypatia, Fall 
1999, Vol 14, Iss.4. 
Bergoffen, Debra, The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Gendered Phenomenologies, 
Erotic Generosities, SUNY Press: Albany, New York, 1997. 
Bergoffen, Debra 'Out from Under: Beauvoir's Philosophy of the Erotic' in Feminist 
Interpretations of Simone de Beauvoir, Simons, Margaret, (ed.), The Pennsylvania 
University Press: Pennsylvania, 1995, p185. 
Bernasconi, Robert, 'Almost Always More Than Philosophy Proper', Research in 
Phenomenology; Number 1, 2000, pp 1-11. 
Braddock, Matthew, 'A Critique of Simone de Beauvoir's Existential Ethics', 
Philosophy Today; Fall 2007; Vol. 51, 3; pp 303-311. 
Butler, Judith, Bodies That Matter: On The Discursive Limits of "Sex", Routledge: New 
York, 1993. 
Butler, Judith, 'Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire', Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity, Routledge: New York, 1990. 
Calhoun, Craig, (ed.) Social Theory and the Politics of Identity, Cambridge: Blackwell, 
1994. 
Card, Claudia, (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2003. 
Cataldi, Suzanne Laba, 'The body as a base for being: Simone de Beauvoir and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty', in The Existential Phenomenology of Simone de Beauvoir, 
O'Brien, Wendy & Embree, Lester (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordecht, 
2001. 
248 
Cerbone, David, Understanding Phenomenologi;, Acumen: Chesham, 2006. 
Colebrook, Claire, 'From Radical Representations to Corporeal Becomings: The 
Feminist Philosophy of Lloyd, Grosz and Gatens', Hypatia, Vol. 15, 2000, pp 76-93. 
Connolly, William, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, 
University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 2002. 
Cooper, David, Existentialism, Basil Blackwell: London, 1990. 
Cove, John J, What the Bones Say: Tasmanian Aborigines, Science, and Domination, 
McGill-Queen's Press, 1995. 
Daly, Mary, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism, The Women's Press, 
1978. 
Descartes, Rene, Discourse on Method and Meditations, Laurence J. Lafleur (trans.), 
The Liberal Arts Press: New York, 1960. 
Deutscher, Max, Genre and Void: Looking Back at Sartre and Beauvoir, Ashgate: 
Hampshire, 2003. 
Deutscher, Penelope, Yielding Gender: Feminism, deconstruction and the history of 
philosophy, London: Routledge, 1997. 
Deutscher, Penelope, 'Enemies and Reciprocities', MLN; Sep 2004; Vol. 119, p 656. 
Dillon, Martin, Merleau-Ponty's Ontologtj, Northwestern University Press: Illinois, 
1997 (Second Edition). 
Diprose, Rosalyn, "What Is (Feminist) Philosophy?" Hypatia, 15:2, 2000 
Diprose, Roslyn, Corporeal Generosity: On Giving with Nietszche, Merleau-Ponty and 
Levinas, Suny: Albany 2002. 
Fanon, Franz, Black Skin, White Masks, New York: Grove, 1967. 
249 
Fisher, Linda, 'Sexual difference, phenomenology, and alterity', Philosophy Today, 
Celina: 1999, Vol 43. 
Franklin, Jane (Lady), Tasmanian Archives: NS 279/2/4, Letter from Lady Jane 
Franklin to her sister, 14 February 1843. 
Fraser, Ian, 'Charles Taylor's Catholicism', Contemporary Political Theory, August 
2005. Vol. 4, Iss. 3; p 231. 
Fullbrook, Edward, & Fullbrook, Kate, Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre: The 
Remaking of a Twentieth-Century Legend, London: Harvester, 1993. 
Fusescu, Marina, Aboriginality in Tasmania, Issue brief 2000/3, September, 2000 
(Tasmanian Parliamentary Library Research Group). 
Gallagher, Shaun, 'The Hermeneutics of Ambiguity', in Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics 
and Post-Modernism, Thomas Busch and Shaun Gallagher (eds.), SUNY Press: New 
York, 1992. 
Gandhi, Leela, 'Postcolonialism and feminism', Postcolonial Theory: A Cultural 
Introduction, Allen and Unwin: Sydney, 1998. 
Gardiner-Garden, John, 'Defining Aboriginality in Australia, Current Issues Brief, 
no 10, 2002-03, Social Policy Group, 3 February 2003. 
Gatens, Moira, 'A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction', in Beyond Marxism? 
Interventions after Marx, Allen, J. and Patton, Paul. (eds.), Intervention Publications: 
Sydney, 1983. 
Gatens, Moira, 'Rousseau and Wollstonecraft: Nature vs. Reason', in, Women and 
Philosophy: Australian Journal of Philosophy, Thompson Janna L. (ed.) supplement to 
Vol. 64, 1986, pp 1-15. 
Gatens, Moira, 'Feminism, Philosophy and riddles without answers' in Feminist 
Challenges: Social and Political Theory, Pateman C. & Gross E. (eds.), Allen and Unwin, 
1986. 
250 
Gatens, Moira, Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on Equality and Difference, Polity 
Press: Cambridge, 1991. 
Gatens, Moira, 'Power, Bodies and Difference', in Destabilising Theory Barrett M. and 
Phillips A. (eds.), Polity Press: Cambridge, 1992. 
Gatens, Moira, Imaginary bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality, Routledge: London 
and New York, 1996. 
Gatens, Moira and Lloyd, Genevieve, Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present, 
Routledge: London and New York, 1999. 
Gatens, Moira, 'Feminism as "password": Re-thinking the "possible" with Spinoza 
and Deleuze', Hypatia, Spring 2000, Vol. 15, p 59. 
Gatens, Moira. 'Beauvoir and Biology: A Second Look', in The Cambridge Companion 
to Simone de Beauvoir, Claudia Card (ed.), Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
2003. 
Gatens, Moira, 'Can Human Rights Accommodate Women's Rights? Towards an 
Embodied Account of Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Cultural Change', 
Contemporary Political Theory, Dec 2004. Vol. 3, Iss 3; p 275. 
Glazer, Sarah,' A Second Sex', Artforum, New York, April/May 2007, Vol. 14, Issue 1, 
pp34-37. 
Godard, Barbra, 'Voicing Difference: The Literary Production of Native Women' in 
A Mazing Space: Writing Canadian Women Writing, Neuman and Kamboureli (eds.), 
Longpoon/Newest: Edmonton, 1986. 
Gothlin, Eva, 'Reading Simone de Beauvoir with Martin Heidegger', in The 
Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, Claudia Card (ed.), Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2003. 
Green, Karen, 'The other as another other', Hypatia; Vol. 17, 4, Fall 2002. 
251 
Grosz, Elizabeth, Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists, Allen and Unwin: NSW, 
1989. 
Grosz, Elizabeth, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism, Allen & Unwin: NSW, 
1994. 
Grosz, Elizabeth, Time, Space and Perversion: Essays on the Politics of Bodies, Routledge: 
New York, 1995. 
Heidegger, Martin, Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected "Problems" of "Logic", 
(trans.)Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer, Indiana University Press: 
Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994. 
Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, (trans) John Macquarie and Edward Robinson, 
Blackwell Publishing, 1962. 
Heidegger, Martin, Basic Writings, David Krell (ed.), Harper Collins: New York, 
1993. 
Heiniimaa, Sara. 'Simone de Beauvoir's phenomenology of sexual difference', 
Hypatia, Fall 1999, Vol. 14, Iss 4, pp 114-133. 
Heiniimaa, Sara, Toward a Phenomenology of Sexual Difference: Husser[, Merleau-Ponty, 
Beauvoir, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, Maryland, 2003. 
Heinamaa, Sara, 'The body as instrument and as expression', in The Cambridge 
Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, Claudia Card (ed.), Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2003. 
Heyes, Cressida, 'Identity Politics', in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2007 Edition), Edward N Zalta (ed.). 
Holland, Nancy J, 'Feminist Politics and The Human Situation: A Re-Reading of 
Merleau-Ponty', Philosophy Today; 2000; 49, 5, p 100. 
252 
Hooks, Bell, 'Feminism: A Movement to End Sexist Oppression', in Feminism and 
Equality: Readings in Social and Political Theory, Anne Phillips (ed.), New York 
University Press: New York, 1987. 
Hooks, Bell, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center, South End Press: Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 2000. 
Huggins, Jackie, 'A contemporary view of Aboriginal Women's relationship to the 
White Women's Movement', in Australian Women Contemporary Feminist Thought, 
Norma Grieve and Ailsa Burns (eds.), Oxford University Press: Melbourne, 1994. 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC), Commonwealth of 
Australia, Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families, Commissioner: R. 
Wilson, 1997. 
Irigaray, Luce, Elemental Passions (trans.) Joanne Collie and Judith Still Routledge: 
New York, 1992. 
Irigaray, Luce, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, (trans.) Carolyn Burke and Gillian Gill, 
Cornell University Press: Ithaca and New York, 1993. 
Irigaray, Luce, The Irigarary Reader, Margaret Whitford (ed.), Blackwell: Oxford, 
1994. 
Jagger, Alison, M. and Young, Iris Marion (eds.), A Companion to Feminist Philosophy, 
Blackwell: Oxford, 2000. 
Jay, Martin, 'Taking on the Stigma of Inauthenticity: Adorno's Critique of 
Genuiness', New German Critique 97; Vol. 33, No 1, Winter 2006, pplS-30. 
Johnson, Patrick E., Appropriating Blackness: Performance and the Politics of 
Authenticity, Duke University Press: Durham, London, 2003. 
Kirby, Vicki, Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal, Routledge: New York, 1997. 
253 
Kirby, Vicki. 'feminisms, reading, postmodernisms: Rethinking complicity', in 
Feminism and the Politics of Difference, Sneja Gunew and Anna Yeatman (eds.), Allen 
and Unwin: Sydney, 1993. 
Koori Consultants, Final Report of Community Consultation on Consultancy on 
Aboriginality in Tasmania, Koori Consultants Pty Ltd, February 1996. 
Kruks, Sonia, The Political Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, The Harvester Press: Sussex, 
1981. 
Kruks, Sonia, Situation and Human Existence: Freedom, Subjectivity and Society, Unwin 
Hyman: London, 1990. 
Kruks, Sonia, "Simone de Beauvoir: Teaching Sartre about Freedom", in Feminist 
Interpretations of Simone de Beauvoir, Simons, Margaret, (ed.), The Pennsylvania 
University Press: Pennsylvania, 1995. 
Kruks, Sonia, 'Fanon, Sartre and Identity Politics', in Fanon: A Critical Reader, Lewis 
Ricardo Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, Renee T. White, (eds.), Blackwell 
Publishing, 1996. 
Kruks, Sonia, Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics, 
Cornell University Press: Ithaca and New York, 2001. 
Kymlicka, Will, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, Oxford University 
Press: Oxford and New York, 2002 (2nd Ed). 
La Caze, Marguerite, 'The Encounter Between Wonder and Generosity', Hypatia, 
Summer 2002, Vol. 17, Iss 3. 
Lake, Marilyn, Getting Equal: A History of Australian Feminism, Allen and Unwin: 
NSW, 1999. 
Langer, Monika, 'Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty on Ambiguity', in The Cambridge 
Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, Card, Claudia, (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 
2003. 
254 
Le Deouff, Michelle, Hipparchia's Choice: An Essay Concerning Women, Philosophy, etc, 
(trans.) Trista Selous, Blackwell Publishing: Oxford and Cambridge, 1991. 
Levin, David Michael, 'Existentialism at the end of Modernity: Questioning the I's 
Eyes', Philosophy Today: Spring 1990; 34, 1. 
Lloyd, Genevieve, The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' m Western Philosophy, 
Routledge: London, 1993. 
Lloyd, Genevieve. 'No-One's Land: Australia and the Philosophical Imagination', 
Hypatia, Vol. 15, 2000, pp 26-39. 
Lundgren-Gothlin, Eva, Sex and Existence: Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex, 
Athlone Press: London, 1996. 
Lyshaug, Brenda, 'Authenticity and the Politics of Identity: A Critique of Charles 
Taylor's Politics of Recognition', in Contemporary Political Theory Avenel: Dec 2004. 
Vol 3, Iss. 3. 
Malpas, Jeff, 'Beginning in Wonder', in Nick Korprdis (ed) Philosophical Romanticism, 
Routledge: London, 2006. 
Marcuse, Herbert. 'Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre's L'Etre et le Neant' 
in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Mar. 1948, Vol. 8, No. 3. 
Marks, Jonathon, 'Misreading One's Sources: Charles Taylor's Rousseau' in 
American Journal of Political Science, January 2005, Vol. 49, No 1, pp 119-134. 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Primacy of Perception; and Other Essays on 
Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics, (trans.) 
James M Edie, Norwestern University Press: Evanston, 1964. 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes, 
(trans.) Alphonso Lingis, Northwestern University Press: Evanston, 1968. 
255 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Phenomenologtj of Perception, (trans.) Colin Smith, 
Routledge: London and New York, 2006 (originally published as Phenomenologie de 
la perception, Gallimard: Paris, 1945). 
Meyers, Diana, Self, Society, and Personal Choice, Columbia University Press: New 
York, 1989. 
Meyers, Diana, 'Feminist Perspectives on the Self', Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, first published June, 1999; substantive revision Jan 7, 2004 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-self/ 
Mai, Toril, Simone de Beauvoir: The making of an intellectual woman, Blackwell: Oxford, 
1994. 
Mai, Toril, 'While we wait: The English Translation of The Second Sex', Signs: 
Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Summer 2002, Vol 27, no. 4. 
Mai, Toril, 'It Changed My Life', in The Guardian, United Kingdom, January 2008 
Moore, John, Tom Haydon and Michael Mansell, Transcript, "The Last Tasmanian", 
ABC Monday Conference 279, 4/9/78. 
Moran, Anthony, 'White Australia, Settler Nationalism and Aboriginal 
Assimilation', Australian Journal of Politics and History: Volume 51, Number 2, 2005, 
pp. 168-193. 
Nicholson, Linda, (ed). The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory, Routledge: 
New York and London, 1997. 
O'Brien, Wendy and Embree, Lester (eds.), The Existential Phenomenology of Simone de 
Beauvoir, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordecht, 2001. 
Olkowski, Dorothea, and Weiss, Gail (eds.), Feminist Interpretations of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006. 
256 
Ortega, Mariana, 'Being Lovingly, Knowingly Ignorant: White Feminism and 
Women of Colar', Hypatia, Summer 2006. Vol. 21, Iss. 3. 
Oyama, Susan, Evolution's Eye: A System's View of the Biology/Culture Divide, Duke 
University Press: Durham and London, 2000. 
Pojman, Louis, Ethics: Discovering Right' and Wrong, Wadsworth Publishing 
Company: Belmont, California, 1990. 
Purdom, Judy, 'Connections', Hypatia, Spring 2000, Vol. 15, Issue 2, pp 18-26. 
Pybus, Cassandra, 'Mannalargenna's Daughters', Outback Heat, Vol. 15, 2000. 
Rachels, James, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (2nd Ed), McGraw-Hill: New York, 
1995. 
Read, Peter, Belonging: Australians, Place and Aboriginal Ownership, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2000. 
Reynolds, Henry, Fate of a Free People: A Radical Re-Examination of the Tasmanian 
Wars, Penguin Books Australia, 1995. 
Reynolds, Jack, "Maurice Merleau-Ponty", The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/m/merleau.htm, last accessed 11June2008. 
Reynolds, Jack, 'Merleau-Ponty, Levinas and the Alterity of the Other', Symposium: 
Journal of the Canadian Society for Hermeneutics and Postmodern Thought, Vol 6. Spring 
2002, pp 63-78. 
Reynolds, Jack, Understanding Existentialism, Acumen: Chesham, 2006. 
Robson, Lloyd, A History of Tasmania: Volume 1, Oxford University Press: Melbourne, 
1983. 
Rolls, Mitchell, 'The Making of "Our Place": Settler Australians, Cultural 
Appropriation, and the Quest for Home', antiTHESIS, Volume ten, 1999. 
257 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Reveries of the Solitary Walker, (trans. )Peter France, Penguin 
Books: London, 1979. 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Emile: or on Education, (trans.) Allan Bloom, Basic Books: 
New York, 1979. 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, (trans.) 
Victor Gourvitch, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1997. 
Ryan, Lyndal, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, (Second Edition), Allen & Unwin: St. 
Leonards, NSW, 1996. 
Salamon, Gayle, "The Place Where Life Hides Away": Merleau-Ponty, Fanon, and 
the Location of Bodily Being', Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 
Volume 17, Number 2, 2006. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 
Hazel Barnes (trans.), London: Routledge, 1994, first published in French in 1943. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul, Saint Genet: Actor or Martyr, (trans.) Bernard Frechtman, Braziller: 
New York, 1963. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul, Existentialism and Humanism, (trans.) Philip Mairet, Methuen: 
London, 1980. 
Scarth, Fredrika, The Other Within: Ethics, Politics and the Body in Simone de 
Beauvoir, Roman and Littlefield, 2004. 
Schor, Naomi, 'This essentialism which is not one: Coming to grips with Irigaray', in 
Engaging with Irigaray: Feminist philosophy and modern European thought, Carolyn 
Burke, Naomi Schor, and Margaret Whitford (eds.), Columbia University Press: 
Columbia, 1994. 
Schrift, Alan, 'Judith Butler: Une Nouvelle existentialiste?', Philosophy Today, Spring 
2001, Vol. 45, Iss.l, pp 12-23. 
258 
Secomb, Linnell, 'Beauvoir's Minoritarian Philosophy', Hypatia, Vol. 14 (4), 1999, pp 
96-113. 
Sherman, David , 'Sartre, critical theory and the Paradox of Freedom' in Philosophy 
Today, Summer 2006, Vol. 50, Iss. 2, pp198-213. 
Short, Damien, 'Reconciliation, Assimilation, and the Indigenous Peoples of 
Australia', International Political Science Review I Revue internationale de science 
politique, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Oct. 2003), pp. 491-513. 
Simons, Margaret, (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of Simone de Beauvoir, The 
Pennsylvania University Press: Pennsylvania, 1995. 
Simons, Margaret, 'An appeal to re-open the question of influence', Philosophy 
Today, Vol.42, 1998, pp 17-25. 
Simons, Margaret, 'The Beginnings of Beauvoir's Existential Phenomenology', in The 
Existential Phenomenology of Simone de Beauvoir, O'Brien and Embree (eds.), Kluwer 
Academic Publishers: Dordecht, 2001. 
Simons, Margaret, with Marybeth Timmerman and Mary Beth Mader (eds.), Simone 
De Beauvoir: Philosophical Writings, University of Illinois Press: Urbana and Chicago, 
2004. 
Smallacombe, Sonia., 'On Display for its Aesthetic Beauty: How Western 
Institutions Fabricate Knowledge about Aboriginal Cultural Heritage', Political 
Theory and The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Ivison, Patton & Sanders (eds.) 
Cambridge University Press: Oakleigh, 2000. 
Snitow, Ann, 'A Gender Diary', in Conflicts in Feminism, Marian Hirsch and Evelyn 
Fox-Keller (eds.), Routledge: New York and London, 1990. 
Spelman, Elizabeth, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought, 
Beacon Press: Massachusetts, 1988. 
259 
Stasiulis, Daiva, 'Authentic Voice: Anti-racist politics in Canadian feminist 
publishing and literary production' in Feminism and the Politics of Difference, Sneja 
Gunew and Anna Yeabnan (eds.), Allen and Unwin: Australia, 1993, pp 35-60. 
Stewart, Jon (ed.), The Debate Between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Northwestern 
University Press: Evanston, 1998, pp448-491. 
Stone, Alison, 'The sex of nature: A reinterpretation of Irigaray's metaphysics and 
political thought', Hypatia, Summer 2003. Vol. 18, Iss. 3. 
Stoller, Sylvia, 'Reflections on Feminist Merleau-Ponty Skepticism', Hypatia, Winter 
2000. 
Sullivan, Shannon, 'Domination and Dialogue in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology 
of Perception', Hypatia; Winter 1997. 
Sullivan, Shannon, 'Feminism and Phenomenology: A reply to Silvia Stoller', 
Hypatia, Winter 2000. 
Tapper, Marion, 'Can a Feminist be a Liberal?' Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 
Supplement to Vol 64, June 1986. 
Taylor, Charles, The Ethics of Authenticity, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 
MA, 1991. 
Taylor, Charles, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1985. 
Taylor, Charles, A Catholic Modernity? Charles Taylor's Marianist Award Lecture, 
edited and introduction by James L. Heft, Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Taylor, Charles, Sources of the Self the Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1989. 
Taylor, Charles, 'The Politics of Recognition', in New Contexts of Canadian Criticism, 
Ajay Heble et al (eds.), Broadview Press: Canada, 1997. 
260 
Tidd, Ursula, 'The Self-other relation in Beauvoir's ethics and autobiography' 
Hypatia; Vol. 14, 4, Fall 1999. 
Toadvine, Ted, 'Naturalizing Phenomenology', Philosophy Today, Vol. 43, 1999, pp 
124-131. 
Tollefsen, Deborah, 'Princess Elisabeth and the problem of mind-body interaction', 
Hypatia, Summer, 1999, Vol. 13. Issue 3. 
Tuana, Nancy, 'Re-Fusing Nature/Nurture', reprinted in Hypatia Reborn: Essays in 
Feminist Philosophy, A.Y. al-Hibri and Margaret Simons (eds.), Indiana University 
Press: Bloomington & Indianapolis, 1990, pp 70-89. 
Veltman, Andrea, 'The Sisyphean Torture of Housework: Simone de Beauvoir and 
Inequitable Divisions of Domestic Work in Marriage, Hypatia, Summer 2004, Vol 19. 
Vintges, Karen, Philosophy as Passion: The Thinking of Simone de Beauvoir, Indiana 
University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1996. 
Vintges, Karen, 'Simone de Beauvoir: A Feminist Thinker of Our Times', Hypatia, 
Fall 1999, Vol. 14, no 4. 
Walsh, Mary, 'Twenty years since "a critique of the sex/gender distinction": a 
conversation with Moira Gatens', Australian Feminist Studies, Vol. 19, Number 44, 
July 2004, pp. 213-224. 
Ward, Julie K, 'Reciprocity and friendship in Beauvoir's thought', Hypatia, Fall 1999, 
Vol. 14, 4. 
Weiss, Gail, 'Context and Perspective' in Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics and Post-
Modernism, Thomas Busch and Shaun Gallagher (eds.), SUNY Press: New York, 
1992. 
Weiss, Gail, 'The Anonymous Intentions of Transactional Bodies', Hypatia, Vol. 17, 4, 
Fall 2002, pp 187-202 .. 
261 
Weiss, Gale, 'Simone de Beauvoir: An Existential-Phenomenological Ethics', in 
Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy, Drummond & Embree (eds.), 
Kluwer Academic Publishers: Netherlands, 2002. 
Weiss, Gail, 'Introduction to The Ethics of Ambiguity', in Simone De Beauvoir: 
Philosophical Writings, Simons et al (eds.), University of Illinois Press: Urbana and 
Chicago, 2004. 
Weiss, Gail,' Ambiguity', in Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts, Rosalyn Diprose and Jack 
Reynolds (eds.), Acumen Publishing: Chesham, 2008. 
Whiteside, Kerry. H., 'Review of Situation and Human Existence: Freedom, 
Subjectivity, and Society by Sonia Kruks', in The Review of Politics, Vol. 53. No. 3, 
Summer, 1991. 
Whitford, Margaret, Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Sartre's Philosophy, French Forum 
Publishers: Lexington and Kentucky, 1982. 
Windschuttle, Keith, The Fabrication of Aboriginal History: Vol. 1, Van Diemen's Land, 
1803-1847, Macleay Press: Sydney 2002. 
Wollstonecraft, Mary, A Vindication of the Rights of Women, Norton, 1967. 
Young, Iris Marion, 'Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder and 
Enlarged Thought', in Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of Gender, Political Philosophy and 
Policy, Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1997. 
Young, Iris Marion, 'Reflections on Families in the Age of Murphy Brown: On 
Justice, Gender and Sexuality' in Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of Gender, Political 
Philosophy and Policy, Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1997. 
Young, Iris Marion, 'Lived Body vs. Gender: Reflections on Social Structure and 
Subjectivity', in The Philosophy of The Body, Proudfoot, M (ed.), Blackwell Publishing: 
Oxford, 2003. 
262 
/' \ 
Yount, Mark, 'Two Reversibilities: Merleau-Ponty and Derrida', in Merleau-Ponty, 
Hermeneutics and Post-Modernism, Thomas Busch and Shaun Gallagher (eds.), SUNY 
Press: New York, 1992. 
Zerilli, Linda, 'A Process without a Subject: Simone de Beauvoir and Julia Kristeva 
on Maternity', Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 1992, Vol 18, no. 1 
263 
